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This study contributes to the understanding of liquidity in two ways. First, it considers the 
multifaceted nature of liquidity and its relationship with money. Second, it constructs a 
conceptual framework for a theory of liquidity. The first contribution is achieved by 
clarifying and categorising the various forms of liquidity to identify those overlooked by 
the existing literature. The second contribution consists of a realist critique of the literature 
on liquidity and money to highlight the strengths and weaknesses of each theoretical 
approach. The study reflects on the attempts to analyse liquidity using moneyless models 
of perfect barter with the assumption that every commodity exhibits perfect saleability; an 
assumption that removes any need for a medium of exchange and, moreover, crowds out 
all other forms of liquidity. It is concluded that, because liquidity is a social and monetary 
phenomenon, it cannot be analysed with models populated by a representative agent 
consuming a single commodity. Furthermore, this conclusion is not altered by the 
introduction of ‘financial frictions’, which are fundamentally at odds with the nature of 
money. Instead, the clarification of the nature of liquidity forms the basis for an 
interpretation of Keynes’s theory of liquidity preference that emphasises its reliance on 
liquidity in general, not money in particular. The study introduces the terms redemption 
liquidity and exchange liquidity to explain the trade-off that underpins the theory of 
liquidity preference. Properly interpreted, the theory of liquidity preference can then 
address many of the deficiencies prevalent in the dominant theories of the rate of interest. 
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Part I Introduction 
The aim of this research is to contribute to the understanding of the role of liquidity in 
monetary theory and asset pricing. Problems arise when analysing a monetary economy 
using the orthodox academic approach: general equilibrium models, being perfect barter, 
have no fundamental place for money. Since all goods can be readily traded against other 
goods, money, rather than providing a means for efficient exchange, is entirely 
unnecessary. Instead, creating a role for money requires introducing it as a friction—the 
opposite of its observed value to society. Similarly, liquidity—how easily goods can be 
bought and sold—has no place. To understand the effects of liquidity, and the observed 
periods of dysfunction when it is missing, requires that money take a realistic place in the 
theoretical structure. Only then will policy responses to episodes like the Global Financial 






Historically monetary theory has developed along many disconnected lines, with vastly 
different views on such issues as: the effect of money on the real economy; whether money 
is best analysed as a medium of exchange or a store of value; whether the money stock is 
under the control of the central authorities or expands to meet the needs of trade; or whether 
it is interest rates or the stock of money itself that has the primary monetary effect on 
economic activity. 
Before the GFC, the prevailing orthodox opinion of both practitioners and academics was 
that the development of the so-called ‘Shadow Banking’ system1 was beneficial due to its 
ability to accelerate risk sharing. In this view, shadow banking, money-market funding, and 
securitisation2 were innovations that enabled progress toward the ideal of frictionless 
markets, in which all resources are allocated efficiently and optimally. Asset pricing, which 
aims to ‘understand the prices or values of claims to uncertain payments’ (Cochrane, 2005b, 
p. xiii), also uses this same frictionless, ideal world of complete markets which allows all 
contingencies to be insured. Assuming a set of financial securities that covers all future 
outcomes allows for a tractable solution to the problem of pricing financial options and 
other exotic derivatives. A fundamental, underlying assumption is that unlimited amounts 
of all assets can be traded at equilibrium market prices—in other words, perfect liquidity 
(Nesvetailova, 2010; Mehrling, 2011). 
Much has been written in an attempt to identify the causes of the GFC: from a global saving 
surplus to the testosterone levels in bank traders (Davies, 2010; Rajan, 2010). Liquidity has 
also been identified as a chief contributor: as traditional banking, with established practices 
for liquidity management from Bagehot (1873), evolved into the shadow banking system 
(Mehrling, Pozsar, Sweeney, & Neilson, 2013), the familiar concepts of liquid reserves and 
                                                         
1 Shadow Banking consists of bank-like activities performed by non-banks, well defined as ‘money market 
funding of capital market lending’ (Mehrling et al., 2013, p. 2). 
2 Securitisation is a financial technique for the bundling and selling of otherwise-illiquid assets.  
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equity-capital buffers were replaced by security repurchase (‘repo’) agreements3 and credit 
default swaps4, respectively (Mehrling, 2011). Despite some agreement that the ‘recent 
crisis, we all know, was characterized by massive illiquidity’ (Tirole, 2011, p. 287), no 
settled agreement on its cause, or causes, exists (Jefferis, 2017). For example, Gorton and 
Metrick (2012) consider the GFC to be akin to a classic bank run in the shadow banking 
system and the repo market in particular, an assessment rejected by Michell (2017) as 
having both analytical and empirical difficulties. This confusion extends into theory: ‘When 
central bankers discussed liquidity in 2008, they found a neglected territory full of the ruins 
of old conceptual structures that were not quite inhabitable’ (Beggs, 2012, p. 1). 
The collapse of the Long-Term Capital Management, a highly leveraged hedge fund, 
(Lowenstein, 2001) and the GFC, both events where liquidity suddenly vanished, have 
exposed the effects that a breach of the assumed perfect-liquidity conditions can have on 
both the financial system and the macro-economy. At the other extreme, post-GFC, many 
central banks worldwide have conducted enhanced open-market operations (OMO)5 known 
as ‘quantitative easing’ (QE) which go far beyond simply reversing the liquidity shortage 
which contributed to the crisis. Naturally, this initiative has produced a variety of responses 
as to its efficacy and predicted effects that reflect the diverse schools of monetary theory 
(Kregel, 2014; Woodford, 2012). 
There is a dissonance: liquidity abundance is needed for financial arbitrage and asset 
pricing, but liquidity scarcity is needed for price-level determinacy in macroeconomics. 
Liquidity is often conceptualised as a friction preventing an ideal state of pure exchange, 
rather than a social benefit created by intermediaries. There is merit in the view that money 
is not just a special commodity used until the barriers to perfect liquidity are removed; it is 
a particular form of intermediated wealth claim. Liquidity in general and money in 
particular are created in response to uncertainty. Although there cannot be an excess of 
                                                         
3 A repo is a collateralised loan involving a contractual sale and subsequent repurchase of a security, often 
for as short a period as one day. It provides a low-risk form of very liquid investment for large corporations. 
4 A CDS is a fixed, periodic premium made in exchange for a contingent payment in the event that a named, 
third-party defaults or restructures its debt. 
5 QE/OMO is the purchase of financial assets, generally government bonds, by the central bank with newly 
produced central-bank money. 
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liquidity, since asset prices adjust to the amount that is created, it may well disappear when 
it is most needed.  
The distinction between scarce and abundant liquidity is arbitrary and misleading. Liquidity 
should not be considered a friction preventing pure exchange, but as a social phenomenon 
enabling economic agents to cope with uncertainty. As such, its existence is socially 
beneficial. In brief, liquidity, in various ill-defined and possibly conflicting forms, is 
recognised as empirically significant in asset pricing, but its theoretical significance is 
disputed and poorly understood and warrants further study and theoretical analysis. 
1.2 The Research Questions 
In the context of the problems identified in Section 1.1, the following two research 
questions have been posed:  
1. What is the relationship between liquidity and money in the economics and finance 
literature and why is this relationship flawed?  
2. How can the theory of liquidity be conceptualised in a framework to guide future research 
on liquidity? 
1.3 Significance of the Research 
Mainstream monetary theory and general equilibrium asset-pricing theory are both 
constructed on the assumption of perfect and unlimited liquidity. As Long-Term Capital 
Management and the GFC have shown, however, a shortage of liquidity can have a 
potentially disruptive effect on the real economy. Liquidity is subject to the classic fallacy 
of composition—it is not available when everyone needs it. 
This research aims to develop a deeper understanding of liquidity and money and to provide 
a more realistic framework for evaluating their fundamental causal relationships. This 
understanding could have policy implications, especially in relation to answering the 
question of how to construct financial regulations to ensure robustness and prevent financial 
instability. There needs to be a separate theory of liquidity since ‘it is essential to take 
liquidity into account in order to discuss any money prices’ (Townshend, 1937, p. 161). 
The relationship between liquidity and money still remains an open question. 
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1.4 Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis is structured in five parts. Part I continues with Chapter 2 which details the 
methodology and research method, so chosen to emphasise the realism of the framework. 
The importance of developing a framework as closely aligned with reality as possible is 
due to the desire to provide explanations, undercover causality and hence policy 
implications that are relevant to the world we actually inhabit. Due to the specifications of 
Chapter 2, an ontological reflection of money, liquidity and banking is conducted in Part 
II. Part III and Part IV survey the literature associated with Real Analysis and Monetary 
Analysis, respectively. Existing theories are examined for their realism and historical 
accuracy; theories based on ‘as if’ assumptions and purely deductive methodologies chosen 
for their convenience are rejected. In Part V, a conceptual framework is presented based on 
a synthesis of the theoretical elements consistent with the research method. The conceptual 
framework is then used to address the research questions. Chapter 11 concludes by 
discussing limitations and implications. 
1.5 Summary 
The conceptual dissonance evident in the literature on liquidity demands that the 
ontological foundations of the existing theories are uncovered and assessed for their 
realism. The identification of the causal mechanisms associated with liquidity require a 
research method grounded in realism, which provides the basis for an immanent critique 
and revision of existing theories to align better with both the ontology of liquidity and 
money, and empirical evidence. The result is a clarification of the relationship between 
liquidity and money and the construction of a conceptual framework for a theory of money. 
An outline of the framework and its application to questions of policy and implications for 
future research are given in Chapter 11. The next chapter outlines the methodology and 






2 Methodology and Method 
2.1 Introduction 
One aim of this study is to address the explanatory failure evident in modern economics 
(Lawson, 2015, p. 3), especially in relation to the GFC. Since this failure is as much one of 
methodology as it is of theorising, it is necessary at this point to discuss the methodology 
and method used in this study and justify their selection. 
The many theories of liquidity and money extant in the literature exhibit varying degrees 
of correspondence with reality and power to explain observed events. It is important, 
therefore, to adopt research methods that can form a basis for assessing their competing 
claims. This assessment should be based on each theory’s ability to interpret the real world 
and its usefulness in forming policy statements. Since the aim of the research is to build a 
conceptual framework for liquidity, the realism of the framework is crucial, as is the 
identification of the fundamental causal links between liquidity and money. The dissonant 
views of liquidity and money lead directly to the importance of realism in the research 
methodology. 
The general equilibrium literature, in which money is a friction, does not satisfy this 
criterion of realism. Instead of an axiomatic deductive methodology with ‘as if’ 
assumptions, the realism of the assumptions needs to be verified. Similarly, since money is 
a social phenomenon, reductionism and methodological individualism are also 
inappropriate—the system must be considered as being more than simply the sum of its 
parts. The identification of causal elements requires explanation of the underlying 
processes, so that instrumentalism, which judges itself via predictive ability alone, is 
uninformative. The nature of the study also involves unobservable phenomena, such as 
expected returns, suggesting that positivism, in which only the directly observed is 
classified as knowledge, is also unsuitable (Boumans & Davis, 2010). Finally, the emphasis 
on uncertainty, with the associated rejection of Rational Expectations, suggests that a 
suitable research methodology needs to recognise the complexity and dynamic nature of 
the underlying economic processes. 
2.2 Critical Realism 
Critical realism is a research methodology which focuses on causality and the interplay 
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between reality as it is perceived by the researcher, the analytical framework developed by 
the researcher, and the descriptive explanations provided by this framework. Reality is 
assumed to be independent of the researcher, thereby making it possible to uncover causal 
mechanisms (Elsner, Heinrich, & Schwardt, 2014, p. 543). Thus realism ‘asserts that the 
ultimate objects of scientific investigation exist for the most part quite independent of, or 
at least prior to, their investigation’ (Lawson, 1997, p. 15). 
Social phenomena are, by nature, ‘intrinsically-meaningful’ or ‘context-dependent’ (Sayer, 
1992, p. 29). Although the descriptions of the object under study are not the phenomena 
themselves, in a social context the nature of object can be affected by the description and 
meaning given to it. For example, money is concept-dependent: 
Money, and the institutions and practices associated with it, are extremely 
important in our society (“money makes the world go round!”). A necessary 
condition of the use of money is that users should have some understanding of what 
the act of exchanging little metal discs and specially printed pieces of paper for 
commodities means or “stands for”. The users must have some concept of money 
and also of related phenomena such as rights of ownership, exchange, etc. Hence 
these social phenomena are “concept-dependent”. (Sayer, 1992, p. 30) 
It is important to distinguish between the physical behaviour and the meaning of the actions 
under observation: 
In the case of using money, we could observe the physical behaviour of handing 
over the little metal discs until the cows came home and we could use every 
statistical technique in the book to process our observational data, yet if we didn’t 
know the meanings on which the use of money is dependent in the society under 
study, we would still not have any idea of what was actually happening, or what 
kind of ‘action’ it was. (Sayer, 1992, p. 31) 
Because of the concept-dependent nature of social objects, it is important to understand, 
not only the object under study, but also society’s understanding of the object: ‘in order to 
understand and explain social phenomena, we cannot avoid evaluating and criticizing 
societies’ own self-understanding’ (Sayer, 1992, p. 39, original emphasis). In this way, false 
ideas held by agents can be identified as such, even if they form part of the ‘common-sense 
knowledge’ (Sayer, 1992, p. 41). 
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Therefore, the investigation must begin with an ‘ontological reflection’ (Jespersen, 2009, 
p. 65), whereby the characteristics of the research subject are identified. Both theorising 
and the development of knowledge ‘require us to “explicate” problematic concepts; that is, 
give concise definitions to important but vaguely understood terms through re-working 
their relations with other terms in the network’ (Sayer, 1992, p. 81). In the present context, 
we could postulate that liquidity is one of the ‘cases where there are so many competing 
explications of particularly difficult concepts that it becomes uncertain whether we are still 
talking about the same thing’ (Sayer, 1992, p. 82). 
‘Liquidity’ is a term that has strong metaphorical associations, which have the potential to 
distort the nature of the observations of liquidity. Theories in the nature of instrumental 
ordering frameworks ignore ‘conceptual problems’ or ‘problems of meaning’, as do 
deductive mathematical models, which are ‘developed and discussed in abstraction from 
any reference to the real world’ (Sayer, 1992, p. 64). Worse still, ‘modern economists end 
up distorting social phenomena just to render them open to treatment by their chosen 
approach’ (Lawson, 2015, p. 122). This distortion of concepts is especially visible in the 
literature on liquidity, in which it is often analysed by mathematical models with unrealistic 
assumptions that deduce insights into the behaviour of phenomena that bear little 
resemblance to more realistic ontological conceptions of liquidity or money. 
Much of the literature on liquidity consists of attempts to measure it empirically. These 
measures and statistical analyses often result in statements of behavioural ‘facts’, made 
without allowing for the possibility that the interpretation of data effects the gathering of 
data. This sharp distinction between facts and theory reflects an inappropriate, theory-
neutral view of data, a form of ‘naive objectivism’ (Sayer, 1992, p. 45), which fails to 
recognise the interpretation required in the gathering process itself. Realism instead 
categorises empirical facts as ‘thought objects’ to avoid confusing them with the ‘real 
objects’ to which they refer (Sayer, 1992, p. 47). The perception of the data is concept-
dependent, so that observations are ‘conceptually-mediated’ or ‘conceptually-saturated’ 
(Sayer, 1992, p. 54). Care is particularly important in a study of liquidity and money since 
these concepts are so enmeshed with people’s beliefs about them. The phenomena of 
liquidity and money are, in many respects, simply concepts themselves, and observations 
of their behaviour will be intertwined with the public’s understanding of what they are. We 
must be careful to think about the hidden concepts, not just with them (Sayer, 1992, p. 52). 
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Ultimately the research method chosen, if it is to provide policy guidance relevant to the 
world we actually inhabit, must ‘ensure correspondence between reality and theory’ 
(Jespersen, 2009, p. 25). By contrast, Friedman (1953a) recommends an instrumentalist 
emphasis on predictability over realism of assumptions, which justifies the literature’s 
mathematical models presented as theory along with policy implications, despite explicitly 
unrealistic assumptions. For Lawson (2015), the problem with this approach lies, not with 
the unrealistic nature of the assumptions, however, but with the mistaken application of the 
method of mathematical modelling as a general-purpose tool for investigating social reality. 
The use of deductive mathematical models relies on the existence and identification of 
intrinsically stable ‘event regularities’, or explicit causal links, that are both ‘isolatable’ and 
act in such a ‘condition of isolation’ (Lawson, 2015, p. 15), in which case the system can 
be described as ‘closed’. In an open system, by contrast, the most a researcher can aim to 
uncover are the ‘underlying mechanisms that govern the directly perceivable events and 
states of affairs of the world’ (Lawson, 2015, p. 16). The workings of these mechanisms 
are observable only as ‘tendencies’. 
The persistent failure of economic researchers to discover event regularities suggests that 
the ‘nature and conditions of social reality are such that the forms of mathematical 
deductivist reasoning favoured by modern economists are almost entirely inadequate as 
tools of insightful social analysis’ (Lawson, 2015, p. 109). Models with unrealistic 
assumptions that merely satisfy the criteria of agreeable conclusions or predictability ‘add 
little to our understanding of social reality’ (Lawson, 2015, p. 9) since such a model ‘allows 
for more or less any conclusion to be deduced’ (Lawson, 2015, p. 113). Any insights gained 
are not from the model itself but are ‘achieved prior to model construction and incorporated 
into the modelling process’ (Lawson, 2015, p. 8). Instead, social reality needs to be 
‘understood rather than modelled’ (Lawson, 2015, p. 122), which means developing 
theories that provide more than just an instrumental ordering framework that generates 
predictions (Sayer, 1992, p. 50). The aim of critical realism is to develop robust, 
explanatory theories that are ‘practically adequate’ by satisfying realist criteria for 
assumptions as well as predictions and insights (Sayer, 1992, p. 70).  
The absence of event regularities and difficulties with predicting economic phenomena 
raise the issue of uncertainty. Since the treatment of uncertainty is as much a 
methodological question as a theoretical one, some mention of it is made at this point. 
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Uncertainty is essentially an epistemological problem; it is beyond human knowledge and 
ability to predict the future with any great precision, and probability theory is a pragmatic 
attempt to cope with this difficulty. The economics literature makes a distinction between 
risk and uncertainty, where, in the former, probabilities are known, but not in the latter, so 
that ‘uncertainty corresponds to the situation where knowledge of the probability relation 
is absent’ (Runde, 1990, p. 284). Unlike uncertainty, then, risk is mathematically tractable 
as ‘calculable risk’ (Chick, 1983, p. 214) which allows for ‘actuarial certainty’ (Davidson, 
2015, p. 4), and enters the literature as the Rational Expectations Hypothesis, whereby 
economic agents know the probability distribution of the model itself. Agents with model-
consistent expectations then have the ability to construct utility-optimising ‘equilibrium’ 
plans that solve the mathematical equations. 
The ability of agents to achieve model-consistency requires the stochastic process to have 
two properties. First, its probability distribution must be stationary, so that its mean and 
standard deviation are unchanging over time. Second, the process must be discoverable by 
observation, meaning that a single actual realisation of the process provides sufficient 
information to estimate the probability distribution with accuracy. Together these 
properties define an ergodic process.6 Davidson (1987, 1988, 2015) defines uncertainty as 
the property of non-ergodicity, because it is ‘only in a nonergodic economic world that the 
concept of uncertainty about the future can be technically defined as differing from risk’ 
(Davidson, 1988, p. 333). 
The second ergodic property means that all possible events occur with meaningful 
frequency, and initial conditions are unimportant or forgotten; there are no ‘Black Swans’ 
(Taleb, 2007). An ergodic process is one where time averages suitably represent the key 
aspects of the probability distribution so that agents can understand the dynamics of an 
ergodic stochastic process by observing one (sufficiently large) realisation. The estimation 
that the GFC was an event that ‘would happen only once in 5,000 years—that is, it was 
highly unique’ (Davidson, 2015, p. 17) is evidence that the ergodic hypothesis corresponds 
poorly with the open ontological nature of social reality (Lawson, 2015). The ergodic 
                                                         
6 In an ergodic process the ‘expectation value of the observable is a constant (independent of time), and the 
finite-time average of the observable converges to this constant with probability one as the averaging time 
tends to infinity’ (Peters & Gell-Mann, 2016, p. 1). 
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assumption avoids the recognition that economics is a social science that, unlike physics, 
studies animate objects (Davidson, 1988, p. 332). 
O’Donnell (2014, 2016a, 2016b), however, argues that a rejection of the ergodic hypothesis 
itself requires some form of epistemological certainty, and favours an epistemological 
definition of uncertainty that ‘is independent of whatever deeper stochastic or nonstochastic 
ontology the world might happen to have’ (O’Donnell, 2014, p. 206). Contributing to the 
difficulty of defining uncertainty is the possibility of chaotic dynamics. Although chaotic 
dynamics are deterministic, and so predictable, the practical limitations of human 
knowledge make prediction impossible (Moore, 2006). Furthermore, because chaotic 
processes are sensitive to initial conditions, the inevitable problems of measurement error 
make them more and more unpredictable over time. The difficulty with modelling chaotic 
dynamics is not ontological; it is an epistemological problem of human capability. Because 
conceptual difficulties arise in agreeing the appropriate treatment of uncertainty as being 
ontological or epistemological, it is noted here that it is beyond the scope of this study to 
develop the theory of uncertainty. Only the implications of uncertainty are considered in 
the context of liquidity, which itself serves as a means of reducing uncertainty. 
In conclusion, this study (and hence the choice of research method) is motivated by the 
contribution that theory can make to explaining social reality. The focus is placed on the 
ontological nature of the phenomena of liquidity, the alignment of existing theories with 
this ontology, and the realism of assumptions supporting these theories. By clarifying the 
concept of liquidity (and, by extension, money) the intention is to increase the explanatory 
power of economic theory by placing liquidity into a realistic theoretical structure. 
2.3 Research Method 
At a high level, the application of the critical realist research paradigm involves an iterative 
process of both induction and deduction, known as retroduction, whereby hypotheses 
generated by the analytical model are confronted by reality and the insights gained are used 
to refine and generalise the model. From this process a deeper understanding of the 
unobservable causal mechanisms in the ‘deep stratum’ of reality is uncovered (Jespersen, 
2009, p. 71). 
The emphasis placed on ontology determines much of the research activities. The first stage 
of the research involves an ontological reflection on the nature of liquidity and money, 
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using the existing literature as a point of departure. A similar reflection is conducted on the 
banking system since it is an important institutional element in the provision of liquidity. 
This ontological reflection is possible by taking the position that reality is independent of 
the research activity itself but is also informed by 25 years’ experience as a practitioner in 
the financial markets. This direct engagement with the concepts being analysed in their 
real-world setting imparts a deep understanding from experience that supports the 
coherence of the ontological reflection. 
Once completed, the ontological reflection allows for a critical analysis of the literature on 
liquidity and money, categorising the essential core of each theory, identifying assumptions 
and their correspondence with reality. The approach taken is to consider critically each 
existing theory of liquidity and money and assess its applicability from a realist perspective. 
Although, on the surface, this approach would seem to be trying to reconcile the 
incommensurable, it is an essential part of the realist methodology to work with pre-existing 
theories and look for overlaps: 
If theories are instead thought of as more or less distinctive localities within a 
continuous conceptual map, which is continually and unevenly evolving, both 
continuity and novelty and discontinuity can be recognized in the development of 
knowledge. Some localities may be distant and poorly connected to others, but new 
links may be established. If we are to avoid the opposite poles of relativism and 
naïve objectivism, the hermeneutic character of the development of knowledge and 
the interdependence of sense and reference must be understood. (Sayer, 1992, p. 
76) 
An attempt is made to discover overlaps in theory, since it is not the case that ‘falsification 
of a part must be fatal to the whole’ (Sayer, 1992, p. 73). This quest for synergies should 
not be overdone but is especially pertinent in the case of interpreting the empirical finance 
literature, where the theories used in the measurement of the observations are not 
necessarily the ones needed to interpret the results. Nevertheless, the research effort will 
focus on the literature where monetary aspects are fundamental to the analysis.  
This body of literature and its realist analysis will be used to construct a conceptual 
framework to understand liquidity and explain its effects on the financial system, asset 
prices and economic activity. This understanding will lead, in turn, to a theoretical 
framework for assessing questions of policy and practice. 
13 
 
2.4 Research Design 
The structure of the theoretical analysis will proceed along the following route. First, the 
nature of money and the role of banks in its creation will be established. This ontological 
platform allows for a taxonomy of liquidity to be offered. The taxonomy frames the 
subsequent examination and analysis of the existing theories related to liquidity.  
The analysis of theory is conducted in two parts. The first part takes the form of an 
immanent critique of Real Analysis with the focus on general equilibrium theory and its 
ability to incorporate liquidity and provide insightful analysis with correspondence with 
reality. Because the effect of liquidity is most significant in the behaviour of asset markets, 
key aspects of liquidity’s relationship with the general equilibrium approach to asset pricing 
and the associated empirical literature are drawn out. 
Then, the next part of the analysis critiques the theories in the tradition of Monetary 
Analysis, most notably Keynes’s theory of liquidity preference, but also other post-
Keynesian and heterodox monetary theories. Finally, a synthesis of the analysis of liquidity 
is presented as a conceptual framework in the penultimate chapter. 
2.5 Summary 
Events like the GFC provide an empirical justification for the inclusion of liquidity as a 
fundamental aspect of monetary theory. Also, due to the complexity of the subject, there is 
a need to establish the ontology of liquidity and money as they exist in reality. In addition, 
expected returns, a key determinant of asset prices, are unobservable. Critical realism, by 
providing a framework for uncovering deep causal mechanisms and tendencies, is an 
appropriate methodology for the research. 
So that the research can be built on a realistic platform that allows for policy implications, 





Part II Ontology 
Following the research method described in Chapter 2, the three chapters of Part II conduct 
an ontological reflection outlining the preliminary characteristics of liquidity, and the 
related phenomena of money and banking. A map of the ontological landscape of money 
and banking will provide guidance when assessing the existing definitions and theories of 
liquidity. Chapter 3 considers the nature of money itself, and the existing theories of money, 
and a similar exercise is conducted for the banking system in Chapter 4. In Chapter 5, an 
overview of the liquidity literature yields a taxonomy of liquidity. As stated in Section 2.2, 
all knowledge is necessarily theory-laden and theoretical statements are unavoidable, so 
presentations of theory are given when necessary for context. The result is a picture of 





3 The Nature of Money 
3.1 Introduction 
Money’s relationship with liquidity depends on the ontological perception of money. 
Money is regarded as the most ‘liquid’ asset, and so it is important to establish, or at least 
outline the assumptions of, what money ‘is’ as a precondition for an analysis of liquidity. 
The purpose of this chapter is to consider whether money has a common essence, or instead 
whether each form has its own distinctive or institutional-specific features. It is important 
to clarify the different treatments of money since a ‘clear, unambiguous taxonomy is 
essential for good scientific enquiry’ (Davidson, 2006, p. 139). To establish this ontology 
the approach taken is to assess critically the existing literature, categorising the essential 
core and identifying the assumptions of each theory to assess their relation with reality. 
Theories based on ‘as if’ or unrealistic assumptions, or otherwise lacking explanatory 
content, will be rejected. In this way, an ontological picture of money is drawn and used to 
inform the subsequent analysis of liquidity. 
Money has taken many forms across history, such as metallic coins, gold standard, fiat 
currencies and even, supposedly, cows, shells and cigarettes. In looking at the ontology of 
money, however, it is less important whether money developed spontaneously to solve the 
problems of barter (Menger 1892; Niehans, 1978; Smith, [1776] 1910), or some other social 
practice (Graeber 2012; Ingham, 2004a; Martin 2013), what is important is the logical basis 
of money. We do not necessarily need to consider the origins of money to understand its 
essence, and the analysis of the ‘historical origin of money’ does not necessarily reveal ‘its 
nature or logic’ (Schumpeter, 1954, p. 289, n. 5). Speculations and evidence concerning the 
origins of money provide clues as to its nature, and any theory of money must be consistent 
with the observed characteristics of money even in the early stages of its development. 
Davies (2002, p. 35) recommends that ‘monetary economists should take much more 
interest in examining primitive money to compensate for their previous neglect’ with the 
result ‘that our understanding of modern money would be significantly improved’. 
Definitions of money are wide and varied. Some emphasise its legality, stating that money 
is the ‘thing that the state declares will legally discharge any contractual obligation under 
the civil law of contracts’ (Davidson, 2006, p. 140). Others downplay the legal aspect to 
focus on money’s ability to settle tax obligations (Keynes, 1930a, p. 6). The customary 
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aspect of money can be emphasised, so that money ‘is anything that is widely used for 
making payments and accounting for debts and credits’ (Davies, 2002, p. 29, original 
emphasis), or ‘what is commonly offered or received for the purchase or sale of goods, 
services or other things’ (Galbraith, 1975, p. 15). The third-party nature of money in 
transactions can be highlighted, whereby money ‘may be defined as a commodity or group 
of commodities customarily paid and received in exchange for other commodities and 
services without reference to the personal credit of the one who offers it’ (Young, [1924] 
1999, p. 266). 
In addition, there is a distinct, but important, relationship between the unit of account and 
the money object itself.  
Money itself, namely that by delivery of which debt-contracts and price-contracts 
are discharged, and in the shape of which a store of General Purchasing Power is 
held, derives its character from its relationship to the Money-of-Account, since the 
debts and prices must first have been expressed in terms of the latter. (Keynes, 
1930a, p. 3, original emphasis).  
At the outset, it should be noted that this distinction between unit and object, and the 
implied preconditions of the unit of account for the existence of the object, allows for more 
than one object or medium of exchange to answer to the description of money (Ingham, 
2004a, p. 113).  
The separation between the unit and object is not always respected, however. For Einzig 
(1954, p. 57), ‘money may be defined as an object or unit conforming in a reasonable degree 
to some standard of uniformity, used for reckoning and making payments and accepted 
with the ultimate intention of using it for making payments’, thereby combining and 
blurring all the concepts. Niehans (1978, pp. 118-119) disregards the logical distinction 
between unit and object, for if there is no fixed relation between the unit of account and the 
medium of exchange, and the unit is purely abstract, then it has no economic significance 
and should be ignored. Instead Niehans prefers the more concrete term ‘medium of account’ 
to represent the object which has a price of unity by definition. 
As for the money object itself, there are broadly two views. The first, the commodity view, 
is that the value of money is derived from its metallic or commodity content. The second, 
the credit view, is that money is essentially tradable credit and is, even in the form of 
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coinage, merely a token that represents a debt payable. Since commodity money is 
restricted by the physical stock of the commodity, whereas tokens have no recognisable 
production function, the commodity view can be taken to express ‘the liquidity scarcity 
view of economics’, whereas the credit view adopts ‘the liquidity abundance view of 
finance’ (Mehrling, 2000b, p. 15). These views are incompatible and are a source of 
conceptual dissonance, a problem that must be addressed. 
In either view, but with varying degrees of emphasis, three characteristics are commonly 
assigned to money: unit of account, medium of exchange, and store of value. The first 
represents money’s role as an abstract measure of the size of debt and wealth; the second 
refers to the use of money as a facilitator for commercial transactions. The third is that 
agents hold money as a means of obtaining claims to future resources.  
In general terms the commodity view is known as ‘metallism’ and the credit view 
(especially when it pertains to state money) is known as ‘cartalism’ (or ‘chartalism’) 
(Schumpeter, 1954, p. 288). Metallism and chartalism can be further divided into their 
theoretical and practical forms. According to theoretical metallism, it is  
…logically essential for money to consist of, or to be “covered” by, some 
commodity so that the logical source of the exchange value or purchasing power 
of money is the exchange value or purchasing power of that commodity, 
considered independently of its monetary role. (Schumpeter, 1954, p. 288) 
For metallism, the value of money is solely derived from the commodity that backs it, such 
as when coins of fixed weight in gold circulate as money. In Schumpeter’s view, however, 
it is self-evident that ‘theoretical metallism is untenable’ since it is an analytical error to 
confuse the logical nature of money with its perceived historical origins (1954, p. 289, n. 
5). Practical metallism makes the weaker assertion that the ‘monetary unit “should” be kept 
firmly linked to, and freely interchangeable with, a given quantity of some commodity’ 
(Schumpeter, 1954, p. 288). For example, under a gold standard, the value of the monetary 
notes in circulation is pegged to gold, and gold reserves are kept in central bank vaults to 
support this value.  
Conversely, ‘Theoretical and Practical Cartalism may best be defined by the corresponding 
negatives’ (Schumpeter, 1954, p. 288). In other words, for theoretical chartalism, it is not 
‘logically essential’ for money to have metallic content or be easily convertible into a 
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commodity, nor for practical chartalism ‘should’ it have such content or convertibility 
(Schumpeter, 1954, p. 288). The prevalence of fiat, or unbacked, currencies in the modern 
monetary system confirms that it is not practically necessary for money to derive its value 
from any fixed commodity. As such, fiat money is often characterised as irredeemable or 
inconvertible (Buiter, 2005). 
3.2 Money and Credit 
It is a firmly established principle in the monetary literature that there is a distinction 
between money-proper, which is issued by the state, and credit, which is merely a claim on 
money (Keynes, 1930a, p. 5; Schumpeter, 1954, p. 717). Credit, in this view, is an 
innovation that economises on the use of money-proper and thereby stretches the money 
supply by increasing its velocity of circulation. This distinction is explicit in the framework 
of Gurley and Shaw (1960) with ‘outside’ money and ‘inside’ money, where the former is 
‘a claim held by consumers and firms against government’ and the latter ‘is based on 
internal debt’ (p. 73). Within this framework, Gurley and Shaw identify and reject what 
they call the ‘net-money doctrine’, in which only outside money is economically 
significant. They argue that the consolidation of private securities with their corresponding 
inside money claims ignores any effect arising from their translation from illiquid primary 
securities to liquid secondary securities. What remains in the net-money doctrine is the 
‘outside’ sector ‘to avoid reverting completely to economic analysis in terms of a barter 
society where there is neither money nor demand for money, neither bonds nor demand for 
bonds’ (Gurley & Shaw, 1960, p. 136). 
The question of how much importance to place on credit money has implications for 
monetary theory and especially the analysis of liquidity. In what follows we consider 
whether the distinction between pure outside money and inside credit money obscures 
many fundamental aspects of liquidity and money, and, instead, whether insights can be 
gained by emphasising their commonality. The approach necessitates expanding the 
definition of money and de-emphasising the importance of state money, since 
…logically, it is by no means clear that the most useful method is to start from the 
coin—even if, making a concession to realism, we add inconvertible government 
paper—in order to proceed to the credit transactions of reality. It may be more 
useful to start from these [credit transactions] in the first place, to look upon 
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capitalist finance as a clearing system that cancels claims and debts and carries 
forward the differences—so that “money” payments come in only as a special case 
without any particularly fundamental importance. In other words: practically and 
analytically, a credit theory of money is possibly preferable to a monetary theory 
of credit. (Schumpeter, 1954, p. 717) 
Therefore, a credit theory of money, in which all money is viewed as credit, is preferred to 
a monetary theory of credit, where money and credit are distinct, and credit merely serves 
as a promise to pay money. It is important ‘to get into the habit of thinking of money as the 
highest form of credit, if only as a corrective to intellectual habits that come from thinking 
of credit as an inferior form of money’ (Mehrling, 2000c, p. 2, n. 2).  
Identifying money as credit, however, requires further clarification since it bears some 
similarity to the practical metallist view, where money should be a promise to pay a fixed 
amount of precious metal (Schumpeter, 1954, pp. 289-290, n. 5). The nuance is that the 
recognition of money as a token is not, in itself, enough to establish a theoretical basis for 
money, although it can be taken as a basic ontological observation. The starting point for 
the following discussion is that, although the institutions and forms of money may have 
changed over time, the nature of money is itself constant. Furthermore, too sharp a 
distinction between credit and money is misleading. All money is credit regardless of its 
issuer, metallic content or institutional arrangements. Consideration of the commodity view 
serves to clarify and strengthen the claim that money is a credit token. 
3.3 Commodity View of Money 
Money, as it is embedded in the classical commodity-view literature, is a natural invention 
that reduces the inefficiency of the primitive state of pure barter. Money is simply a natural 
evolution of the most liquid or saleable commodity reinforced by agent self-interest (Mises, 
1953, p. 32). The effect is that ‘this difference in saleableness ceases to be altogether 
gradual, and must be regarded in a certain aspect as something absolute’ so that there are 
‘goods which have become money and goods which have not’ (Menger, 1892, p. 252). The 
unit of account, because it is the measure associated with the liquid commodity, is 
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inseparable from the commodity itself.7 A ‘medium of exchange derives its usefulness from 
some sort of imperfection or “friction” in the market’ (Niehans, 1978, p. 1), so the ‘use of 
money increases the efficiency of the economy’ (Niehans, 1978, p. 2).  
Also common in the classical literature is the axiom of monetary neutrality. In ‘Of Money’, 
Hume (1742, para. II.III.1) begins with the assertion that ‘Money is not, properly speaking, 
one of the subjects of commerce; but only the instrument which men have agreed upon to 
facilitate the exchange of one commodity for another.’ This assertion leads Hume to deduce 
that ‘it is of no manner of consequence, with regard to the domestic happiness of a state, 
whether money be in a greater or less quantity’ (Hume, 1742, para. II.III.9). By regarding 
the real economy as separate from the monetary economy, Hume concludes ‘that the want 
of money can never injure any state within itself: For men and commodities are the real 
strength of any community’ (Hume, 1742, para. II.III.20). Money is a neutral ‘veil’, or more 
accurately a ‘lubricant’ (Niehans, 1978, p. 8), whereby ‘an exogenous change in its 
quantity, once all adjustments have run their course, produces a proportional change in all 
prices, leaving real phenomena unchanged’ (Niehans, 1978, p. 2). The classical literature 
emphasises money’s property as a medium of exchange and de-emphasises its role as a 
store of value. A seller’s only intention is to gain money to be a buyer immediately: ‘money 
can serve no other purpose besides purchasing goods’ (Smith, [1776] 1910, pp. 384-385). 
If money is neutral and can be safely ignored in economic analysis, then it may well follow 
that liquidity can be ignored as well. 
It is customary to consider money and coins as conceptually inseparable, with the metallic 
content of the coins providing their value. As such, the only substantive difference between 
the metallic money and coins is that coins are stamped to guarantee their metallic content 
(Hicks, 1989, p. 46). Analyses with the assumption that the value of money is established 
by its commodity content do not often explicitly distinguish between coinage and its related 
commodity (for example, see Kiyotaki & Wright, 1989). The outcome is that one 
commodity becomes unique in that agents will accept it even though they have no 
immediate need for it, with coins simply a more convenient way of ensuring this 
                                                         
7 Marx’s theory of money most closely aligns to the theoretical metallist perspective and the commodity view 
of money. Because of Marx’s embedded-labour theory of value, money must be a commodity otherwise it 
cannot be produced and therefore has no value (Nelson, 2005, p. 66). 
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acceptance. In a commodity view of money, the motivation for the selection of a monetary 
commodity is to mitigate the inconvenience of barter, thereby directly contradicting 
available evidence: 
On one thing the experts on primitive money all agree, and this vital agreement 
transcends their minor differences. Their common belief backed up by the 
overwhelming tangible evidence of actual types of primitive moneys from all over 
the world and from the archaeological, literary and linguistic evidence of the 
ancient world, is that barter was not the main factor in the origins and earliest 
developments of money. (Davies, 2002, p. 23) 
If not in a coin format, however, commodity money is sited in a ‘theory of exchange...in 
which every commodity could serve as a perfect money’ (Niehans, 1978, p. 3, n. 5), in other 
words commodity ‘money’ is no more than an untransformed commodity. 
Without dwelling too much on the question of the origins of money, we can use some 
elements of the historic record to eliminate some unnecessary conjectures as to the nature 
of money. First, the variation in coin size and metallic content was too great for the value 
of the coin to be based on metal alone (Davies, 2002, p. 75; Ingham, 2004a, pp. 109-110; 
Innes, 1913, p. 380). Second, many coins were minted without any numerical denomination 
so that their value in the unit of account could be changed arbitrarily by the issuer as a form 
of tax (Davies, 2002, pp. 98-99; Innes, 1913, p. 385). Third, the quantity of coins in 
circulation was too small for common use (Davies, 2002, p. 77; Innes, 1913, p. 389); and 
fourth, in many cases the value of coins was often too great for day-to-day use (Tymoigne 
& Wray, 2006, p. 7). Fifth, there were many types of coin, many issued by merchants so 
that often ‘eighty different coinages’ were in circulation (Innes, 1913, p. 385; see also 
Ingham, 2004a, p. 111). Together these imply the existence of other, more common, forms 
of payment such as credit. An undue focus on state money and the state versus credit-money 
dichotomy is unwarranted. 
Consider the relationship between coins and their metallic content. By the force of arbitrage 
coins cannot circulate below their intrinsic value; the metallic content of coins provides a 
lower bound to their value. The fact that they generally circulate above the value of their 
embedded metal is evidence that they represent more than their metallic content; in other 
words, they are ‘tokens’. The value of coins, even with consistent weights of precious 
metals, is not due to their metallic content. When metal is minted into coins the difference 
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between the value of the metallic raw material and the coin created from it, known as 
seigniorage, is profit available to the minting authority. This profit is only available if the 
value of coins is greater than their value in metal, and provides the motive for private 
minters (Tymoigne & Wray, 2006, p. 10). ‘The Mint price was established with reference 
to a money of account, and it could diverge, and very often did, from the market price of 
the metal’ (De Cecco, 1991, p. 315). Alternatively, coins that were worth less in their 
monetary form than in their metallic form would not remain in circulation since they could 
be melted down and sold as metal for a greater value. Similarly, attempts to maintain a 
bimetallist standard often failed when the relative market values of the two commodities 
deviated enough from the official rates of parity to offer arbitrage opportunities (De Cecco, 
1991, p. 322; Galbraith, 1975, pp. 78-79). 
Historically, and hence theoretically, there is no fixed relationship between the unit of 
account, coinage and the metallic content of the coinage (Ingham, 2004a, p. 110).8 The 
implications for monetary theory are that coins must be deemphasised lest they dominate 
the conceptual landscape. We must recognise that ‘coinage never played any considerable 
part in commerce, that the monetary unit was distinct from the coinage and that the price 
of gold and silver fluctuated constantly in terms of that unit’ (Innes, 1913, p. 390). The use 
of credit denominated in a unit of account pre-dates coins by at least two thousand years 
(Ingham, 2004a, p. 46; Tymoigne & Wray, 2006, p. 7). Historically, clearing of credits has 
been conducted without coins (Wray, 2004, p. 11), so it is necessary for monetary theory 
to account for non-money forms of settlement. 
Theoretically, coins are a pure expression of practical metallism, and the various forms of 
metallic standard were important as a cure either for mismanagement or for limiting the 
seigniorage of the state. Mismanagement generally meant that the issued money would not 
be acceptable in payment of taxes or that the state would succumb to temptations to ‘cry 
down’ the currency, with the result that ‘the gold standard may have been desirable in an 
era of monarchs who mismanaged the monetary system’ (Tymoigne & Wray, 2006, p.11). 
Reforms enforcing a specific metallic content of coins were a means of reducing the 
                                                         
8 The logical separation of the unit of account and coinage is a rejection of a key element of Marx’s theory of 
money: that gold is the evolved form of money and the measure of value must be associated with its social 
cost of production (Foley, 2005, p. 42). 
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sovereign’s taxation ability so that ‘he would be compelled to resort openly to his fiscal 
powers’ (De Cecco, 1991, p. 316). The continuous tug-of-war between the state and its 
subjects over the metallic content of the state’s coinage, and the occasional victory by those 
in favour of a pure metallic standard, should not obscure the fundamental credit nature of 
coinage. A closer look at the workings of the gold standard further reveals the fundamental 
credit nature of money. 
3.4 Gold Standard 
For a more evident example of a practical metallism, consider the gold standard. Under a 
gold standard, central banks provide convertibility of their notes into gold at fixed gold 
points or prices, thereby setting the monetary value of their paper currency equivalent to 
that of a specific weight of metal. For instance, from 1919 until early 1933 the value of the 
US dollar was defined so that one ounce of gold was equivalent to $20.67. Thereafter it was 
raised incrementally by arbitrary decree to finish at approximately $35.00 per ounce early 
in 1934 (Galbraith, 1975, pp. 223-224). To maintain this fixed-price conversion the central 
bank maintains a stock of gold in reserve, but the amount of currency issued is not limited 
to the amount of gold reserves, as in a pure commodity currency. Instead, the amount of 
currency outstanding is based on the demand for currency at the gold-exchange price and 
the central bank’s open-market operations (Glasner, 1985, p. 47), with the supply of money 
responding to the demand for money (Glasner, 2000, p. 45, n. 3). 
Thus, under a gold standard, a central bank’s note is a promise to pay gold. If the flow of 
redemptions of money for gold were to become too large, thereby diminishing its reserves, 
the central bank would need to reverse this flow, and the instrument for maintaining the 
target stock of gold is the central bank’s discount rate—raising it reduces the outflow of 
gold (Keynes, 1930b, p. 303). The value of a currency on a gold standard is pegged by 
arbitrage to the value of the gold commodity, as an imposed, but not intrinsic, value. The 
backing of the notes is maintained by use of interest rates as the means to discourage 
redemption into gold. As a form of open-market operation, raising the discount rate reduces 
the stock of notes on issue by making it less rewarding for the public to swap non-gold 
assets with the central bank for notes. The reduction in notes restores the target note-to-
gold ratio.  
Furthermore, under a gold standard world prices and interest rates are set by international 
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arbitrage assuming the ‘unity of world markets’. Gold flows simply satisfy the demand for 
money, by a decrease either in the gold-to-money ratio or in the propensity for imports. A 
decrease in import propensity leads to increased gold imports, which are then converted 
into money (Glasner, 1985; McCloskey & Zecher, [1976] 1997). Changes in the stock of 
gold at each central bank do not alter world prices, since, with fixed exchange rates, the 
vector of world prices is fixed by international arbitrage and the law of one price9 (Glasner, 
1985, p. 56; see also Samuelson, [1980] 2015; and Cottrell, 1997, for a rebuttal). World 
stocks of gold determine the spot value of the currency, but open-market operations are 
essential in maintaining and managing its convertibility. In periods when the gold standard 
was in operation the difficulties in maintaining sufficient reserves to support the promise 
of convertibility affected the stability of the entire international monetary system, especially 
in the decentralised US banking system before the introduction of the Federal Reserve (De 
Cecco, 1991; Mehrling, 2011).  
The issuing of paper money in return for gold is conceptually the same as coin minting, 
except that the monetary token is not based physically on the gold itself. The gold standard 
clarifies the nature of the gold specie: the central bank holds the physical gold, and issues 
paper tokens, thereby eliminating the inefficiency of transporting gold for domestic 
transactions. In the UK in the early 1960s the Royal Mint, a government department, issued 
coins and the Bank of England issued notes convertible into these coins. The Bank of 
England would use its notes to purchase coins directly from the Royal Mint, which would 
use these notes to purchase the metal and labour to create the coins. The two forms of 
money, state money and central bank money, were distinct, the latter viewed as a promise 
to pay the former (Sayers, 1964, p. 82). This distinction between state money and central 
bank money is more likely to be overlooked in the current institutional framework where 
central bank money is more dominant, and no longer convertible into any other state money. 
Although there are historical periods when money forms have been linked to metal, 
physically or in value terms, the basic nature of money is that it is effectively a credit token 
whose value is not derived solely from any metallic content. Unless converted into 
monetary form, silver and gold are commodities like any other, and have no intrinsic 
                                                         
9 Not to be mistaken for purchasing power parity, which operates at the overall price level and not at the level 




3.5 Quantity Theory of Money 
The ontology of money affects the treatment of money within the monetary literature. 
Transcending all theories is the quantity theory of money, which has dominated the 
monetary literature, in one form or another, since the classical period of economic analysis. 
Because of its dominance, some comment must be made about the quantity theory of money 
at this point in the study. 
Since the time of classical political economy, it has been postulated that the effect of money 
is ‘that the prices of every thing depend on the proportion between commodities and 
money’ (Hume, 1742, para. II.III.12). The result is the quantity theory of money (QTM), 
based on the equation of exchange: 
 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 =  𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀. (3.1) 
By inferring a right-to-left direction of causality, it is claimed that the price level 𝑃𝑃 is 
determined by the transactions demand 𝑃𝑃 for a fixed stock of commodity money 𝑀𝑀 
circulating at a particular ‘velocity’ 𝑀𝑀. The QTM embeds the dominant metaphor of money 
as a veil which obscures, but does not affect, the workings of the real economy (Sowell, 
1974, p. 42), and the ‘classical dichotomy’ (Patinkin, 1965) between the real and the 
monetary economy. An increase in the money supply could lower interest rates and 
stimulate economic activity in the short term, but it would have no long-term effects apart 
from on the price level (Sowell, 1974, pp. 56-57). A surplus of money raises prices because 
it first raises demand (Patinkin, 1965).  
The QTM relies on the independence of the elements comprising the equation of exchange 
(Schumpeter, 1954, p. 703), so that, most notably, the supply of money is unaffected by the 
demand for money. Instead, any discrepancies are resolved by adjustments in income in the 
short term, and prices in the long term. Hence, the theoretical power of the equation of 
exchange relies on the stability of velocity and its independence from the money supply, 
but both are undermined ‘because of the ease of response of the money supply to changes 
in the volume of money transactions makes changes in velocity superfluous’ (Kaldor, 1982, 
p. 29). Townshend (1937, p. 161) observes that any amount of money can support any price 
level depending on its velocity of circulation regardless of its institutional limitations.  
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Nevertheless, the QTM is maintained by its seemingly unassailable empirical support. ‘The 
central predictions of the quantity theory are that, in the long run, money growth should be 
neutral in its effects on the growth rate of production and should affect the inflation rate on 
a one-for-one basis’ (Lucas, 1996, p. 665). The strong correlation between price changes 
and money supply changes are viewed as validating this prediction; the QTM has 
remarkable success empirically (Lucas, 2014). The QTM ‘applies, with remarkable 
success, to co-movements in money and prices generated in complicated, real-world 
circumstances’ (Lucas, 1996, p. 666), even though it is possible to identify historical 
episodes that contradict the hypothesis (Schwartz, 1973, p. 249). 
Whatever its empirical basis, however, there are logical problems. The ‘quantity theory’ 
should be known as ‘the quantity theorem’, since ‘it is not a complete theory of money but 
merely a proposition about the exchange value of money’ (Schumpeter, 1954, p. 312). If 
we assume a pure metallist standard then any increase in the monetary commodity has its 
effect via the shape of its supply and demand schedules, just like any other commodity. 
There is no reason to appeal to the QTM at all. In fact, the theories are conflicting since the 
QTM implies a proportionate change in price to the change in the monetary commodity’s 
supply, a result that is difficult to achieve for a commodity with an elastic production 
function. Although the QTM is often associated with the commodity theory of money, it 
can only apply to inconvertible fiat money (Glasner, 1985, p. 56; Niehans, 1978, pp. 9, 113, 
147-149, 193). Fiat money is considered unbacked and is assumed to be accepted in 
payment simply from the authority of the state, either by legal tender laws or some 
indefinite form of trust. As such, the QTM is more in alignment with a chartalist view of 
money: 
This logical affinity of the quantity theorem with theoretical cartalism should be 
borne in mind: the theorem essentially amounts to treating money not as a 
commodity but as a voucher for buying goods, though not everyone who does 
consider money in this light need accept the specific schema offered by the quantity 
theorem. (Schumpeter, 1954, p. 313) 
Fiat money, or base money as it is known in the modern context, is defined as ‘an object 
that is intrinsically worthless (does not appear in any utility or production function) and 
inconvertible (is not a redeemable claim to something that does, such as a stock certificate)’ 
(Kiyotaki & Wright, 1989, p. 941, n. 11). 
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When a commodity is accepted in trade not to be consumed or used in production, 
but to be used to facilitate further trade, it becomes a medium of exchange and is 
called commodity money. If an object with no intrinsic value becomes a medium 
of exchange, it is called fiat money. (Kiyotaki & Wright, 1989, p. 929) 
The supposedly irredeemable nature of fiat money is essential to recent proposals to 
increase aggregate demand by means of ‘helicopter’ money, with the recommendation that 
the central bank dramatically increase the stock of fiat base money. Since fiat money is 
viewed as irredeemable and is always considered an asset by its owner, this helicopter drop 
is an increase in ‘net wealth for the private sector’ (Buiter, 2014, p. 3), as per the net-money 
doctrine. In effect, fiat or outside money is treated as if it were metallic or commodity 
money, but this treatment is logically inconsistent. Instead, fiat money should be considered 
another form of bank money with ‘negligible costs of production’ (Rogers, 1989, p. 172).  
Furthermore, the association between fiat money and commodity money is based on a 
misunderstanding of commodity money; that is, once metal has taken a monetary token 
form, it ceases to be valued as a metal and takes on the value of a credit token. Fiat money 
is issued by central banks, which, despite their elevated position in the financial system, are 
banks both logically and historically. Inconvertible fiat money is a liability, in many 
respects, like a stock certificate. Stock certificates are inconvertible: they only provide the 
holder to a claim on the profits of the business but no actual rights to the assets. A limited 
liability company is an infinitely lived entity until insolvency or shareholders vote to 
liquidate it. The inconvertible aspect of the definition of fiat money is not strong enough to 
distinguish it from other liabilities.  
Mehrling provides a useful summary of the confusion generated by the introduction of fiat 
money and the attempt to maintain the commodity view: 
Even today, the notion that currency is in some sense backed by the public credit 
remains controversial. Most people seem to be more comfortable thinking about 
currency as “fiat”, a kind of paper token taking the place of outside gold, than as a 
liability of the central bank. (Mehrling, 2000c, p. 7, n. 5) 
Mehrling (2000c, p. 7, n. 5) goes on to reject an appeal to legal tender and state authority 
as a suitable substitute by implying a ‘commitment to pay one’s bills quite apart from one’s 
actual ability to do so’. The problem is that ‘the loss of a commodity anchor seems to have 
28 
 
left us intellectually unanchored as well’ (Mehrling, 2000c, p. 7, n. 5). 
Instead, the gold standard, correctly interpreted, provides a basis for understanding fiat 
money, since 
…national money today is best understood as a promise to pay, just as it was under 
the gold standard. The payor is much the same. What has changed is that what is 
to be paid is not one particular commodity but rather abstract value itself, the value 
of the unit of account named on the bill. (Mehrling, 2000c, p. 7, n. 5) 
Although the link between the money issued by the central bank and any explicit 
commodity has been severed, support for the currency is still based on credit-worthiness 
and the ability to maintain its value through some form of asset backing or offsetting credit 
flows. Instead, the unit of account has become more important, with the value of money the 
result of social and political conflict (Galbraith, 1975; pp. 316-317; Ingham, 2004a, pp. 80-
85). 
Finally, the assumption of money neutrality fails to find support from the commodity view. 
Commodities have a cost of production and hence ‘the neutrality proposition, strictly 
speaking, does not apply to commodity money (like gold coins)’ or ‘paper money 
convertible into gold’, with the result that ‘the neutrality proposition [only] relates to 
inconvertible paper currency’ (Niehans, 1978, p. 9). The assumption of money neutrality 
logically and necessarily restricts any associated analysis to that of fiat money.  
In summary, the QTM epitomises the unresolved tension between the treatment of money 
as a commodity and its recognisable modern fiat form. Each aspect is emphasised in 
different contexts but otherwise remains as a form of conceptual dissonance. Whatever 
truth is expressed in the QTM, it cannot be satisfactory as an explanation of money, it can 
only provide an ‘as if’ theory sustained as one of the ‘theories which for the time being 
have not been bettered’ (Sayer, 1992, p. 71). The quantity theory of money stands or falls 
on its restricted applicability to fiat money. 
3.6 Credit View of Money 
At the other extreme from the commodity view of metallism is the credit view of money, 
which asserts that all money is credit (or debt) since any ‘sale and purchase is the exchange 
of a commodity for a credit’ (Innes, 1914, p. 152). Note that, in the context of the credit 
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view of money, the terms ‘credit’ and ‘debt’ can be used interchangeably. Credit money is 
a debt on the liability side of the issuer’s balance sheet which must correspond, in existence 
but not necessarily value, to the credit on the asset side of the money owner’s balance sheet. 
An essential implication is that a money asset cannot exist without a corresponding debt 
liability on another agent’s balance sheet. Under a credit view of money, fiat money without 
a corresponding liability does not conceptually exist. 
In considering commercial transactions, Hicks (1989, p. 42) insists that they consist of three 
parts: ‘first is the contract between the parties, consisting of a promise to deliver and a 
promise to pay (both are needed to make even a constituent part of a transaction); the second 
and third consist of actual delivery, one way and the other.’ The credit view departs from 
Hicks by treating the exchange as final even without the resolution of the promise to pay:  
[W]hen a seller has delivered the commodity bought and has accepted an 
acknowledgment of debt from the purchaser, the transaction is complete, the 
payment of the purchase is final; and the new relationship which arises between 
the seller and the purchaser, the creditor and debtor, is distinct from the sale and 
purchase. (Innes, 1913, p. 394) 
For exchange to take place, an acknowledgement of the associated or corresponding debt 
and credit is enough. This acknowledgment can take a physical form, such as bills of 
exchange (Sayers, 1964, pp. 46-48), tally sticks (Davies, 2002, pp. 147-153), or abstract 
financial securities (Lozano, 2015). Settlement, where the credit or promise to pay is later 
honoured with another commodity, is a separate exchange independent from original. This 
independence allows the acknowledgement of debt to be transferred to another agent 
entirely unrelated to the original exchange. 
The credit view postulates that money is founded on tradable credit and agrees with the 
theoretical chartalist position that the value of money is not necessarily derived from any 
metallic content, and that money is by nature a ‘token’. Importantly, the unit of account and 
the monetary token are independent. The existence of an abstract unit of account allows for 
the development of double-entry bookkeeping, which in turn allows for complex debit and 
credit relations, the interplay of balance sheets and financial engineering. It is money’s use 
for settlement that makes the difference between debt and money, and explains the 
departure from and then return to Hicks’s conception of a transaction: credit that can be 
used in settlement of other credits is money. 
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The assertion that all money is credit is not to claim, as Goodhart (2005a, p. 760, original 
emphasis) does, that this ‘implies that all credit is money’. Likewise, the claim by Bell 
(2001, p. 150) that ‘when a buyer (debtor) and a seller (creditor) enter into a forward 
contract, money (or equivalently, credit and debt) is created’ cannot be substantiated. In 
many cases, debt is just debt, and debt must be settled by money (Keynes, 1930a, p. 3). 
Transferability for settlement is what transforms debt into money. Not all credit is equal; 
only some credit can become money, and, even then, with different degrees of acceptability:  
All money is debt in so far as issuers promise to accept their own money for any 
debt payment by any bearer of the money. The credibility of the promises forms a 
hierarchy of moneys that have degrees of acceptability. The state’s sovereign issue 
of liabilities usually occupies the top place, as these are accepted in payment of 
taxes. (Ingham, 2004a, p. 198, original emphasis) 
Mehrling (2013a) expands on this idea of a hierarchy of money, as a form of pyramid, with 
(in the example given) gold at the apex, then descending through state money, bank money, 
down to more modern forms of liquidity such as security repurchase agreements (repo), a 
key feature of the shadow banking system (Gabor & Vestergaard, 2016). The hierarchy is 
dynamic in terms of order and quantity of each money, but: ‘Always and everywhere, 
monetary systems are hierarchical’ (Mehrling, 2013a, p. 1). It is because of the familiarity 
of the current hierarchy, or perhaps unfamiliarity with historical versions, that it is 
customary to distinguish sharply between state money, which is deemed to be money-
proper, and credit money. Government money has become so prevalent, that we are in the 
habit of associating it alone with ‘money’ (Innes, 1914, p. 152). Because of its direct 
relation with taxes, state money is currently at the top of the pyramid of money (Bell, 2001, 
p. 160), but historical evidence shows that other debt tokens have a right to the label of 
‘money’. Although it is important to recognise the essential hierarchy of money, it is also 
important that ‘the different means of payments may, on a certain level of abstraction, be 
treated as essentially alike’ (Schumpeter, 1954, p. 719, original emphasis). 
As Minsky ([1986] 2008, p. 255) notes, ‘everyone can create money; the problem is to get 
it accepted’10, and that ‘usually there is a hierarchy of monies, with special money 
                                                         
10 Bell (2001, p. 150) uses this statement to imply that the mere acceptance of another’s debts is sufficient for 
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instruments for different purposes’. Ultimately, the hierarchy is a form of Gresham’s Law, 
where bad money drives out good. Higher forms of money in the hierarchy are hoarded 
where possible and, lower forms of money in the hierarchy are preferred for transactions, 
and hence substitutes come into existence (Galbraith, 1975, p. 56). 
As mentioned previously (see Section 3.3), recent studies compiling anthropological 
research into the origins of money provide no empirical support for the commodity view of 
money assumed in the classical and neoclassical literature.11 Instead, the evidence shows 
that credit is the more predominant form of payment throughout history, with metallic coins 
playing a much smaller, reduced role (Graeber, 2012; Ingham, 2004a; Martin, 2013). 
‘There is no question but that credit is far older than cash’ (Innes, 1913, p. 396). 
Innes’s version of the credit theory of money has, then, three main elements. First, 
money is primarily an abstract measurement of value. Second, all forms of money 
are credit in that their value consists in their ability to redeem a debt; “money” 
cannot exist without the existence of a debt to be redeemed. Third, credit 
instruments predate coined currency and historically represent the major form that 
money has taken. (Ingham, 2004b, pp. 178-179) 
According to the credit view, metallic coins, which have led to the development of the 
commodity view of money, are merely tokens used for the purpose of paying tax, with a 
‘necessarily close connection between the minting of money and collecting it back in taxes. 
Minting and taxing were two sides of the same coin of royal prerogative, or, we would say, 
monetary and fiscal policies were inextricably interconnected’ (Davies, 2002, p. 147). The 
exchange value of coins would always exceed their intrinsic value as base metal, otherwise 
no metal would be taken to the minters and the existing stock of coins would be melted 
                                                         
the creation of ‘money’, seemingly because, since money is a balance-sheet relation, all balance-sheet 
relations are money. The importance of transferability for settlement is not recognised by Bell as the 
distinction between debt and money. This omission distorts her subsequent discussion on the hierarchy of 
money, which is more in terms of market liquidity than money due to the confusion between money and debt. 
This confusion results in state bonds, which cannot be used as a medium of exchange, incorrectly appearing 
in the hierarchy of money (Bell, 2001, p. 159, n. 2). 
11 This alleviates Keynes’s concerns, in reviewing Innes (1913), that the credit theory is ‘much diminished by 
an entire absence of any references to authorities’ (Keynes, 1914, p. 420). 
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down. The value of the coins would depend, not on their commodity content, but on the 
creditworthiness of the issuer, namely the state and its taxation ability. Thus 
…the value of credit or money does not depend on the value of any metal or metals, 
but on the right which the creditor acquires to “payment,” that is to say, to 
satisfaction for the credit, and on the obligation of the debtor to “pay” his debt, and 
conversely on the right of the debtor to release himself from his debt by the tender 
of an equivalent debt owed by the creditor, and the obligation of the creditor to 
accept this tender in satisfaction of his credit. (Innes, 1914, p. 152) 
Whereas the conventional view is that ‘credit is the lending out of the money commodity’ 
(Martin, 2013, p. 14), the credit view of money shows that credit is delayed settlement, 
where the settlement can be achieved, not just by money or commodities, but by other, 
third-party credits. The existence of third-party credits acceptable as payment is the social 
invention of money. In the process of commerce, agents accumulate credits, which only 
after a period are discharged by some form of commodity or settlement. ‘To focus on the 
commodity payment rather than the system of credit and clearing behind it was to get things 
completely the wrong way round [sic]’ (Martin, 2013, p. 12). Credit, and its role as a 
medium of exchange, plays a fundamental role in commerce throughout history. 
A credit-money economy often involves three parties in a transaction: buyer, seller and the 
money issuer (Rossi, 2012, p. 81; Rochon & Rossi, 2013). In this case, paying with a third 
party’s promise to pay settles the transaction for the buyer, so that by the transferability of 
money, an agent can settle outstanding debts with the credits of other agents (Ingham, 
2004a, p. 72). A failure to maintain the balance of current credits and debts affects the 
current value of the obligor’s credit: 
The debts which count in the depreciation of the monetary unit are those which are 
contracted without any provision for their payment and which are either payable at 
sight as in the case of currency notes or payable at short terms and have to be 
constantly renewed for want of credits with which to cancel them. (Innes, 1914, p. 
157) 
Thus, the ‘law of the equation of debts and credits’ states that ‘the value of a credit on any 
debtor depends on an equation between the amount of debt immediately payable by the 
debtor credit and the amount of credits which he has immediately available for the 
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cancellation of his debts’ (Innes, 1914, p. 160). Although third-party credit money may 
circulate through the hands of many agents to enable settlement, its value derives from the 
fact that it will eventually find its way back to the original issuer as payment of a debt. All 
agents must eventually make some form of repayment, and this repayment generally takes 
the form of handing over the credits of a third party. In the modern economy, that third 
party is the banking system, and modern commerce is conducted by the transferral of bank 
deposits. 
The recognition that money is credit emphasises the intermediated and social nature of 
money; it is not just an asset to the holder but, also a claim on a borrower. In the commodity 
view, money is similarly an asset to the holder, but has no liability counterpart, and hence 
is unambiguously wealth. If money is a credit and not a commodity, then all money in 
existence must have an associated asset and liability entry on the money issuer’s balance 
sheet. Not only are government bonds not net wealth (Barro, 1974), but neither is 
government money. Money, at a macroeconomic level at least, is indicative of past 
investment, and it follows that the hoarding of money cannot be a leakage from investment. 
The idea that money hoards are ‘spending power in some absolute sense removed from the 
economy’ (Turner, 2013, p. 5) can only be aligned with the commodity view of money. 
Instead, money hoards are the result of an asset allocation decision because the investment 
decision associated with its existence has already been made. That money must indicate 
investment, and not hoarding, is an important detail that we return to when we consider the 
‘loanable funds’ theory of the rate of interest in Section 6.2. 
Next, we must consider the nature of the unit of account, which as Keynes (1930a, p. 3) 
suggests, is a pre-condition for money, before clarifying the relationship between money 
and the state. 
3.7 Unit of Account 
Without a unit of account distinct from monetary forms, ‘we have scarcely emerged from 
the stage of barter’ (Keynes, 1930a, p. 3). The existence of a monetary medium of exchange 
implies the existence of a unit of account, but not the converse (Hicks, 1989, p. 43). It must 
be emphasised again that the term ‘money’ represents at least two quite distinct concepts. 
The first is the unit of account, which is an abstract measurement of debt and value, no 
different in essence from a measure of weight or length. The second includes the objects 
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that perform the function of discharging a debt or acting as a store of value. The use of the 
term ‘money’ blurs this distinction: for instance, Hicks (1989, p. 43) cites the historical 
example of cattle used as ‘money’, but the evidence suggests that cattle were a unit of 
account, not a means of payment (Davies, 2002, p. 42). As we will see with the term 
‘liquidity’, the term ‘money’ fails to provide the ‘clear, unambiguous taxonomy’ 
(Davidson, 2006, p. 139) required for analysis. In fact, in common usage ‘money’ often 
refers to wealth more generally. 
Sayers (1960, p. 711) finds the idea of the abstract unit of account less ambiguous than the 
object of money. The money object itself, which has the functions of medium of exchange 
and store of value, is much more ambiguous: ‘I suspect that, because money in the abstract 
sense is an unambiguous concept, people have subconsciously believed that there must also 
be a simple answer to the question of what is money in the concrete sense.’ To maintain 
clarity, it must be recognised that the term ‘money’ does not refer to a singular thing with 
both the characteristics of a unit of account and a medium of exchange; instead, these are 
entirely different concepts. The unit of account is important: it measures all transactions 
and wealth. The money object itself has a supporting role, transformed from any metallic 
content it may have. 
As a pre-condition to the existence of money objects and markets, the unit of account must 
be introduced by an authority (Ingham, 2004a, p. 49). Tymoigne and Wray (2006, p. 3) 
‘believe that the monetary unit almost certainly required and requires some sort of authority 
to give it force’ and, rather than arising spontaneously, ‘that the unit of account was socially 
determined rather than the result of individual optimization.’ The importance of the unit of 
account, imposed by some authority, must be emphasised. ‘Without this unit of account, no 
debt instruments could have become monetary instruments because they could not have 
been recorded in a generalized unit of account but rather only as a specific debt’ (Tymoigne 
& Wray, 2006, p.12). In all likelihood, the unit of account is derived from measures of 
value associated with fines, tributes, ransom, or bribery (Davies, 2002, pp. 25-26; Einzig, 
1954, p. 62; Graeber, 2012; Ingham, 2004a, pp. 90-93). The ‘money of account is logically 
anterior and historically prior to market exchange and market value’ (Ingham, 2004a, p. 
179). 
Whether or not the abstractness of the unit of account is important analytically (Niehans, 
1978, pp. 118-119), we know that historically there are examples of this phenomenon. 
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Instead of the necessity of an object that corresponds to the unit of money, Davies (2002, 
p. 29, original emphasis) recounts that ‘for around half the long monetary history of the £ 
sterling in Britain this was not the case: there was no such thing as a pound; it existed only 
as a unit of account. There are numerous similar examples.’ Just so, other instances of 
currencies as a unit of account without an associated physical object are the euro currency 
(Ingham, 2004a, p. 6) and its predecessor the European currency unit, or ECU, (Stigum, 
1990, p. 212), and the URV (‘unit of real value’) during the introduction of the Brazilian 
Real (Sachs & Zini, 1996). The fact that modern money often only exists as computer 
entries is entirely consistent with the logical separation of unit and object: ‘the dollar is a 
measure of the value of all commodities, but is itself not a commodity, nor can it be 
embodied in any commodity. It is intangible, immaterial, abstract’ (Innes, 1914, p. 159). 
It has been recognised that, logically, money is credit denominated in a unit of account, 
imposed by an authority or convention. The power to set the unit of measure, however, 
does not award control over all that can be measured. The limitations of the authority and 
its theoretical relationship with money must be considered next. 
3.8 State Money 
Knapp’s (1924) state theory of money places emphasis on the government’s power to 
declare what it will accept in payment of taxes and the related concept of legal tender. In 
opposition to the commodity view of Menger (1892) that money emerged spontaneously 
from barter, the state theory denies the existence of money without state involvement, such 
that ‘Money is the Creature of Law’ (Schumpeter, 1954, p. 1090). The theory is based on 
the premise that, since money cannot arise spontaneously as in the commodity-money view, 
it must have arisen from government intervention. The result is a ‘non-market based theory 
of money’ which ‘places the state centre-stage’, wherein the ability to tax is necessary and 
sufficient to give value to government currency (Bell, 2000, p. 154). Consequently, the 
state theory is presented as more general than the ‘most traded’ commodity theory (Bell, 
2000, p. 160, n. 1). 
The state theory of money has been revived by neo-chartalists or proponents of ‘Modern 
Monetary Theory’. At its core, the state theory claims that the government is the ‘monopoly 
supplier’ of money and, since it has the power to issue inconvertible fiat or outside money, 
it does not face a hard budget, or finance, constraint (Bell, 2000, 2001; Tymoigne & Wray, 
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2013; Wray, 1998, pp. 74-96).12 
The monetarily sovereign government is the monopoly supplier of its currency and 
can issue currency of any denomination in physical or non-physical forms. As such 
the government has an unlimited capacity to pay for the things it wishes to purchase 
and to fulfill promised future payments, and has an unlimited ability to provide 
funds to the other sectors. Thus, insolvency and bankruptcy of this government is 
not possible. It can always pay. (Tymoigne & Wray, 2013, p. 5) 
In this view, government is the sole issuer of currency and therefore government spending, 
which creates this currency, must logically occur before the public is able to pay taxes. The 
government’s budget constraint, in which government spending must be financed by a 
combination of taxes, borrowing and new money stock, is rejected (Tymoigne & Wray, 
2013, p. 6). Instead, it is claimed, the government can achieve all of its expenditure with 
new currency issues; only thereafter does it need to adjust the level of taxation to ensure 
that that stock of money is consistent with price stability. 
Based on the essential elements of the nature of money and the credit view outlined up until 
this point, several problems with the state theory can be recognised. The first observation 
is that the theory does not distinguish between the unit of account, which indeed must be 
imposed by custom or authority, and the medium of exchange, which can take many forms. 
It is not logically correct to observe that the state has the ability to dictate the unit of account 
and then conclude that state money is the only form of money, any more than to conclude 
that the state is the only agent that can create objects that can be measured in metres or 
kilograms. This assertion will only hold if state money is the only form of money that can 
be used in transactions, a claim that has no historical or logical accuracy. As Ingham 
(2004a, p. 179) points out, ‘economic value is not natural like the relatively constant 
properties of, say, distance and weight.’ 
The historical support of the assertion that state money is the sole form of money, is 
undermined by state money’s limited use in comparison with credit, which has been the 
                                                         
12 Neo-Chartalist theory, restricted to the special case where the state pursues a flexible exchange-rate policy, 
is packaged into ‘Modern Monetary Theory’ (MMT) with other ideas such as ‘Employer of Last Resort’ and 
‘Net Financial Assets’, which are outside the scope of consideration here; see Wray (1998), Tymoigne & 
Wray (2013). For critiques, see Lavoie (2013), Mehrling (2000a) and Palley (2015). 
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predominate form of payment. ‘So unimportant indeed was the coinage that sometimes 
Kings did not hesitate to call it all in for re-minting and re-issue and still commerce went 
on just the same’ (Innes, 1913, p. 389). In addition, government money was often only 
accepted at a discount to other forms of money, it did not even maintain its face value in 
the nominated unit of account (Davis, 1900, p. 16; Innes, 1914, p. 153). ‘For most of 
economic history, the state has been rather weak and consequently dependent on money 
markets and financial markets for its projects’ (Mehrling, 2000c, p. 7). A monetary theory 
that can account for historical episodes must deal with the observed episodes of weakness 
of state money (Beggs, 2016). ‘The main problem for the state, in most periods and most 
places, has been to find a way to insert itself into the ongoing hierarchy of private credit 
and international money’ (Mehrling, 2000c, pp. 7-8). The same problems of establishing 
the worth of state credit are visible in attempts to adopt currency pegs or boards (Mehrling, 
2000c, p. 13). 
Ultimately, being a monopoly supplier of its own money does not logically make the state 
the monopoly supplier of all money. In the presence of other forms of money, such as 
private or merchant money, the balance between its spending and taxation will determine 
the strength of demand for state money. It does not follow from the ability to produce 
unlimited credits, that the state (or anyone) has unlimited spending capacity. Under the 
credit view, it is also undoubtedly true that each agent is a monopoly supplier of its own 
money, and the state is no exception. The state can emit as much credit, in either money or 
debt form, as will be accepted by the other agents in the economy.  Nevertheless, there are 
limits, since the 
…view of the role of the state as the sole creator and guarantor of money, although 
useful as a corrective to the metallistic theories current at the end of the nineteenth 
century, nevertheless carries the state theory of money to an absurd extreme. 
(Davies, 2002, p. 26)  
One problem with the state theory stems from its failure to recognise other forms of money; 
even the difference between state and central bank money is overlooked. When other 
monetary forms are recognised, they are viewed through lens of the state theory. The claim 
that only taxes give value to money is even applied to bank money. Rather than realising 
the bank money is necessary as part of the banking system’s role as a clearing house of 
credit, Bell (2001, p. 159) asserts that ‘even if convertibility to state money were suspended 
38 
 
indefinitely (except at clearing houses), bank promises, as long as they were accepted in 
payment of taxes, would continue to accepted.’ Although taxes are sufficient to give state 
money value (Tymoigne & Wray, 2013, p. 10), it does appear that, in the state theory, only 
taxes can give money value and, since only the state can raise taxes, only state money has 
value. This claim must be rejected historically and logically. 
Next, it can be recognised that the state has the ability to impose tax obligations on all other 
agents, with the result that these agents are obliged to obtain state credits to discharge their 
tax obligations. The necessity to pay tax with a state-issued token can give value to state 
money13; without the ability to tax, the value would fall to zero (Bell, 2001, p. 155, n. 2). 
The actual value, however, is not determined, nor is it the only way in which a money token 
can evoke value. In knocking over a metallist straw man, neo-chartalism overreaches by 
claiming not just ‘that state determines the money of the economy by declaring what it will 
accept in payment to itself’ (Bell, 2001, p. 154), but also that the state need not ‘pay market 
prices for the goods and services it purchases’ (Bell, 2001, p. 156, n. 2).  
It is because of its inability to determine the actual value of money that Schumpeter also 
finds Knapp’s (1924) state theory of money ‘absurd’ (Schumpeter, 1954, p. 1091) since it 
provides no theory or explanation of value: 
Had Knapp merely asserted that the state may declare an object or warrant or ticket 
or token (bearing a sign) to be lawful money and that a proclamation to this effect 
or even a proclamation to the effect that a certain pay-token or ticket will be 
accepted in discharge of taxes must go a long way toward imparting some value to 
that pay-token or ticket, he would have asserted a truth but a platitudinous one. 
Had he asserted that such action of the state will determine the value of that pay-
token or ticket, he would have asserted an interesting but false proposition. 
(Schumpeter, 1954, p. 1090, original emphasis) 
The ability to impose taxes requiring repayment using state credit is sufficient to give state 
credits value, but it is not sufficient to give the state arbitrary power to determine the value 
of its credits. 
                                                         
13 Cochrane (2005c) outlines a fiscal theory of the price level explaining the value of money by the ability of 
the government to tax. See Buiter (2005) and Rogers (2006) for a critique. 
39 
 
Similarly, Goodhart (2005a), whose ‘judgement is that the chartalist/credit approach is 
historically valid’ (p. 760), nevertheless doubts the neo-chartalists’ claims that ‘the state 
can choose anything it likes to function as the “money thing”’ (Wray, 2004, p. 243), beyond 
setting the unit of account. The neo-chartalists appear to reject the requirement that the 
state, in issuing credits backed by taxes, must maintain the value of its credit, thus directly 
contradicting a core tenet of the credit theory of money: 
The value of a credit depends not on the existence of any gold or silver or other 
property behind it, but solely on the “solvency” of the debtor, and that depends 
solely on whether, when the debt becomes due, he in his turn has sufficient credits 
on others to set off against his debts. If the debtor neither possesses nor can acquire 
credits which can be offset against his debts, then the possession of those debts is 
of no value to the creditors who own them. (Innes, 1913, p. 393) 
Nevertheless, the claim that taxes are not necessary to ‘finance’ government spending (Bell, 
2000) is consistent with the principles of the credit theory. Like all agents, governments 
can spend via emitting credit and this credit may or may not then take the form of money 
or debt. It is also consistent with credit theory that taxes are the source of the offsetting 
credits required to maintain the value of government credit ‘as an asset on the government’s 
balance sheet’ (Mehrling, 2000a, p. 401), and taxes do not need to be received prior to 
government spending. Nevertheless, the government, like any agent, has a budget 
constraint, whereby its expenditures are met by emitting new debts, and old debts must 
have means of retirement if they are to maintain their value. Tymoigne and Wray (2013, p. 
6) claim that the budget constraint is ‘not an equation describing the choices to fund 
government expenditures.’ This claim is incorrect. 
Other attempts by the neo-chartalists to enlist the support of the credit theory in their quest 
to accentuate the usefulness of a state-issued fiat currency (Wray, 2004) are not entirely 
successful. Innes himself explicitly points to the fallacy of their approach: ‘of all the false 
ideas current on the subject of money none is more harmful than that which attributes to 
the government the special function of monopolising the issues of money’ (Innes, 1914, p. 
152). Innes is very clear that all money is credit that credit takes many forms, and arises in 
any transaction. State money is a ‘promise to pay’ just like any other and, in credit theory 
terms, the emphasis placed on state money by the neo-chartalists is unwarranted and 
unnecessarily myopic. ‘All forms of money are identical in their nature’ (Innes, 1914, p. 
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154), so instead of focusing on the irredeemable nature of modern central bank money, the 
credit view emphasises the similarities between state money and other forms of credit. The 
former is a ‘promise to pay’ based on the government’s ability to impose a taxation debt on 
the public, whereas the latter are valued by their use in repaying private debts. 
In the credit view of money, state or outside money receives no special treatment; it is credit 
like all others, including those historical periods where the monetary system was based on 
a gold or silver standard. The ability to tax does not excuse the state from problems of 
maintaining the value of its debt:  
The fact, however, is that the more government money there is in circulation, the 
poorer we are. Of all the principles which we may learn from the credit theory, 
none is more important than this, and until we have thoroughly digested it we are 
not in a position to enact sound currency laws. (Innes, 1914, p. 161)  
The credit theory rejects the net-money doctrine, where outside money is unquestionably 
considered to be net wealth to the public. Although it is often overlooked in the literature, 
neo-chartalism ‘has a natural affinity with’ the quantity theory of money (Mehrling, 2000a, 
p. 405) and is therefore essentially a form of monetarism (Davies, 2002, p. 26), even though 
many advocates of MMT would be uncomfortable with this affinity. Since it is restricted 
to state money only (Bell, 2000, p. 154), it is also more limited than the credit theory. In 
the neo-chartalist view, state money is the only money available, and the only consequence 
of its over-issue can be inflation. By assuming away other forms of money, the neo-
chartalist theory is left by default, at the expense of ‘conflating money and state finance’ 
(Mehrling, 2000a, p. 401). 
Instead, state or outside money, although having the appearance of never ‘becoming due’, 
may lose its acceptability in payment if its value is not maintained. ‘The fact that the modern 
state arrogates to itself the right to determine what is and what is not money does not give 
it the alchemical power to create something from nothing’ (Mehrling, 2000a, p. 401). 
Instead, fiat money is simply another form of inside money: ‘the liability of the central 
bank’ (Mehrling, 2000a, p. 401). Conceptually, ‘“fiat money” is very much like metallic 
money subjected to a 100 per cent seigniorage charge’ (Young, [1924] 1999, p. 271); and 




All money is credit, including state money, and its value is ultimately derived from the debt 
it represents. Even fiat money issued by a central bank, which appears to be irredeemable, 
is credit since it ultimately is used to repay tax obligations or is an intermediated claim on 
the central bank’s assets. In addition, a distinction must be made between the money issued 
by a central bank and money issued by the state, and indeed the other forms of money. 
The state theory of money, being a special case of the credit theory, is true in its limited 
realm but should otherwise be subsumed into the broader and more applicable credit theory. 
The recognition that money is credit allows the emphasis to move from state money to 
credit more generally, since state money is but one form of credit. The current institutional 
arrangements mean that state money is generally the strongest form of money but this 
strength is not a continuously-observed phenomenon throughout history, and so should not 
be allowed to dominate the analysis of money. State money should not take such a ‘logically 
privileged position’ (Schumpeter, 1954, p. 719, original emphasis). In the analysis of 
liquidity, all forms of money need attention so that the picture of liquidity is complete. 
All money is credit in that it ultimately represents a promise to pay and is in essence an 
intermediated claim on the credit of the money issuer. Even where the monetary asset is 
explicitly linked to a fixed amount of commodity, the ultimate product is a promise to pay 
the stated amount of commodity. Monetary theories in which a commodity itself is the 
medium of exchange are non-monetary; instead, they represent a model of idealised pure 
commodity exchange. Although there are many examples of metallic-based currencies, the 
value of money does not arise from any metallic content through any logical necessity. 
Consequently, monetary theories where an unrefined commodity is the basis of money can 
be rejected on grounds that their ontology is insufficiently aligned with reality.  
Money is recognised as the most-liquid asset, and so a broader definition of money allows 
for a richer investigation of liquidity. As will be seen in Chapter 5, ‘liquidity’ is also a term 
that covers a host of concepts without sharp boundaries, and by considering all forms of 
‘money’ more of the concept of liquidity can be encompassed. By treating all money as 
credit, we are able to increase the boundaries of the object of study so that all forms of 
liquidity can be captured in the analytical framework. For instance, recognising the distinct 
nature of the unit of account allows for the analysis of the shadow banking system as a 
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provider of modern money. Complementing this approach is a rejection of the quantity 
theory of money because of its limited application to fiat money only.  
In summary, the evidence suggests that money and credit are more complex phenomena 
than is admitted by the commodity or state theories. The realisation that money is a special 
form of credit in a dynamic hierarchy invites us to picture it as a spectrum rather than in a 
fixed supply, and to reconsider money’s neutrality in the acts of commerce. 
For a deeper understanding of the credit nature of the monetary system the primary supplier 




4 Banks – Clearing Houses of Credit 
4.1 Introduction 
The characteristics of the banking system, which plays such a large part in the creation and 
management of money, are fundamental to the understanding of liquidity and money. This 
chapter places the phenomenon of money into its natural institutional context: the banking 
system. 
A bank is fundamentally a ‘dealer in debts or credits’ (Hawtrey, 1919, p. 4) or equivalently 
‘an institution that deals in debts’ (Young, [1924] 1999, p. 272). The activity of banking is 
best considered as a swapping of IOUs, where the IOUs issued by the banking system are 
themselves used as a medium of exchange (Mehrling, 2011, p. 72; Tymoigne & Wray, 
2006, p. 13). The constant issuing and cancelling of debts are represented by the terms 
efflux and reflux, and signify that money, in the form of bank liabilities, is continuously 
created and destroyed. By the reflux mechanism any excess in the supply of money is 
automatically extinguished (Lavoie, 1999). ‘Debts and credits are perpetually trying to get 
into touch with one another, so that they may be written off against each other, and it is the 
business of the banker to bring them together’ (Innes, 1913, p. 402). 
Since bank liabilities are money, it follows that banks do not simply re-lend state money as 
suggested by the misleading analogy that money is deposited in a bank just like ‘we entrust 
our bag to the cloakroom clerk’ (Cannan, 1921, p. 29). Instead,  
…[the banker] lends the same sums over and over again before the first borrower 
has repaid: that is to say, he does not merely find successive employments for the 
sum entrusted to him, but many employments which that sum then fills 
simultaneously. (Schumpeter, 1954, p. 320, original emphasis)  
The cloakroom analogy fails because the ticket received in exchange for a bag cannot be 
used as a bag. The ticket received in exchange for state money deposited at a bank, on the 
other hand, can be spent as if it were itself state money. The purchasing power embedded 
in the original money can be ‘used’ twice, something not possible with bags. Instead, it 
must be recognised that a bank can create money by the expansion of its balance sheet: 
‘from the point of view of the rest of the economy, the bank has “created” money. This is 
not to be denied’ (Hicks, 1989, p. 58).  
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Banking is not money lending; to lend, a money lender must have money. The 
fundamental banking activity is accepting, that is, guaranteeing that some party is 
creditworthy. A bank, by accepting a debt instrument, agrees to make specified 
payments if the debtor will not or cannot. Such an accepted or endorsed note can 
then be sold in the open market. A bank loan is equivalent to a bank's buying a note 
that it has accepted. (Minsky, [1986] 2008, p. 256) 
Banks do not ‘lend’ money; it is the distinguishing feature of banks that their liabilities are 
money: 
It should be obvious that banks’ role in money creation does not arise from their 
use of “leverage” (debt financing) per se. All sorts of firms, commercial and 
financial alike, employ leverage—often in large amounts—but are not said to 
create money. Nor is money creation synonymous with “lending” (or investing) in 
and of itself. Finance companies are prominent in the lending business, after all. 
Rather, it is the combination of banks’ investment activities and their reliance on a 
particular type of liability—deposits—that is responsible for their role in 
augmenting the money supply. (Ricks, 2011, p. 77, original emphasis) 
Through the lens of the commodity view, however, this money creation process is often 
regarded as ‘alchemy’ (King, 2016). The idea that bank credit economises money-proper 
by increasing its velocity is an impediment to a deeper understanding of credit and money. 
‘There surely must be other ways of expressing these practices than by calling these bank 
notes embodiments of velocity of circulation—a velocity so great that it enables a thing to 
be in different places at the same time’ (Schumpeter, 1954, p. 320). Rather than increasing 
the velocity of money, banks increase the supply of the means of payment—a feat that 
cannot be achieved with any commodity. Instead, money should be identified with credit 
since 
…credit instruments, or some of them, intrude into the monetary system; and, by 
the same token, money in turn is but a credit instrument, a claim to the only final 
means of payment, the consumers’ good. By now this theory [the credit theory of 
money]—which of course is capable of taking many forms and stands in need of 
many elaborations—may be said to prevail. (Schumpeter, 1954, p. 321) 
Consequently, the class of money should be extended to include banknotes and checking 
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deposits, and ‘be broadly defined to include all debts that transfer purchasing power from 
the future to the present’ (Wray, 1992b, p. 301). Next, we consider one of the most 
important credit instruments. 
4.2 The Bill of Exchange 
Essential to understanding banking and credit clearing is the bill of exchange or trade credit. 
In this primitive instrument, all modern instruments affecting the provision of liquidity can 
be recognised and the decoupling of the state from the supply of liquidity can be seen in its 
simplest form. The bill of exchange allows trade to be enacted without the need for any 
recognisable form of money. In addition, a bill of exchange can be transferred and used as 
a secondary medium of exchange, so that bills form both part of the supply and the demand 
for money as not just ‘elements in the total demand for money but elements in its supply’ 
(Schumpeter, 1954, p. 695). The bill of exchange stands as a form of private money 
(Ingham, 2004a, p. 116). 
Furthermore, the bill of exchange has a long historical pedigree: 
The use of bank deposits, bills of exchange and other forms of credit as substitutes 
for banknotes had long been acknowledged in the literature; on the historical order 
of events as we know them, it might rather have been argued that banknotes were 
a substitute for bills of exchange. (Sayers, 1960, p. 717)  
According to Davies (2002, p. 34), banking in Babylon predated coinage by close to a 
millennium. Analysis of the bill of exchange, or trade credit, is useful to complete the 
picture of money as payment in exchange. 
A bill of exchange can most easily be visualised as a post-dated cheque, whereby final 
payment is not due until the maturity of the bill, that is, the post-date. At the beginning of 
the process, the creditor ‘draws’ the bill on the debtor, the drawee. Then the drawer sends 
the bill to the drawee, who ‘accepts’ it, thereby committing to paying the owner of the bill 
the notional amount at its maturity. The drawer need not hold the bill to maturity.  Instead, 
the bill can be sold, generally for a sum less than its notional face value, by means of 
‘discounting’, effectively paying the purchaser an interest rate. Even after selling the bill, 
the original creditor is also liable for the notional amount of the bill should the original 
drawee fail to pay (Sayers, 1964, pp. 46-48). There is no limit to the amount of 
rediscounting possible for a single bill. Bills of exchange that are hoarded and held to 
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maturity can be classified as ‘simple credit’ to distinguish them from a ‘currency of credit’ 
that circulates and acts as payment in other, unrelated transactions (Mehrling, 1996, p. 334). 
Since bank liabilities are monetary and private non-banking liabilities are not, the 
discounting of bills by banks provides liquidity and maturity transformation services, an 
activity that is not naturally provided by other economic agents. 
The process of discounting bills of exchange is the logical and historical starting point for 
understanding the business of banking. Bills of exchange, as a form of credit to make 
payment in transactions, can arise simply in the normal course of trade. Even a ‘market for 
acceptances of bills of exchange’ (Hicks, 1989, p. 48, original emphasis) does not 
necessarily require specialists in financial dealing such as bankers and brokers. 
Nevertheless, from such a market for bills, it is natural that discount specialists would 
emerge (Hicks, 1989, p. 49). These specialists are dealers that supply ‘money’ in the present 
for a price, the interest rate. Bills of the same quality but different maturities have different 
interest rates due to ‘a pure matter of time-preference—a pure rate of interest’ (Hicks, 1989, 
p. 49). Similarly, different borrowers, even with the same maturity and nominal amount in 
the unit of account, will be worth different amounts because of credit risk and lack of 
familiarity across all other agents. 
Intermediaries are essential for a competitive market in loans due to the problem of 
familiarity with borrowers, otherwise ‘the establishment of a competitive market for simple 
lending is not at all a simple matter’ (Hicks, 1989, p. 50). The banking system, by collecting 
the bills of many agents, can balance debts and credits, and provide a system of cancelling 
or ‘clearing’ offsetting bills. ‘There is thus a constant circulation of debts and credits 
through the medium of the banker who brings them together and clears them as the debts 
fall due’ (Innes, 1913, p. 403). 
Demand deposits have exchange value because a multitude of debtors to banks 
have outstanding debts that call for the payment of demand deposits to banks. 
These debtors will work and sell goods or financial instruments to get demand 
deposits. The exchange value of deposits is determined by the demands of debtors 
for deposits needed to fulfill their commitments. (Minsky, [1986] 2008, p. 258) 
Ultimately, credits are useful only because they provide a means of repaying a debt to the 
original borrower. State money repays a debt to the state. Despite appearances, bank debts 
are not repaid with state money; a debtor to a bank can only repay with an equivalent 
47 
 
amount of bank money. From the point of view of a bank, state money does not cancel a 
bank debt; it merely replaces it with a credit against the state.  
In considering the relationship between the state and the banking system, Tymoigne and 
Wray (2006) observe that the state spends its liabilities through the banking system, 
conceptually just like any other economic agent. They also claim that ‘the state cannot 
“spend” its tax receipts, which are just reductions of outstanding state liabilities’ (Tymoigne 
& Wray, 2006, p.13). There is no reason, however, to exclude the possibility that the state 
can amass credits against private agents, denominated in the unit of account, held as 
liabilities of the banking system, just like any other economic agent. The state has the power 
to get its liabilities accepted as credit in the banking system because of its ability to impose 
taxes, and this is generally, not always, the better credit in the hierarchy (Mehrling, 2013a), 
but it does not follow that it is somehow any different in concept from other money or credit 
issuers. State money itself can be viewed as a form of bill of exchange. The most significant 
difference from a standard bill of exchange is that state money is undated and requires no 
discount on acceptance. It can be used in the clearing process to settle a tax obligation 
immediately. As we shall see, this undated nature of money is crucial. 
Hicks (1989, p. 56) assigns three activities to a bank: ‘(1) accepting deposits, (2) 
discounting bills, and (3) making advances to customers.’ Once it is recognised that central 
bank or state money is simply a state-issued bill of exchange, then activities 1 and 2 differ 
only in the identification of the issuer of the bill being discounted. Accepting deposits is 
conceptually the same as discounting bills of exchange issued by the state; the outcome is 
that the bank intermediates lending to the state or central bank, which was formerly lent 
directly by the depositor. In either case, the lending has already been made, since the money 
exists, and the existence of a new deposit does not imply that the bank can lend this again. 
Nor does a bank require a reserve of state money to engage in more lending. Accepting 
deposits should be interpreted as intermediating government borrowing, nothing more.  
Similarly, Hicks’s third activity—making advances to customers—is merely the 
simultaneous act of creating a bill of exchange and discounting it. The act of taking a loan 
from a bank is the simultaneous creation of a new bill drawn by the bank on the borrower 
and a new bill drawn by the borrower on the bank, the latter being bank money. The 
borrower uses the bill drawn on the bank for the purchase requiring the loan. In essence, 
Hicks’s three activities are only of one genus: the creation and clearing of credit. 
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Furthermore, potential borrowers can also pre-arrange lines of credit, or overdrafts, 
whereby this process of dual bill creation can occur at the discretion of the borrower 
(Moore, 1988). The existence of undrawn overdrafts, and their implications for the 
measured stock of money, is revealed by a comparison between the traditional, post-war 
English system where overdrafts were left undrawn and the contemporary American system 
where they were fully drawn and the unused balances were left on deposit (Sayers, 1964, 
p. 35). Conceptually these two forms of unused spending power are the same, but the 
implications for the money stock are significant and highlight the difficulties associated 
with its measurement in the quantity theory (Black 1970b; Schumpeter, 1954, p. 705). In 
the former setting the money stock, as measured by deposits, is smaller, yet there is no 
difference in the amount of ‘money’, or purchasing power, available. ‘Banks create credit 
and thus purchasing power’ (Turner, 2013, p. 20) but ‘any attempt to measure the definitive 
quantity of transaction balances, separate from other bank (or shadow bank) liabilities has 
become increasingly impossible’ (Turner, 2013, p. 22).  
The implications for bank liquidity are equally significant. In fact, the very existence of the 
bill of exchange in its undiscounted form is a monetary element that needs consideration. 
Trade credit ‘introduces considerable elasticity into the response of business to efforts by 
the monetary authorities to compress liquidity’ (Radcliffe Committee, 1959, p. 103). The 
use of trade credit is an extension of money achieved by non-financial firms expanding 
their balance sheets, and these liabilities should be included in the class of liquid assets. 
‘The distinction between banks as creators of credit and other firms as users or 
intermediaries in the monetary field is if not completely false at least misleading’ (Sayers, 
1960, p. 713).  
As soon as we realize that there is no essential difference between those forms of 
“paper credit” that are used for paying and lending, and that demand, supported by 
“credit,” acts upon prices in essentially the same manner as does demand supported 
by legal tender, we are on the way toward a serviceable theory of the credit 
structure and, in particular, toward the discovery of the relations between prices 
and interest. (Schumpeter, 1954, pp. 718-719) 
For the purposes of effective demand, the relevant quantity is the availability of the means 
of purchasing power, in any form. Once circulating and non-circulating credit is included 
in the means of payments for transactions, it can be shown that the means can expand pari 
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passu with the value of transactions (Mehrling, 1996, p. 333).  
It is this wide concept of liquid assets that we must put, in the place conventionally 
occupied by “the supply of money,” as the monetary quantity influencing total 
effective demand for goods and services. And we must interpret it widely enough 
to include credit that can be brought into existence concurrently with a decision to 
exercise demand. (Sayers, 1960, p. 712)  
Trade credit in a closed cycle of efflux and reflux still provides effective demand, even 
though the net amount may be zero (Sayers, 1960, p. 713).14 Its effect is significant since 
‘trade credit is so large in relation to bank credit that a comparatively small lengthening of 
trade credit would normally offset quite a large proportionate reduction in bank credit’ 
(Radcliffe Committee, 1959, p. 103). The banking system is not the only source of credit 
creation, control over credit supplied by banks cannot be justified unless a firm relationship 
exists between bank and non-bank credit (Sayers, 1960, p. 714). Is there any limit to this 
credit creation? 
4.3 The Creation of Credit 
The discounting or acquisition of bills of exchange by banks is ‘effected chiefly by the 
creation of liabilities in the form of deposits’ (Dunbar, 1922, p. 33); no particular reserve 
of state money is required. This naturally leads to the question:  
What determines the limit to which this process can be carried?  
If depositors seldom demanded the payment to which they are entitled, and were 
content with the mere transfer of their existing rights among themselves as a 
conventional currency, the bank might dispense with holding any large amount of 
specie or cash in any form and keep most of its resources employed in its 
productive securities. (Dunbar, 1922, p. 33) 
In response, it must first be recognised that the possibility of an unlimited expansion of the 
banking system as a whole, as distinct from the constraints on individual banks, only exists 
                                                         
14 The reader should be aware that Professor R. S. Sayers (Sayers, 1960, 1964) was also a member of the 
‘Committee on the Working of the Monetary System’ chaired by Lord Radcliffe, and a principal author of 
the committee’s report (Radcliffe Committee, 1959). 
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if the banks offer indistinguishable monies (Glasner, 1985, p. 57). If each bank promises to 
convert their monetary liabilities into a common form, such as state money or gold, then 
each bank’s money is interchangeable and hence indistinguishable. With convertibility, 
each bank individually cannot expand its lending, but the banking system together perhaps 
can (Keynes, 1930a, p. 26; Schumpeter, 1954, p. 730). This assertion ignores the level of 
reserves for the banking system as a whole, and the level of competitiveness within the 
system. Expansion is easier if the banks are not competing. Individual banks do compete 
by offering convertibility and the payment of interest on deposits, both of which place limits 
on the creation of bank money (Glasner, 1985, p. 58). Competition, and not reserve 
requirements, is the constraint on the banking system’s issuing of money (Glasner, 1985, 
p. 57). In neoclassical terms, if each marginal investment or new loan is subject to 
diminishing returns, it follows that ‘by paying competitive interest on deposits, each bank 
reaches a profit maximizing equilibrium at which the incentive, under given cost and 
demand conditions, to create additional notes and deposits is exhausted’ (Glasner, 1989, p. 
216; see also Tobin, 1963). 
The efficacy of convertibility as a limit on banknote issuance is the crux of the historical 
debate between the ‘Currency’ and ‘Banking’ schools. For the Currency School, the value 
of paper money was derived solely from its correspondence to metallic currency, with the 
implication that regulations were required to limit its issue and prevent price inflation, a 
view derived from the quantity theory of money (Ingham, 2004a, pp. 41-42). For example, 
one fear was that paper money would mask the effects of an efflux of gold and prevent the 
money supply from contracting in accordance with Hume’s (1742, Chapter II.V) price-
specie-flow mechanism.15 The Currency School recognised that gold and state money must 
be used in final settlement so that the growth of the bank credit superstructure could not get 
too far out of alignment. Since Bank Rate was used to protect the gold reserve, the hierarchy 
of money would impose itself, but with a problematic time lag and instability (Sayers, 1960, 
p. 718). 
For the Banking School, supported by the ‘Real Bills Doctrine’ and the ‘Law of Reflux’, 
regulatory control of banknote issue was unnecessary. The Real Bills Doctrine—the 
                                                         
15 For critiques of Hume’s flawed price-specie-flow mechanism see Godley and Lavoie (2012, pp. 196-197) 
and Samuelson ([1980] 2015). 
51 
 
recommendation that bank-issued notes should only be backed by non-speculative or trade-
based bills of exchange—would ensure that note issue (known as efflux) would only meet 
the ‘needs of trade’, thereby ‘controlling the quality of money’ (Mehrling, 1996, p. 332). 
The Law of Reflux states that note convertibility, by providing a means to return unwanted 
banknotes to the issuer in return for deposits, which must pay interest, makes an over-issue 
impossible. An over-issue of notes was impossible and the convertibility into gold would 
be enough to ensure uniform world prices by the law of reflux (Glasner, 1985, p. 60).  
Both schools agreed on the need for a gold standard and that the potential for an over-issue 
of notes existed. The Banking School relied on convertibility and the fact that deposits were 
no different from notes, whereas the Currency School merely wanted more control over 
Bank of England notes (Schumpeter, 1954, p. 728).  
The Banking School were right in emphasising the variety and the importance of 
sources of credit, but the Currency School were right in arguing that the 
superstructure of credit could not for very long get out of line with the supply of 
the basic money, the gold and bank-notes. (Sayers, 1960, p. 718)  
The result of the debate was a modification of the Currency School’s policy (Sayers, 1960, 
pp. 718-719) with the recommendation that the central bank must act as a lender of last 
resort (LOLR) to prevent instability (Bagehot, 1873). In the end, the differences between 
the Banking and Currency Schools were more of a practical nature than theoretical, but 
they serve to highlight the conflicting aspects and interpretations of the hierarchy of money. 
That modern banks are legally required to convert deposits into state money on demand is 
an arbitrary institutional arrangement enforced by the state and is a prime factor that 
contributes to bank runs, credit crunches and insolvency.  
The abolition of the law of legal tender would help to mitigate such a situation 
[credit crunch or bank run] by making everybody realize that, once he had become 
a depositor in a bank, he had sold his credit to that bank and was not entitled to 
demand payment in coin or government obligations. (Innes, 1913, p. 405)  
Just so, Galbraith (1975, p. 98) outlines historical periods where convertibility was 
suspended or not enforced. For instance, ‘by the time of the [American] Civil War ... [a]n 
estimated 7000 different bank notes [inconvertible currency] were in greater or lesser 
degree of circulation, the issue of some 1600 different or defunct state banks.’ 
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Convertibility is not an intrinsic characteristic of banking. Innes (1914, p. 153) outlines 
historical periods where bank money has been stronger than state money, thus showing that 
the order in the hierarchy of money is not immutable.  
It is only recently, perhaps since the consolidation of the British war debt, that state 
finance has been on a sufficiently sound basis to rival private finance. And it is 
even more recently that state finance has been on a sufficiently sound basis to back 
a convertible domestic currency. (Mehrling, 2000c, p. 7, n. 5) 
Immediate convertibility is a consequence of making state money legal tender. Originally 
introduced to enforce the acceptability of the state monetary token (regardless of metal 
content) it has morphed into the only acceptable means of payment. 
The effect of this impression is peculiarly unfortunate. When suspicion arises in 
the minds of depositors, they immediately demand payment of their credit in coins 
or their equivalent namely a credit on the State bank, or "lawful money,"—a 
demand which cannot possibly be complied with, and the result is to augment the 
panic by the idea getting abroad that the bank is insolvent. Consequently at the 
beginning of a stringency, every bank tries to force its debtors to pay their debts in 
coin or credit on the government, and these debtors, in their turn, have to try to 
extract the same payment from their debtors, and to protect themselves, are thus 
forced to curtail their expenditure as much as possible. When this situation 
becomes general, buying and selling are restricted within comparatively narrow 
limits, and, as it is only by buying that credits can be reduced and by selling that 
debts can be paid, it comes to pass that everybody is clamoring for payment of the 
debts due to them and no one can pay them, because no one can sell. Thus the panic 
runs in a vicious circle. (Innes, 1913, p. 405).  
That banks are required to convert their money into state money on demand has the effect 
of giving the impression that state money is the only money-proper. Hence, the current 
institutional setting of banks maintaining equality at par with central bank money is 
logically akin to the gold standard. As such, it could then be imagined that banks could 
move from this standard to an equivalent ‘fiat’ standard where they do not maintain 
convertibility into any commodity or money. With convertibility suspended or halted, bank 
monies would become distinguishable, with the result that a ‘depositor sells to his banker 
his right on someone else and, properly speaking, his sole right so long as the banker is 
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solvent, is to transfer his credit to someone else, should the latter choose to accept it’ (Innes, 
1913, 404). Instead, banks would issue their own individual money notes, which would be 
the only means possible for borrowers from that particular bank to repay their debts to that 
bank.  
The acceptability of each bank’s notes would depend on their ‘monetary space’ (Ingham, 
2004a), that is, on the extent of each bank’s reach into the activity of commerce in the 
region it serves. The value of each bank’s notes would depend on the perceived 
creditworthiness of its customers. There would be variation in the value of bank moneys 
just as displayed by the US banking system in 1814 when ‘the banks outside New England 
suspended specie payment’ (Galbraith, 1975, p. 84). A hierarchy of banknote discounts 
developed: 
The notes of New England banks, since they were exchangeable into gold or silver, 
were accepted at par therewith. The slightly less promising notes of New York 
were subject to a discount of 10 per cent. The distinctly more garish notes of 
Baltimore and Washington banks had a 20 per cent discount. Numerous notes from 
west of the Appalachians were at a 50 per cent discount. (Galbraith, 1975, pp. 84-
85) 
In all likelihood, the outcome would be either a dramatic shrinking of the effective 
monetary sphere of any one bank or a consolidation of the banking industry as banks 
merged to provide the brand familiarity and diversification necessary to ensure that their 
own monetary liabilities maintained a level of stability suitable to their customers. 
Although each bank’s liability would not be convertible into a common element, an 
interbank market and interbank reserves would probably still be necessary. As central banks 
that issue fiat currencies maintain reserves of other central bank currencies, banks with 
distinguishable monies would need to do the same. 
Nevertheless, the current institutional arrangements include a commitment by the banking 
system to maintain immediate convertibility from its monetary liabilities into state money. 
The banking system has developed many techniques for managing this obligation. 
4.4 Asset and Liability Management 
Without the explicit LOLR support by a central bank, a commitment by the banking system 
to maintain convertibility to state or central bank money exposes each bank to liquidity 
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risk: the risk of a bank run (Goodhart, 2008). According to Hicks (1989, p. 59) the three 
forms of protection are: 1) the law of large numbers, but this could fall apart due to inter-
dependencies, 2) a cash reserve and 3) the interbank market (liability management). Hicks, 
however, has missed another: 4) matched-book or term funding, which is a more traditional 
form of liability management. We first consider the nature of bank deposits before turning 
to the interbank market, cash reserves and matched-book funding. 
‘Deposits in commercial banks, whatever their origin, are constantly being used’ (Dunbar, 
1922, p. 27) so a bank must keep a stock of assets which provide ‘easy conversion into cash 
in case of need’ (Dunbar, 1922, p. 29). Traditionally, short-term lending is considered ‘self-
liquidating’ (Sayers, 1964, p. 183) and is the preferred means of satisfying the near-term 
need for cash. Long-term assets pose a liquidity problem: a bank would need a portfolio of 
shiftable assets. Assets that meet this criterion might be government and near-government 
bonds, but traded equities would not. Contrary to modern practice, mortgages, now a 
standard bank asset, would be traditionally unacceptable due to their illiquidity (Dunbar, 
1922, p. 29). 
To manage the liquidity risk resulting from this mixture of liquid and illiquid assets two 
types of bank liabilities arise: demand or cash deposits; and term, savings or time deposits. 
The former are held ‘for the purpose of making payment’ and are therefore monetary, 
whereas the latter are a ‘means of employing savings’ (Keynes, 1930a, p. 36). Term 
deposits must first be converted into demand deposits before they can be used to make 
payment. That monetary liabilities can be converted into non-monetary liabilities is an 
often-overlooked channel for reflux, and the distinction between these two types of bank 
liabilities must be emphasised. The problem is compounded by including non-monetary 
deposit liabilities in many of the broader measures of the money supply. ‘This duality of 
function is the clue to many difficulties in the modern Theory of Money and Credit and the 
source of some series confusions of thought’ (Keynes, 1930b, p. 214). The liabilities of the 
banking system bifurcate by function: 
The first function of the banking system is to provide payment transmission 
facilities which typically consist of chequeable deposit liabilities (“transactions 
money”), thereby acting as a clearing house in transferring current payments by 
means of book entries. Their second function is intermediation, thereby providing 
“asset money” (or rather indirect monetary and non-monetary liabilities in 
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general). (Bibow, 1995, p. 660, original emphasis) 
The amount of each functional type depends on the term of the lending by the bank; the 
interplay between the tenor of a bank’s liability structure and the convertibility of its assets 
is all important. For instance, if term deposit rates are too low—in an attempt to increase 
profits—then banks will have too many monetary liabilities and, for any given set of assets, 
their ‘balance-sheet liquidity’ will deteriorate (Hicks, 1962). 
The liquidity of a bank balance sheet depends on a comparison of the term of its deposits 
and its liquid assets (Brunnermeier, Gorton, & Krishnamurthy, 2011), where the liquid 
quality of assets will ‘vary over time and over state of mind’ (Hicks, 1989, p. 63). The 
purpose of a fixed-term deposit is twofold. First, the holder is unable to alter its structure. 
A term deposit has a definite maturity date and, until that time, it must maintain its current 
form, even if transferred to another holder. Second, a term deposit cannot be used to repay 
a debt to the issuing bank. As emphasised so far, money must be undated, and available to 
pay debts immediately. 
Debts due at a certain moment can only be cancelled by being offset against credits 
which become available at that moment; that is to say that a creditor cannot be 
compelled to accept in payment of a debt due to him an acknowledgment of 
indebtedness which he himself has given and which only falls due at a later time. 
(Innes, 1913, pp. 393-394)  
In the sense that money can be applied to the repayment of debts, fixed-term bank liabilities 
are not money. 
Two examples are helpful: term deposits and negotiable certificates of deposit (NCDs).16 
Each is structured so that the issuing bank has no obligation to provide convertibility. Each 
helps preserve the bank’s balance-sheet liquidity. Both pay a fixed rate of interest at 
maturity. To preserve the bank’s balance-sheet liquidity, the liquidity risk has been passed 
to the deposit holder. For instance, the term deposit holder has accepted a form of market 
illiquidity. A term deposit provides price stability at maturity, but cannot be broken without 
violating its terms, nor can it be transferred to another depositor. It has limited price stability 
but is otherwise entirely illiquid. The NCD, in comparison, is transferable in a secondary 
                                                         
16 Chapter 5 provides a more detailed discussion of the various forms of liquidity referred to here. 
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market and is liquid in a marketability sense, but, because a fixed rate of interest is paid at 
maturity, the value of the certificate will vary over time, exposing the holder to market risk. 
Again, the bank has protected its liquidity position by placing market-liquidity risk onto the 
NCD holder. 
As Minsky (1957) points out in his discussion of financial innovation, profit-seeking 
activities have the capacity to structurally change the financial system, especially during 
periods of official monetary restraint, and alter the efficacy of monetary policy and the 
behaviour of the financial system in ways that are not fully understood at the time. One 
innovation that minimises the use of central bank money is the interbank market. 
4.5 Interbank Market 
In a banking system with many banks, banks ultimately use ‘bankers' money’ to settle 
interbank payments; examples are gold, central bank reserves, and deposits at 
correspondent banks (Minsky, [1986] 2008, pp. 225-226). In the simplest case—when two 
parties conducting a transaction have accounts at a single bank—payments can be effected 
merely by means of transferring ownership of the bank’s liability. If each party has accounts 
at different banks, then the transaction will enter the pool of inevitable two-way transactions 
between the two banks, and the amount owing from one bank to another can simply be 
settled as a deposit by the creditor bank with the debtor bank. The interbank market yields 
the simple outcome that the receiver’s bank replaces the original depositor, and there is no 
requirement for a transfer of central bank money. In effect, the receiving bank lends the 
paying bank the funds to make the transaction. That some banks are habitually lending 
banks and others are deposit taking or savings banks means that this is standard practice. 
This process is simplified even further by means of a clearing-house system whereby the 
bilateral process of transaction netting is made with a single central counterparty, and only 
the net amount of transactions is settled (Dunbar, 1922, p. 47). In the course of many 
transactions, each bank will attempt to net out transaction traffic so that only net deposit 
balances between banks are established. Effectively ‘banks use the liabilities of the 
government only for net clearing’ (Tymoigne & Wray, 2006, p.13).  
Under a net settlement system, there is no requirement for central bank balances in the 
normal course of events. The banking system can provide payment services almost without 
regard to the existence of state money (Turner, 2013, p. 3). Since ‘a debt can be just as well 
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cancelled against another debt as extinguished by a payment of money’, in world without 
money, a banker ‘can obtain credit from another banker’ (Hawtrey, 1919, p. 4). The 
introduction of real-time gross settlement (RTGS), however, has increased the need for 
central bank funds for intraday interbank payments. The central bank must supply 
collateralised intraday loans (by means of repo) to ensure that each bank has sufficient 
central bank funds to handle these payments. These loans are repaid at the end of the day, 
so overnight balances at the central bank are small (Dent & Dison, 2012). As the monopoly 
supplier of the RTGS funds, the central bank is able to enforce its policy rate because ‘it is 
always in a position to impose losses on individual banks that do no manage their cash 
flows effectively or on the banking system as a whole when it seeks to raise its target rate’ 
(Rogers, 2008a, p. 23). 
As stated in Section 4.3, when banks maintain convertibility, they operate as if on a gold 
standard, where instead of gold they agree to exchange their liabilities for central bank 
money at par. Each bank within a state monetary sphere needs to ensure that its balance of 
payments, or transfers of central bank money, is sustainable. Their means of ensuring an 
appropriate balance of payments is the interest rate that they pay on their liabilities: in the 
face of a central bank money outflow, they must raise rates, and lower them if there is too 
much inflow. This modus operandi is exactly that of central banks on a gold standard and 
means that banks must pay market rates on deposits.  
Just as many central banks would maintain parity with gold, many commercial banks adopt 
a link with one central bank. The interbank market provides the means for banks to lend 
each other the central bank money required to satisfy payment imbalances in the same way 
as, under the gold standard, central banks would lend each other gold reserves in times of 
payment imbalances to maintain an orderly currency market (De Cecco, 1991, p. 321). This 
ability to lend the means of payment between banks has implications for the dynamics of 
the banking system. 
4.6 Central Bank Reserves 
That a deposit transferred from one bank to another is ultimately settled by means of a 
transferral of a deposit, or bankers’ money, at the central bank has often led to the 
conclusion that central bank reserve balances play a significant role in the lending decisions 
of banks. The thinking is that, if an individual bank knows that new lending will require 
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the surrendering of its store of reserves to other banks, it will be hesitant in its lending. By 
this reasoning, if a bank deems it prudent to keep a ‘fractional reserve’ equivalent to 10% 
of its deposit liabilities then $100 of central bank money can only be scaled up to $900 of 
bank money in a process known as the ‘money multiplier’ (Ferguson, 2008, p. 50; Ingham, 
2004a, p. 139). This process, however, does not distinguish between on-demand and term 
deposits or take account of the influence of interest rates. The theory of the money 
multiplier is supported by the observation that in many jurisdictions banks are required to 
maintain a reserve of central bank money as a proportion of their deposit liabilities. 
Cash reserves are conceptually no different from gold reserves for a central bank operating 
under a gold standard and are ultimately managed by adjustments to the bank’s discount 
rate. For commercial banks, the story is the same: term deposits are raised to ensure that a 
bank’s liquidity mismatch is mitigated while still maintaining the desired level of 
profitability. Term funding enables a bank to match the maturity profile of its portfolio of 
bills or other loans. Banks, at an individual level, must postpone the possibility of reflux or 
convertibility for some portion of their liabilities to maintain their cash reserve, and this 
activity affects the liability structure of the banking system as whole. 
The operation of monetary policy by a ‘channel system’ reveals the irrelevance of a cash 
reserve, and its independence from interest-rate policy (Lavoie, 2010).17 Under this system, 
the central bank lends settlement funds throughout the day to those banks needing to make 
interbank payments. At the end of the trading day, some banks will have central bank 
deposits and some will be indebted to the central bank. All banks are expected to repay 
outstanding balances by the day’s end. If a bank ends the day’s trading owing money to the 
central bank, it must borrow the funds to repay the central bank from another bank—an 
exactly offsetting balance must exist in aggregate somewhere in the system, since other 
banks will have ended the day in surplus. At the end of the day the central bank ends up 
entirely square, with no outstanding balances of central bank money (Lavoie, 2006, pp. 19-
21).18 Although the rate of interest is indeterminate and market-driven, in practice it 
                                                         
17 Examples of central banks operating one form of channel system or another are the Bank of Canada, the 
Reserve Bank of Australia, and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (Woodford, 2003, p. 26). 
18 The Reserve Bank of Australia requires banks to hold a positive balance of Exchange Settlement funds 
(Reserve Bank of Australia, 2016). The Bank of Canada aims for a zero position (Lavoie, 2006, p. 20). 
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establishes itself exactly at the central bank’s policy level. 
A central bank operating a channel system is not an active participant in the overnight 
money market. Officially, the central bank lends at a rate slightly above its overnight policy 
rate (generally 25 basis points) and pays interest on deposits at a rate slightly below (again, 
generally 25 basis points). The central bank stands ready to borrow or lend at rates that 
provide boundaries to their guidance or policy rate, so that the central bank’s policy rate 
operates in a ‘channel’ between its borrowing and lending rates. Any intraday loan of 
reserves taken by a bank in payment to another bank is borrowed back and the loan to the 
central bank is repaid. What remains is the bilateral loan between the two banks: the surplus 
bank has lent the deficit bank the funds to repay the original loan from the central bank; the 
central bank provides temporary elastic funds only. The result is that gross balances in 
promises to pay central bank money are high, but the net balance at the central bank is zero. 
These ‘procedures ensure a determinate demand for net settlement balances – equal to zero’ 
(Lavoie, 2006, p. 20).  
Since the target balances for overnight central bank are zero, the central bank does not, in 
practice, make any payments based on its deposit rate or receive any funds at its lending 
rate unless the market is malfunctioning. The balance at the central bank will only be non-
zero if borrowers and lenders in the interbank market experience difficulties trading with 
each other, such as when the payment flows are suitably unusual that surplus and deficit 
banks are not in contact, or when surplus banks develop an aversion to lending in the 
interbank market. In the case of a malfunctioning market, the central bank will need to act 
as an intermediary, lending to the deficit banks and taking the deposits of the surplus banks 
itself. In this case, the central bank will earn profits based on the spread between its lending 
and deposit rates (generally 50 basis points).  
Similarly, if the quantity theoretic explanation of the value of money is taken to be in terms 
of central bank money in the equation of exchange then, in static equilibrium, the velocity 
of a stock of central bank money that approaches zero is effectively infinite. By extension, 
when a requirement to hold a reserve deposit at the central bank is imposed it can be seen 
that is has no actual effect on interbank clearing—it must remain fixed as a reserve at all 
times. Since central banks generally pay no interest on required reserves, they are simply a 
tax on the banking system in that they are loss-making interest-free loans to the central bank 
(Fama, 1980, p. 47). 
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The overall result is that, in general, banks use promises to pay in the unit of account for 
payment.19 During the process of net clearing, the banking system will establish a zero 
position in central bank money by borrowing and lending between the deficit and surplus 
banks. The decision to lend money in the interbank market is to release control over it; the 
interest paid overnight is not paid on central bank, or ‘base money’, as assumed in many 
models, especially the New Keynesian variety (for instance, see Woodford, 2003, p. 75). It 
is interest paid on interbank credit. The fact that interbank borrowing and lending are done 
at the guidance rate of the central bank should not obscure the fact that interest paid on 
money in the channel system is not a ‘risk-free’ rate paid by the central bank. Instead, it is 
an (often unsecured) interbank rate made on promises to pay central bank money, or, more 
generally, credit measured in the unit of account. The implications of central banks that 
operate a channel system paying interest on reserves are less significant when it is 
recognised that the central banks also maintain zero, or near-zero, overnight balances. 
Consequently, the lending decisions of banks are not based on the reserves of central bank 
money available ‘for lending’ as in the money multiplier model (Jakab & Kumhof, 2015; 
McLeay, Radia, & Thomas, 2014). 
As a clarification, Mehrling (2000a, p. 404) invites us to consider bank money as a 
derivative security over central bank money, since conceptually ‘bank deposits are long 
positions in fiat money, while loans are shorts, and the outstanding stock of fiat money is 
the inventory.’20 Like any other financial derivative21, the stock of bank money at any one 
                                                         
19 The nature of interbank market has changed significantly in the US since the GFC. Banks no longer 
undertake unsecured interbank lending and Fed reserves are the predominant settlement medium (Pozsar, 
2017). 
20 The use of the long/short terminology here is somewhat confusing. In finance, a long position is one where 
the asset in question is held for a period of time; and in a short position the asset is sold and repurchased later. 
In each case there is an equal and opposite monetary transfer. In the case of long positions in money itself, it 
is ambiguous what has been transferred in return for the money held. In fact, in the case of a deposit the bank 
has issued its own money in return for the long position in state money. Nevertheless, the idea that a bank has 
adopted a derivative position in another financial asset is valuable in considering the nature of bank money 
and its relation to central bank money. 
21 A financial derivative is contract between two parties that derives its value from the price of another 
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time can dramatically exceed the stock of the underlying security, in this case fiat money. 
‘Viewing the bank money supply as the open interest in currency tends to shift our attention 
away from reserve requirements and money multipliers, and forces us instead to confront 
head-on the credit character of modern money, and its consequent elasticity’ (Mehrling, 
2000a, p. 405). Finally, the banks should not just be seen as just intermediaries, but as 
actually taking the long and short positions themselves via their deposits and loans, 
respectively. The role of bank lending, and the lender of last resort, ‘enters naturally’ 
(Mehrling, 2000a, p. 405), since, by taking long and short positions that are not perfectly 
offsetting, the bank is taking risk. When no central bank exists such as in the Eurodollar 
market, this risk must be managed more actively and explicitly. 
4.7 Matched-Book Funding 
The offshore Eurodollar market, which is the ‘central institution of the world liquidity 
system’ (Mehrling, 2015, p. 315), operates without the direct backstop of a central bank, 
since the Eurodollar is ‘a private liability of global banks not the public liability of a central 
bank’ (Mehrling, 2015, p. 320). Consequently, the market must pay particular attention to 
the timing of payments. Payment times are aligned by the use of foreign-exchange forward 
contracts to hedge unwanted risk and these contracts are supported by speculators who 
accept the risk. The price of accepting this risk determines the forward exchange rate, so 
that the forward rate is not an unbiased predictor of the expected future spot rate as per the 
expectations theory. This deviation is the expected source of profits for these speculators, 
so that ‘uncovered interest parity...is incompatible with a system of private liquidity 
provision’ (Mehrling, 2015, p. 316).  
As outlined in Mehrling (2013b) forward exchanges rates are, in practice, set by foreign 
exchange dealers to match their order flow, which, since they are absorbing liquidity 
mismatches, must be maintained as inventory on their balance sheets until they can be 
cleared. As their positions become more extreme, that is they take more liquidity risk, the 
prices with which they are willing to trade move further from those they would quote in a 
‘neutral position’ (Mehrling, 2013b, p. 358). As a result, the difference between the forward 
                                                         
underlying asset. Without an obligation for either party to deliver the underlying asset, no practical restriction 
to the creation of such contracts exists. 
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exchange rate and the current spot exchange rate becomes more pronounced. The term (not 
overnight) foreign and domestic interest rates, which are derived by arbitrage from the 
covered interest parity, are affected as well. Interest rates provide the adjustment 
mechanism for managing liquidity risk. 
Balance-sheet size restrictions introduced by the Basel III regulations and money market 
fund reforms are limiting the ability of dealers to absorb this mismatch in order flow 
(Pozsar, 2016). This lowering of dealer leverage has caused a violation of the covered 
interest-rate parity (CIP) arbitrage relationship and a persistent cross-currency swap basis 
(Sushko, Borio, McCauley, & McGuire, 2016).22 Balance-sheet restrictions mean a failure 
to exploit this arbitrage, with the result that liquidity is currently being priced in the cross-
currency swaps market (Mehrling, 2015). The ‘deviation from CIP is quite a clean measure 
of the price placed by banks on the use of their balance sheet’ (Shin, 2016, p. 7) or the 
‘shadow price of bank balance sheet capacity’ (Shin, 2016, p. 12). Liquidity is a balance-
sheet phenomenon provided by dealers and banks. 
4.8 Clearing and Final Settlement 
The distinction between money-proper and credit money is generally based on the ability 
of state money, as money-proper, to perform ‘final settlement’ or credit clearing, whereas 
credit money is postponed settlement. In this view, debts are only settled when they are 
repaid by state money. Under the credit view, however, state money is simply credit and 
hence this form of settlement is not sufficiently final. Under a stricter definition of final 
settlement, all debt, and hence money, is extinguished. Payment by currency, or state 
money, is not enough: 
The payment of clearing house balances in this way [use of state money for 
settlement] could not occur unless the currency were redundant. It is not really 
payment at all, it is a purely fictitious operation, the substitution of a debt due by 
the government for a debt due by a bank. Payment involves complete cancellation 
                                                         
22 By CIP, the forward exchange rate, 𝐹𝐹, is related to the current spot exchange rate, 𝑆𝑆, by the relationship 
𝐹𝐹 = 𝑆𝑆(1 + 𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓)/(1 + 𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑), where 𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓 and 𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑 are the respective foreign and domestic interest rates. Deviations 
from this relationship imply an extra interest rate spread, or cross-currency basis, which, as a source of riskless 
profit, should be eliminated. Its persistence is evidence of the balance-sheet limits to arbitrage. 
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of two debts and two credits, and this cancellation is the only legitimate way of 
paying clearing house debts. (Innes, 1914, p. 167) 
The definition of payment implied here is much more stringent than many would impose. 
By this definition, the settling of interbank payments with promises to pay is not payment 
at all. Similarly, a payment by the transfer of central bank money is not full payment either. 
Conceptually, payment with state money is merely a swap of one debt for another debt. To 
see this, consider that banks will accept central money for settlement of interbank domestic 
transactions, but central bank money is not necessarily acceptable for international 
transactions (Michell, 2017). 
Instead, complete and final payment requires that all balance-sheet relationships be 
cancelled, a phenomenon that can only occur when each of the two agents involved owe 
and are owed the same amount to each other. No state money is required for this form of 
payment. For example, banks accept their own liabilities as payment for the debts that 
private agents incur with them. Banks do not accept non-bank private credits. The 
repayment of a loan from a bank requires the re-acquisition of a bank deposit of the 
equivalent amount to the loan outstanding. Then all four balance-sheet entries between the 
borrower and the bank are cancelled. Bank loans are not repaid with state money, they are 
repaid with bank money, the distinction between money-proper and credit is misleading. In 
extremis, if all payments were satisfied to this degree, then no money stock would exist. 
Hence it is instructive to reemphasise that money is an undated credit ‘redeemable at any 
time’ (Tymoigne, 2017, p. 1). In effect, money has a zero-length maturity. We can use the 
idea of a financial put option, which gives the holder the right, but not the obligation, to sell 
a specified asset to the put option writer at a pre-agreed strike or exercise price, to interpret 
money. In finance terms, money is a zero-coupon perpetual bond with an embedded put 
option to the benefit of the owner, where the asset is the perpetual bond and the exercise 
price is par.23 Reflux is the simply the action of exercising this put option, whereby the 
holder of money repays taxes or a loan from a bank. In recognising this put option, it is 
tempting to use it to derive a floor price of 100% of nominal money value, but this approach 
                                                         
23 I have drawn on discussions in Romanchuk (2016) and Rowe (2016).  
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would be ignoring that all financial instruments routinely have a value significantly 
different from their nominal value due to factors such as uncertainty, time, credit risk, to 
name only a few. 
The put option is of the nature of an ‘American’ option24, meaning that it can be exercised 
at any time. It is a standard maxim in finance theory that an American option should never 
be exercised early; it always has a higher exchange value than exercise value before 
maturity. The same maxim can be applied to the put option embedded in money to explain 
the demand for money. Furthermore, the volatility of the underlying asset of an option 
contract affects the value of the option itself. If we consider fundamental uncertainty as the 
‘underlying’ of money then a direct conceptual link between uncertainty and a demand for 
money can be established. 
The value of money is sustained in three ways: first, by reflux to the issuer, either as a 
repayment or converted to another debt form without the put option; second, by transferral 
to another agent who wishes to perform this reflux; or, third, to be held by an agent for its 
liquidity value, that is, for the latent benefit of its put option.  
4.9 Banking Theory 
The ontological picture of the banking system established in this chapter allows us to 
consider the three predominant theories of banking behaviour and the provision of money: 
debt intermediation, fractional reserve and credit creation (Werner, 2015).25 The first, the 
debt intermediation theory, is most closely aligned to the cloakroom ticket view of banking 
whereby banks simply re-lend money placed on deposit. It disregards the fundamental 
banking activity as a swapping of IOUs, where a bank’s IOU is monetary, and assumes that 
the banking system simply exists to channel the flow of savings into investment 
opportunities: Money is neutral and banks have no specific macroeconomic implications. 
Fractional reserve banking, on the other hand, recognises bank money and focuses on the 
limitations of deposit creation as a behavioural multiple of the amount of state-money 
reserves available to the banking system. This money multiplier fixes the amount of bank 
                                                         
24 By contrast, a ‘European’ option can only be exercised at a fixed maturity date. 
25 Chick (1992) discusses the evolution of the banking system where the stages of development overlap with 
the three theories (see Section 9.4) 
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money in terms of the amount of state money, so that the banking system takes no part in 
macroeconomic analysis. Finally, the credit-creation theory works from the observation 
that bank lending involves a balance-sheet expansion, whereby a loan asset and deposit 
liability are created simultaneously as loan commitments are drawn by borrowers. The 
essential feature of the credit-creation theory is that banks do not first need reserves in order 
to lend. The process of lending itself creates a deposit by an individual bank, not at the level 
of the banking system as in the fractional reserve theory. 
Each theory captures a behavioural element of the banking system at the expense of other 
aspects. The debt intermediation theory is based on the observation that banks intermediate 
between borrowers and lenders but misses the process of lending which leads to the 
outcome. It assumes that banks must lend physical state money already on hand, and the 
savings provided to investment by the banking system must have already been generated. 
Rather than lending savings, banks lend purchasing power and confusion concerning this 
distinction arises from a lack of clarity in the meaning behind such terms as ‘money’, 
‘funds’ and ‘saving’. The outcome of new lending, where agents receive a counterpart of a 
new deposit, is what Moore (1988, 2006) calls ‘non-volitional saving’ or ‘convenience 
lending’ to the banking system. Agents receive and hold bank deposits, not because of any 
prior saving decision, but as part of commercial activity. A subsequent decision involves 
portfolio re-allocation and the potential reflux of the deposit. Instead, the debt 
intermediation theory is concerned with the final state of equilibrium when all depositors 
have been converted by their own decisions into savers. The process of arriving at 
equilibrium and the dynamics of the flow of funds are not considered; ‘the neglect of the 
role of financial intermediation in current macroeconomic analysis with its characteristic 
preoccupation with equilibrium states restricts the explanatory power of macroeconomic 
theory immensely’ (Bibow, 1995, p. 664). 
Commercial banks operate on a state-money standard, whereby their liabilities are 
convertible into state money on demand, an imposition that is reflected in the fractional 
reserve theory. A single bank alone cannot expand the bank-money supply because requests 
for conversion into state money will undermine it individually. Instead, each bank must 
manage the demand for convertibility by means of the interest it pays on its term, or non-
monetary, deposit liabilities. This form of reflux, whereby monetary liabilities are 
converted into non-monetary liabilities, is not entirely incorporated into the fractional 
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reserve story. The fractional reserve theory provides a behavioural link between the state-
money supply and the bank-money supply, so that the latter can be excluded from the 
quantity theory of money. As Lavoie (1984, pp. 792-793, n. 11) points out, however, a 
stable money-multiplier is not compatible with bank’s maximising their profits by portfolio 
adjustments, since it implies a fluctuating credit multiplier instead of the stable one as seen 
in practice, resulting from the accommodating behaviour of central banks to ensure 
financial stability (Lavoie, 1984, p. 779). 
The credit-creation theory is sound in that banks create deposits as the first by-product of 
lending. The existence of overdraft commitments whereby banks provide the public with 
ability to spend on demand is enough to establish this fact. It should also be recognised that, 
subsequently, the bank must honour its convertibility obligations by settling any deposit 
transfer to another banking entity by providing interbank or state money. Each bank’s 
lending is limited by its ability to access interbank or deposit funding. If all banks within 
the system are expanding at a similar rate then the state money is available from within the 
system. The banking system’s reserves of state money are not funds available for lending—
they are already lent to the state. Any use of state money to settle interbank payments is not 
part of any credit transaction; it is merely a settlement of a credit transaction. The 
availability of state money, from the central bank or other banks, for final settlement 
directly affects interest rates, but only after the loan has been made. 
Being purely descriptive, the credit-creation thesis falls short of being a theory. Merely 
observing that banks create a liability when they lend does not provide an explanation of 
this phenomenon, why it is possible, what conditions are necessary, and how much credit 
money can be created. Arguably, the fractional reserve theory answers some of these 
questions in equilibrium, but at the expense of ignoring the path to equilibrium. In the 
current institutional banking framework, bank money is convertible to, and pegged to the 
value of, state money. Therefore, convertible bank money cannot be used in the equation 
of exchange as the correct metric in the quantity theory of money, as does Werner (2015), 
since the quantity theory is only applicable (if at all) to non-convertible, non-commodity 
money.  
4.10 Summary 
Banks are clearing houses of credit. The banking system, once the credit view of money is 
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adopted, is an integral part of the monetary nexus. The dominance of state money in the 
prevailing literature can be seen as a form of myopia, while the real monetary action is 
conducted elsewhere. The adoption of the conceptual essence that banking is a swap of 
IOUs, coupled with a credit theory of money, releases the analysis from whether money is 
provided publicly or privately. The answer is both and each form has its strengths and 
weaknesses.  
Money is a debt that is immediately payable to the issuer in return for the asset that backs 
it. In the case of the gold standard, the asset is gold; in the case of fiat money, it is taxes. In 
the case of bank money, it is the repayment of an outstanding loan. The balance between 
debts payable and credits outstanding in the current period determines its value. Without 
enough tax payable, state money loses its purchasing power. Similarly, banks must have 
credit assets repayable in the near future to support their monetary liabilities. The historical 
distinction between banks, which lent for trade, and building societies, which facilitated 
mortgage lending, displays early efforts to manage these mismatches in the timing of 
repayments. 
Historically, the practical consequence for the banking system to maintain convertibility to 
state money are reserves of central bank money. More recently, liability management and 
central bank support as the lender of last resort have made these reserves unnecessary. 
Banks have developed a myriad of techniques both to manage the liquidity risk inherent in 
their activities and to minimise their dependence on state money. Central banking operating 
models such as the channel interest rate system demonstrate the deficiency of standard 
monetary theories such as the quantity theory of money, and closer inspection shows that 
modern interpretations are also found wanting.  
The current feature that banks must convert their liabilities into state money is not 
historically or logically essential. Bank money can conceptually exist parallel to state 
money. An analysis of the banking system should recognise both its dependence on, and its 
independence of, the state. Banks are specialists in issuing and clearing credit and are able 
to create the means of payment and provide purchasing power on demand. Furthermore, a 
revised definition of final settlement, where balance-sheet entries must cancel, shows that 
state money is not logically necessary for repayment. Money is not conceptually a persistent 
stock, but a perishable flow continually created and destroyed. The ability of banks to 
manage their monetary versus their non-monetary liabilities is essential to this process and, 
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consequently, to the provision of liquidity. 
The parallels between the modern banking system and the gold standard are striking. They 
highlight the inconsistencies in the current monetary literature, which habitually leaves 
bank-created money unconsidered. The gold standard provides better insights than the 
money multiplier. Commercial banks must maintain convertibility between their money 
and state money at a price of par, just as central banks used to convert their money into 
gold at a fixed weight. Commercial banks keep reserves of central bank money to maintain 
this link but the main tool they use is interest rates. Raising rates paid on deposits limits the 
flow of conversions. Thus, the creation of too much deposit money would require higher 
term-deposit rates to prevent the conversion of deposits into state money. 
The importance of the banking system to the provision of money must be stressed, allowing 
state money to be put into the broader context and given its appropriate emphasis. The 
banking system specifically, and credit more generally, has the ability to facilitate trade 
without necessarily relying on state money. Credit clearing, which includes the complete 
cancellation of two sets of balance-sheet debits and credits entries, is the fundamental 
means of final payment or settlement. 
In the next chapter, the ontological landscape is expanded to consider the nature of liquidity 





5 A Taxonomy of Liquidity 
5.1 Introduction 
The terms ‘liquid’ and ‘liquidity’ cover many loosely defined concepts. Liquidity is most 
commonly identified with being ‘more certainly realisable at short notice without loss’ 
(Keynes, 1930b, p. 67) or ‘the ability to convert an asset into money at short notice with 
minimum loss’ (Rogers, 2014, p. 5). Other equivalent terms such as ‘saleableness’ 
(Menger, 1892, p. 242), ‘shiftability’, ‘salability’ (Mehrling, 2011, p. 6) or ‘marketable’ 
(Kiyotaki & Wright, 1989, p. 935) are used to encompass the three dimensions: trading a 
significant amount at the asset’s fundamental price in a short time-frame. The fact that some 
assets are seemingly more marketable than others has led to the concept and empirical 
observation of a liquidity premium. According to Mehrling (2011, p. 50), ‘the extra yield 
on the long-term investment is a kind of “liquidity premium” that compensates the long-
term investor for the fact that he may have to take a loss if for some reason he needs to 
convert his investment into cash before maturity.’ 
The liquidity literature classifies the common, saleability form of liquidity as ‘market 
liquidity’ and distinguishes it from ‘funding liquidity’, which refers to the ability to 
refinance debts as they mature (Brunnermeier & Pedersen, 2009). A third form, 
‘technological liquidity’, arises when an investment in physical capital is reversible 
(Brunnermeier, Eisenbach, & Sannikov, 2013, p. 5). Market liquidity and technological 
liquidity are both related to the ease with which an investment can be reversed if necessary, 
since marketable financial assets allow reversible commitments to otherwise illiquid and 
heterogeneous capital assets (Brown, 2003). Market liquidity cannot apply to the economy 
as a whole in the same way that technological liquidity can. To a certain extent, market 
liquidity can mitigate technological illiquidity, although not for society as a whole.26 
None of these concepts, however, covers the pure or perfect liquidity of money itself. 
Lozano (2015, p. 14, original emphasis) argues for a ‘universal definition’ of liquidity ‘as 
                                                         
26 Non-specialist equipment with many applications is the sort of physical equipment that could be classified 
as technologically liquid. For instance, in economic models containing a single consumption good, such as 
corn, whereby saving and investment are indistinguishable, ‘investment’ can be reversed by consuming more 
corn. Technological liquidity is not related to conversion into money and will not be considered in this study. 
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the nominal relationship between maturity and value.’ The term ‘liquidity’ has a 
metaphorical aspect that must be considered in relation to the real phenomena it represents 
(King, 2012). The use of the term ‘liquidity’ is a form of ‘linguistic ingenuity’ (Jespersen, 
2009, p. 68) that introduces additional connotations, which influence how concepts are 
interpreted when insights from the analytical world are applied to the actual world of policy. 
This chapter examines in more detail the ontological aspects of the elements of the 
taxonomy of liquidity. 
5.2 Market Liquidity 
Market liquidity, whereby ‘liquidity is the ease of trading a security’ (Amihud, Mendelson, 
& Pedersen, 2005, p. 270), naturally leads to a study of the microstructure of financial 
markets. In an idealised world of perfect market liquidity, all assets can be immediately 
bought or sold in any amount at their fundamental value. Deviations from this perfect 
market liquidity arise from ‘frictions’ such as transaction fees and taxes, demand pressure, 
inventory risk, information asymmetries and search impediments. Each restriction adds 
costs to transactions and reduces the ease of trading, in other words: illiquidity. The costs 
of illiquidity can have an impact on asset prices and expected returns ‘if investors require 
compensation for bearing them’ (Amihud et al., 2005, p. 271). Market liquidity costs are 
paid either in ‘shoe-leather’ while searching or as income to securities dealers or market 
makers. For the market maker, the problem becomes one of inventory management: 
…variations in demand pressure that cause variations in the market maker 
inventory change the prices at which he is willing to trade. These are short-term, 
transitory effects of inventory on prices, but the permanent effect on prices and 
expected return flows through the effect on trading costs. For example, in market 
systems with better capacity to absorb inventory shocks, the models would predict 
smaller illiquidity costs and consequently there would be smaller price discount 
due to illiquidity. (Amihud et al., 2005, p. 300) 
Like used-car dealers, market makers provide inventory management services for profit 
and are an important part of the ontological landscape of liquidity, just as bankers are for 
money. Market makers can profitably provide a ready market for people wanting to buy 
and sell by means of a spread between buy and sell prices. ‘Dealers supply liquidity by 
absorbing temporary imbalances on their own balance sheets, and they charge for the 
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service’ (Mehrling, 2013b, 359).  
In providing their service, market makers hold assets in inventory until they can be resold, 
and by having a judicious combination of long and short positions they can largely avoid 
overall market or systematic risk. Dealers operate in the practical realm of finance and use 
relative values (Cochrane, 2005b, p. xiv); dealer-based liquidity is founded on relative 
value not absolute value. A ‘dealer has no need to assess the fundamental value of the 
security’ (Mehrling, 2013b, p. 356). By applying matched-book or hedging techniques 
(Stigum, 1990, p. 433) dealers can inoculate themselves from both systematic risk and the 
need to know absolute prices. Instead, they rely on the frequency of transactions and a 
stable relative-price structure. In the face of constant selling pressure, they must stand aside. 
The market makers themselves provide market liquidity and, as such, it is a property 
superimposed on the asset by a third party, not a fundamental or intrinsic characteristic of 
the asset itself. In a dramatic movement of market level market making ceases and all assets 
become illiquid until the new level of the market is established. 
Inventory imbalances are resolved, not by adjusting the bid-offer spread, but by skewing 
bid and offer prices (Treynor, 1987). When a market maker’s inventory is too long, both 
the bid and offer prices are lowered relative to those displayed by other market makers. 
Conversely, when the inventory is too short, the relative prices displayed are raised. In this 
way, flow imbalances are shared between market makers. Market makers operate a smaller 
‘inside’ spread within the protective boundaries of the ‘outside’ spread provided by ‘value-
based investors’ (Treynor, 1987). ‘Dealers are thus valuable to transactors in a hurry, 
because they greatly reduce the spreads encountered by those transactors. By doing so, they 
also greatly improve the liquidity of the markets in which they deal’ (Treynor, 1987, p. 27). 
In addition to skewing their bid and offer prices, market makers rely on the outside spread 
to manage their inventory. At the limits of a dealer’s inventory capacity, the market maker 
can deal with ‘the only other transactor in the market who is motivated by price—the value-
based investor’ (Treynor, 1987, p. 27). The value-based investor acts as a ‘market-maker 
of last resort’ (Treynor, 1987, p. 28) or, equivalently, ‘dealer of last resort’ (Mehrling, 
2011).  
Trading itself incorporates information. If trading happens at a low frequency, then there 
will be more information between each trade and the market will be less continuous. Large 
orders result in discontinuous price jumps. ‘The ability to handle large amounts of stock in 
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short periods of time without changing the price of the stock is not a characteristic of a 
liquid market’ (Black, 1971, p. 31). The market maker should not resist large changes in 
price resulting from large orders, nor should he increase his spread, as this will make prices 
‘sticky’ (Black, 1971, p. 32). If prices move with new information, they will be 
informationally ‘efficient’ and exhibit randomness, meaning that profits cannot be earned 
from statistical knowledge of past transactions (Black, 1971, p. 32; Fama, 1970, 1991). 
Therefore, large price movements in one direction, and not a series of small steps, are a 
sign of an efficient market. If market makers resist price moves, then those with special 
information will make money at the expense of those without. 
Fischer Black gives the clearest set of criteria for market liquidity provided by an organised 
exchange: 
…the market for a stock is liquid if the following conditions hold: (1) There are 
always bid and asked prices for the investor who wants to buy or sell small amounts 
of stock immediately. (2) The difference between the bid and asked prices (the 
spread) is always small. (3) An investor who is buying or selling a large amount of 
stock, in the absence of special information, can expect to do so over a long period 
of time at a price not very different, on average, from the current market price. (4) 
An investor can buy or sell a large block of stock immediately, but at a premium 
or discount that depends on the size of the block. The larger the block, the larger 
the premium or discount. (Black, 1971, p. 30) 
In a liquid market, small amounts should be tradable at any time, but it is unrealistic to 
expect to be able ‘to buy or sell large blocks of stock in short periods of time without 
moving the price of the stock very much’ (Black, 1971, p. 30; see also Kyle, 1985). An 
organised exchange has low costs and bid-offer spreads, continuous trading or immediate 
execution, and easy access (Black, 1971, p. 34). It does not display ‘price continuity or 
“stability”’ (Black, 1971, p. 35). An attempt to sell a large block of an individual security 
suggests the possession of private information affecting relative values and not a simple 
need to raise funds. If a genuine desire for cash is the motivation for selling, then the 
investor should be happy to sell smaller amounts of any combination of the stocks in their 
portfolio. This observation alone demonstrates that discounts are inevitable for large parcels 
(Black, 1971, p. 30). 
An ideal market has at most one market maker, more than this is inefficient (Black, 1971, 
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p. 33). In practice, market making requires an established liquid point of convergence in 
the form of an asset that can be bought and sold to offset the risk of the other, less-liquid, 
assets held inventory. Thus, many market makers, operating by hedging against a common 
futures contract, emulate an ideal single market maker in the same way that the banking 
system aims to operate as one bank by means of an interbank money market.  
Echoing the line of reasoning followed in Section 4.8, market makers can be conceived of 
as providing both a call and a put option to their customers. The customer has the right, but 
not the obligation, to buy at the ask price and the equivalent ability to sell at the bid price 
(Copeland & Galai, 1983, p. 1464). Bid-ask spreads, and hence the cost of market liquidity, 
must increase with risk and volatility (Amihud, 2002, p. 39) and observations of volatility 
and market liquidity for both bonds and stocks are highly correlated (Chordia, Sarkar, & 
Subrahmanyam, 2005). 
With market liquidity provided by an organised exchange the asset is ‘readily shiftable’, 
since, in general, a market price exists at all times, but nevertheless the gain or loss on sale 
is unpredictable (Sayers, 1964, p. 178). The asset has the property of being convertible into 
money quickly but not necessarily without loss. The uncertainty concerning the proceeds 
of an asset sale associated solely with market liquidity excludes it from any idea of ‘perfect 
liquidity’, as with money itself; instead, it merely signifies a form of ‘shiftability’ (Sayers, 
1964, p. 179). For this reason, Robinson (1951, p. 94) calls market liquidity the 
‘convenience’ of an asset and explicitly draws attention to the crucial difference between 
market liquidity, an asset’s underlying value, and the idealised concept of ‘perfect 
liquidity’. 
For example, government bonds held to maturity have a known capital-value outcome, but 
this certainty of outcome comes at the cost of illiquidity. Convenience is a concept quite 
apart from variability in an asset’s price and distinguishes it from ‘capital-uncertainty’ and 
‘income-uncertainty’ (Robinson, 1951, p. 94). Bills and bonds have the same level of 
convenience but are less convenient than money (or bank deposits) and are ‘good’ in the 
sense that there is no credit risk (Robinson, 1951, p. 95). Bills differ from bonds in that they 
have no capital-uncertainty, but they do have income-uncertainty. 
In the practical realm, Kay (2015) finds that market liquidity might help in providing a 
continuously tradable price, otherwise known as ‘price discovery’. He makes the point, 
however, that many long-term investors would be just as well served by an asset market 
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that traded once per week. Instead, the attempt to offer perfect market liquidity in 
investment products affects the composition of the underlying assets and is ultimately 
counter to the interests of investors. 
5.3 Funding Liquidity 
Funding liquidity represents the ease with which a borrower can obtain a loan or access 
money to repay an existing loan. Whereas market liquidity refers to conversion of assets 
into cash and is therefore associated with the asset side of the balance sheet, funding 
liquidity is the counterpart for the liability side of the balance sheet.27 Funding liquidity 
represents the ability to access funds by issuing new liabilities, or the re-establishment of 
an existing liability. 
Nevertheless, funding liquidity can be re-interpreted as a form of market liquidity. 
Conceptually, the borrower is ‘selling’ an asset in the form of a new loan to replace an old 
one, or equivalently re-selling an old one, since ‘“borrowing” is selling an asset, the asset 
being money forward’ (Radcliffe Committee, 1959, p. 132). The difference is that for 
market liquidity the asset being sold has only the risks associated with the asset itself, the 
nature of the seller of the asset is not important. For funding liquidity, on the other hand, 
the risks for the purchaser predominantly relate to the credit-worthiness of the vendor. 
Otherwise, the risks involved—transaction costs and the expected interest rate payable—
are simply the ones analysed in relation to market liquidity. Since banks are the 
predominant providers of loans, they are essentially dealers in funding liquidity. In the 
presence of organised loan markets (overdrafts and pre-arranged lines of credit), where 
transaction costs are minimal, the interest rate applicable at the time that the loan is drawn 
is the predominant cause of uncertainty. Again, it is uncertainty of the future rate of interest 
at the time that the cash flow arises that is the fundamental element to be considered. 
Dealers are the link between money markets and financial markets because repo provides 
                                                         
27 For Tirole (2011, p. 288, n. 3), however, the correspondence of market and funding liquidity with opposing 
sides of the balance sheet is not so clear-cut. The counter-example given is the securitisation of a bank’s loan 
portfolio coupled with liquidity support, but it actually shows the combination and the interaction of market 




the funding for their market making. Funding liquidity and market liquidity are 
interdependent, both are mutually supporting (Adrian & Shin, 2010). The ease of trading 
overall depends on the interplay between both market and funding liquidity. Because 
inventories are funded by repo, market liquidity is constrained by the dealer’s capacity for 
inventory, which in turn relies on funding liquidity. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) and 
Mehrling (2010) emphasise the inherent roles of both market and funding liquidity in 
financial instability. The relationship between market liquidity, funding liquidity and risk 
suggests a ‘commonality in liquidity’ because the ‘shadow cost of capital is a driving state 
variable’ (Brunnermeier & Pedersen, 2009, p. 2227).  
The link between market liquidity and funding liquidity can be explained by changes in 
monetary policy (Chordia et al., 2005). To see this, consider ‘maturity transformation’, 
where illiquid long-term debts are funded by short-term money-like debt. Maturity 
transformation blurs the distinction between money and credit and moves the liquidity risk 
from the investor to the financial system. The banking system creates market liquidity by 
adopting funding liquidity risk. The interdependence between market and funding liquidity 
identified above comes about due to their being fundamentally the same thing—the ability 
to sell financial assets. They are provided by dealers and are not macroeconomic 
phenomena. 
5.4 Trade Liquidity 
Considering a debtor’s potential sources of finance reveals yet another form of liquidity. 
According to Minsky ([1986] 2008, p. 260) there are three sources of finance: ‘cash flows 
from operations, refinancing or rolling over debts, and selling assets or net borrowing.’ The 
final two are covered by the aforementioned funding liquidity and market liquidity, 
respectively; the first is not. Furthermore, Minsky ([1986] 2008, p. 223) identifies three 
types of operational cash flow: income, balance sheet, and portfolio. Again, portfolio cash 
flow arising from the sale and purchase of assets is already represented by market liquidity. 
The process of production and sale yields cash flow, and hence liquidity (Rochon, 1997, p. 
287). We must introduce the category of trade liquidity, which is associated with the 
circular flow of funds, the dynamic process of income becoming expenditure, and the 
continual creation and destruction of money. 
Income cash flows—wages and salaries, both public and private, the payments 
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from one stage of production and trade to another, and gross profits after taxes of 
business—result from the process of production. Money, in effect, goes around an 
income circuit; the income circuit as here defined includes all the payments for 
partially finished products sold by one firm to another. (Minsky, [1986] 2008, p. 
223) 
The process of production, especially in buoyant conditions, allows for a form of liquidity 
based on expectations of future trade. In boom conditions, ‘industry is likely to be confident 
of replenishing its liquidity out of future profits’ (Radcliffe Committee, 1959, p. 103). 
Trade liquidity is available ‘even when bank credit is being contracted, so long as business 
expectations remain sanguine’ (Radcliffe Committee, 1959, p. 103).  
For consumption is just as effective in liquidating the short-term finance as saving 
is. There is no difference between the two. If the entrepreneur gets wind of ex-ante 
consumption in the mind of the consumer, he is not only just as safe to get liquid 
and pay off his bank in due course as where there is ex-ante saving, but indeed 
much safer—for there is no risk that the consumption, when it matures, will take 
the form of an enhanced desire for cash. (Keynes, 1937c, pp. 667-668) 
The second type of operational cash flow—balance sheet—is income generated by existing 
assets and ‘the rapidity with which the wealth embodied in them can become “liquid”, in 
the sense of producing output, the proceeds of which can be re-embodied if desired in quite 
a different form’ (Keynes, 1936, p. 240). For the purposes of liquidity, balance-sheet cash 
flow can be considered as trade liquidity.  
Thus, the supply of liquidity, in its broadest sense, is not based on the number of liquid 
instruments in existence at any point in time. It must include some element of its potential 
supply. The relationship between liquidity, credit and money means that 
…an individual’s power to purchase, which is the objective element behind 
demand in terms of numéraire, is not fully represented by the amount of the credit 
instruments that are actually used in “payment” or even, so we should add, by the 
deposits, overdrafts, etc. against which checks are drawn, but by the total amount 
that an individual could command if he wanted to, i.e. the amount that is actually 
at his disposal in some measurable form plus something that might be called 
potential credit, which defies measurement, yet is a factor in any situation. 
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(Schumpeter, 1954, p. 718, n. 5, original emphasis) 
Because trade liquidity is based on the anticipation of spending arising from the proceeds 
of production, it is a socially constructed property of the system arising from the circular 
flow of income and expenditure. 
5.5 Self-Liquidating Assets 
One form of cash flow in the balance-sheet category that requires its own distinction is the 
form of liquidity displayed by short-dated financial instruments. Short-term assets, such as 
bills of exchange, are ‘self-liquidating paper’ (Sayers, 1964, p. 183), since they are expected 
to produce cash flow in the near future. These assets are generally classified as ‘near-
money’ and have properties that are described as self-liquidating, since the ‘proceeds of a 
loan would be used to finance the acquisition of a specific stock of goods, and the sale of 
these goods—either with or without processing or transporting—was to yield the funds to 
repay the debt’ (Minsky, [1986] 2008, p. 229). Thus, it is a form of liquidity closely related 
to, but once removed from, trade liquidity, since the cash flow generated by the asset is 
supported by the proceeds of an anticipated income cash flow.  
In the context of banking specifically, the term ‘liquidity’ can be taken to mean the ‘ability 
to satisfy demands for cash in exchange for deposits’, for which a banker ‘must maintain 
an adequate degree of liquidity in his assets’ (Sayers, 1964, p. 177). For a bank, the perfectly 
liquid asset is cash, by which is meant either state or central bank money, but it is an ‘idle 
asset’ since it generally earns no interest. To meet the requirement to satisfy depositors’ 
demands for cash, bank assets must be convertible into cash quickly and without loss. The 
latter requirement means that banks cannot rely on assets that only offer only market 
liquidity because of their capital-uncertainty. As we have seen, government bonds are often 
highly shiftable, but have capital-uncertainty unless held to maturity, thus rendering them 
effectively illiquid for the purposes of a bank. The capital-uncertainty associated with a 
fixed-term asset decreases as it approaches maturity. The Real Bills Doctrine (see Section 
4.3) recommends that banks hold self-liquidating assets (Mehrling, 1996, pp. 335-336; 
Mehrling, 2011, p. 31). A bank with a portfolio consisting entirely of long-term assets will 
be reliant on market liquidity, in other words, on shiftability to a market maker, and will be 
forced to secure term funding to match the illiquidity of its assets (see Section 4.7). 
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5.6 Aggregate Liquidity 
The taxonomy outlined so far is incomplete; the pure or perfect liquidity associated with 
money itself is left uncategorised. If liquidity can only be defined ‘in terms of 
exchangeability for money’ then money cannot have ‘perfect liquidity’, for to do so ‘is to 
argue in a circle’ (Hicks, 1989, p. 42). Defining money as the most liquid commodity via 
its ‘exchangeability’ is therefore tautological (Ingham, 2004a, p. 6). Going further, liquidity 
presents ‘both a tautology and a paradox’ (Lozano, 2015, p. 15), for both liquidity in its 
purest form and the realised value of an asset are represented by money. Liquidity cannot 
only be money, for then they could not be separate concepts, nor could non-monetary assets 
have the property of liquidity (Lozano, 2015, p. 16). 
Money has no natural place in a liquidity theory based simply on the ease of conversion to 
money (such as market liquidity), even if money is in some way defined to be perfectly 
liquidity or ‘par excellence “liquid”’ (Keynes, 1936, p. 234, original emphasis). Under the 
commodity view, money is the most saleable, and hence liquid, good where its acceptability 
derives from its liquidity, and its liquidity from its acceptability. For Chick (1983, p.306), 
‘the fact that argument is circular does not make it less true. The properties of money are 
self-reinforcing.’ The liquidity of money itself is of a form that is not captured by mere 
saleability, unless it refers to the conversion money into assets, the reverse of the process 
of saleability. The liquidity of money is in a different category from that of market liquidity. 
Some degree of clarity is provided by the terms ‘inside’ liquidity and ‘outside’ liquidity, 
which are used to refer to liquidity provided by a cash reserve and liquidity from sale of 
assets, respectively. These terms have been associated with funding and market liquidity 
(Bolton, Santos, & Scheinkman, 2011, p. 266). Although it would be accurate to recognise 
outside liquidity as a form of market liquidity, holding a cash reserve cannot be justifiably 
viewed as a form of funding liquidity since no requirement for refinancing exists. Instead, 
including money in the framework requires a distinction between, on the one hand, ‘market 
microstructure or microeconomic liquidity’ (Tirole, 2008, p. 54), which focuses on bid-ask 
spreads and market liquidity, and, on the other hand, ‘aggregate or macroeconomic 
liquidity’ (Tirole, 2008, p. 55), which attaches to securities that do not lose value in an 
economic crisis.  
The importance of a macroeconomic perspective is highlighted by the ‘paradox of 
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liquidity’, in which the ‘the attempt of economic agents to become more liquid transforms 
previously liquid assets into not-so-liquid assets’ (Lavoie, 2014, p. 21). Market liquidity is 
subject to a fallacy of composition: the more people want market liquidity the more it 
disappears. More precisely, a desire for aggregate liquidity undermines the supply of 
market liquidity. Nesvetailova recognises and expands on the illusion of market liquidity: 
The first fallacy is the assumption that it is the market-making capacity of financial 
intermediaries to identify, price and trade new financial products that creates and 
distributes liquidity in the markets. Second is the view that general market trade 
and turnover are synonymous with market liquidity. The third and corresponding 
fallacy is the notion that market liquidity itself – when multiplied across many 
markets – ultimately is synonymous with the liquidity (and financial robustness) 
of the economic system as a whole. Altogether, this line of reasoning has been 
underpinned by the notion that financial innovation in its various forms ultimately 
enhances the liquidity of the financial system as a whole. (Nesvetailova, 2010, p. 
17) 
The recognition that dealers can provide an overlay of market liquidity to assets only at a 
microeconomic level leaves the open question of what ‘liquidity’ can mean at a 
macroeconomic or aggregate level, and whether it can be measured. Thus, in the taxonomy 
of liquidity, aggregate or macroeconomic liquidity is an important classification. To extract 
the precise liquidity implications of the fallacy of composition, we should introduce yet 
another classification: aggregate liquidity. Two conditions appear to distinguish aggregate 
liquidity from market liquidity. First, aggregate liquidity does not require market-making 
agents for its provision and, second, it is available regardless of the prevailing economic 
conditions. The nature of agents that have the ability to provide macroeconomic liquidity 
compared with microeconomic liquidity leads to the idea of ‘public’ and ‘private’ liquidity, 
respectively (Holmström & Tirole, 1998). This distinction suggests another paradox of 
liquidity: financial innovations that appear to increase the provision of private liquidity 
actually decrease the level of overall liquidity (Lavoie, 2014, p. 21; Nesvetailova, 2007, p. 
78). 
For Nesvetailova (2010, p. 8, original emphasis), aggregate ‘liquidity is a property of an 
asset’, not the state of the market overall. Any assumption otherwise is rejected as a fallacy:  
At the level of financial institutions themselves, the axiom that financial innovation 
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and engineering have the capacity to liquefy any type of asset – or, more accurately, 
debt – has resulted in the now mainstream notion of liquidity that is divorced from 
any attribute of assets per se. (Nesvetailova, 2010, p. 16, original emphasis)  
Some assets are more liquid, in the aggregate sense, than others. Furthermore, aggregate 
liquidity is ‘intimately related to the notion of money’ (Nesvetailova, 2010, p. 8). Aggregate 
liquidity manifests itself only in a select set of assets: 
“Aggregate or macroeconomic liquidity” understanding: according to this 
alternative definition, variants of which date back to Keynes and Hicks, an asset 
offers liquidity to the corporate world if it can be used by the latter as a cushion to 
address pressing needs. To be an effective cushion, though, the asset must not lose 
value in those very circumstances in which the corporate sector does need money. 
In this respect, the on-the-run Treasury bond is rather distinct from the stock index 
or the hypothetical mortgage-backed portfolio in that it does not lose value in 
recessions, while the latter’s value is likely to be reduced precisely in case of an 
industrial or financial recession. (Tirole, 2008, p. 55) 
The description given here, however, is insufficiently distinguished from a more standard 
measure of risk or volatility, especially in correlation with systematic risk. It is suggested 
here that on-the-run Treasuries28 are more liquid in a macroeconomic sense because they 
are negatively correlated with overall market risk. In many ways, this definition leads us 
simply to the ‘risk-free’ asset so prevalent in much of finance and macroeconomic theory. 
Aggregate liquidity should not be confused with asset-price uncertainty. 
For Nesvetailova the definition of liquidity is ‘an asset’s capability over time of being 
realised in the form of funds available for immediate consumption or reinvestment – 
proximately in the form of money’ (Nesvetailova, 2010, p. 8). Her discussion frames the 
historical movement in the meaning of the term ‘liquidity’ from a property of an asset, to a 
property of the market overall. It is clear from the context that Nesvetailova is implicitly 
referring to a process whereby the meaning of the term ‘liquidity’ has transitioned from 
aggregate liquidity to market liquidity and is discussing the associated macroeconomic 
                                                         
28 The on-the-run bond is the one most recently sold into the market by the US Treasury and is the one most 
actively traded. Off-the-run bonds are held as core portfolio positions by insurance and investment funds and 
are traded much less frequently.  
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difficulties. The result is that ‘over the past few decades, analyses of finance in the macro-
economy have assumed that liquidity is no longer primarily a property of assets, but rather 
an indicator of the general condition and vitality of a financial market’ (Nesvetailova, 2010, 
p. 11). The lack of a clear taxonomy of liquidity contributes to this confusion. 
Similar confusion arises when Holmström and Tirole (1998, p. 2) focus on the demand for 
liquidity, where ‘liquidity refers to the availability of instruments (market and nonmarket) 
that can be used to transfer wealth across periods.’ These intertemporally liquid instruments 
are required to cover unexpected funding shortfalls. In their model, when risks are purely 
idiosyncratic, ‘private liquidity’ is sufficient, but in the face of pure aggregate uncertainty, 
‘public liquidity’ must be provided. At an aggregate level, shiftability can only be awarded 
to assets by the ultimate market maker, the central bank (Sayers, 1964, p. 181). Thus: 
An institution that performs a lender-of-last-resort function guarantees that the 
terms of some contracts will be fulfilled, regardless of market conditions or the 
business situation of the particular debtor. Thus, a lender of last resort diminishes 
the risk of default of the assets it guarantees. Assets with low default risk are readily 
marketable—they are liquid. When the Federal Reserve extends the domain of 
instruments that it protects against default, it is increasing the effective quantity of 
liquid assets and thus of assets that have the properties of money in the community. 
(Minsky, [1986] 2008, p. 47) 
As we have seen, however, marketability is not risk free: the central bank does not 
necessarily remove price uncertainty. The ability to avoid price uncertainty is valuable and 
an important part of liquidity. 
5.7 Price-Protection 
Ricks (2011) argues that money-market instruments function as ‘money’, where the key 
aspect of these ‘money-claims’ is their short-term price stability. Although a precautionary 
motive (Keynes, 1936, p. 170) describes why agents hold a stock of the medium of 
exchange, Ricks argues that the actual medium itself need not be held. Instead a very liquid 
equivalent will do—hence the existence of the money market and its highly liquid 
instruments. These instruments are more than just marketable, like equities or Treasury 
bonds: ‘Not only are they extremely liquid (i.e., convertible into the medium of exchange 
on very short notice and at practically no cost), but, like deposits, their value in terms of 
82 
 
money is almost always extremely stable’ (Ricks, 2011, p.92). Ricks calls this their ‘price-
protection’ feature, and it is more than just high credit quality.  
Closely related to price-protection is the concept of ‘information insensitivity’ (Cochrane, 
2014; Dang, Gorton & Holmström, 2012), which refers to debt instruments of sufficient 
credit quality that almost full payoffs can be expected in bad states, thereby removing the 
need for investors to uncover any private information about the underlying obligor. Not all 
money-claims can be used as a medium of exchange (Michell, 2017), but their near perfect 
market liquidity is their distinguishing feature and inasmuch as the shadow banking was 
able to create these instruments then this appears to be liquidity creation.  
Using the concept of price-protection, Ricks (2011, p. 101) considers whether the 
Modigliani-Miller theorem applies to banks and other maturity-transformation firms (such 
as shadow banks) who finance themselves in the money market. The Modigliani-Miller 
theorem (Modigliani & Miller, 1958) demonstrates the irrelevance of debt versus equity 
funding in determining a firm’s value. Money-claim financing, however, has a lower 
expected return because of the instrumental value of transaction-reserve assets, and the 
ability to create these instruments affects the value of the firm. The Modigliani-Miller 
theorem rests on the assumption that investors can re-create the financing arrangements of 
the firm themselves and hence adjust it to their preference. This is not possible with money-
market funding. Thus: 
On closer examination, this analysis does not actually contradict the Modigliani-
Miller theorem. That theorem rests on explicit assumptions, one of which is that 
the firm’s suppliers of funds are able to finance themselves on the same terms as 
the firm. And this condition cannot hold true in the case of maturity-transformation 
firms. The market will not fund just any economic agent with money-claims; the 
‘moneyness’ of a money-claim depends on its price-protection, which requires 
exceptionally high credit quality. For this reason, maturity-transformation firms 
invariably invest the vast majority of their assets in credit instruments—that is, in 
senior claims on other economic agents. As a logical matter, not every economic 
agent can limit its assets to senior claims on other economic agents. (Nor should 
they want to!) Thus, very few savers seeking to store transaction reserves are able 
to issue low-yield money-claims themselves. Otherwise it would happen all the 
time. (Ricks, 2011, p. 102) 
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This insight points the way to one potential limit to liquidity creation: the availability of 
senior claims on other economic agents. For Ricks this reliance on senior claims is a modern 
version of the money-multiplier. ‘Functionally speaking, all of these firms are engaged in 
the activity of fractional-reserve banking (or money creation), whether they are called 
“banks” or not’ (Ricks, 2011, p. 97). Thus, for Ricks at least, the shadow banking edifice 
of liquidity is built on foundations that are not unlimited.  
The concept of price-protection has a broader application. Assets that maintain price 
stability in the unit of account provide a reserve of liquidity. Through the maintenance of 
convertibility, bank liabilities are one such example. Price-protection can also take the form 
of guarantee or risk transfer:  
In the private market, the amount of cash you can get for an asset depends on that 
asset’s current market value. By buying a guarantee of the market value of your 
assets, in effect you are guaranteeing your access to cash as needed; if no one else 
will give you cash for them, the guarantor will. (Mehrling et al., 2013, pp. 7-8) 
The hierarchy of money can then be extended to include the liquidity-storage capability 
inherent in price-protected money-claims (Pozsar, 2014). These money-claims come in four 
forms depending on the ‘type of assets backing them and the type of backstops supporting 
them’ (Pozsar, 2015, p. 4). First are public money-claims such as central bank reserves and 
government bills. Second, we have private-public money-claims in the form of 
government-insured bank deposits. Third, repurchase agreements backed by government 
securities are public-private money-claims, where private promises to pay are backed by 
public assets. Finally, there are purely private money-claims not supported in any way by 
a public assets or backstops. The result is what Pozsar (2014, 2015) calls the ‘Money 
Matrix’ (see Table 1). As noted above, many of these ‘money’ forms cannot be used as a 
medium of exchange, so they are more appropriately classified as forms of liquidity. The 
instance of assets with a price-protection feature, but which lack monetary characteristics, 






Table 1 – The ‘Money Matrix’ 
 Public Backstop Private Backstop 
Public Assets 
Central bank reserves, 
treasury bills 
Government bond repos 
Private Assets Insured bank deposits 
Non-government bond repos, 
uninsured bank deposits 
(Adapted from Pozsar, 2014, 2015) 
5.8 Summary 
Market liquidity—the ability to sell assets quickly without undue loss—is the most 
common form of liquidity in the literature. Funding liquidity, which is the ability to access 
funds to repay an existing loan, enters the literature as a complement to market liquidity in 
studies of the microstructure of dealers and market makers. That market and funding 
liquidity are liable to a fallacy of composition is recognised by categorising them as 
privately provided outside liquidity, in that the liquidity provided is not intrinsic to the asset 
in question. 
Market and funding liquidity refer to the conversion of assets into monetary or pure liquid 
form. The former captures the idea of saleability or marketability of an asset, the latter the 
ability to acquire liquidity to postpone payments of existing debts. Each aligns with the 
necessity that, when a payment is due, offsetting credits must be available with which to 
make the payment. If there are insufficient credits then the agent must acquire them and 
may need to appeal to market or funding liquidity. 
Two other options are available: either to rely on credits arriving into one’s possession; or 
have on hand a ready store of credits that are due at that moment, that is: money. Thus, 
market making provides transactional liquidity associated with portfolio flows, and can be 
distinguished from liquidity arising from income-producing activities and liquidity flows 
from short-dated or self-liquidating assets. Inside liquidity, in the form of cash balances, is 
provided by assets with a price-protection feature that provide an overarching stability in 
the unit of account. Otherwise-safe assets such as government bonds are convenient in that 
they are readily shiftable but cannot provide capital certainty. 
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Table 2 – Forms of Liquidity Supply 
Liquidity Inside/Outside Private/Public Supplier Example 
Purely Public Inside & Price-
Protected 
Public Government Central bank 
reserves and 
state money 
Private-Public Inside & Price-
Protected 
Hybrid Banks Insured bank 
deposits 

















Outside Either Production Bills of 
exchange 
Trade Outside Private Consumption Sales of goods 
and services 
Funding Outside Private Banks Borrowing 
Market Outside Private29 Dealers Sales of assets 
 
What appears is a hierarchy of liquidity from price-protected money-claims, through trade 
liquidity, self-liquidating assets, funding liquidity, to market liquidity. The spectrum falls 
between the inside and the outside categories of pure cash and the reliance on the sale of 
assets. Other categories that must be considered are the public and private provision, and 
the availability in the face of aggregate and idiosyncratic disruptions. Table 2 provides a 
summary of the liquidity forms and spectrum thus identified. 
                                                         
29 Except possibly for those assets that are part of the central bank’s open-market operations. 
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The purpose of this and the previous two chapters was to conduct an ontological reflection 
on the nature of liquidity, money and the banking system. The characteristics of each were 
presented with as little theoretical interpretation as possible. In the case of money, however, 
it was not possible to avoid theory and the assumptions underlying each theory were 
identified and those theories that most aligned with historical and empirical evidence were 
preferred. 
Part II has performed an ontological reflection on the characteristics of liquidity, money 
and the banking system. The resulting ontological landscape is used in the following 
chapters to assess existing theories for correspondence with reality. Part III discusses 
theories of liquidity in the tradition of Real Analysis, in which the neutrality of money is 
considered axiomatic. Then Part IV considers liquidity in theories in the alternative 
tradition of Monetary Analysis which retains a fundamental role for money. In Part V, 
elements of both Real and Monetary Analysis are combined to construct a coherent and 





Part III Real Analysis 
It has long been recognised that incorporating a monetary asset into general equilibrium 
models is problematic. ‘The most serious challenge that the existence of money poses to 
the theorist is this: the best-developed model of the economy cannot find room for it’ (Hahn, 
1982, p. 1). The difficulty arises from their basis in the tradition of ‘Real Analysis’, which 
proceeds from the principle that all the essential phenomena of economic life are 
capable of being described in terms of goods and services, of decisions about them, 
and of relations between them. Money enters the picture only in the modest role of 
a technical device that has been adopted in order to facilitate transactions. 
(Schumpeter, 1954, p. 277) 
When analysis is conducted in real terms, and the neutrality of money is axiomatic, money 
becomes an afterthought. ‘Monetary Analysis’, by contrast, ‘introduces the element of 
money on the very ground floor of our analytic structure and abandons the idea that all 
essential features of economic life can be represented by a barter-economy model’ 
(Schumpeter, 1954, p. 278).  
The exclusion of money from general equilibrium models is an oversight that inhibits the 
applicability of these models, especially with regard to the analysis of liquidity. More far-
reaching consequences cannot be discounted since: 
It so happens that so far macro-economic theory has not come to serious grips with 
the phenomenon of liquidity preference in its widest sense. In particular, it has not 
allowed for transaction costs and uncertainties that arise for assets, especially real 
assets, other than money. That this is so is well illustrated by the popularity of the 
“representative” agent. This device abstracts from transactions that are the result 
of the heterogeneity of agents. Many propositions of macro-economics are 
seriously at risk from this neglect. (Hahn, 1990, p. 79) 
The inability of general equilibrium models to incorporate money, and hence liquidity, in 
a fundamental sense is a serious deficiency. In Part III, the relationship between liquidity 
and money in the tradition of Real Analysis is considered. Chapter 6 outlines the two main 
strands of general equilibrium: the Wicksellian theory of the natural rate of interest and 
neo-Walrasian general equilibrium, as well as Irving Fisher’s theory of the rate of interest. 
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Chapter 6 also considers the Rational Expectations Equilibrium and highlights the 
Wicksellian, Fisherian and Walrasian foundations beneath modern asset-pricing theory to 
identify its potential strengths and weaknesses. Chapter 7 evaluates the attempts to 




6 General Equilibrium Theory 
6.1 Introduction 
General equilibrium theory can be divided into two theoretical strands: Wicksellian and 
neo-Walrasian. In assessing the usefulness of general equilibrium theory in explaining 
liquidity, we must first consider ‘the distinction in theoretical structure between neo-
Walrasian and Wicksellian theory. Both are neoclassical general equilibrium theories but 
both have distinct properties and hence distinct monetary theories’ (Rogers, 1989, p. 5).30 
Neo-Walrasian theory operates in a world of perfect barter where all commodities are 
traded directly for each other. The Wicksellian approach, on the other hand, recognises a 
distinction between credit and money and introduces the concept of a ‘natural rate of 
interest’ as the keystone for its monetary theory. As a complement, Fisher’s theory of 
interest can apply to either form of general equilibrium, and so its implications for liquidity, 
money and asset pricing must also be identified. As we shall see, each approach has 
fundamental difficulties incorporating money, and hence liquidity, into its framework. 
This chapter proceeds in five main parts. The first reviews the Wicksellian theory of the 
natural rate of interest and its implied scarcity of liquidity. The second introduces Fisher’s 
theory of interest based on time preference that provides the crucial element missing from 
the Wicksellian theory. The third part evaluates the relationship between liquidity and neo-
Walrasian general equilibrium theory with its assumption of perfect market liquidity, or 
liquidity abundance. The fourth part considers the Rational Expectations Equilibrium and 
the fifth introduces the concepts underlying modern asset-pricing theory. 
Although each form of general equilibrium stems from distinct theoretical foundations, the 
line of delineation between Wicksellian and neo-Walrasian models has become blurred in 
the literature, with Fisher’s theory incorporated into either. Since each approach has its own 
difficulties explaining liquidity, the distinction is maintained during the discussion of asset 
pricing. 
                                                         
30 A neoclassical or competitive equilibrium is one in which all optimal plans are achieved (Arrow & Hahn, 
1971, p. 107). 
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6.2 Wicksell and the Natural Rate of Interest 
Wicksell ([1898] 1936) analyses the distinction between bank credit (inside money) and 
money-proper (outside money). After considering the limits of pure credit creation, 
Wicksell subsequently postulates the existence of a unique ‘natural rate of interest on 
capital’ ([1898] 1936, p. 102), equivalent to the rate determined in a non-monetary 
economy, that ensures price stability. This rate of interest is derived from the productivity 
of capital, and ‘would be determined by supply and demand if no use were made of money 
and all lending were effected in the form of real capital goods’ (Wicksell, [1898] 1936, p. 
102). As such, is it is based on Böhm-Bawerk’s time-based theory of interest as a reward 
for the ‘technical superiority of roundabout methods of production’ (Conard, 1959, p. 39), 
where the real rate of interest is uniform across all assets and equal to the marginal 
productivity of capital. 
Wicksell’s innovation is to recognise the distinction between a market-determined rate of 
interest, which clears the credit or money market, and an underlying natural rate of interest 
determined solely by the real economy (Schumpeter, 1954, p. 1118). Wicksell reasons that, 
if banks were to offer credit money at a market rate lower than this natural rate, then ‘prices 
[would] rise continually higher and higher’ in a ‘cumulative process’ (Wicksell, [1898] 
1936, p. 95) and, conversely, an indefinite fall in prices would result if the market rate were 
set above the natural rate. In an economy based on pure credit, this cumulative process 
would lead to price indeterminacy, implying that a commodity money is essential to place 
a binding reserve constraint on banks to prevent market rates from deviating from the 
natural rate (Patinkin, 1965, p. 368). Wicksell’s conclusion is that, since prices are 
determinate in reality, the QTM is valid and a purely credit-based economy is impossible, 
in accordance with practical metallism. The supply of credit money is then restricted by the 
supply of the (scarce) outside or commodity money.  
The theoretical and conceptual foundations for Wicksellian models are problematic. The 
first problem stems from the derivation of the marginal productivity of capital due to the 
difficulties in selecting a unit for capital inputs entering an aggregate production function. 
The existence of a unique Wicksellian natural rate of interest is not guaranteed unless 
capital and output are measured in terms of the same commodity or in units of monetary 
value (Rogers, 1989). The former cannot extend to a multi-commodity world and allows 
for technological liquidity to obscure other forms of liquidity; the latter involves treating 
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the rate of interest as both exogenous and endogenous simultaneously (Rogers, 1989, p. 
38). Consequently, the Wicksellian system is a ‘one-sided productivity model’ (Hirshleifer, 
1967, p. 196) and is incomplete without the addition of time preference. The productivity 
of the system can potentially be consistent with any externally determined interest rate 
(Hirshleifer, 1967).  
To be complete, Wicksellian general equilibrium theory must be extended so that the 
natural rate of interest is determined by both the marginal productivity of capital and 
intertemporal consumption preferences. In this form of the ‘loanable funds’ theory, the 
natural rate of interest serves to equilibrate the flows of real investment and real saving 
(Leijonhufvud, 1981), and is unaffected by monetary policy, thereby placing Wicksellian 
theory in the tradition of Real Analysis. Wicksellian theory attempts to reconcile the 
liquidity abundance associated with pure credit with the liquidity scarcity view of the QTM 
by means of an insuperable, but unobservable, equilibrium rate of interest determined 
independently of the monetary system. Consequently, ‘the natural rate of interest lies at the 
heart of a Wicksellian statement of the loanable funds theory and both stand or fall together’ 
(Rogers, 1989, p. 22). 
In Wicksellian theory, ‘disequilibrium in the goods market, usually expressed as a 
difference between planned saving and investment, affects the rate of interest’ (Hayes, 
2010, p 808; see also Robertson, 1940, p. 18). It predicts that ‘a rise in thrift directly and 
immediately lowers the rate of interest unless obstructed by either one of two specific 
factors, namely, a simultaneous rise in hoarding or by credit contraction’ (Bibow, 2001, p. 
593, original emphasis). In the loanable funds view, an increase in saving means that savers 
either buy bonds—that is, supply loanable funds—so that interest rates fall, or they hoard 
deposits so that the interest rate stays unchanged (Bibow, 2001, p. 597). Difficulties with 
this prediction appear when the implications for a rise in thrift, which has an impact on 
buffers of goods for sale, are applied to the unavoidable financial counterpart (Bibow, 2001, 
p. 595). The loanable funds theory overlooks the equal and opposite demand for funds by 
the firms that need to finance their inventories (Bibow, 2001, p. 598). For firms, the result 
of an unexpected drop in sales is a build-up of unsold inventories, or unplanned investment, 
and the consequent requirement for unexpected funding. Although interest rates may well 
change to meet revised portfolio preferences, this change is only an indirect result. 
Depending on liquidity preference (see Chapter 8), interest rates may well rise (Bibow, 
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2001, p. 599). The inaccuracy of this prediction signifies an ‘analytical flaw’ such that 
‘loanable funds theory is logically inconsistent and should thus be abandoned’ (Bibow, 
2001, p. 592, original emphasis). 
Furthermore, ‘real’ saving in the Wicksellian sense is undefined in a world where capital 
goods are produced (Rogers, 1989, p. 42), especially when it is recognised that savings are 
intermediated in the modern economy (Chick, 1983, pp. 56-57). Banks do not simply 
intermediate prior savings; they create money. Banks provide finance for investment via 
money creation, and do not just intermediate pre-existing savings. As seen in Chapter 3, 
the hoarding of money cannot result in funds that are unavailable for investment. The 
hoarded money is already invested, due to the very nature of its existence (or the very fact 
that it exists). 
Loanable funds theory ignores the ability of banks to create liquidity and money 
‘instantaneously and discontinuously’ (Jakab & Kumhof, 2015, p. 4, original emphasis) by 
imposing the restriction that they can only ‘lend’ pre-existing savings. In reality, ‘cash is 
never lent directly but only withdrawn against deposits that have first been created through 
lending’ (Jakab & Kumhof, 2015, p. 5). The Wicksellian theory, being in the tradition of 
Real Analysis, has no fundamental place for either liquidity or money. ‘It turns out that 
loanable funds proponents simply confuse money and saving’ (Bibow, 2001, p. 604, 
original emphasis). Ex-ante investors are assumed to finance their investment out of ex-
ante savings, a concept that has no place in a monetary economy.31 Savings can only 
‘finance’ investment in a single-commodity non-monetary world.  
For Bibow (2001, p. 610, original emphasis) ‘the Wicksellian notion of the “natural rate of 
interest”, as determined by the real forces of productivity and thrift, is irreparably 
undermined as the anchor of the system.’ Rather than the market rate of interest adjusting 
to restore equilibrium with the ‘natural’ rate, Rogers (1989, p. 212) proposes that the 
interpretation should be reversed. An increase in the market rate is followed directly by a 
‘fall in the spot prices of all durable assets’ that equilibrates expected returns with the new 
market rate (Rogers, 1989, p. 213). Consequently, changes in the market rate of interest 
                                                         
31 That it is not possible for ex-ante saving to finance ex-ante investment undermines both the Hicks/Ohlin 
version of loanable funds—where planned savings are from future income—and the Robertson version—
where planned savings are from past income (Robertson, 1940, p. 6). For discussion, see Hayes (2010). 
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affect the flow of investment, the level of speculative loans and possibly contribute to asset-
price bubbles (Turner, 2013). Wicksell’s focus on the effect of credit creation on price 
stability should be broadened. It follows then that the rejection of the natural rate of interest 
requires more care when interpreting the direction of causation of Fisher Equation, which 
ultimately is a definition of the real rate of interest. It is Fisher’s theory of interest that we 
must consider next. 
6.3 Fisher’s Theory of Interest 
The addition of time preference to Wicksellian theory requires a clarification of the 
relationship between the natural rate of interest and Fisher’s theory of interest (Fisher, 
1896). Fisher’s theory of the rate of interest is a market-determined ‘real’ rate of interest 
that aligns consumer time preferences with technological production possibilities, under 
conditions of full employment (Cottrell, 1994b, p. 428) and constant prices (Conard, 1959, 
p. 140). The interest rate so determined is ‘real’ in the sense that it represents the trade-off 
between consumption of a single commodity in the present and in the future. Since this 
trade-off is conducted without money, the theory is also in the tradition of Real Analysis. 
Furthermore, because the rate of interest established is simply a ratio of commodity prices, 
unrelated to capital or time, it is doubtful that it is a theory of interest at all (Rogers, 2007, 
p. 142). The rate of interest is not guaranteed to be positive (Rogers, 2007, p. 140). 
Confusingly, however, Fisher defines the real rate of interest 𝑟𝑟 as the nominal rate of 
interest 𝑖𝑖 adjusted for inflation32 𝜋𝜋, giving, in approximation, the Fisher Equation: 
 𝑖𝑖 ≈ 𝑟𝑟 +  𝜋𝜋. (6.1) 
The real rate of interest from equation (6.1), being the nominal rate of interest adjusted for 
the change in the value of money, is conceptually different from the ‘real’ rate of interest 
derived from either the Wicksellian or Walrasian forms, or even Fisher’s theory of the rate 
of interest (Keynes, 1930a, p. 197, n. 2; Rogers, 1989, pp. 21-22, n. 1; Smithin, 2006). 
The definition of the real rate of interest and the axiom of money neutrality leads to the 
‘Fisher Effect’ whereby, in equilibrium, the nominal interest rate adjusts one-for-one with 
                                                         
32 The real rate of interest can be ex ante or ex post depending on whether, respectively, expected or realised 
inflation is used in the equation (Conard, 1959, p. 140; Fisher, 1896) 
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changes in expected inflation. There are several problems with this effect. First, in many 
cases, anticipated future price rises will be reflected immediately in current prices, before 
any effect on the money rate of interest can take place (Keynes, 1936, p. 142). A subtler 
problem, but of relevance to this study, is that changes in expected inflation will result in 
the same loss of purchasing value on non-interest paying money balances, as on interest-
bearing assets. The rate of interest is not a return for holding money, it is a return for lending 
it: the expectation of a change in the value of money will fall equally on money and loans 
of money (Cottrell, 1994b, p. 427; Kaldor, 1982, p. 97). At issue is the relative desirability 
of holding money, since its real value will be reduced by the expected rate of inflation −𝜋𝜋𝑒𝑒 
versus lending money, which earns 𝑖𝑖 − 𝜋𝜋𝑒𝑒 in real terms. Inflation has an equal impact on 
the two alternatives and can therefore have no influence on the decision to hold or lend 
money. That the nominal rate adjusts to anticipated rates of inflation ‘is false for the simple 
reason that the holding of liquid financial assets (which is the alternative to holding bonds) 
is exposed to exactly the same risk of erosion in real value through inflation as gilts [UK 
government bonds] are’ (Kaldor, 1982, p. 97).  
A deeper issue concerns the increase in investment that may result from an increase in 
inflation expectations (Cottrell, 1994b, p. 420). With interest rates unchanged, higher 
inflation expectations will increase the discounted value of future profits and, if production 
prices of investment goods are unchanged, increase investment itself. Is there a higher 
nominal rate of interest that would offset this increased investment, and what is its 
relationship with the increase in inflation expectations? The Fisher Effect states that the 
new nominal rate will be derived from the previous real rate. The problem is, inflation 
affects money and money lending in the same way, therefore only a higher real rate can 
offset the increase in investment. The Fisher Effect is incorrect: money rates cannot adjust 
to inflation ‘directly’, a ‘mistake’ identified by Keynes (1936, p. 142). A higher real rate of 
interest is needed to offset the increase in investment, but the Fisher Effect does not ensure 
this outcome. The required increase in the real interest rate cannot be the result of a greater 
demand for loanable funds, since the real rate of interest is unchanged by assumption in 
Fisher’s theory.  
Neo-Wicksellian models overlook these difficulties and use the Fisher Equation as a means 
to derive expected inflation from the Wicksellian natural rate of interest and the central 
bank’s nominal policy rate. Wicksellian theory is widely used in the neoclassical monetary 
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literature as the basis of a theory of interest rates (Galí, 2008; Woodford, 2003). By the 
premise of the QTM, monetary policy conducted by interest rates, and not the stock of 
money, raises questions of price determinacy (Black, 1970b; Sargent & Wallace, 1975). 
Combining the Fisher Equation with the Wicksellian natural rate of interest provides the 
foundation for the Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993) determining how central banks should 
conduct interest-rate policy. A central bank following the Taylor rule will automatically 
adjust nominal interest rates in response to any deviation of inflation from its target rate, 
thereby forcing market interest rates to diverge from the natural rate of interest. In this way, 
neo-Wicksellian models, where Wicksellian ideas are coupled with Rational Expectations, 
allow for the complete absence of either outside or inside money while still preserving price 
determinacy in a cashless model (Woodford, 2003; see Cochrane, 2011a, for a critique.). 
Similarly, the neo-Fisherian literature places the Fisher Equation onto a Wicksellian 
foundation to reverse the commonly accepted ‘stylised fact’ that raising policy rates lowers 
inflation (Cochrane, 2017b). The fixed natural rate of interest implied by the Wicksellian 
monetary foundations contradict this stylised fact, since the product of higher nominal 
interest rates can only be ‘an immediate and permanent rise in expected inflation’ 
(Cochrane, 2017b, p. 3). 
Nevertheless, loanable funds theory and the Fisher Equation underpin the central banks’ 
current consensus regarding the use of a negative interest rate policy (NIRP) as a means to 
increase aggregate demand and to combat the a ‘global savings glut’ (Bernanke, 2005) or 
‘secular stagnation’ (Summers, 2016). In either case, it is estimated that the Wicksellian 
natural rate33 is negative. Pre-NIRP, the consensus was that central banks were restricted 
by a zero lower bound (ZLB) on interest rates. The contents of the pre-NIRP toolkit were: 
QE; ‘forward guidance’, promising lower policy rates in the future (Woodford, 2012); or 
to ‘credibly promise to be irresponsible’ so that inflation expectations increase thereby 
lowering real interest rates via the Fisher Equation (Krugman, 1998). The introduction of 
negative interest rates and the breach of the ZLB have prompted a revision of this 
consensus. Unfortunately, the NIRP has had very limited apparent success in stimulating 
aggregate demand, and its Wicksellian theoretical basis renders it ‘profoundly wrong’ 
                                                         




(Palley, 2016, p. 2).  
6.4 Walras and Pure Exchange 
Neo-Walrasian34 general equilibrium theory (Arrow & Hahn, 1971; Debreu, 1959) 
identifies the assumptions required in a hypothetical economy for all markets to clear 
simultaneously. One such assumption is a complete set of Arrow-Debreu contracts 
available for all commodities, trading dates and future states of nature, also known as 
complete markets. These contracts enable agents to conduct all conceivable transactions at 
the beginning of time, time-0, thereby reducing the economy to frictionless pure exchange. 
Briefly, the process of arriving at equilibrium is achieved by a fictional Walrasian 
auctioneer who, in an ‘as if’ procedure called tâtonnement, facilitates multilateral 
exchanges between all agents until a Pareto efficient allocation35 is achieved. Agents are 
allowed to recontract during this process, but, by assumption, the final set of exchanges is 
honoured without default. Much of the literature concentrates on establishing the conditions 
for the existence, uniqueness and stability of this equilibrium. 
The result, since any commodity can be exchanged for any other commodity (including in 
any future time or location), is that ‘under an Arrow-Debreu auction all commodities are 
equally liquid’ (Rogers, 2008b, p. 19). In terms of the taxonomy of liquidity outlined in 
Chapter 5, all commodities display perfect market liquidity. A consequence of perfect 
market liquidity is that there is no need for any form of physical money beyond the 
numéraire, a commodity arbitrarily chosen to represent the unit of account. Money loses 
its form as either a medium of exchange or a store of value. In the absence of uncertainty 
about future commodity flows, there is no requirement for liquidity or a liquid asset. Perfect 
market liquidity renders all other forms of liquidity irrelevant; they are disregarded and 
entirely absent. It can be argued that liquidity is only a property of a money-mediated 
system; a pure-exchange system has no concept of liquidity (Lozano, 2015, p. 22). With 
complete markets, all agents can risk share to an extent that justifies the use of a single 
                                                         
34 A Walrasian general equilibrium is based on Walras’ Law, which states that the sum of the excess demands 
and excess supplies of all goods must be zero (Niehans, 1978, p. 9-12; Patinkin, 1965, pp. 35-36). 
35 A Pareto efficient allocation is a set of feasible commodity allocations between agents for which ‘there is 
no way of making everyone better off’ (Arrow & Hahn, 1971, p. 91). 
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‘representative’ agent, a modelling technique which itself suggests an absence of financial 
transactions.  
The emphasis given in Chapter 3 to the distinction between the unit of account and 
monetary objects is reflected in the concept of the numéraire in Walrasian theory. A key 
difference between the numéraire and an abstract unit of account, however, is that the 
numéraire is a commodity (or fiat money treated as an ‘as if’ commodity), which has an 
arbitrary price of unity. An Arrow-Debreu contract is a promise to deliver real goods, not 
money—it is not a financial contract. As such, the numéraire is tied to the tradition of Real 
Analysis and expresses the commodity view of money. The unit of account, on the other 
hand, is an abstract measure with an uncertain real value and no corresponding physical 
presence used to denominate financial assets. 
The axiom of money neutrality allows for the analysis of the economy within the context 
of pure exchange without liquidity or money. The net-money doctrine (see Section 3.2) is 
used to justify the simplification of analysing models without an explicit banking system 
or even money itself (Woodford, 2003) and the absence of an integrated theory of liquidity. 
The Modigliani-Miller theorem (see Section 5.7) is an expression of the net-money doctrine 
and leads to the conclusion that bank intermediation and inside money cannot have 
significant macroeconomic effects. By applying the Modigliani-Miller theorem to the 
banking system, Fama (1980, p. 44) denies that bank deposits are money, and can neither 
be the numéraire nor affect the problem of price level determinacy. The result is that ‘as 
portfolio managers, banks are financial intermediaries with no special control over the 
details of a general equilibrium’ (Fama, 1980, p. 45). Only outside currency issued by the 
government or central bank reserves that reduce transactions costs can perform this function 
(Fama, 1980, pp. 50-53). 
With pure exchange, banks—including central banks—lose any differentiating factor that 
could explain their macroeconomic effects or even their very existence. Wallace (1981) 
highlights the confusion that the net-money doctrine causes by applying the Modigliani-
Miller theorem to open-market operations to demonstrate the irrelevance of government 
portfolio constructions and ends up questioning why government bonds cannot be ‘spent’. 
Models where central bank profits, or seigniorage, are included in a representative agent’s 
budget constraints struggle to show that open-market operations have impact due to a lack 
of any wealth effect (Barro, 1974). Similarly, no explanation can be provided for ‘one of 
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the most obvious “liquidity” premiums: Money is overpriced—it has a lower discount 
rate—relative to government debt, though they are claims to the same payoff in a 
frictionless market’ (Cochrane, 2011b, p. 1079). By analysing QE in such a liquidity-free 
framework, Ben Bernanke concludes that ‘the problem with QE is it works in practice, but 
it doesn’t work in theory’ (Ahamed & Bernanke, 2014, p. 12).  
Buiter (2009) doubts that the assumption of complete markets is an ‘appropriate 
simplification’, since it implies an infinite number of markets that would ‘exhaust the 
resources of the universe’. For Lucas (1984, p. 13), however, the inconsistency with reality 
of time-0 trading and complete market of securities is ‘superficial’. Instead, Rational 
Expectations and the no-arbitrage condition ensure that the prices arising from more 
frequent trading agree with the time-0 prices, and reduce the need for superfluous contracts 
(Lucas, 1984, p. 14). The requirement for complete markets and clearing at time-0 can be 
replaced by sequential complete markets (Harrison & Kreps, 1979; Ljungqvist & Sargent, 
2004, pp. 223-230). 
Finally, it must be noted that the neo-Walrasian system produces the prices of commodities 
dated by delivery time. Interest rates can only be extracted as the ratio of the prices of like 
commodities. As such, these rates are real, but not in the sense that they are nominal rates 
adjusted for purchasing power using the Fisher Equation. There are as many real rates of 
interest as there are commodities and delivery times; the neo-Walrasian framework 
provides a theory of value, not a theory of the rate of interest. Interest rates derived from 
the prices of time-dated commodities provide no ‘analytical insights’ beyond those 
provided by the prices themselves (Rogers, 1989, p. 52). As in the Fisherian theory of 
interest, time is no different from location in a time-0 auction and there is no guarantee that 
neo-Walrasian real interest rates are positive. Nor does a neo-Walrasian model satisfy the 
Wicksellian condition that the rate of interest is equal for all assets in equilibrium. 
The distinction between the Wicksellian and neo-Walrasian theories can be seen from their 
treatments of liquidity. Mehrling (2000b, p. 15) pinpoints the issue as a ‘fundamental source 
of misunderstanding’ which manifests itself in the ‘difference between the liquidity scarcity 
view of economics and the liquidity abundance view of finance.’ Liquidity scarcity is 
expressed by the Wicksellian notion that market interest rates must adjust to agree with the 
natural rate of interest defined in the real economy. Thus,  
…the persistent attraction to economists of the quantity theory of money, even 
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given all its faults, is that it expresses succinctly the economist’s intuitive sense 
that the real liquidity of the economy as a whole is scarce and that attempts to 
increase liquidity by expanding nominal money must eventually reckon with this 
fundamental real scarcity. (Mehrling 2000b, p. 15) 
On the other hand, the neo-Walrasian ‘theory of value abstracts from the scarcity of 
liquidity and treats all commodities as equally and perfectly liquid’ (Mehrling 2000b, p. 
15). These views are incompatible, both with each other and with the ontology of either 
liquidity or money. Consequently, 
…monetary theory cannot be brought under the theory of value (as currently 
constructed) but no alternative analytical structure has yet emerged to gain general 
acceptance. Until it does, the old distinction between money and credit remains as 
the economist’s crude theoretical attempt to grapple with the apparent hierarchy of 
liquidity, with credit viewed as a mechanism for stretching scarce liquidity 
(money). Similarly, the old attempt to measure the quantity of money remains as 
the economist’s crude empirical attempt to grapple with the same hierarchy by 
measuring the size of its base. (Mehrling 2000b, p. 15) 
Both the ‘economics view’ and the ‘finance view’ (Mehrling, 2013b, p. 356) in their 
attempts to understand the world ‘resolutely abstract from money’ (Mehrling, 2013b, p. 
357) in the perfect exchange constructions of neo-Walrasian general equilibrium (‘trade in 
goods’) and the perfect liquidity modern asset pricing (‘trade in financial assets’). Ignoring 
the monetary or liquidity dimension and ‘the standard practice of focusing attention on the 
‘‘equilibrium’’ or ‘‘fundamental’’ exchange rate amounts to focusing on a special limiting 
case that would prevail if matched-book and speculative dealers were willing to do their 
work for free’ (Mehrling, 2013b, 358). 
The acknowledgement of this omission has resulted in various attempts to incorporate 
money into general equilibrium theory. These attempts are not entirely successful in 
providing explanations, as we shall see in the next chapter. Before that, we must look more 
deeply at Rational Expectations and modern asset pricing, with their failure to explain the 
observed frequency of trading and assumptions of perfect market liquidity.  
6.5 Rational Expectations 
The Rational Expectations Hypothesis (REH) stems from the straightforward idea that 
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‘expectations, since they are informed predictions of future events, are essentially the same 
as the predictions of the relevant economic theory’ (Muth, 1961, p. 316). The precise 
statement of the hypothesis distinguishes between subjective and objective probabilities, 
since the 
…expectations of firms (or, more generally, the subjective probability distribution 
of outcomes) tend to be distributed, for the same information set, about the 
prediction of the theory (or the “objective” probability distributions of outcomes). 
(Muth, 1961, p. 316) 
The REH is qualified with two caveats. First, the ‘expectations of a single firm may still be 
subject to greater error than the theory’, and, second, the hypothesis does not ‘state that 
predictions of entrepreneurs are perfect or that their expectations are all the same’ (Muth, 
1961, p. 317). The REH has evolved to be ‘the imposed extra assumption that the subjective 
probability distribution of outcomes believed by agents within an economic system equals 
the objective frequency distribution actually generated by the system itself’ (Weitzman, 
2007, pp. 1102-1103). Conveniently, agents with Rational Expectations ensure the 
existence, uniqueness and stability of a Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE) 
equivalent to a fully informed neo-Walrasian general equilibrium (Grossman, 1981). In a 
REE, the requirement for complete markets is removed but at the cost of ‘unlimited 
computational capacity’, without altering the conclusion that the theory has ‘no role for 
money and liquidity’ (Radner, 1968, p. 31). If uncertainty is a necessary requirement for a 
liquid store of value, then the REH removes the need for ‘the constant revision of strategies’ 
and continuous trading and, hence, the ‘demand for money and liquidity’ (Radner, 1968, p. 
36).  
The importance of the REH is in its implications for models in which agents do not have 
the same information set because access to information is asymmetric. For example, in 
models with asymmetric information, each agent may have a different estimate of each 
asset’s payoff. By means of the REH, private information available to only some agents 
can become public by means of its observed effect on asset prices. In a REE, uninformed 
investors can learn from the informed investors by conditioning their asset allocations on 
asset prices. The result is that ‘each agent has a different (but correct) asset pricing model’ 
conditional on their own information set (Admati, 1985, p. 640). Each agent’s expectations 
of future prices will differ, but this ‘creates an incentive for the opening of a futures 
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market...where they can bet against each other’ (Grossman, 1981, p. 546). 
When information is asymmetric, a REE improves on a naive neo-Walrasian equilibrium 
by allowing agents to use the private information of other agents so revealed in market 
prices, such that a REE is equivalent to a fully informed neo-Walrasian equilibrium. To 
establish a REE, ‘traders need only know the stochastic process generating the equilibrium 
price’ (Grossman, 1981, p. 545). Differences in information between agents are eliminated, 
since ‘agents make statistically correct inferences on all the information they possess, 
including current prices’ (Admati, 1985, p. 629), whereas neo-Walrasian equilibrium prices 
would prompt re-contracting by agents as soon as they were observed (Grossman, 1981, p. 
549). The resulting ‘equilibrium price is a random variable’, not a number like in a neo-
Walrasian equilibrium (Grossman, 1981, p. 544), in that the REE price vector clears the 
market for every future state of nature. This perfect foresight regarding the price in each 
state of nature is equivalent to a complete set of Arrow-Debreu contracts (Cass & Shell, 
1983, p. 201). The result is that equilibrium prices are the same as if all investors were fully 
informed and information symmetry is restored. 
Observed market prices can incorporate information to eliminate trading advantages, ‘but 
if traders have diverse information sets, then these expectations need not be the same across 
traders. Thus, as in microstructure models, the adjustment of prices to full information 
values can differ widely across markets that are deemed efficient’ (O’Hara, 2003, p. 1351). 
Price discovery, which is ‘the incorporation of new information into asset prices’ (O’Hara, 
2003, p. 1339), must be distinguished from the cost of market liquidity or transactions costs. 
‘The symmetric information-based asset pricing models do not work because they assume 
that the underlying problems of liquidity and price discovery have been completely solved’ 
(O’Hara, 2003, p. 1335). When information is asymmetric, or only partially revealed, in an 
otherwise neo-Walrasian model, then idiosyncratic risk requires a risk premium. The risks 
associated with price discovery and asymmetric information can affect expected returns but 
is an issue that is only peripherally related to liquidity. 
The use of price information differentiates a REE from a neo-Walrasian equilibrium and 
formalises the idea of agents forming opinions of other agents’ opinions as in Keynes’s 
beauty contest analogy (Keynes, 1936, p. 156). The cost of gathering this information, 
however, makes the existence of a REE uncertain. Gathering information requires 
resources, which removes the incentive for each investor to gather information, thereby 
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undermining the foundations for efficient markets and the very existence of a REE 
(Grossman & Stiglitz, 1980). Of particular relevance to liquidity, the conceptual problems 
with REE are only solved by the addition of some form of ‘noise’ trading (Admati, 1985; 
Black, 1970b). Noise trading takes the form of a random supply of assets, which represents 
an unexplained random demand for assets by uninformed or liquidity-motivated investors 
(Admati, 1985, 632). ‘Understanding liquidity requires us to unravel the puzzle of why real 
people and institutions trade so much more than they do in our models’ (Cochrane, 2011b, 
p. 1071). 
The relationship between the REH and the Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH) can now 
be identified. The EMH states that ‘a market in which prices “fully reflect” available 
information is called “efficient”’ (Fama, 1970, p 383). Furthermore, Fama (1991, p. 1575) 
divides the EMH into the ‘extreme version of market efficiency’, which is ‘the simple 
statement that security prices fully reflect all available information’, but ‘is surely false’ 
because of the costs of obtaining so much information. Instead a ‘weaker and economically 
more sensible version of the efficiency hypothesis says that prices reflect information to 
the point where the marginal benefits of acting on information (the profits to be made) do 
not exceed the marginal costs’. In other words, opportunities for profit based on publicly 
available information, such as past asset-price behaviour and dividend forecasts, will be 
eliminated where possible. The implication of the EMH is that technical trading (for 
example, the use of charts of past prices to predict future prices) is ultimately futile. This 
translates into the idea that it is impossible to beat the market, the market is unpredictable, 
but not necessarily that the market is always ‘right’. 
Jespersen (2009, p. 69) highlights the metaphor associated with the REH and proposes 
‘ideal’ expectations as a better description to expose its opposition to ‘realistic’ 
expectations. A REE is a much stronger proposition than an equilibrium where all agents’ 
expectations are in alignment and future prices are ‘agreed’ but need not be correct, just 
consistent across all agents (Hayek, 1937). Therefore, the 
REE is a seriously misleading equilibrium concept for pricing assets because it is 
describing an unstable knife-edge balance in price distributions, having 
probability-of-existence measure zero, which unravels completely in the presence 
of even an infinitesimally small bit of evolutionary-structural uncertainty. 
(Weitzman, 2007, p. 1115) 
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It is important to question the REH, without which the concept of fundamental asset prices 
established by a general equilibrium is impossible. The full risk sharing implied by general 
equilibrium is unrealistic: ‘Risk sharing needs everyone to change their portfolios and bear 
a risk in order to eliminate segmentation’ (Cochrane, 2011b, p. 1072, original emphasis). 
Geanakoplos (1990, p. 16) clarifies that efficient markets in incomplete markets models do 
not imply ‘efficient or Pareto optimum allocations’, merely the existence of a pricing kernel 
such that all the prices are subject to the law of one price (referred to as ‘no arbitrage’). The 
pricing kernel ‘typically does not correspond to any agent’s measure of beliefs, even when 
they all agree’ (Geanakoplos, 1990, p. 16).  
The risk that a price deviates from its fundamental value is eliminated by complete markets 
or the REH. When all assets have perfect market liquidity, interest rates and asset prices 
are determined by intertemporal preferences. Even in explicitly incomplete market models, 
agents are often still assumed to have ‘perfect (conditional) expectations’, that is, Rational 
Expectations, which ensure a general equilibrium rather than a temporary equilibrium 
(Geanakoplos, 1990, p. 10). Other simplifications, such as the existence of only one 
consumption good, eliminate the possibility of short selling and reduce the complexity of 
an incomplete market model to a complete market model (Geanakoplos, 1990, p. 11).  
The difficulty that incomplete market models have with short selling and borrowing is 
troublesome given the ontological nature of money as both a credit and debit on agents’ 
balance sheets. As noted in Section 6.4, under the assumption of perfect market liquidity, 
markets can be made complete by continuous trading of long-lived assets, instead of Arrow-
Debreu time-0 market clearing. Neo-Walrasian general equilibrium theory permits the 
analysis of an economy where ‘all assets have well-defined prices’ but where ‘transactions 
are costly’ (Hahn, 1990, p. 65). General equilibrium, by providing a solid platform of 
fundamental prices, restricts the focus to market liquidity, thereby obscuring all other forms 
of liquidity. 
For example, Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) use the difference between the market 
price and fundamental value to represent market illiquidity (p. 2210). This difference is the 
source of profit for the ‘traders’ that provide market liquidity. Information asymmetry 
means that only some agents are aware of the fundamental value, and, because this expected 
profit is not known to all agents, ‘illiquidity’ exists in the model. Traders are partially debt-
funded by financiers, using assets as collateral. The entire value of the asset cannot be 
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borrowed, so that traders must provide their own funds to cover a margin or ‘haircut’ that 
financiers vary with observed asset-price volatility. The margin increases with volatility 
because financiers do not know expected profits, and consequently funding illiquidity and 
market illiquidity move in the same direction. Conversely, and counter-intuitively, if 
financiers had complete information they would charge a margin that falls with higher 
volatility and ‘illiquidity’ (Brunnermeier & Pedersen, 2009, p. 2220). 
Similarly, for Shleifer and Vishny (1997), noise traders generate a difference between an 
asset’s market price and its fundamental value that represents potential arbitrage profits. 
Information asymmetry, however, means that financiers cannot observe the potential profits 
of arbitrageurs, only price volatility. The result is that arbitrage funding is removed when 
potential arbitrage profits are highest, causing involuntary liquidations and further moves 
from fundament value (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997, p. 46). Without a large number of 
diversified arbitrageurs, idiosyncratic risk affects the funding of strategies and undermines 
the ‘theoretical underpinnings of the efficient markets approach to arbitrage’ (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1997, p. 52). Again, the model relies on the introduction of noise or sentiment 
traders who are unable to understand the strategies of the arbitrageurs (Shleifer & Vishny, 
1997, p. 46). 
As stated in Section 5.2, attempting to extract profits from the difference between market 
values and fundamental values is the activity of a speculator and not a market maker. In 
noise-trader models, by contrast, informed speculators work as combined market makers 
and outside-spread investors. Information asymmetry and market liquidity are the 
predominant features of attempts to add liquidity to general equilibrium models (O’Hara, 
2003). In a general equilibrium model, market makers need to be wary of counterparties 
with private information and that have an advantage in assessing fundamental value 
(Amihud et al., 2005, pp. 295-298; Kyle, 1985). Models based on information asymmetry 
with reference to a fundamental or ‘true’ underlying price (see, for example, Ho & Stoll, 
1981, p. 48) assume behaviour not reflective of actual dealer activity. 
A reliance on fundamental value reinforces the need for ad hoc assumptions of exogenous 
price shocks, or noise traders, which randomly move prices from their fundamental value. 
Without noise traders, those who are misinformed, there would be no trading, ‘noise trading 
is essential to the existence of liquid markets’ (Black, 1970b, p. 529). Furthermore, ‘the 
noise traders as a group will lose money by trading, while the information traders as a group 
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will make money’ (Black, 1970b, p. 531). By aligning liquidity with market liquidity within 
a general equilibrium model, the whole purpose of trading disappears and an unexplained 
random element must be introduced. 
In general equilibrium, where the system is converging on a fixed point, the long-period 
point of convergence is known, and the ‘equilibrium itself is independent of the traverse’ 
or starting point (Jespersen, 2009, p. 11). Initial conditions do not matter, only the 
equilibrium point itself is significant. Agents are surprised at short-term events, but the 
long-term is certain. To achieve greater realism ‘the macroeconomic process can only be 
perceived within an open framework’ (Jespersen, 2009, p. 50) where the end-point is 
unknown. With this level of uncertainty, then the long-period point does not exist and the 
system becomes ‘open’ and its path-dependence creates even more uncertainty. The system 
diverges from a fixed point and the traverse itself becomes the focus of attention. Agents 
behave rationally with limited information and inherent uncertainty. They have more 
certainty about the short term; the long term is much more uncertain. 
Asset-pricing theory does provide, however, a useful framework within which to discuss 
liquidity, money in both Real and Monetary Analysis. The relevant aspects of modern asset-
pricing theory are discussed in the next section. 
6.6 Asset Pricing 
Wicksellian, neo-Walrasian and Fisherian concepts merge in modern treatments of asset 
pricing in the finance and economics literature. The assumption of complete markets, 
whereby an Arrow-Debreu contingent-claim contract exists for every conceivable future 
state of nature, leads to perfect market liquidity, and, consequently, the exclusion of any 
other form of liquidity. The complete set of Arrow-Debreu contracts also ensures a neo-
Walrasian general equilibrium and risk sharing between representative agents. The 
possibility of risk sharing also allows a risk-free asset to be created from a combination of 
contingent claims. This risk-free asset plays a pivotal role in asset pricing and removes the 
need for a liquid asset. In this section, both the generalised asset-pricing model and the 
specific consumption-based asset-pricing model are presented. The generalised model 
frames the discussion of liquidity and money in following chapter. The consumption-based 
model is used to consider liquidity in asset pricing.  
The application of general equilibrium models to the problem of determining asset prices 
106 
 
and interest rates is based on an investor’s expected utility trade-offs, via a ‘stochastic 
discount factor’. In the case of complete markets, or the Rational Expectations equivalent, 
the stochastic discount factor is unique and investors are able to share risk to produce an 
optimal resource allocation (Cochrane, 2005b, pp. 54-56). The additional assumption of a 
single consumption good allows asset returns to reflect the marginal productivity of capital, 
and the Fisherian subjective time preference ties asset pricing to the intertemporal 
consumption choices of the representative agent. The agent, in assessing the decision to 
consume now or save for the future, arrives at a point where the marginal utility of present 
consumption is balanced by the marginal utility of future consumption.  
In a simple derivation of the consumption-based model36, a two-period investor can buy or 
sell as much of an asset with payoff 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡+1 as they wish. In addition, the investor receives 
endowments 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 and 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡+1 and enjoys consumption 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 and 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡+1 according to time-separable 
utility function: 
 𝑈𝑈(𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡, 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡+1) =  𝑢𝑢(𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡) + 𝔼𝔼𝑡𝑡[𝛽𝛽𝑢𝑢(𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡+1)]. (6.2) 
Where 𝛽𝛽 is the subjective discount factor and 𝔼𝔼𝑡𝑡[. ] =  𝔼𝔼[. |ℱ𝑡𝑡] is the (subjective or 
objective) expectation conditional on ℱ𝑡𝑡, the set of information known by the investor at 
time 𝑡𝑡. 
The optimal amount that the investor would purchase 𝜉𝜉 solves the objective function: 
 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑥𝑥
𝜉𝜉
  𝑢𝑢(𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡) + 𝔼𝔼𝑡𝑡[𝛽𝛽𝑢𝑢(𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡+1)] (6.3) 
subject to the constraints 
 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 = 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 − 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝜉𝜉, (6.4) 
and 
 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡+1𝜉𝜉. (6.5) 
Where 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 is the asset price in terms of the single consumption good at time 𝑡𝑡. 
Conducting substitutions and differentiating with respect to 𝜉𝜉 gives the first-order 
condition: 
                                                         
36 This derivation is taken from Cochrane (2005b, pp. 5-6). For a more complete treatment, see Ljungqvist 
and Sargent (2004). 
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 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 =𝔼𝔼𝑡𝑡 �𝛽𝛽 𝑢𝑢′(𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡+1)𝑢𝑢′(𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡) 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡+1�. (6.6) 
The asset price  𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 is established at the point where the expected marginal utility of 
consumption at time 𝑡𝑡 + 1 is equal to the marginal cost of utility forgone at time 𝑡𝑡.37 
Equation (6.6) is a form of the Euler equation, the necessary first-order condition for 
optimal consumption.  
The stochastic discount factor or pricing kernel 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡+1 is then defined as 
 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡+1 ≡𝛽𝛽
𝑢𝑢′(𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡+1)
𝑢𝑢′(𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡) . (6.7) 
In infinite-horizon models, both the Euler equation (6.6) and a transversality condition are 
necessary conditions for optimal consumption; the Euler equation alone is sufficient in 
finite-horizon models. The transversality condition is generally expressed (Cochrane, 
2005b, p. 27) as 
 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗→∞𝔼𝔼𝑡𝑡�𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡+𝑗𝑗𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡+𝑗𝑗� = 0. (6.8) 
The transversality condition is an extra first-order, no-Ponzi condition that prevents the 
representative agent from borrowing an infinite amount in the present and rolling over these 
debts forever. Conversely, it prevents the agent from ‘overaccumulating assets’ since ‘a 
higher expected lifetime utility could be achieved by, for example, increasing consumption 
today’ (Ljungqvist & Sargent, 2004, p. 394). Another interpretation of the transversality 
condition is that it ensures that all assets are held by someone (Ljungqvist & Sargent, 2004, 
pp. 401-402). A strictly negative value would create an infinite demand for the asset; 
alternately no agent would demand the asset if the transversality condition were strictly 
positive. The problem with the transversality condition is that it specifies convergence to a 
fixed point, thereby closing the system and making the future more certain than the present. 
The transversality condition ensures that ‘the influence of the infinitely distant future on 
asset prices today vanishes’ (Buiter, 2009). 
                                                         





Some observations are warranted. First, the Fisherian pedigree of the stochastic discount 
factor is evident in its being the marginal rate of substitution between consumption across 
the two periods. With complete markets, all risk is shared and the consumption level 
entering the marginal utility is effectively aggregate, figuratively consumed by a 
representative agent. Second, the payoff, and hence the asset ‘price’, is in terms of the 
consumption good, acting as numéraire, and not in terms of money. Finally, with complete 
markets the stochastic discount factor is unique and establishes unique prices for all assets. 
If, however, markets are incomplete, then there are an infinite number of valid discount 
factors (Cochrane, 2005b, p. 66). 
An important assumption underlying the theory is that the amount an investor can transact 
is limitless, that is, perfect liquidity. Thus, ‘present theories of asset pricing pay no attention 
to the liquidity characteristics of assets’ (Hahn, 1990, p. 65). Arbitrage is the condition that 
𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡+1 > 0, which ensures that any positive payoff has a positive price. Perfect arbitrage 
assumes perfect liquidity (Mehrling, 2011, p. 90) and so the effects of liquidity and money 
on asset pricing are assumed away. As a real-world consequence, Mehrling (2011, p. 65) 
claims that, prior to the GFC, liquidity was essentially regarded as a free good, with the 
associated allocation distortions. 
Although the ‘consumption-based model is, in principle, a complete answer to all asset 
pricing questions’, it ‘works poorly in practice’ (Cochrane, 2005b, p. 41). Tests against the 
marginal utility of consumption are less than convincing (Cochrane, 2005b, pp. 41-43). Its 
predictions result in the equity premium and risk-free rate puzzles, where the theoretical 
risk premium on equities is too small relative to the observed premium and the risk-free 
rate is too large (Mehra & Prescott, 1985; Weil, 1989). It also cannot explain the term 
premium or volatility of long-term bonds (Holmström & Tirole, 2001, p. 1839). This 
disconnection between empirical evidence and theory has left a divide between traditional 
finance, which continues to focus on the practical task of relative asset pricing, and 
economics grappling with a theoretical explanation of absolute pricing using 
macroeconomic factors (Cochrane, 2005b, p. xiv). As such, opinions on the applicability 
of the Euler equation to asset pricing divide economics from finance (Marsh, 1984; 
Summers, 1985). Ultimately, ‘perfect barter or frictionless models appeal [to economists] 
because it was thought that the successful empirical application of these frictionless models 




The concept of the stochastic discount factor itself gives a generalised asset-pricing formula 
of the form: 
 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 = 𝔼𝔼𝑡𝑡[𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡+1𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡+1]. (6.9) 
Where 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡+1 is any stochastic discount factor providing the state-contingent value of 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡+1, 
which represents asset dividends, cash flows or quasi rents (Cochrane, 2005b). 
Note that, for the generalised formula, neither Rational Expectations nor complete markets 
are assumed; equation (6.9) is sufficient to establish asset prices, either in equilibrium or as 
individual measures of value. In addition, all returns are such that: 
 𝔼𝔼𝑡𝑡[𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡+1𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡+1] = 1, (6.10) 





Every asset-pricing model implies an expression of the form of equation (6.9) and equation 
(6.10). The content of the model is in the interpretation of the elements. 
It is a ‘classic issue in finance’ (Cochrane, 2005b, p. 15) that idiosyncratic risk does not 
warrant an expected return premium, since it is risk that can be diversified by, for instance, 
having a portfolio of equities rather than one single stock. If information is symmetric, so 
that all agents are equally well informed, then asset-specific risks can be diversified 
(O’Hara, 2003). Then only the risk that cannot be diversified, known as systematic risk, 
will have an expected return above the riskless rate of return. The asset’s expected excess 
return is based on its sensitivity to the overall market, thus forming the basis of the Capital 
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) (Lintner, 1965; Sharpe, 1964). It is worth noting that liquidity 
itself is similarly diversifiable because portfolios can be divided among various illiquid 
assets to reduce the risk that any one asset will not be liquid when necessary. 
That returns are related only to systematic risk can be seen by decomposing equation (6.10) 
using the definition of covariance: 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐(𝑚𝑚,𝑅𝑅) ≡ 𝔼𝔼[𝑚𝑚𝑅𝑅] − 𝔼𝔼[𝑚𝑚]𝔼𝔼[𝑅𝑅] (Cochrane, 2005b, p. 
14). Dropping sub-scripts, we have: 
 𝔼𝔼[𝑚𝑚]𝔼𝔼[𝑅𝑅] + 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐(𝑚𝑚,𝑅𝑅) = 1. (6.12) 
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Then, by introducing the gross risk-free return, 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 ≡ 1/ 𝔼𝔼[𝑚𝑚], we have an expression for 
the expected excess return: 
 𝔼𝔼[𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒] ≡ 𝔼𝔼[𝑅𝑅] − 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 = −𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐(𝑚𝑚,𝑅𝑅). (6.13) 
Interpreted through the lens of the consumption-based asset-pricing model, an asset’s 
expected excess return is lower (and its price is higher) if it enables more consumption 
when the marginal utility of consumption is higher, that is, if the asset has a higher payoff 
in economic downturns.  
The assumption of a risk-free rate, or ‘common pure rate of interest’ (Sharpe, 1964, p. 433), 
takes on vital importance and removes the need for a liquid asset. The risk-free asset, in a 
world of perfect market liquidity, dominates any other non-interest earning asset, such as 
money. In the Arrow-Debreu context, the risk-free asset can be constructed from contingent 
claims that span all future outcomes (Cochrane, 2005b, p. 51). In a Wicksellian model, the 
risk-free rate is equated to the marginal productivity of capital and the natural rate of interest 
(Rogers, 2007, p. 139). In presentations of the CAPM, for example, prices of risky assets 
adjust to reach a stock equilibrium, but the risk-free rate is exogenously given (Admati, 
1985, p. 631; Lintner, 1965, p. 15) or implicitly the result of a loanable-funds flow 
equilibrium (Sharpe, 1964). 
The risk-free rate also exemplifies the difficulties in moving from relative to absolute value. 
In a relative value framework, an asset’s value can be implied from other tradable assets 
that have a similar risk profile. A financial options contract is valued by replicating its 
payoff by means of the underlying asset (Black & Scholes, 1973). When all risks are 
eliminated by replication then the investment that remains earns the ‘risk-free’ rate of 
return—an abstract construction representing the theoretical state of a perfectly known 
outcome.  
Evidence suggests that discount factors vary through time and expected returns are, to a 
certain extent, predictable (Fama & French, 1988, 1989); expected returns do not simply 
follow a ‘random walk’ (Brown, 2011; Fama, 1991). Shiller (1981, p. 421) highlights the 
difficulties arising from the assumption that discount factors are constant. For if they are, 
sudden movements in stock markets can only be due to new information about future 
dividends, which are not volatile enough to explain observed stock price volatility. Asset 
prices are more volatile than their ‘underlying fundamentals’ would seem to imply 
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(Cochrane, 1992). ‘Simple regressions of real ex post stock returns on lagged dividend 
yields find that the null hypothesis that the real ex ante rate is constant can be rejected at 
almost any level of confidence’ (Summers, 1985, p. 635). Discount factors rise in economic 
downturns, which suggests that agents want higher returns when conditions are bad or 
uncertain (Crotty, 2011, p. 146) in such a way that ‘the premium [on long securities] 
compensates for exposure to discount-rate shocks’ (Fama & French, 1989, p. 24). 
Furthermore, empirical studies show that ‘higher or lower stock prices do not signal higher 
or lower subsequent dividends’ (Cochrane, 2017a, p. 947), instead forecast excess returns 
rise when dividend/price ratios are low. ‘High prices reflect low risk premia, lower 
expected excess returns’ (Cochrane, 2005b, p. 400, original emphasis). Since ‘asset price 
fluctuations are all about variation in risk premiums’, it follows that ‘recessions are driven 
by varying risk premiums and risk aversion’ and not by variations in risk-free ‘interest rates 
and intertemporal substitution of present for future consumption’ (Cochrane, 2017a, p. 
978). It should be noted, however, that empirical studies of expected returns focus on excess 
returns, a focus that influences their conclusions. Excess returns are founded on the concept 
of the risk-free rate, which is itself theory-laden. Consequently, studies that interpret 
empirical ‘facts’ as theory-neutral accidentally adopt a ‘naive objectivist’ approach (Sayer, 
1992, p. 45; see Section 2.2). 
The difficulty with a non-constant real rate of interest in theory can be highlighted by 
placing the asset-pricing formula into a Wicksellian model with production technology 
displaying stochastic constant returns to scale. In a single consumption-good model, 
consumption and investment are perfect substitutes and a temporarily high output of 
consumption goods will be transformed into capital because saving is investment (Marsh, 
1984, p. 15). The profile of consumption and asset prices both remain unaffected because 
asset returns are determined by the marginal productivity of capital. The empirical variation 
in asset returns cannot be explained. Only in a model with non-storable goods can asset 
prices vary dramatically with variations in output. Then, asset prices are affected by the 
failure in aggregate for agents to ‘save’ excess output or conversely exchange assets for 
consumption goods when output is low (Lucas, 1978; Marsh, 1984).  
Allowing the consumption-based discount factor to vary enough over time to explain 






𝑢𝑢′(𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡) 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡+1. (6.14) 
The introduction of an extra time-varying element means that discount factors can always 
be found to satisfy equation (6.10), thereby rendering it un-testable (Shiller, 1981, p. 430). 
Since ‘distorting marginal utility is the same thing as distorting probabilities’ (Cochrane, 
2017a, p. 949), discount factors, or expected returns, are not directly observable. As seen 
in this section, insights cannot be obtained using the asset-pricing model within a positivist 
methodology, they are part of the ‘deep stratum’ (see Section 2.3). 
The concepts of the REH and the EMH can be isolated by reference to the generalised asset-
pricing formula, equation (6.9), or its equivalent 𝔼𝔼[𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡+1 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡+1|ℱ𝑡𝑡] = 1. The EMH states 
that all available information (past and present) contained in ℱ𝑡𝑡 is used in the formation of 
the expectation 𝔼𝔼[. |ℱ𝑡𝑡].39 It is because it makes no claims about the price of risk conveyed 
by the stochastic discount factor 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡+1 that problems exist in testing the EMH. As Fama 
(1991, p. 1575) points out, ‘market efficiency per se is not testable’. The empirical testing 
of the EMH cannot be separated from the researcher’s model for asset pricing, since to 
determine whether ‘information is properly reflected in prices’, some model of ‘properly’ 
is necessary (Fama, 1991, p. 1576). Fama calls this the ‘joint-hypothesis’ problem and 
failures of empirical tests can result simply from a ‘bad model of market equilibrium’. 
Only with the addition of the REH do agents use the objective, or model-consistent, 
probability distribution of the future cash flows 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡+1 to establish the expectation 𝔼𝔼𝑡𝑡[. ] 
(Weitzman, 2007). The REH is required to establish unique prices in a competitive 
equilibrium, but the ‘EMH does not imply that prices are set in some kind of competitive 
market equilibrium’ (Brown, 2011, p. 82). The EMH does not imply the REH, but the REH 
implies the EMH. The assumption of REH is not essential; subjective probabilities, that 
vary by agent, could be used to form the expectations of cash flows (Cochrane, 2005b, p. 
54). The general applicability of the formula allows its use in the evaluation of Keynes’s 
                                                         
38 See Cochrane (2017a, p. 948). 




theory of liquidity preference in Section 8.7. 
The importance of distinguishing the information set and the pricing model in the asset-
pricing expression is that, ultimately, the probabilities used to determine asset prices are 
not based on the ‘correct expectation of the distribution of future cash flows associated with 
each security’, as Crotty (2011, p. 136) asserts. Asset prices are based on risk-neutral 
probabilities. The distinction between actuarial and risk-neutral probabilities should be 
recognised. Although risk-neutral probabilities are related to actuarial or real-world 
probabilities, they are not same.40 It is not necessary to know the ‘true’ actuarial 
probabilities to estimate the risk-neutral equivalents. Real-world probabilities are 
unknowable and are subject to fundamental uncertainty (Crotty, 2011; Hayes, 2006), but 
risk-neutral probabilities are subjective and differ for each individual. Because they are a 
combination of subjective judgements of utility and likelihood, their estimation suffers 
from the joint-hypothesis problem. This hypothesis-testing problem is generalised as the 
Durhem-Quine thesis, which states that it is impossible to isolate a single hypothesis for 
testing (Boumans & Davis, 2010; Elsner et al., 2014). 
The foregoing discussion affects the interpretation of the observation that expected returns 
(and hence the stochastic discount factor or pricing kernel) vary over time. In the view of 
Fama (1991, p. 1577), this variation is likely to be ‘real and rational’. 
The predictability of stock returns from dividend yields…is not in itself evidence 
for or against market efficiency. In an efficient market, the forecast power of D/P 
[dividend yield] says that prices are high relative to dividends when discount rates 
and expected returns are low, and vice versa. On the other hand, in a world of 
irrational bubbles, low D/P signals irrationally high stock prices that will move 
predictably back toward fundamental values. To judge whether the forecast power 
of dividend yields is the result of rational variation in expected returns or irrational 
bubbles, other information must be used. As always, even with such information, 
the issue is ambiguous. (Fama, 1991, p. 1583) 
This predictability covers all asset classes. The evidence regarding expected returns is that 
                                                         
40 Often the real-world measure is denoted by ℙ, and the risk-neutral measure as ℚ. Technically they are 
‘equivalent probability measures’: for any set, 𝐴𝐴, ℙ(𝐴𝐴) > 0 if and only if ℚ(𝐴𝐴) > 0. In other words, any 
outcome possible by ℙ is also possible by ℚ, and vice versa. See Harrison and Kreps (1979, p. 383). 
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there exists a ‘common premium for maturity risks’ (Fama, 1991, p. 1584) or ‘common 
variation in expected returns’ (Fama, 1991, p. 1585). Fama (1991, p. 1585) also points the 
way forward, his ‘view is that we should deepen the search for links between time varying 
expected returns and business conditions, as well as for tests of whether the links conform 
to common sense and the predictions of asset pricing models.’ Cochrane (2011b, p. 1071) 
would also move the focus from the incorporation of information to ‘discount rates, 
expected returns, risk bearing, risk sharing, and risk premiums’, since the ‘[EMH] basically 
won, and we moved on. When we see information, it is quickly incorporated into asset 
prices’ (Cochrane, 2011b, p. 1072). Whether or not markets are ‘right’, it is sufficient to 
recognise that markets can incorporate new information without actual trading and that 
expected returns vary over time. This variability in expected returns common over all assets 
introduces the uncertainty in the future rate of interest underlying Keynes’s theory of 
liquidity preference, to be discussed in Chapter 8. These empirical tendencies also influence 
later discussions about the importance of a variety of opinion in the market in Section 8.5, 
and whether it is the flow of risk or the flow of funds that affects asset prices in Section 8.6. 
6.7 Summary 
Liquidity has an uncomfortable position in Real Analysis. The Arrow-Debreu complete-
markets model of neo-Walrasian general equilibrium equates to a state of pure exchange 
and has no essential need for money or money flows. Neo-Walrasian theory, by abstracting 
from liquidity scarcity, assumes perfect market liquidity and hence liquidity abundance. All 
other forms of liquidity are absent and money has no fundamental place in the analysis. 
Closer inspection also reveals that no financial securities of any sort are necessary. Rogers 
(2014) highlights the conceptual problem: attempting to analyse liquidity, by any sensible 
definition of the term, is simply impossible in a model without money. Similarly, the Fisher 
Effect, whereby changes in expected inflation have a one-for-one effect on nominal interest 
rates, is only justifiable in a non-monetary setting. 
Wicksellian theory, on the other hand, recognises liquidity scarcity, the credit nature of 
money, the importance of the banking system, and a market rate of interest that clears the 
money market in equilibrium. Since the theory is anchored to the concept of a natural rate 
of interest determined entirely by the real economy it also follows in the tradition of Real 
Analysis and has a limited role for either liquidity or money. Furthermore, the natural rate 
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of interest itself can only be justified theoretically in a single-commodity model, which also 
precludes any essential role for a monetary asset by allowing perfect technological liquidity 
to obviate the need for any other form of liquidity. Savings in a single-commodity world 
can directly ‘finance’ investment. Consequently, neither a banking system nor money is 
required. The Wicksellian notion of a natural rate of interest determined entirely in the real 
economy stems from confusion between money and saving and results in theoretical 
inconsistencies that also call into question the value of its analytical insights. An analytical 
system built on Wicksellian foundations cannot provide a fundamental explanation of 
liquidity. 
General equilibrium asset-pricing methodologies are based on a number of problematic 
assumptions. The most relevant to this study is the exclusion of liquidity since it is observed 
to have significant effects. That said, much of modern asset-pricing theory is used in 
practice and cannot be simply rejected. The focus on risk as the basis of pricing, rather than 
the supply and demand of assets, is more in tune with the intermediated nature of finance 
and the credit theory of money itself. When financial derivatives can be created to refer to 
component aspects of asset risk, the supply and demand of specific assets cannot remain 
the focus. The issue to be tackled is that risk-pricing paradigm is supported by the 
assumption that all risks can be traded in any amount. It must be recognised that it operates 
in an idealised liquidity-abundant world and that, if possible, liquidity must be 
incorporated.  
The crux of the problem is that general equilibrium asset pricing has no fundamental place 
for liquidity, even though its effects are recognised by the associated finance literature. 
Instead, something called ‘liquidity’ can only be incorporated into these pure-exchange 
models by the addition of arbitrary frictions that only temporarily prevent the ultimate 
general equilibrium. Although the treatment of uncertainty in the literature is side-lined by 
the use of Rational Expectations due to its tractability, aspects of the risk-neutral approach 
are useful. In the next chapter, we consider various attempts to incorporate liquidity and 




7 Liquidity and Money in General Equilibrium 
7.1 Introduction 
Attempts to incorporate a monetary asset into either Wicksellian or the neo-Walrasian 
general equilibrium theories take many forms. Most can be classified as ad hoc, in that they 
do not present a coherent explanation of the existence of money; they simply recognise that 
money is present in the real world and make a pragmatic attempt to rectify this absence 
from the analytical world. The attempt to explain liquidity from within a framework of 
perfect market liquidity, leads to the opposite: how to explain illiquidity or the lack of 
liquidity. The task reduces to looking for imperfections along the lines of ‘participation 
costs, transaction costs, asymmetric information, imperfect competition, funding 
constraints, and search’ (Vayanos & Wang, 2011, p. 221). By concentrating on market 
liquidity, which eclipses all other forms of liquidity, general equilibrium models are unable 
to analyse the various forms of liquidity identified in Chapter 5. This chapter considers the 
range of attempts to add liquidity and money to models where they have no fundamental 
place. 
7.2 Utility of Money 
Money can be added as a commodity-like asset issued by government fiat. Immediately, 
problems arise with its valuation. If, for greater realism, the fiat asset is also used as the 
numéraire then there are additional problems with price-level determinacy. For example, 
in finite time-horizon models the terminal value of money must be zero, since it provides 
no consumption utility, and by backwards induction, its value must be zero in all previous 
periods. In infinite lifespan models, the perception that money is a zero-coupon perpetual 
bond causes similar valuation problems. To give money a formal value, an ad hoc appeal 
must be made to its unspecified usefulness in facilitating trade and reducing transaction 
costs (Woodford, 2003, p. 102). This usefulness can then justify the explicit inclusion of 
money balances in the representative agent’s utility function.  
Once money is included directly in the agent’s utility, the standard neoclassical optimising 
techniques can be applied, so that the marginal utility of money can be used to establish the 
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demand for money. To prevent any form of money illusion41 the money balances in the 
utility function must be adjusted by the price level or the value of money itself. The stock 
of money must also be homogeneous and fixed by some external agent, such as a central 
bank. The scarcity of liquidity must be maintained by the strict separation of credit from 
money-proper. For example, Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) assume a ‘continuum of infinitely 
lived agents’ to ensure that ‘there is no credit since a given pair will meet again with 
probability zero’ (p. 931). This set-up achieves ‘sufficiently well-defined demand and 
supply functions to give the unit in which [the fiat money] is measured determinate prices 
in terms of other goods’ (Fama, 1980, p. 50).  
Notwithstanding the lack of explicit justification for the inclusion of money, the approach 
presents some logical problems, the first of which is easily disposed of but needs a mention 
nonetheless. The ‘circularity charge’ alleges that the marginal utility of money cannot 
determine the value of money since the price level must first be known before the marginal 
value of an extra unit of money can be established. The ‘[circularity] charge originates in a 
basic misunderstanding of the theory of price determination’ (Patinkin, 1965, p. 114). The 
key is to differentiate between individual experiments, where hypothetical quantities are 
determined for given prices, and market experiments, where prices are determined by the 
interplay of these individual demands and supplies to establish a market equilibrium 
(Patinkin, 1965, p. 12). Along these lines, the utility of monetary balances is the result of 
an individual experiment conducted at varying prices; the value of money itself is 
determined in a market experiment based on the interplay of these individual experiments 
(Niehans, 1978, p. 13; Patinkin, 1965, p. 116). 
The more challenging issue in applying utility theory to money is that ‘the utility of money 
has [both] a flow aspect and a stock aspect’ (Niehans, 1978, p. 14). The former concerns 
the purchasing power of income in monetary form, its ‘subjective exchange value’ 
(Schumpeter, 1954, p. 1089), where the utility of extra units of monetary income is the 
value of goods that can be purchased. The flow value presents no difficulty since ‘the 
proposition that money’s utility derives solely from its exchange value is indisputable’ 
(Chick, 1983, p. 303). The problem arises in determining the stock aspect of utility, that is, 
                                                         
41 An individual is free of money illusion if his excess-demand functions depend solely on relative prices and 
real wealth (Patinkin, 1965, p. 22). 
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the value of money held. The problem with balances of purely fiat money is that they do 
not improve anyone’s wellbeing. It is here that deductive ‘as if’ reasoning enters. The 
security of holding real balances of money, in an environment where future payments are 
at uncertain times, is simply assumed to provide utility similar to that of consumption goods 
(Patinkin, 1965, p. 80). In a sense, ‘these approaches must presuppose what they set out to 
explain’ (Ingham, 2000, p. 20) because, although the utility of consumption goods is well 
understood and concerns individual tastes, the utility of money balances is not, and is 
merely a proxy for unexplained ‘frictions in the exchange system’ (Niehans, 1978, p, 16). 
Money is deemed to provide an unspecified and unexplained liquidity service, which is 
nevertheless valued by a single, representative agent. 
A more explicit attempt to include money in neoclassical models, by assuming that money 
reduces unspecified transactions costs, leads to the cash-in-advance model (Clower, 1967; 
Lucas, 1990) where all purchases must be made in a single, state-issued money. Effectively, 
a medium of exchange is introduced into a neo-Walrasian general equilibrium model by 
imposing the equation of exchange, equation (3.1). The demand for money is established 
because the representative agent must have sufficient money balances to implement his 
proposed consumption plans. Under some conditions, however, this restriction prevents 
otherwise-optimal trades. Instead, money operates as a ‘finance constraint’, and ‘cannot be 
interpreted as a demand and supply relationship in neo-Walrasian theory’ (Rogers, 1989, 
p. 98). The cash-in-advance constraint designed to integrate money into a fundamentally 
moneyless model is welfare reducing and operates as an impediment to trade or by 
increasing the volatility of asset prices. The lack of explanatory content and counter-
intuitive nature of these models leads to post-GFC exasperation: ‘The irony of modelling 
liquidity by imposing money as a constraint on trade was lost on the profession’ (Buiter, 
2009, p. 1). 
Overlapping-generations (OLG) models have also been used to provide an avenue for the 
existence of an, otherwise worthless, fiat money asset (Samuelson, 1958). In these models, 
agents generally ‘live’ for two periods. In the first, they are ‘young’ and productive and can 
earn the money asset. In the second, they are ‘old’ and unproductive; they must live off 
their saved money. Overlapping generations of young and old agents coexist and this allows 
the transfer of money assets from the old to the young in each period. The acceptance of 
money, however, is only ensured by eliminating the possibility of saving in land or other 
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durable goods. Restricted to perishable endowment goods during their productive period, 
young agents have no way to save or invest for their ‘retirement’ period. The introduction 
of paper ‘money’ allows for this, but the result is that saving and investment are physically 
identical, not just an accounting entity. OLG models do not explain ‘money’ because the 
object representing ‘money’ is not money at all, and would be dominated by any other 
interest-earning asset (Rogers, 1989, p. 46-47).  
Despite their continued use, the only conclusion regarding cash-in-advance and 
overlapping-generations models is that ‘they have no hope of explaining endogenously 
either the nature of money or the development of monetary exchange’ (Kiyotaki & Wright, 
1989, p. 928, n. 1). Similarly, the observation that the medium of exchange is subject to 
evolution in its objective form is a basis for rejecting the cash-in-advance technique or 
putting money in the utility or production functions (Kiyotaki & Wright, 1989, p. 951). 
This problem is compounded when the hierarchical basis of liquidity and money, identified 
in Part II, is considered. These techniques neither capture the tendency of the banking 
system to evolve (Minsky, 1957) nor cover the ‘wider structure of liquidity’ beyond the 
supply of money (Radcliffe Committee, 1959, p. 132). Adding a commodity-like money 
asset to general equilibrium models does not provide a fundamental treatment of liquidity 
or money.  
7.3 Financial Frictions 
Rather than adding money directly into general equilibrium models, the assumption of 
perfect market liquidity itself can be addressed. Attempts to include the effects of liquidity 
in the context of a pure-exchange general equilibrium model are made by adding ad hoc 
‘financial frictions’. These frictions provide an ‘as if’ element to introduce the market 
illiquidity and funding illiquidity observed during financial crises. The frictions can take 
various forms, such as inefficient use of technology, transaction costs, or imperfect 
information; all serve to create instances of incomplete markets (Quadrini, 2011). Without 
perfect market liquidity, some trades that would otherwise occur are prevented. 
Just so, Cochrane (2014) outlines two ‘stories’ why financial crises affect the real economy. 
In the first, falling asset values prevent the banking system from playing its role as an 
intermediary between savers and lenders. A financial crisis is a form of financial friction, 
in which otherwise-profitable firms cannot get access to funds. In the second story, which 
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Cochrane calls ‘aggregate demand’, a flight to quality assets means higher government 
bond prices, lower equity prices and a subsequent fall in consumption and investment 
demand. Institutional investors, for some reason, sell assets temporarily undervalued by the 
crisis. In Cochrane’s opinion, the second story ‘can easily be managed with sufficient fiscal 
and monetary stimulus’ so that there is no need to adjust banking policy (Cochrane, 2014, 
p. 211). 
Financial frictions do not address the conceptual problems inherent in the money-in-utility 
or cash-in-advance models. The moneyless neo-Walrasian model is kept intact; the frictions 
merely prevent the system from attaining its full, efficient equilibrium. At its core, each 
model assumes the existence of a ‘true’ general equilibrium price vector. The frictions 
create the need for enhanced, illiquidity-compensating returns for some agents, which are 
then identified as liquidity premiums. None of these additions creates a demand for a liquid 
store of value. Instead, they are restrictions on the success of the invisible medium of 
exchange and not a deep, causal explanation of liquidity itself. Consider following 
statement taken from a survey of ‘financial frictions’, directly after a recognition that 
‘liquidity spirals’ and the dysfunction of a ‘credit crunch’ are major contributors to the 
financial sector’s instability: 
In a frictionless economy, funds are liquid and can flow to the most profitable 
project or to the person who values the funds most. Differences in productivity, 
patience, risk aversion or optimism determine fund flows, but for the aggregate 
output only the total capital and labor matter. Productive agents hold most of the 
productive capital and issue claims to less productive individuals. In other words, 
in a setting without financial frictions it is not important whether funds are in the 
hands of productive or less productive agents and the economy can be studied with 
a single representative agent in mind. In contrast, with financial frictions, liquidity 
considerations become important and the wealth distribution matters. 
(Brunnermeier et al., 2013, p. 4) 
The use of the term ‘funds’ and the phrase ‘funds are liquid’ in the quotation above implies 
a monetary flow, but in the neo-Walrasian model there are no money flows, since all trades 
are direct via commodity futures contracts. The phrase ‘funds are liquid’ gives the 
impression that money is an aspect of the analysis, but the correct interpretation is that it is 
resources that are mobile, there is no movement of a medium of exchange. Financial 
121 
 
frictions build on this monetary masquerade by conjuring up an image of a ‘monetary flow’ 
that is somehow impeded by the financial system. The financial system cannot impede a 
non-existent flow, so the idea of financial frictions collapses (Buiter 2009; Rogers, 2006c, 
2008a; Rogers, 2014). 
A family of models (Holmström and Tirole, 1998; and Tirole, 2008) provides an illustrative 
attempt to analyse liquidity using liquidity-free general equilibrium theory. Tirole 
recognises up front that general equilibrium models cannot find a fundamental place for 
liquidity or money: 
But what is “liquidity”? Does liquidity matter and should governments and central 
banks do something about it? While trivial to a practionner [sic], these questions 
surprisingly are not so obvious to an economist trained in the general-equilibrium 
tradition. Intuitively, an industrial company or financial institution is short of 
liquidity when a) some (continuation or investment) spending decisions are 
worthwhile, and b) the firm somehow cannot manage to find the money to finance 
them. Classical (Arrow-Debreu, Modigliani-Miller) economic theory holds it that 
a) and b) are inconsistent: if refinancing or financing of new projects is desirable, 
so goes the argument, the firm can always issue claims on associated future profits, 
that investors will find sufficiently attractive to be willing to finance the outlay. 
According to this logic, firms have no reason to plan their liquidity (or for that 
matter to engage in risk management to avoid bad surprises in their liquidity 
position): they just can return to the capital market as needs arise. (Tirole, 2008, p. 
54) 
In response, Tirole (2008, p. 54) provides a ‘conceptual framework for liquidity’, to resolve 
the inconsistency in Arrow-Debreu models of not being able to find funding for profitable 
activities. The framework incorporates agency costs and costly refinancing unlike the 
‘classical economics world, in which firms could costlessly return to the capital market to 
raise funds when they need to’ (Tirole, 2008, p. 56). Unlike in the Arrow-Debreu world, 
where no trading is conducted beyond the Walrasian auction, cash flow mismatches arise 
which must be funded by ‘finance as you go’ or ‘liquidity hoarding’ (Tirole, 2008, p. 55). 
Specifically, a loss, deemed a ‘liquidity shock’, in the second period of a three-period model 
must be covered to ensure the realisation of the investment gains available in the final 
period. External financing is unavailable, however, because there is a ‘wedge between the 
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full value of the firm and the external value of the firm’ that ‘prevents it from financing all 
projects that have positive net present value’ (Holmström & Tirole, 1998, p. 2), so the 
potential gains in the subsequent period do not sufficiently remunerate the new investors. 
Rather than modelling a liquidity event, where funds are unavailable for otherwise 
profitable activities, the loss is a catastrophic event. The supposed ‘liquidity shock’ requires 
new funds, but not for rolling over existing funds to resolve a funding liquidity problem, or 
relying on market liquidity to sell an asset that has fallen in value. It is more akin to an 
insurance loss, where an income-generating asset has been destroyed and must be rebuilt 
to complete the partially produced output for sale. Liquidity is presented as some sort of 
‘agency problem’—an ad hoc explanation that has no theoretical content, a symptom of 
how general equilibrium models struggle to ‘illustrate how disruptions in financial 
intermediation can induce a crisis that affects real activity’ (Gertler & Kiyotaki, 2011, p. 
549). It appears that, unless the ‘refinancing’ involves a loss, the Arrow-Debreu model 
cannot conceive of any reason for a failure to source funding. 
For Tirole, the financial construction that solves the problem is a ‘line of credit’, but it 
actually takes the form of an insurance contract. This misunderstanding is evident in the 
description of a credit line: 
This is indeed the nature of a credit line: there would be no reason to contract in 
advance on a credit line if at date 1 the bank were always happy to provide the 
funds; it is precisely because lending is a money-losing operation at date 1 that it 
must be pre-arranged. (Tirole, 2008, p. 58)  
The suggestion, and hence the basis for a fundamental explanation of liquidity, is that banks 
make ‘money-losing’ loans on the basis of pre-arranged credit lines. This is simply not true 
in practice. Credit lines are contingent on the credit-worthiness of the borrower, and both 
terms and availability are revised based on credit events like the one underlying the 
‘liquidity’ in the model. Perpetuating loanable funds’ confusion of saving and money, there 
is uncertainty regarding where the banks find the funding to satisfy the pre-arranged lines 
of credit (Tirole, 2008, p. 58). The commodity view of money underlies the question as to 
‘whether the intermediary can raise enough funds at date 1 to meet its (deterministic) credit 
obligations’ (Holmström and Tirole, 1998, p. 18). With a more realist assessment of the 
banking system, this question would not be asked. 
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Instead, statements such as ‘credit lines are granted by intermediaries such as banks, which 
can make commitments, assuming of course that they have enough funds to meet later credit 
needs’ (Holmström and Tirole, 1998, p. 13) should be re-framed in terms of whether it has 
enough collateral to borrow these funds from another bank intermediary. In the absence of 
aggregate uncertainty, the liquidity requirement is deterministic and can be met by the 
private sector, whereas aggregate uncertainty requires government intervention 
(Holmström and Tirole, 1998, p. 15). In other words, government can issue safe assets that 
are used as the basis of outside liquidity. Mehrling (2012) emphasises collateral as key to 
keeping the liquidity of the future incarnation of the shadow banking system alive. Central 
banks cannot maintain the system by being only the lender of last resort, an issue considered 
further in Section 9.4.  
As discussed in Section 6.4, in Real Analysis banks are merely financial intermediaries 
with no special significance and can therefore be ignored. Nevertheless, the Diamond-
Dybvig model (Diamond & Dybvig, 1983), and its derivatives (Allen & Gale, 1998, 2000, 
2004), is the workhorse model of bank runs and liquidity provision, and requires discussion 
and placement in its theoretical context. The model is briefly as follows: ‘Illiquidity’ 
originates from the different yields available from operating the productive technology over 
one or two periods in a three-period model. Interrupting the technology after one period 
reduces the yield compared with its operation over two periods. Although the model has 
‘no transaction costs’, the ‘analysis would be the same if the asset were illiquid because of 
selling costs: one receives a low return if unexpectedly forced to “liquidate” early’ 
(Diamond & Dybvig, 1983, p. 403).  
Demand for ‘liquidity’ arises because, in the second period, agents discover their personal 
consumption ‘type’ or ‘liquidity preference’ (Allen & Gale, 2004, p. 1016), that is, in which 
of the second or third periods they prefer to consume the single homogeneous good. The 
consumption type is only known to the consumer, and is not publicly available, thus 
preventing a full neo-Walrasian equilibrium and ‘optimal risk sharing’. There can be no 
‘complete market of Arrow-Debreu state-contingent claims, because this market would 
require claims that depend on the nonverifiable private information’ (Diamond & Dybvig, 
1983, p. 407). The model is based on a financial friction arising from incomplete 
information. 
In the model, bank deposits can mitigate the problem of incomplete markets, but at the risk 
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of bank runs. ‘It is precisely the “transformation” of illiquid assets into liquid assets that is 
responsible both for the liquidity service provided by banks and for their susceptibility to 
runs’ (Diamond & Dybvig, 1983, p. 409). Consumers can ‘deposit’ their first period 
endowment of the consumption good into the bank. This deposit returns 𝑟𝑟1 units of the 
consumption good on demand in the second period, regardless of the consumer’s type. In 
this case, customers are served sequentially ‘until the bank runs out of assets’ (Diamond & 
Dybvig, 1983, p. 408). The bank is susceptible to a bank run when 𝑟𝑟1 > 1; that is, when the 
return is greater than the ‘liquidating’ value of the technology. If the value of the bank 
deposit in the second period were the same as the liquidating value of the technology then 
there would be no bank run, but a ‘demand deposit contract which is not subject to runs 
provides no liquidity services’ (Diamond & Dybvig, 1983, p. 409). 
Lending is conducted in terms of a single consumable or investible good, and the ‘liquidity’ 
constraint is due to the time profile of the available technology. The form of ‘liquidity’ 
adopted is technological and arises from a ‘real’ production constraint. To isolate the effects 
of ‘liquidity’, as distinct from ‘risk’, only the uncertainty regarding the timing of 
consumption is allowed to affect the equilibrium. ‘There is a trade-off between 
[technological] liquidity and returns: long-term investments have higher returns but take 
longer to mature (are less liquid)’ (Allen & Gale, 2004, p. 1016). As such, the liquidity 
premium is assumed rather than explained. There is no risk-return trade-off: production 
outcomes (i.e. ‘asset returns’) for the two production techniques are deterministic. The 
external, technological specification of asset returns based on the existence of a single 
consumption good gives the model a Wicksellian pedigree. 
Diamond and Dybvig (1983, p. 404) interpret the results as having ‘far-reaching policy 
implications, because they imply that the real damage from bank runs is primarily from the 
direct damage occurring when recalling loans interrupts production.’ In the strict sense, 
banks cannot recall loans in this fashion, but the phenomenon could be interpreted as the 
losses made by the bank when attempting to sell illiquid assets. As such, the model reflects 
some of the difficulties faced by banks in maintaining convertibility to state money. There 
are, however, some ontological problems. 
First, the bank ‘deposits’ are contracts to provide a ‘fixed amount of consumption’ (Allen 
& Gale, 2004, p. 1017), there are no monetary aspects to the model, and as such it is a non-
monetary form of analysis. The ‘bank’ is unrecognisable as a money-creating entity that 
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exchanges and clears credit. The bank must receive deposits, or prior saving, before 
engaging in investment projects. It is standard within the financial frictions literature to 
‘assume that households deposit funds in financial intermediaries that in turn lend funds to 
nonfinancial firms’ (Gertler & Kiyotaki, 2011, p. 550), thereby disallowing any asset-price 
feedback between credit creation and existing assets (Turner, 2013, p. 30). The model 
confuses money and saving and suffers from all the problems identified with loanable funds 
theory.  
Second, and related to the first problem, the ‘bank’ attempts to optimise the production of 
the consumption good in the second and third periods, subject to the technological trade-
offs and the randomness of consumption preferences. Hence the ‘bank’ is, in fact, a planner, 
whose role it is to maximise the expected utility of consumers (the ‘depositors’). Its 
portfolio of long- and short-term investments can differ from the demands of the depositors 
and this misalignment in the flow of the consumption good is the source of the bank run. 
The Diamond-Dybvig model is used to interpret the GFC, which has been likened to a 
traditional bank run in the shadow banking system (Gorton & Metrick, 2012; Lucas, 2014; 
Lucas & Stokey, 2011). Repo agreements replaced bank deposits, but without deposit 
insurance or the protection of a lender of last resort. Lucas and Stokey (2011) apply the 
model to analyse this ‘run on repo’. They conclude that repo collateral plays the role of 
deposit insurance (Lucas & Stokey, 2011, p. 12). Michell (2017) highlights the analytical 
and empirical flaws in this argument. First, it is essentially a category error to compare the 
banking system, which creates money, to the repo market, which cannot. Second, the bank 
run argument fails to recognise the importance of asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) 
as the primary source of financing for the shadow banking system. Only once the shadow 
banking system had moved through its first phase of failure, in which the ABCP market 
had ceased to function, did the system resort to repo financing (Mehrling, 2011). The 
shadow banking system relied on repo financing during the second phase, before moving 
to the third phase in which off-balance-sheet vehicles were brought back onto bank balance 
sheets. 
Finally, it must be noted that the Diamond-Dybvig model covers only an individual bank-
run; a system-wide bank run is a ‘coincidence’ (Allen & Gale, 2004, p. 1019). In fact, unless 
all bank depositors attempt to convert their holding into state money, an individual bank 
run cannot have systematic effects, therefore it is ‘hard to invent persuasive scenarios in 
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which runs now could threaten the banking system as a whole’ (Moore, 1988, p. 37, n. 19). 
Thus: 
A run on an individual institution is not a crisis, however. To be a crisis, the run 
has to affect the financial system and, ultimately, the real economy. We need to 
understand what makes for “contagion” or a “systemic” run. (Cochrane, 2014, p. 
206) 
In Real Analysis, financial crises are ideally related to changes in the fundamentals of 
‘tastes, endowments, or production possibilities’ (Cass & Shell, 1983, p. 194, n. 1), so that 
contagion derives from ‘real shocks and real linkages’ (Allen & Gale, 2000, p. 3). These 
shocks represent intrinsic uncertainty ‘caused by stochastic fluctuations in the primitives or 
fundamentals of the economy’ (Allen & Gale, 2004, p. 1017). Faced only with intrinsic 
uncertainty, complete markets are able to achieve full risk sharing and establish a 
‘fundamental equilibrium’, so that a ‘crisis cannot occur in a fundamental equilibrium in 
the absence of exogenous shocks to fundamentals, such as asset returns or liquidity 
demands’ (Allen & Gale, 2004, p. 1018).  
Exogenous shocks, or ‘sunspots’, however, allow for extrinsic uncertainty which ‘by 
definition has no effect on the fundamentals of the economy’ (Allen & Gale, 2004, p. 1018). 
Extrinsic uncertainty cannot be shared because there are ‘no markets for Arrow securities 
contingent on the sunspot variable, so financial institutions cannot insure themselves 
against asset-price fluctuations associated with the sunspot variable’ (Allen & Gale, 2004, 
p. 1020). Consumers are excluded from the capital market and are unable to construct 
contracts to ‘implement the first-best allocation of risk’ (Allen & Gale, 2004, p. 1023). As 
such, the models are open to the objection that they ‘depend on easily cured ignorance about 
the current state of the world and on inability to create simple securities’ (Black, 1987, p. 
147, n. 7). Nevertheless, Lucas and Stokey (2011, p. 10) interpret a sunspot equilibrium as 
representing an outcome that occurs due a self-reinforcing belief feedback loop where 
‘what you want to do depends on what you think others will do.’ The sunspot introduces a 
systemic element missing from the Diamond-Dybvig model and overcomes the weaknesses 
in a ‘domino’ view of financial crises versus a ‘contagion’ view (Cochrane, 2014). Rather 
than losses at individual financial institutions causing subsequent institutions to topple like 
dominoes, the GFC showed that systemic effects on asset prices are able to cause all 
institutions trouble at once. 
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Using the Diamond-Dybvig model to evaluate bank runs also leads Cochrane (2014) to 
recommend that banks be prevented from issuing ‘run-prone securities’. Instead of 
deposits, banks should fund themselves with 100% equity42, since equity holders cannot 
force repayment; they can only sell their equity. The ontological underpinning of this 
recommendation is the commodity view of money, whereby there is a fixed stock of money 
in circulation such that ‘system as a whole promises more cash than is available’ (Cochrane, 
2014, p. 206). In this worldview, liquidity cannot be differentiated from solvency, and a 
failure to repay in the money commodity is insolvency. It follows that only asset sales 
represent liquidity, and, since banks only lend money they receive on deposit, they should 
be able to conduct asset sales to recover this money. 
Attempts to prevent the possibility of bank runs by increasing the level of equity funding 
downplay liquidity risk to emphasise solvency risks. From this viewpoint, liquidity risk 
arises because of insolvency risk, for ‘when banks take risks with the funds that they obtain 
by “producing debt,” this risk can create solvency problems that would threaten the very 
liquidity’ that banks create (Admati & Hellwig, 2013, p. 295). No recognition is given to 
the fact that insolvency is not a liquidity problem for firms with long-term liabilities, only 
when debt is short term. It is because bank liabilities are generally short-term, and hence 
liquid, that there is a problem. If not, solvency would not be an issue. Liquidity is the first-
order problem, solvency is a subsidiary issue. Although the ‘short-term debt that a bank 
produces may therefore not be very money-like if the bank does not have much equity’ 
(Admati & Hellwig, 2013, p. 156), equity alone cannot save a bank from illiquidity. 
Solvency-based analyses of bank liquidity ignore several issues with the asset side of the 
balance sheet. Descriptions of a ‘traditional bank’ (Admati & Hellwig, 2013, Chapter 4), 
with long-term lending funded short-term, are not accurate representations of traditional 
banking (see Section 4.4). If the assets are also short-term self-liquidating bills, in the 
tradition of English banking as per the recommendations of Bagehot and Dunbar, then the 
                                                         
42 The 100% equity plan is very different from the 100% reserves or ‘Chicago’ plan most associated with 
Milton Friedman. The latter refers to having a one-for-one backing of state money for all bank money issued, 
and is more akin to the ideas of the Currency School (see Section 4.3) and the commodity view of money. 
The implications of the 100% equity plan are the reverse, since it would mean that banks would not be able 
to issue any debt or create money at all. 
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fire-sale issues arising from maturity transformation are less relevant. Using short-term 
funding for long-term assets, and thereby relying on market liquidity, leads to asset-price 
dislocations during a period of funding stress. Nevertheless, this dislocation is 
predominantly a liquidity event, and insolvency during these periods is primarily due to 
illiquidity. Proposals for the central bank to act as a ‘dealer of last resort’ are entirely 
tailored to the situation of long-term borrowing with short-term funding (Mehrling, 2011). 
In this case, we must recognise the importance of collateral and its implications for 
solvency.  
Also downplayed by Admati and Hellwig is the moneyness of bank money, with the view 
that a ‘dollar in a bank account is the debt of the bank. A dollar in cash is nobody’s debt’, 
since ‘the issue of [government] banknotes does not commit the government to anything’ 
(Admati & Hellwig, 2013, p. 294). By this reasoning, the gold standard, whereby central 
banks promise to pay gold of a fixed weight—a gold debt owed by the central bank—cannot 
be a monetary system since there is nothing answering to this definition of ‘cash’. As seen 
in Section 5.7, the Modigliani-Miller theorem does not apply to firms that finance 
themselves in the money market. It may be that the equity funding of banks should be 
greater than pre-GFC levels, but recommendations based on an analytical framework 
inconsistent with fundamental ontological aspects of the banking system are of dubious 
merit. 
7.4 Credit 
Arrow-Debreu models, in addition to lacking any form of recognisable money, also lack 
the concept of credit risk. Inasmuch as the concept of monetary settlement is relevant, all 
transactions are settled at the beginning of time. Credit risk, in the sense that payment or 
final settlement is not forthcoming, simply does not feature. The Arrow-Debreu model 
determines pre-settled delivery of the contracted commodity. As such, there is no risk of 
default in money terms; there is no credit risk. From the ontological viewpoint of this 
study—that money is a form of credit—this omission is significant. The Arrow-Debreu 
securities are promises to deliver a commodity, not to pay money. The only risk is non-
delivery of the commodity at the maturity of the futures contract, but even this risk can be 
mitigated or shared.  
It can be imagined that all Arrow-Debreu markets clear by a form of ‘trade credit’ (Lucas, 
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1984, p. 21) that never defaults and is always accepted. Consequently, no agent has any 
need to maintain a reserve of better-quality credits, as is demonstrated by the hierarchy of 
money. The fundamental problem with adding money to an Arrow-Debreu model is not 
just that it appears as a finance constraint, or that it is unnecessary; credit money, as a 
medium of exchange, implicitly exists but, because of the lack of uncertainty and 
intertemporal trading, it ceases to exist in equilibrium. Instead, all banks work perfectly, all 
credits clear, and final settlement is achieved across all agents. Barter exchange, in which 
commodities are traded with a time lag, conceptually involves promise to pay, but the 
payment is made with other commodities. A ‘credit’ economy is possible with barter, but a 
monetary economy only appears when payment is made with the credit of others. The 
banking system, which enables settlement by means of the credits of others, is essential to 
a theory of money. 
Once an allowance is made for potential delivery failures, however, the equilibrium 
becomes game-theoretic. Each agent must attempt to evaluate interdependent strategies of 
own-default and other-agent default. Default and bankruptcy can be ‘thought to be 
incompatible with equilibrium analysis’ and ‘incompatible with perfect competition, since 
rational agents would have to calculate the probabilities of their loans defaulting, and 
conjecture how these probabilities would change as they increased their loans’ 
(Geanakoplos, 1990, p. 32). The implications for a model where the basis of money is credit 
are significant. Within neo-Walrasian theory, default risks must be assessed during the 
time-0 Walrasian auction. No strategy can involve holding the credits of other agents—the 
pre-condition for a monetary asset. The characteristics of the resulting equilibrium are 
likely to differ from that under complete markets, but the process is no different. 
For Goodhart (2005b, p. 195) ‘the possibility of default is central to the analysis of any 
monetary world’. The absence of default risk for Goodhart is expressed via the 
transversality condition, equation (6.8), which he interprets as meaning that the 
representative agent ‘always manages, in due course, to pay her debts’ (2005b, p. 194, 
original emphasis). Although the transversality condition is often interpreted as the 
assumption that agents never default (see Goodhart, 2009; Espinoza, Goodhart, & 
Tsomocos, 2009), in neo-Walrasian theory, as we have seen above, default is not a concept 
that exists. Instead, the transversality condition rules out endless debt accumulation and 
price bubbles (Cochrane, 1992, p. 247), not debt default. 
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The attempt to adjust asset prices for credit and liquidity risk from within the risk-neutral 
complete-markets world has created much confusion. From within this incoherent 
framework, the post-GFC emphasis on credit and liquidity has produced a suite of 
‘valuation adjustments’, known collectively as ‘XVA’, to incorporate the elements missing 
from the complete, risk-neutral theory. Examples are the credit valuation adjustment 
(CVA), the funding valuation adjustment (FVA), the debt valuation adjustment (DVA) and 
the capital valuation adjustment (KVA) (Albanese, Caenazzo, & Crepey, 2016). Each 
adjustment is motivated by the omission of credit or default risk from the classic Arrow-
Debreu model, and attempts to extend asset-pricing models to incorporate credit or liquidity 
risk by means of funding costs and credit or liquidity premiums. Nevertheless, all leave the 
complete markets framework intact and assume the existence of a risk-free rate. For 
instance, the ‘FVA debate’ (Castagna, 2012; Hull & White, 2012) sets risk-neutral 
theoreticians against market practitioners over the validity of adjusting asset prices to 
account for difficulties in accessing funding during a crisis. The theoreticians apply strict, 
but misguided, complete markets logic to the problem of liquidity and money to reject the 
effect of funding on prices. By contrast, the practitioners are theoretically adrift, but, by 
necessity, have the intuitive and pragmatic approach required to solve a real and pressing 
asset-pricing problem.  
The lengthy debate between theoreticians and practitioners concerning the validity of the 
valuation adjustments, and how to incorporate them into the standard asset-pricing 
techniques, serves to highlight the unrecognised difficulty in attempting to incorporate 
failures of monetary payment or access to money into a framework that excludes money. 
Neither side of the debate has explicitly recognised the fundamental problem with the 
existing Arrow-Debreu model. In an Arrow-Debreu model, the risk-free rate is more 
fundamental than simply being the assumed funding rate for market participants in a risk-
neutral world. No-arbitrage, or replication, arguments are used to establish risk-free 
portfolios that must earn the risk-free rate. Yet, since the theoretical basis for this rate is 
non-monetary Fisherian time preference, attempts to adjust the risk-free rate for potential 
funding problems are fundamentally at odds with the theoretical structure itself and need 
to be abandoned. 
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7.5 Transactions and Search Costs 
In effect, neoclassical theory leaves ‘exchange arrangements indeterminate’ and is ‘forced 
to treat money metaphorically as potential consumer or producer good, which, in fact it is 
not’ (Niehans, 1978, p. 99). Taking a commodity view of money, and denying the existence 
of credit money, exchange arrangements can be added by considering all commodities ‘as 
potential media of exchange’ (Niehans, 1978, pp. 99-100). The medium of exchange solves 
the fundamental problem of barter: the double coincidence of wants (Jevons, 1875). 
Nevertheless, transactions costs have an impact on liquidity. ‘The ease of conversion of an 
asset into something else suggests the importance of transactions costs. These, in turn, may 
be formulated into terms of search theory’ (Hahn, 1990, p. 64). Such models attempt to 
explain the nature of money. 
Neo-Walrasian general equilibrium models, in which all trades are conducted at the first 
point of time (time-0), do not have to contend with uncertain payment times; this form of 
liquidity risk is absent. The Walrasian auctioneer provides a central exchange that removes 
the need to search for a suitable counterparty (Vayanos & Wang, 2011, p. 292). Money, by 
contrast, provides utility for agents facing random payments times (Patinkin, 1965, p. 80). 
This technique can be questioned for its ‘failure to capture a large part of reality’ (Niehans, 
1978, p. 18, n. 44), for, if necessary, agents can negotiate between themselves to eliminate 
payment uncertainty. Instead, Black (1970a, p. 7) observes that a ‘person or institution does 
not need to hold liquid assets to help handle unexpected cash flows. Almost all cash flows 
are expected, and the cost and risk associated with handling those cash flows that are 
unexpected are very low.’ Similarly, Niehans (1978, pp. 18-19) concludes that uncertainty 
concerning the timing of payments is neither a necessary nor sufficient ingredient for 
monetary theory. For Niehans, the medium of exchange is the commodity with the lowest 
transactions and storage costs, and its use provides efficiency gains (Niehans, 1978, p. 18). 
In this view, the social invention of money somehow reduces transactions costs. 
Consider a neo-Walrasian economy with the explicit friction that agents can only meet for 
exchange randomly. Some of the necessary Arrow-Debreu contracts for a Pareto optimum 
cannot arise (Kiyotaki & Wright, 1989, p. 931). The potential for credit payment to solve 
the barter problem is disallowed, and the emphasis is placed on the ‘different intrinsic 
properties’ (Kiyotaki & Wright, 1989, p. 928) of each of the monetary commodity 
‘candidates’, in accordance with the commodity view of money. ‘A commodity is regarded 
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as money for our purposes if and only if it can be traded directly for all other commodities 
in the economy’ (Clower, 1967, p. 5). In equilibrium, agents converge on holding the 
commodity, for which they have no immediate need, but which has the lowest storage cost. 
The commodity with the lowest transactions and storage costs becomes a dominant media 
of exchange, hence marketable. Commodity ‘money’ spontaneously appears as the result 
of optimising agents’ minimising their storage costs and allowing indirect trade (see 
Kiyotaki & Wright, 1989; Kiyotaki & Wright, 1993).  
The commodity acting as medium of exchange, however, is implicitly in a raw, un-minted 
state, that is, not in any monetary form. It is nevertheless held for reasons unrelated to 
consumption or production (Kiyotaki & Wright, 1989, p. 937). Although trade could 
conceivably be conducted by credit or other forms of financial asset, these potential media 
of exchange are excluded by construction.43 No recognisable form of money appears in 
these models. Instead, the agents play an optimising game of commodity middlemen. Other 
configurations of the model produce equilibria where there is more than one ‘medium of 
exchange’, because, of the three types of agent in the model, only one pair can trade 
directly, the other two pairs must use different commodities as a store of value for future 
trades (Kiyotaki & Wright, 1989, p. 938). One commodity is used as a medium of exchange 
even though it has the highest storage costs because of its ‘superior marketability’. High 
storage costs, interpreted as negative returns, are used to give justification that, in the real 
world, money has a rate of return dominated by all other assets (Kiyotaki & Wright, 1989, 
p. 938). In many cases ‘money’ fails to arise at all (Kiyotaki & Wright, 1989, p. 939). 
Fiat money, which is ‘intrinsically useless’ (Kiyotaki & Wright, 1989, p. 951), is introduced 
into the model seemingly by helicopter and becomes the ‘general medium of exchange’ 
(Kiyotaki & Wright, 1989, p. 942, original emphasis). The initial introduction of this money 
is entirely glossed over (Kiyotaki & Wright, 1989, p. 942, n. 12); the fiat money is accepted 
simply because it is trusted. Since there is no facility, except time, by which trust can be 
established, the model assumes the very proposition that it attempts to prove. There is no 
explanatory content in this treatment of fiat money, nevertheless the ‘tenuousness’ of fiat 
                                                         
43 With credit payments and Rational Expectations, the economy could still be Walrasian even when agents 
only meet at random. If each agent knew the probability of meeting, as they would with Rational Expectations, 
then Arrow-Debreu contracts could be constructed. 
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money in the model is declared to be a strength, since, under the commodity view, the value 
of fiat money must depend on faith (Kiyotaki & Wright, 1989, p. 943). 
Search costs affect expected returns in such a way that assets can be ranked in terms of 
liquidity and assets assigned liquidity premia. Lippman and McCall (1986) produce such a 
measure of liquidity, which can be used to compare assets. Liquidity is defined as ‘the 
optimal expected time to transform an asset into money’ (Lippman & McCall, 1986, p. 44). 
In their model, the time it takes to be converted into money depends on the variability in 
sequential price offers ‘drawn from the same known distribution’ (Lippman & McCall, 
1986, p. 46). In this search-based model, liquidity ultimately depends on the asset’s price 
variability and ‘liquidity is determined by characteristics of the asset; characteristics of the 
seller have virtually no impact’ (Lippman & McCall, 1986, p. 47). The association of 
liquidity with marketability (Lippman & McCall, 1986, p. 48, n. 12) results in the counter-
intuitive conclusion that rising interest rates or time preferences lead to increased liquidity 
(Lippman & McCall, 1986, p. 47). The explanation is that the seller’s optimal sale price 
falls as the discounted future costs of holding the asset fall with the rise in interest rates. 
Given the same distribution of offers, the likelihood of an acceptable match increases. 
Transactions and search theories also have a problem with realism: search difficulties rely 
on the existence of clearly profitable niches that, inexplicably, remain unoccupied: 
There is of course a connection here between the search-theoretic and 
straightforward transaction cost approach. Ordinary economic theory suggests that 
when there is inducement to search there will also arise middlemen who can 
profitably reduce search costs. Ordinarily agents then do not search but pay a 
middleman, which is the transaction cost of the theory. Middlemen, in turn, will 
charge more in markets where the frequency of offers and bids is low. As I have 
already noted, such a story is not only required by ordinary observation of the 
world but also by economic theory which supposes that profitable niches do not 
remain unoccupied. (Hahn, 1990, p. 73) 
Search and transactions costs can be mitigated by dealers and market makers. As seen in 
Section 5.2, market makers provide inventory services for profit and, in doing so, take 
liquidity risk, but avoid price risk where possible. Each market maker can add market 
liquidity to any asset by relying on a correlated hedge asset used by all other market makers. 
Liquidity and bid-offer spreads are determined by the frequency of the asset’s turnover, 
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search and transactions costs, or ‘return characteristics’ (Ho & Stoll, 1981, p. 62).  
Walrasian price flexibility and market makers relate to the distinction between ‘flexprice’ 
and ‘fixprice’ markets (Hicks, 1974). Prices in flexprice markets are determined by supply 
and demand, whereas in fixprice markets prices are less responsive to supply and demand 
imbalances. The neo-Walrasian, perfect market liquidity setting aligns with the flexprice 
assumption. Notably, a flexprice market is characterised by intermediate traders (Hicks, 
1974, p. 24) who ‘expect to make a profit’ from their activities (p. 26). The neo-Walrasian 
framework has, by its very nature, an implicit dealer structure underpinning it, although the 
‘basic Walrasian story abstracts from the actual mechanics of markets’ since ‘buyers and 
sellers are all present at the same time’ (O’Hara, 2003, p. 1336). The Walrasian auctioneer 
can be interpreted as the single market maker that serves an ideal market (see Section 5.2). 
To address the assumption of perfect market liquidity, many empirical studies have 
investigated the effect of transactions costs and other measures of illiquidity on asset prices. 
This literature can be distinguished from that providing the ‘micro-foundations’ for 
commodity money based on transactions and search costs (see Section 7.5). As with the 
equity premium and risk-free rate puzzles, general equilibrium models cannot explain the 
volume of trading observed in reality. In models with symmetric information, each agent’s 
best interest is served by holding the market portfolio, and not trading at all, a strategy that 
can only be reinforced by transactions costs. Nevertheless, the idea of transactions costs is 
used as the basis for analysis of the market ‘microstructure’ and the effects of illiquidity by 
studying measures constructed from trading volumes and daily price changes.  
Fischer Black’s description of a liquid market (see Section 5.2) shows that large orders to 
buy or sell cannot be fulfilled without large price movements, which create ‘a positive 
relationship between the order flow or transaction volume and price change’ (Amihud, 
2002, p. 33). One interpretation of market liquidity prompts illiquidity measures based on 
a ratio of absolute returns and turnover: ‘the daily price response associated with one dollar 
of trading volume’ (Amihud, 2002, p. 32). Illiquid stocks are then those with higher average 
absolute returns for any given dollar volume. A stock is illiquid ‘if the stock’s price moves 
a lot in response to little volume’ (Acharya & Pedersen, 2005, p. 386) and the cost of 
transacting illiquid stocks is higher because order flow has more of a price impact. In 
another interpretation, illiquidity could be signalled by unusually large price reversals 
following a day with a high volume of trading (Pastor & Stambaugh, 2003). A more 
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comprehensive measure, which attempts to include ‘trading quantity, trading speed, trading 
cost, and price impact’, defines illiquidity as ‘the standardized turnover-adjusted number 
of zero daily trading volumes over the prior 12 months’ (Liu, 2006, p. 631). 
These empirical measures of market liquidity suffer conceptual problems, and each is ‘a 
fundamentally different measure’ (Cochrane, 2005a, p. 10). Observed correlations between 
asset-price changes and their order flow or traded volumes are strong, but measures of 
liquidity put forward in the literature often differ fundamentally or are contradictory, and 
these difficulties prevent the emergence of an agreed measure of market liquidity. As a 
result, evidence as to whether transactions costs affect expected returns is mixed (O’Hara, 
2003, pp. 1338-1339), but many studies find that ‘illiquid’ stocks and bonds display an 
expected return premium attributed to illiquidity (Acharya & Pedersen, 2005; Amihud, 
2002; Amihud et al., 2005; Liu, 2006; Pastor & Stambaugh, 2003). The empirical literature 
on market liquidity concludes that stocks with higher transactions costs—those deemed 
illiquid—should have a higher expected excess return as compensation for the costs of 
market illiquidity. 
Illiquidity costs can be incorporated into the consumption-based asset-pricing model in 
several ways. In the simplest case, when investment horizons are known and transactions 
costs are constant, the asset’s payoff is simply reduced by the sale cost and asset prices 
adjust to compensate for this lower expected payoff (Acharya & Pedersen, 2005). ‘The 
liquidity premium on the risky asset with trading costs is then defined as the decrease in its 
expected return that would leave the investor indifferent between this asset and an identical 
asset with no trading costs’ (Amihud et al., 2005, p. 292). When agents have variable time 
horizons, those with shorter horizons hold those assets with lower transactions costs, 
whereas agents with longer horizons can amortise costs over a greater period and are less 
concerned with minimising them (Amihud et al., 2005, p. 282).  
Liquidity-adjusted extensions of the standard systematic pricing workhorse model, the 
CAPM, include asset-specific and overall market or aggregate illiquidity costs (Acharya & 
Pedersen, 2005). The introduction of market illiquidity provides the necessary systematic 
or aggregate factor to deduce that assets which ‘are more sensitive to aggregate liquidity 
have substantially higher expected returns’ (Pastor & Stambaugh, 2003, p. 683), and that 
liquidity is a risk factor and ‘a good candidate for a state variable’ in pricing (Pastor & 
Stambaugh, 2003, p. 643). In addition, the basic CAPM extended to include aggregate or 
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market liquidity captures the important differences in cross-sectional returns (Liu, 2006) 
and removes the need for the size and book-to-value factors in the Fama-French model 
(Fama & French, 1996). Expected returns in the liquidity-based asset-pricing model of 
Holmström and Tirole (2001) are based on the asset’s sensitivity to ‘aggregate liquidity’, 
which is ‘the aggregate value of financial instruments used to transport wealth across time 
and to back up promises of future payments’ (Holmström & Tirole, 2001, p. 1837, n. 1). 
Examples of aggregate liquidity used to support the model are land or Treasury bonds 
backed by land. In each case, the payoff is exogenous. In this model, liquid assets take more 
of a collateral role, whereby land must be available to fund new projects. 
Several conceptual problems appear with the aggregate transactions cost approach. First, 
the market portfolio underlying the CAPM is the ‘wealth portfolio’ or a claim on all future 
consumption. It includes all physical and human capital (Cochrane, 2005b, p. 169). The 
idea of relative market illiquidity must conceptually represent the ease of trading all 
wealth—a difficult concept to apply in practice and therefore of dubious realistic merit. In 
the empirical literature, aggregate liquidity is often an average across all the individual 
asset’s liquidity measures, or the cost of a trade distributed evenly across all assets (Pastor 
& Stambaugh, 2003, p. 650). Second, asset-specific transactions costs simply reduce the 
asset payoff, and the predictions from the liquidity-adjusted CAPM are identical to the non-
adjusted version (Acharya & Pedersen, 2005, pp. 380-381). Although the decomposition 
provides new points of traction for empirical testing, no explanatory power is added. Third, 
a premium for illiquidity is not the same as a premium for liquidity; the difference is looking 
for a price discount in an ‘illiquid’ security compared to a frictionless benchmark, versus 
the ‘convenience yield’ or price premium for money-like assets (Cochrane, 2005a, p. 7). 
Finally, although sitting in a general equilibrium model, the analysis is essentially 
microeconomic. Macroeconomic liquidity is represented by the aggregation of individual 
asset liquidity. Transactions costs, which in reality form the basis of dealer profits, are 
simply exogenous costs. As noted in Section 5.6, aggregate liquidity constructed from 
market liquidity suffers from a fallacy of composition. The deficiencies of this analytical 
approach are evident in the contradictory concerns about the excess liquidity resulting from 
QE and the absence of market liquidity displayed by the asset markets (PwC, 2015). 
In principle, the observation that two assets with very similar payoffs can have different 
expected returns suggests an arbitrage opportunity. Once the ‘bid-ask spread, brokerage 
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fees and cost of carrying the short position’ are taken into account, however, the ‘apparent 
arbitrage profit disappears’ (Amihud et al., 2005, p. 333; see also Cochrane, 2005a, pp. 2-
3). Cochrane (2005a) surveys the evidence that restrictions on short sales similarly affect 
the market’s ability to maintain arbitrage relationships between financial options and their 
underlying assets. Transactions costs can affect asset payoffs and therefore asset prices. 
This finding should not be controversial, but also should not be overemphasised. Instead of 
transactions costs having their effect on the pricing kernel, they can be categorised as cash 
flows of the asset. What is less certain is whether transactions costs can explain cross-
sectional returns or time-series variability (O’Hara, 2003, p. 1350). In models with 
transactions costs, ‘securities with the same dividend streams have different prices if they 
have different transaction costs’ and the existence of a common pricing kernel is called into 
question (Amihud et al., 2005, p. 278). For illiquidity to move from a being a cost to being 
a risk and thereby affecting the stochastic discount factor or pricing kernel, it needs to be 
time varying or systematic (O’Hara, 2003, p. 1339). 
The existence of a liquidity premium arising from risk faces a fundamental challenge. ‘In 
a world in equilibrium, it simply does not make sense to think of liquidity as an attribute of 
an asset that affects its expected return. There is no trade-off between liquidity and return’ 
(Black, 1970a, p. 1). This assertion rests on two observations: first, that the risk of an asset 
can be entirely separated from its funding by financial derivatives; and, second, that 
‘liquidity, if it has any meaning at all, is associated with risk transfers rather than cash 
transfers’ (Black, 1970a, p. 7). Interest rate, currency and credit default swaps allow the 
separation of an asset’s various risk components from its ownership. Selling costs should 
be paid by the asset user, not the asset owner, and not affect the asset’s return (Black, 1970a, 
p. 2). The risks associated with an asset can be entirely separated from its funding, and, in 
the limit, the investor simply provides a riskless loan with pre-arranged cash flows. As long 
as the collateral from the borrower is sufficient, the lender is indifferent to new information 
that affects the asset’s price (Black, 1970a, p. 2). The significance of collateral, the 
interdependence between market and funding liquidity, and the effect of information on 
asset prices are discussed further below. 
Ultimately, the illiquidity-premium literature identifies and describes the phenomenon that 
asset owners require compensation for expected selling costs, costs that permit the profits 
of market dealers. This illiquidity premium suffers from the problems outlined in Section 
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6.2, since it is built on implicit Wicksellian foundations, where asset returns are given by 
productivity, and allowing the comparison of two assets with the same pre-cost return. The 
illiquidity premium should be interpreted as the compensation for transactions costs that 
equilibrates expected returns across assets. It cannot be interpreted as a premium; the issuer 
of the financial asset does not pay the transactions costs.  
The consumption-based asset-pricing model has the intuitively pleasing feature that payoffs 
in states where an extra degree of consumption would be welcomed are given a higher value 
weighting. This is the very crux of the risk-neutral ‘probability’ paradigm. Risk-neutral 
probabilities play a very important part in asset pricing. Although they are often referred to 
as probabilities they are better thought of as subjective value weightings or measures of the 
various outcomes associated with an asset payoff. Risk-neutral pricing can be understood 
with reference to the idea of certainty equivalence. Pratt (1964) considers the choice 
between an uncertain return 𝑅𝑅 and its expected return 𝔼𝔼[𝑅𝑅] with certainty. For a risk-averse 
investor with utility function 𝑢𝑢(. ) and wealth 𝑊𝑊 to be indifferent between these two options 
requires a risk premium 𝜋𝜋 such that 
 𝑢𝑢�𝑊𝑊(𝔼𝔼[𝑅𝑅] − 𝜋𝜋)� = 𝔼𝔼[𝑢𝑢(𝑊𝑊𝑅𝑅)]. (7.1) 
In other words, a risk-averse investor will value an investment with a certain return more 
highly than an uncertain investment with the same expected return. Risk-neutral 
probabilities are the result of applying this value weight to their equivalent real-world or 
physical probabilities. 
Using the risk-neutral measure, each asset can be deconstructed into its component risks 
and each risk can be evaluated. Each asset can be assessed at an atomic risk component 
level and then compared to other assets, allowing for risk replication by other, related assets 
and the discipline of no arbitrage can be applied. This deconstruction provides the 
theoretical support for Black’s (1970a) assertion that asset risk can be separated from 
funding risk, and that asset prices are based on risk transfers and not flows, stocks or 
liquidity. 
The fundamental difficulty in connecting liquidity with funding stems from the irrelevance 
of liquidity and money to a neo-Walrasian equilibrium. Motivating transactions costs and 
trading in general equilibrium models requires: uninformed ‘noise’ traders (Black, 1986); 
that agents are unable to borrow (Amihud et al., 2005, pp. 283, 291); or other ‘unpalatable 
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devices’ (Cochrane, 2005a, p. 14). Such devices serve as ‘as if’ mechanisms to investigate 
the effects of illiquidity and trading in general equilibrium models, but do not purport to be 
deep explanations. Market liquidity is ‘explained’ by turnover, but the reasons for trading 
are not. Furthermore, the characteristic of market liquidity is viewed as an intrinsic feature 
of the asset itself and not due to the institutional arrangements of organised markets and 
dealers. The empirical studies showing that transactions costs affect asset pricing 
demonstrate that the balance-sheet capacity of market makers limits the absolute market 
liquidity of the neo-Walrasian model (Chordia et al., 2005). The effect on market makers 
is time varying, persistent and therefore provides predictive power.  
Next, we see how the commodity view of money relates to the actions of the Walrasian 
auctioneer. 
7.6 Cashless Models 
In a frictionless, complete markets world all transactions are spot transactions and there is 
no delayed settlement and no problem with non-payment (Hicks, 1989, p. 47). Money is 
unnecessary as a medium of exchange and is always dominated as a store of value by an 
interest-bearing risk-free government bond. To bypass the problems of establishing the 
value of a fiat monetary asset, modern extensions of the classical approach restrict money 
only to the form of a unit of account, or numéraire. That general equilibrium models have 
no essential need for money can also be justified by the argument that, in reality, physical 
cash is becoming obsolete. The difficulty of adding money to general equilibrium models 
can be resolved by appealing to the idea that moneyless models represent the natural 
outcome of evolutions in institutions and technology: 
For years, economists have had difficulty in incorporating money into rigorous 
general equilibrium models. To the elegance of the Walrasian model of an 
exchange economy has been bolted on an assumption about the technology of 
making payments such as a “cash in advance” constraint. These untidy ways of 
introducing money into economic models are not robust to changes in institutions 
and technology. Is it possible that advances in technology will mean that the 
arbitrary assumptions necessary to introduce money into rigorous theoretical 
models will become redundant, and that the world may come to resemble a pure 
exchange economy? (King, 1999, p. 48) 
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These ‘cashless’ models can be supported by the observation that, in recent times, the use 
of physical cash has given way to credit cards and mobile-phone payment technologies, 
and therefore represent an inevitable technological ‘cashless limit’ towards which society 
is moving. It is claimed that the analysis of models without ‘monetary frictions’ provides 
insights into the hypothetical limiting case of this technological process (Galí, 2008; 
Woodford, 2003). Galí (2008, p. 24, n. 4) dismisses the ad hoc approach of including real 
money balances in utility functions, arguing that the cashless model is sufficient for the 
purposes of monetary analysis. 
Nevertheless, in cashless models the representative agent can invest a portion of their 
wealth in balances of base money, which pay interest at the central bank’s policy rate. Here 
the line between neo-Walrasian and neo-Wicksellian models blurs. The agent only holds 
non-zero money balances if the policy rate equals the Wicksellian natural rate of interest 
(Woodford, 2003, p. 69). In addition, Rational Expectations ensure that the ex-ante version 
of the Fisher Equation determines expected inflation (Woodford, 2003, p. 50). Central bank 
monetary policy has temporarily non-neutral effects due to ‘Keynesian’ sticky prices which 
mean that ‘the real rate of return at which borrowing and lending occurs can differ from the 
natural rate of interest’ (Woodford, 2003, p. 51). 
Although these models supposedly ‘resemble the channel systems’ used by central banks 
(Woodford, 2003, p. 75), the explicit payment of interest on base money is not the most 
remarkable aspect of a channel system. As we have seen in Section 4.6, the more interesting 
feature is that the central bank is not required to be an active participant in the money 
market. The channel system allows the central bank to enforce its policy rate in the 
interbank market, even though overnight balances at the central bank need not be 
significantly different from zero, simply by changing its borrowing and lending rates. By 
building the model on interest paid by the central bank at the Wicksellian rate, the cashless 
models assume what they set out to explain, but this difficulty is brushed aside because the 
assumption of interest paid on base money provides a convenient ‘as if’ means of 
establishing price determinacy in a cashless, neo-Walrasian world (Woodford, 2003, p. 83). 
The cashless models, uninhibited by monetary frictions, are the apotheosis of a neo-
Walrasian model: complete markets and perfect market liquidity (Mehrling, 2011, p. 64). 
In the monetary analysis of Galí (2008) and Woodford (2003), the standard model is 
‘cashless’, there is no requirement for money except as a unit of account. The result is an 
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‘accounting system of exchange’ (Fama, 1980, p. 39) where exchanges are direct and 
measured only in the numéraire. ‘Money [or unit] of account makes possible prices and 
debt contracts, which are all that are required for extensive multilateral exchange to take 
place’ (Ingham, 2004b, p. 6). The numéraire need not have any physical presence in a 
general equilibrium model; the only function that the unit of account is permitted is the 
limited role of converting relative prices to ‘absolute’ or ‘money’ prices (Patinkin, 1965, p. 
16). A neo-Walrasian general equilibrium can determine prices in any arbitrary numéraire, 
that is, an accounting price, but that these prices are not economically significant (Rogers, 
2006b, p. 6), since only relative prices, or price ratios, are determined by the model. The 
unit of account ‘is defined in terms of a claim to a certain quantity of a liability of the central 
bank, which may or may not have any physical presence’ (Woodford, 2003, p. 63). The 
overall price level, which can be denominated any fictitious measure, is not just 
indeterminate, it is conceptually undefined.44 
The ontology of money outlined in Chapter 3 certainly allows for a unit of account to exist 
independently of any money object, and the neo-Walrasian general equilibrium can be 
interpreted as a representation of this phenomenon. The neo-Walrasian general equilibrium, 
however, represents a framework in which all contracts are promises to pay in a specified 
consumption good; an interpretation inconsistent with the credit theory of money. The 
Walrasian auction can be interpreted as instantaneous credit clearing at the beginning of 
time, after which no financial contracts exist that promise to pay in an abstract unit of 
account (Rogers, 2006c). The numéraire is an arbitrary commodity that acts as a unit of 
account for the pricing of contracts, but once these prices are used in market clearing, it 
plays no role in specifying the nature of the promise made by each contract. 
Finally, the view that society is becoming cashless is a superficial reading of the 
phenomenon of electronic payments, for behind each technology are money transfers in 
substance identical to that performed by cheques. For instance, Cochrane (2014, p. 199) 
thinks it perfectly feasible that ‘you could buy a cup of coffee by swiping a card or tapping 
a cell phone, selling two dollars and fifty cents of an S&P 500 fund’. Instantaneous real-
time and netted payment systems would effectively remove the need for reserves when 
‘crediting the coffee seller’s two dollar and fifty cents mortgage-backed security fund.’ 
                                                         
44 See Rogers (2006c, 2008a) for a full discussion of the conceptual problems of cashless models. 
142 
 
Similarly, King (1999, p. 48) foresees that settlement could be conducted in liquid 
instruments ‘for which there were market-clearing prices in real time’. In each view, it is 
anticipated that technology would enable perfect market liquidity, making all other forms 
of liquidity redundant. In addition, there would be no need for bank liabilities to act as 
money. Banks would lose their role as clearing houses of credit. Overlooked in these 
hypothetical worlds is the need for market makers and the elasticity of the real-time 
payments system to make this exchange of coffee without money possible. As Rogers 
(2008a) observes, it would be difficult for the economy to become truly moneyless in the 
neo-Walrasian sense, since ‘e-money of some form to approximate the time-0 auction 
would require the instantaneous flow and coordination of information that is beyond the 
capability of even the most super of computers’ (p. 11). A move to a neo-Walrasian 
moneyless payments system would involve the elimination of the central bank altogether, 
and the adoption of a free banking system (Rogers, 2008a, p. 24). Since each monetary 
space would still need a unit of account provided by an authority, the society could be 
cashless, but not moneyless (Ingham, 2004a, p. 179). 
7.7 Summary 
Although proxies for liquidity and money can be added to general equilibrium models, they 
provide no explanatory power. An intrinsically worthless fiat currency can be given value 
in the model only as a welfare-reducing exchange restriction, since a non-interest earning 
money asset is dominated by all other interest-earning assets. Consequently, ‘monetary 
theorists are forced to proceed without sound theoretical foundations’ (Rogers, 1989, p. 
xvii). Since money has no natural place and perfect market liquidity is assumed, any alleged 
concept of liquidity in the model bears no resemblance to the real-world concept of 
converting assets into money or even the pure liquid nature of money itself. The use of 
general equilibrium models to analyse liquidity is an example of the use of an ordering 
framework at the expense of the meaning of the concepts in a real-world sense (see Section 
2.2). The neo-Walrasian general equilibrium model is inappropriate for analysing the 
spectrum of liquidity identified in Chapter 5. Search theories and pockets of inefficiencies 
are the only means by which ‘liquidity’ can be assessed. 
The financial frictions literature sets out to explain the conditions that prevent the 
attainment of the general equilibrium as a concession to illiquidity. The assumption that a 
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stable and unique equilibrium exists brings with it the concept of a fair value of assets and 
the whole problem of ‘liquidity’ reduces to one of two problems. The first is of finding 
agents who need to trade at the same time, since, with symmetric information, there is no 
difficultly in establishing the correct price. The second concerns the transactions costs 
associated with selling. In this case, the fair value cannot be attained directly, but an 
intermediary or market maker can match buyers and sellers for a fee. As such, financial 
frictions are based on the difficulty of search and matching, not a problem of valuing the 
assets. In a general equilibrium model there is no doubt that a market-clearing price exists. 
Financial frictions slow the process of arriving at equilibrium, but do not alter the properties 
of the equilibrium. 
Attempts to add money to neo-Walrasian models result in such severe distortions to the 
concepts of liquidity and money that any insights gained are of dubious value. Furthermore, 
the prevailing view that money is a commodity, even in its fiat form, thwarts the 
fundamental integration of the banking system. By adopting the commodity view of money, 
Real Analysis makes liquidity the spontaneous property of a particular commodity or asset, 
and thereby restricts the analysis of money as a liability. The only form of liquidity 
allowable into the framework is market liquidity, a characteristic of the commodity that 
becomes the medium of exchange. That market liquidity is provided by profit-seeking 
dealers is overlooked. 
Modern asset-pricing theory, with its neo-Walrasian roots, operates in a world where the 
timing of payments is never an issue. The specification of Rational (or model-consistent) 
Expectations imposes the condition of ergodicity and collapses the dimensions of time and 
space. Since time is equivalent to place and all transactions happen at once, there cannot be 
the sort of credit-valuation problems associated with the credit view of money, whereby the 
value of credits payable is determined by the value of credits available to make payment. 
These concepts have no place in the models.  
Furthermore, it is evident that the neoclassical ‘cashless’ benchmark model also suffers 
from many theoretical problems. Its reliance on Wicksell’s natural rate of interest restricts 
the analysis to that of a single good (indeed, see Woodford, 2003, p. 64), and the reliance 
on the Fisher Equation for inflation determination is problematic. The emphasis given in 
Section 3.7 to the independence of unit of account function is in sympathy with the role of 
an abstract numéraire in neo-Walrasian general equilibrium theory, but with important 
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points of difference. That liquidity is not fundamentally derived from the unit of account 
will be discussed in Part IV. In neo-Walrasian theory, however, the unit of account is the 
only monetary function permitted, so it follows that liquidity is ejected along with the rest 
of the monetary functions.  
In neo-Walrasian models, liquidity is interpreted as a constraint or incompleteness in the 
geographic landscape of the economic realm: some Pareto optimising transactions cannot 
be conducted, for some reason. Instead of being an issue that arises from commitments 
made now to make payments in an uncertain future, liquidity is understood to concern 
difficulties in making payments now. The possible interpretation of the Walrasian 
auctioneer as a representation of a perfect credit-clearing operation does align somewhat 
with the ontological view of the banking system presented in Chapter 4, but without the 
risk that the credit structure might malfunction—all credits are paid with surety—the value 
of any insights derived is undermined. Attempting to build a theory to explain the observed 
desire to hold liquid assets based on failed attempts to make current payments is not a 
promising avenue. 
We must be mindful of these useful aspects as we now consider the relationship between 
liquidity and money in theories associated with Monetary Analysis. Post-Keynesian 
theories of money, banking and liquidity are good starting points for more considered 




Part IV Monetary Analysis 
Part IV uses the ontology established in Part II to consider liquidity and its relationship 
with money within the tradition of Monetary Analysis. Unlike Real Analysis, the role of 
money in Monetary Analysis is fundamental, the axiom of money neutrality is rejected, and 
the spectrum of liquidity identified in Chapter 5 is more readily visible. Yet pre- and post-
GFC developments show that the treatment of liquidity and money is still problematic and 
areas of deficiency remain. The purpose of Part IV is to identify the elements of the theories 
in the tradition of Monetary Analysis that explain the phenomena of liquidity and money 
as defined in this study. Part V combines these elements with those discussed in other 
chapters into a conceptual framework. 
Three branches of Monetary Analysis are assessed: the theory of liquidity preference in 
Chapter 8, and the theory of the monetary circuit and the theory of endogenous money in 
Chapter 9. Each can be broadly associated with the post-Keynesian school of economics, 
although they are in apparent conflict and attempts at reconciliation are not entirely 
successful (Chick & Dow, 2002). Suggestions for reconciliation with each other and 




8 Liquidity Preference 
8.1 Introduction 
Keynes’s theory of liquidity preference (Keynes, 1936) makes a clean break from the 
interest and asset-pricing theories based on pure exchange and general equilibrium. The 
theory of liquidity preference stipulates that the rate of interest is a monetary phenomenon, 
not one that is driven by the real forces of productivity and thrift as in the loanable funds 
theory. According to Chick (1983, p. 174, original emphasis), ‘Keynes argued that his 
theory of interest follows naturally from what interest is: the price of having money now 
instead of later; the price of being liquid.’ In opposition to the loanable funds theory of 
interest, Keynes’s theory of liquidity preference states that interest rates are not a reward 
for saving, but instead are a reward for not hoarding money:45 
It should be obvious that the rate of interest cannot be a return to saving or waiting 
as such. For if a man hoards his savings in cash, he earns no interest, though he 
saves just as much as before. On the contrary, the mere definition of the rate of 
interest tells us in so many words that the rate of interest is the reward for parting 
with liquidity for a specified period. For the rate of interest is, in itself, nothing 
more than the inverse proportion between a sum of money and what can be 
obtained for parting with control over the money in exchange for a debt for a stated 
period of time. (Keynes, 1936, p. 167) 
The effect of time preference is only partially reflected in the rate of interest. Keynes 
conducts Monetary Analysis and generalises 
…the classical psychological concept of time preference by splitting it into two 
elements; the marginal propensity to consume and the state of liquidity preference. 
It is the latter which plays a key role in determining the rate of interest in a 
monetary economy and it is this element which is missing from real analysis. 
                                                         
45 See Robertson (1940, p. 16) for a loanable funds rebuttal that the rate of interest has an important role in 
balancing consumption and saving, and can instead be a reward both for saving and not hoarding. For 
Moggridge (1992, p. 596), however, loanable funds and liquidity preference are ‘equivalent ways of 
describing the same phenomena.’ 
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(Rogers, 2008b, pp. 10-11) 
A reward for not hoarding money is required because of the ‘convenience of liquidity’ 
(Keynes, 1936, p. 168) which mitigates the ‘existence of uncertainty as to the future of the 
rate of interest’ (Keynes, 1936, p. 168, original emphasis). The risk in holding bonds, for 
example, is that ‘if a need for liquid cash may conceivably arise before the expiry of n years 
[the length of the bond], there is a risk of a loss being incurred in purchasing a long-term 
debt and subsequently turning it into cash, as compared with holding cash’ (Keynes, 1936, 
p. 169). If an asset with capital risk needs to be converted into money at some point in the 
future, its value at that time is uncertain. In essence, cash provides protection against asset-
price risk. 
According to Keynes, four motives drive the demand for liquidity: the transactions, finance, 
precautionary and speculative motives.46 The transactions, finance and precautionary 
motives are assumed to be largely interest-inelastic; only the speculative motive is sensitive 
to the rate of interest (Keynes, 1936, p. 199). The transactions motive covers the liquidity 
required to conduct current exchanges and can therefore be interpreted as the opening 
demand in the monetary circuit (see below, Section 9.2), with its demand related to the cost 
of output or income. Similarly, the finance motive is the demand for money to begin an 
investment project, and, as such, is the investment equivalent of the transactions motive 
(Bibow, 1995), since it reflects the fact that planned investment requires finance to begin 
production (Keynes, 1937b, p. 246). 
The precautionary motive represents a desire to hold a reserve of liquid assets as a 
protection against uncertainty. The precautionary motive provides ‘for contingencies 
requiring sudden expenditure and for unforeseen opportunities of advantageous purchases, 
and also to hold an asset of which the value is fixed in terms of money to meet a subsequent 
liability fixed in terms of money’ (Keynes, 1936, p. 196). It is here that an emphasis on 
liquidity over money must be recognised. As argued in Section 5.7, a liquid reserve need 
not consist solely of the medium of exchange itself; assets with a price-protection feature, 
convertible into the medium of exchange with little price risk, will serve the same purpose. 
The precautionary motive is satisfied not just by money-proper, but also by short-term 
                                                         
46 For the transactions, precautionary and speculative motives, see Keynes (1936, p. 170); for the finance 
motive see Keynes (1937b). 
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assets that can provide ‘portfolio diversification for precautionary purposes’ (Chick, 1983, 
p. 202). It is a mistake to focus solely on money-proper, but, since many price-protected 
assets also yield a rate of interest, care must be taken in interpreting the precautionary 
motive and the determination of the rate of interest. 
Finally, the speculative motive displays the most sensitivity to the rate of interest. The 
holdings of liquid assets that an investor demands depend on how far the current rate of 
interest differs from the investor’s perceived ‘safe’ level of the rate of interest (Keynes, 
1936, p. 201). Keynes first presents the theory of liquidity preference in a two-asset model 
comprising only two types of asset: ‘money’ or ‘cash’; and ‘debts’ or ‘bonds’.47 Thereafter 
the theory is generalised to consider all assets. In the two-asset model, when the current 
rate is below the safe level, there is a strong desire to maintain holdings of cash, to avoid 
capital losses by delaying the purchase of debt until the rate has risen closer to the safe 
level. For those with the opposite belief, ‘the purchase of debts will be a preferable 
alternative to holding cash’ (Keynes, 1936, p. 170, n. 1). Therefore, the 
…individual, who believes that future rates of interest will be above the rates 
assumed by the market, has a reason for keeping actual liquid cash, whilst the 
individual who differs from the market in the other direction will have a motive for 
borrowing money for short periods in order to purchase debts of longer term. 
(Keynes, 1936, p. 170) 
Importantly, the speculative motive depends on an organised market for trading assets, for 
‘in the absence of an organised market, liquidity-preference due the precautionary-motive 
would be greatly increased; whereas the existence of an organised market gives an 
opportunity for wide fluctuations in liquidity-preference due to the speculative-motive’ 
(Keynes, 1936, pp. 170-171). The existence of organised markets, which can be interpreted 
as the presence of dealers providing market liquidity, presents an individual with the 
‘opportunity to revise his judgement and change investment’ (Keynes, 1936, p. 153). As 
shown in Section 5.2, an organised exchange providing market liquidity gives investors 
some assurance of saleability, but Keynes highlights the uncertainty regarding asset prices 
at the time of sale. Organised markets allow for the existence of an observable interest rate 
                                                         
47 Keynes uses the terms ‘cash’ and ‘money’ interchangeably, as he does with the terms ‘debts’ and ‘bonds’. 
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that the public can compare to their subjective safe interest rates. 
8.2 Liquidity Premium 
In Keynes’s generalised model, the total return expected from holding an asset is given by 
𝑚𝑚 + 𝑞𝑞 –  𝑐𝑐 +  𝑙𝑙, where 𝑚𝑚 is the expected price appreciation of the asset measured in the unit 
of account, 𝑞𝑞 is the yield or output of the asset, 𝑐𝑐 is the carrying cost, and 𝑙𝑙 is the liquidity 
premium (Keynes, 1936, pp. 225-228). The attributes 𝑞𝑞, 𝑐𝑐 and 𝑙𝑙 are measured in terms of 
the asset itself, so 𝑚𝑚 is an adjustment factor necessary to convert the returns into units of 
account, and hence become comparable across assets. 
The meaning of the liquidity premium 𝑙𝑙, however, is somewhat ambiguous and requires 
careful interpretation. Keynes describes it as the return that an investor is willing to forgo 
for the ‘potential convenience’ of ‘the power of disposal over an asset’ (Keynes, 1936, p. 
226). On the surface, it is tempting to interpret this liquidity premium as a reference to the 
convenience of saleable assets with deep market liquidity, except that Keynes’s premium 
is one of convenience given to liquid assets, not an extra return required to compensate for 
illiquidity. Keynes’s liquidity premium is highest for money itself, whereas the premia for 
machinery, wheat and houses are likely to be ‘negligible’ (Keynes, 1936, pp. 226-227). The 
size of the liquidity premium for non-money assets is ambiguous, and so clarification must 
be made as to how Keynes’s liquidity premium relates to market liquidity and the taxonomy 
outlined in Chapter 5. 
Keynes uses the term ‘liquidity’ in both A Treatise on Money (Keynes, 1930), and the 
General Theory (Keynes, 1936) to put forward the theory of liquidity preference. As 
highlighted by Beggs (2015), subsequent interpretations of these usages have developed 
along two ‘careers’ or ‘strands’, and have consequently affected the understanding of 
liquidity preference. The Treatise strand found its home in the ‘practical world of bankers, 
central bankers, and policymakers’ (Beggs, 2015, p. 1), whereas the strand stemming from 
the General Theory was restricted to the realm of theoretical economics.  
The second strand is considered in Section 8.3. The first strand, as stated in the Treatise, 
pertains in particular to the portfolio choices of bankers: 
Broadly there are three categories to choose from—(i.) Bills of Exchange and Call 
Loans to the Money Market, (ii.) Investments, (iii.) Advances to Customers. As a 
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rule, advances to customers are more profitable than investments, and investments 
are more profitable than bills and call loans; but this order is not invariable. On the 
other hand, bills and call loans are more “liquid” than investments, i.e. more 
certainly realisable at short notice without loss, and investments are more “liquid” 
than advances. (Keynes, 1930b, p. 67) 
Hicks uses ‘more certainly realisable at short notice without loss’ as a definition of liquidity 
that could ‘be reinterpreted so as to give it a wider reference’ (Hicks, 1989, p. 64). Again, 
it would be tempting to align this ‘definition’ with market liquidity and the ability to trade 
immediately with certainty in efficient markets. The difficulty with this characterisation is 
the interpretation of the final characteristic: without loss. The unresolved question is: 
without loss relative to what? For Hicks (1962, p. 790), the answer is that, for a liquid asset, 
the ‘price at which it is realisable at short notice is much the same as that at which it is 
realisable at longer notice.’ Hicks concludes that the term ‘liquidity’ refers to marketability 
(that is, market liquidity) relative to an absolute fundamental or long-period price, 
supported by an organised market of dealers (Hicks, 1962, p. 791).  
The attempt to interpret liquidity preference within a framework built on market liquidity 
is a direct consequence of the commodity view of money outlined and rejected in Chapter 
3. The view that money is simply the most saleable commodity limits the analysis of 
liquidity to market liquidity only. This ontological starting point leads Bronfenbrenner 
(1945) and Hicks (1962) to conclude that liquidity preference can be satisfied by a selection 
of assets from across a spectrum of assets ranked by market liquidity. To illustrate, consider 
Bronfenbrenner’s description of ‘perfect liquidity’: 
By calling a commodity “perfectly liquid” in a given use we mean that it is 
absolutely certain that its holder can obtain for a unit of the commodity at least one 
hundred per cent of its (deflated) money cost to him minus only depreciation 
compensated for by actual use, measured in terms of general purchasing power, 
immediately upon deciding to dispose of it. (Bronfenbrenner, 1945, p. 407, original 
emphasis) 
When money is merely the most traded commodity then market liquidity or saleability is 
the only form of liquidity that can be considered, since there is no other form of liquidity. 
Bronfenbrenner’s interpretation of ‘without loss’ protects the holder from losses in value 
compared to the original price in real or price-deflated terms, but leaves unanswered what 
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the holder can obtain in return for the unit of commodity.  
Hicks’s long-period idea, on the other hand, introduces the unstated assumption of a 
fundamental value derived from a long-period or general equilibrium that can be used as a 
benchmark for the observed market price, with perfect market liquidity providing the 
frictionless benchmark. As seen in Section 7.5, neo-Walrasian general equilibrium theory 
is inappropriate for a deep analysis of liquidity; the fundamental value that Hicks relies on 
is undefined if money and liquidity are non-neutral and no long-period equilibrium exists. 
In practice, market liquidity is based on the existence of dealers who are prepared to provide 
continuously tradable prices for small amounts with a view to relative value. Dealers do 
not, as a rule, attempt to measure fundamental value (see Section 5.2). In the limit, when 
all assets have perfect market liquidity, money has no need to exist. Market liquidity cannot 
form the theoretical basis of liquidity preference. 
In its reliance on dealer support, market liquidity is a form of liquidity that disappears in a 
crisis and is unable to satisfy liquidity preference at the very moment it is needed. Market 
liquidity is a mirage:  
This is the inevitable result of investment markets organised with a view to so-
called “liquidity”. Of the maxims of orthodox finance none, surely, is more anti-
social than the fetish of liquidity, the doctrine that it is a positive virtue on the part 
of investment institutions to concentrate their resources upon the holding of 
“liquid” securities. It forgets that there is no such thing as liquidity of investment 
for the community as a whole. (Keynes, 1936, p. 155) 
Market liquidity suffers from a fallacy of composition. It should be clear from the context 
that ‘liquidity of investment’ refers to market liquidity, as opposed to money-liquid assets, 
since ‘[i]nvestments that are “fixed” for the community are thus made “liquid” for the 
individual’ (Keynes, 1936, p. 153). Organised markets, supported by dealers, allow long-
term investments to be transformed into short-term investments for individuals, but not for 
the community as a whole. Market liquidity itself is not an ‘intensive property’ (Lozano, 
2015, p. 16), instead it is a ‘property described by functional relationship between delay 
time and percentage realization, and not by a single number’ (Tobin & Golub, 1998, p. 14). 
This multidimensional and functional nature means that ‘there may be no simple ordering 
of assets according to [market] liquidity’ (Tobin & Golub, 1998, p. 14), and any ordinal 
relationship is necessarily complex.  
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Furthermore, the cost of market liquidity in organised markets does not justify a liquidity 
premium beyond that which covers the expected cost of trading. In liquidity preference, the 
‘underlying idea of the liquidity premium is that assets will have an “illiquidity discount” 
relative to money if their future price is less predictable than that of money’ (Bibow, 1998, 
p. 245, n. 9). Crucially, the uncertainty relates to the fact that the ‘price may go either way’ 
(Bibow, 1998, p. 245, n. 9, original emphasis). Transactions costs and market illiquidity 
belong in the carrying cost component 𝑐𝑐, since it is ‘a clear cut one-way guess’ (Bibow, 
1998, p. 245, n. 9, original emphasis). The measure of an asset’s market liquidity—its bid-
ask spread—would be seen in its carrying cost, not its liquidity premium. 
In the absence of organised markets, and hence market liquidity, the speculative motive 
would not operate, although liquidity preference would still be driven by the other motives. 
Keynes distinguishes market liquidity from the form of liquidity embedded in money: ‘If 
individual purchases of investments were rendered illiquid, this might seriously impede 
investment, so long as alternative ways in which to hold his savings are available’ (Keynes, 
1936, p. 160, original emphasis). These alternative ways involve ‘hoarding or lending 
money’ (Keynes, 1936, p. 160, original emphasis), and would be preferred without the 
existence of organised markets in which investment assets ‘can be easily realised for 
money’ (Keynes, 1936, p. 161). Therefore, although liquidity preference cannot be built on 
a preference for assets that have market liquidity, its operation is affected by the presence 
of organised exchanges that reduce the sale costs of assets. Liquidity preference explains 
the desire for the aggregate or macroeconomic liquidity available in assets displaying price-
protection, thus justifying the sharp distinction between money and non-money assets in 
the two-asset model that Keynes first uses to present the theory of liquidity preference. 
Instead of favouring assets that can be sold with limited ‘marketing time and effort’ or 
concerns about ‘the depth of an asset’s market’ (Beggs, 2015, p. 15), it is market risk and 
market liquidity risk that create a preference for liquidity. Investors wish to hold assets with 
a price-protection feature because they are uncertain about future price variability. 
Liquidity preference describes the choice between near-money assets that mature before 
the investor’s horizon and longer-term assets with capital-uncertainty that rely on market 
liquidity for conversion into the medium of exchange. Market liquidity does not clarify the 
concept of liquidity in the theory of liquidity preference, because a high degree of market 
liquidity does not indicate that an asset has a low degree of uncertainty regarding its future 
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price or return—the very reason given for liquidity preference. Exchange-traded stocks and 
shares generally have a high degree of market liquidity but also a high degree of price 
variation. 
Liquidity preference also mitigates the uncertainty relating to the interest rate payable for 
‘selling’ a newly created debt ‘asset’ to a lender. In other words, liquidity preference would 
also be a defence against problems with funding liquidity and the future cost of borrowing. 
It is applicable to the liability side of an investor’s balance sheet as well as the asset side 
(Beggs, 2015, p. 24). A decision to maintain a stock of price-protected assets because of 
uncertainty regarding the cost of future borrowing is consistent with liquidity preference. 
Thus, it is a mistake to align Keynes’s liquidity premium with the illiquidity premium 
derived from the transactions and search costs theory of liquidity. It follows that Keynes’s 
liquidity premium is not an increase in expected returns for illiquid assets as it is in the 
empirical literature on liquidity (see Section 7.5). Instead, the abstract liquidity premium 
associated with money sets the standard that all other assets must match, meaning that 
liquidity preference is a theory of the rate of interest, and not a theory of liquidity premia. 
The interpretation that this study adopts is that liquidity preference is a desire to hold assets 
that have price stability in terms of the unit of account, and therefore provide price-
protection. Price-protection is the essential feature of liquidity preference due to the 
‘convenience of holding assets in the same standard as that in which future liabilities may 
fall due and in a standard in terms of which the future cost of living is expected to be 
relatively stable’ (Keynes, 1936, pp. 236-237). 
8.3 Portfolio Rebalancing and the Demand for Money 
The second strand of liquidity identified by Beggs (2015) concerns the demand and supply 
of money itself. In this strand, the interpretations of liquidity preference theory explain the 
demand for money due to risk aversion (Tobin, 1958) and the determination of asset prices 
by portfolio rebalancing (Hicks, 1989; Tobin, 1969). The portfolio-rebalancing paradigm 
involves equilibrating the supply and demand of available assets, including money, where 
expected rates of return are given by each asset’s marginal rate of productivity, so that ‘the 
price of assets moved to ensure that all assets were held by someone’ (Mehrling, 2011, p. 
62). On the one hand, the portfolio rebalancing approach is Walrasian because all assets 
‘are assumed to be saleable at prices determined by the balance of supply and demand’ 
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(Mehrling, 2011, p. 64). The implication for liquidity is that the ‘demand for money is not 
a demand for the ultimate liquid asset but only a demand for the ultimate riskless asset, as 
all assets are assumed to be liquid’ (Mehrling, 2011, p. 64, original emphasis). On the other 
hand, the approach is also Wicksellian due to its reliance on capital in value, not physical, 
terms and returns determined by the marginal productivity of capital (Rogers, 1989, pp. 
117-124).  
The assertion that portfolio rebalancing is Walrasian, just because all assets are tradable, is 
not entirely accurate. Walrasian analysis cannot specify asset returns without the model 
being over-determined, some prices cannot be ‘traded’ because asset returns are given by 
the Wicksellian set up of the model (Rogers, 1989, p. 53). These aspects mean that the 
expected return and variance of each asset is known. This prior knowledge of all asset 
returns ensures consistent expectations, thereby removing uncertainty and the need for 
liquidity. The portfolio rebalancing interpretation of liquidity preference suffers from the 
problems associated with Wicksellian and Walrasian theories identified in Chapter 6.  
The most significant obstacle for portfolio rebalancing to be a valid interpretation of 
liquidity preference is that the speculative motive is not used to determine interest rates 
(Chick, 1991). Instead, it asserts that ‘liquidity must be regarded as an explanation of the 
existence and level not of the interest rate but of the differential between the yield on money 
and the yields on other assets’ (Tobin, 1958, p. 65, n. 2). The portfolio rebalancing theory 
loses the key element of the liquidity preference theory—that uncertainty about future rates 
determines current interest rates and a demand for liquidity (Chick, 1983, pp. 213-214). 
The speculative motive is unnecessary, since returns are already determined, all that is left 
is the precautionary motive as a utility-derived selection based on asset volatility. The 
portfolio rebalancing theory is, at best, complementary to liquidity preference (Bibow, 
1998, p. 260; Chick, 1983, p. 213). 
Although liquidity preference has been interpreted as a demand for money, Keynes’s 
definitions of liquidity and money are flexible and depend on investment horizons:  
…we can draw the line between “money” and “debts” at whatever point is most 
convenient for handling a particular problem. For example, we can treat as money 
any command over general purchasing power which the owner has not parted with 
for a period in excess of three months, and as debt what cannot be recovered for a 
longer period than this; or we can substitute for “three months” one month or three 
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days or three hours or any other period; or we can exclude from money whatever 
is not legal tender on the spot. It is often convenient in practice to include in money 
time-deposits with banks and, occasionally, even such instruments as (e.g.) 
treasury bills. As a rule, I shall, as in my Treatise on Money, assume that money is 
coextensive with bank deposits. (Keynes, 1936, p. 167, n. 1, original emphasis) 
Depending on the investor’s time horizon, the definition of ‘money’ is flexible and the 
distinction between liquidity and illiquidity is similarly relative. With this relative 
distinction, Keynes is able to present the theory of liquidity preference using the two-asset 
model consisting of ‘money’ and ‘debts’, to represent liquid and illiquid assets, 
respectively. According to the ontology of money established in this study, debts of three 
months, for example, would not conform to the characterisation of money as a medium of 
exchange, since money is a debt-repayment token, and must be undated. Liquidity 
preference does not concern money per se; the difference between liquid and illiquid assets 
matters: 
The current rate of interest depends, as we have seen, not on the strength of the 
desire to hold wealth, but on the strengths of the desire to hold it in liquid and 
illiquid forms respectively, coupled with the amount of the supply of wealth in the 
one form relatively to the supply of it in the other. (Keynes, 1936, p 213) 
The conclusion to draw is that Keynes uses the terms ‘money’ and ‘liquidity’ as synonyms 
in the context of liquidity preference. Liquidity preference is satisfied by holding assets ‘in 
the form of immediate, liquid command’, that is, ‘in money or its equivalent’ (Keynes, 
1936, p. 166). The theory of liquidity preference rests on liquidity in general and not on 
money in particular; it is a theory of liquidity and not a theory of the demand for money. 
Liquidity preference can form the basis of ‘a theory of financial asset pricing’ (Brown, 
2003, p. 330) or even a ‘generalisation of the classical (marginal) theory of value’ 
(Townshend, 1937, p. 160).48 
Liquidity preference expresses a tendency to avoid assets with capital uncertainty in favour 
of those with a price-protection feature, but not just money-proper. Keynes’s liquidity 
                                                         
48 For attempts to apply liquidity preference to asset pricing see also Boulding (1944), Mott (1985), 
Townshend (1937), Wells (1983) and Wray (1991a, 1991b). 
156 
 
premium only applies to such liquid assets as short-dated, self-liquidating, near-money 
securities with a price-protection feature, and, in the modern context, this set of liquid 
instruments would include repo. Although this spectrum of liquidity in assets is juxtaposed 
with the sharp bifurcation of liquid and illiquid assets in Keynes’s two-asset model, we can 
reject the assertion that, by adopting the two-asset model, ‘Keynes invoked a simplifying 
assumption, namely, that bills, bonds, equities, or other securities can be treated for 
analytical purposes as holding the same relationship to money’ (Brown, 2003, p. 330; see 
also Tobin, 1958).  
Nor is liquidity preference a desire for less volatile instruments due to risk aversion, as it is 
in portfolio rebalancing. It is concerned with the uncertainty of the realised asset return if 
conversion to money is required unexpectedly, and so refers to a desire to hold price-
protected or self-liquidation assets, instead of assets with market liquidity that can only be 
converted into money by means of market makers and organised markets. The key issue 
that portfolio-rebalancing theories fail to cover is the very risk that liquidity preference 
mitigates: that the market price of an asset falls at the precise moment that it must be 
converted to a means of payment. It does not cover the possibility that the investment 
horizon may change unexpectedly, and, since the asset must be liquidated before the 
planned investment horizon, its expected return cannot be realised. The fixed-term analysis 
of Hicks and Tobin fails to address this form of liquidity risk. 
Hicks (1974, p. 37), therefore, realises that ‘we need something more than a portfolio 
selection theory; we need a theory of liquidity.’ For Hicks, an important addition to the 
theory would consider ‘things which are unknown now, but will become known in time’ 
(Hicks, 1974, p. 39). Portfolio construction is not a single choice activity, but involves 
decisions sequenced in time where optimal choices change with the arrival of new 
information, and, for Hicks, liquidity relies on time and the postponing of investment 
decisions: a waiting theory of liquidity (Bibow, 1998). It is rational that a store of liquid 
assets ‘permits the individual to take advantage of currently unforeseeable, future 
opportunities, while simultaneously self-insuring the holder against untoward events’ 
(Davidson, 1988, p. 335). 
This sequence or waiting theory of liquidity can be interpreted within the asset-pricing 
framework of Equation (6.9) by means of ‘managed portfolios’ of the form 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡+1, where 
𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡 is a trading strategy that improves expected portfolio outcomes 𝔼𝔼[𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡+1𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡+1|ℱ𝑡𝑡] when 
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compared to a simply buy-and-hold strategy (Cochrane, 2005b, pp. 133-134).49 Managed 
portfolios allow the asset-pricing framework to handle the fact that asset prices do not 
follow a random walk and that discount factors change over time with the arrival of new 
information (Cochrane, 2005b, p. 131) by means of the law of iterated expectations: 
 𝔼𝔼[𝔼𝔼[𝑥𝑥|ℱ𝑡𝑡]|ℱ𝑡𝑡−1] = 𝔼𝔼[𝑥𝑥|ℱ𝑡𝑡−1], (8.1) 
which expresses the idea that ‘your best forecast today of your best forecast tomorrow is 
the same as your best forecast today’ (Cochrane, 2005b, p. 133). In terms of holding money 
to delay an asset purchase, the expected and subjective return on holding money until time 
𝜏𝜏 and then purchasing some asset with payoff 𝑥𝑥𝑇𝑇, with 𝜏𝜏 < 𝑃𝑃, given what is known now, 
relative to what is expected to be known at 𝜏𝜏, must be greater than simply purchasing 𝑥𝑥𝑇𝑇 
now.  
Placing the waiting theory into the context of modern portfolio theory shows that it relies 
on marketable assets that allow for portfolio reallocation, and therefore has Walrasian roots, 
since it could easily be handled by a suitable number of Arrow-Debreu contracts or 
continuous trading (Lucas, 1984). Market liquidity available for portfolio re-allocation 
allows agents to respond to new information (Hicks, 1974). By emphasising the managed 
portfolio benefits of liquidity, the waiting theory relies on shiftability and the framework 
reverts to one based only on market liquidity, since investors prefer assets with 
marketability (Hicks, 1974, p. 42), or low transactions costs, so that they can perform 
subsequent changes in asset choice at minimum cost. Liquidity preference then becomes a 
preference for marketable assets over non-marketable assets, such as ‘a new factory’ 
(Hicks, 1974, p. 42), but Bibow (1998) rightly dismisses the choice between a new factory 
and an existing marketable security as an investment, not a portfolio, decision.  
Hicks (1974, p. 43, original emphasis) recognises that an asset can be ‘imperfectly liquid’ 
if, at a random time of sale its price can be ‘abnormally low’. The risk of loss at sale is a 
factor in the ability to make sequential decisions. The key factor is not market liquidity but 
the possibility of loss at the time of sale; we need to consider the relationship between 
liquidity preference and the riskiness of assets. 
                                                         
49 Technically zt is previsible, that is, it is known or chosen at time 𝑡𝑡. 
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8.4 Theory of Bearishness 
If liquidity preference is simply a response to concerns that asset prices will fall, then 
liquidity preference could be interpreted as an extension of Keynes’s (1930) theory of 
bearishness (Brown, 2003; Ertürk, 2006; Skidelsky, 1992, pp. 561-562). As Keynes puts it, 
in an organised market, the ‘price will be fixed at the point at which the sales of the “bears” 
and the purchases of the “bulls” are balanced’ (Keynes, 1936, p. 170; see also Keynes, 
1930a, p. 250). For a bear, the alternative option is to hold money, and ‘each increase in the 
quantity of money must raise the price of bonds sufficiently to exceed the expectations of 
some “bull” and so influence him to sell his bond for cash and join the “bear” brigade’ 
(Keynes, 1936, p. 171). The speculative motive, as well as being tied to the concept of a 
safe level of interest rate, expresses ‘the object of securing profit from knowing better than 
the market what the future will bring forth’ (Keynes, 1936, p. 170). Following this line, 
Chick (1983, p. 204) has speculators, with short-term investment horizons, as the instigators 
of the speculative motive, and downplays the idea of the safe rate of interest, instead 
emphasising a ‘normal’ rate to which the speculator expects the current market rate to 
return, with deviations from this normal rate being a source of profit. 
An analysis of market liquidity, and its reliance on market makers, should make us wary of 
emphasising the role of speculators. The necessary condition for the speculative motive is 
an organised market, which, in turn, requires the support of market makers. It is a mistake 
that an ‘economist might refer to a market maker as a “speculator”’ (Black, 1971, p. 29). 
An overemphasis on speculators also introduces the misleading concept of fundamental 
value that conflicts with the reality of limited information and uncertainty (see Section 7.5). 
According to Friedman (1953b, p. 175), speculators add stability to asset prices by 
providing the countervailing forces that restore prices to their fundamental values when 
affected by speculative bubbles or over-pessimistic market crashes. As seen in Section 5.2, 
price moves on an organised exchange should be unpredictable in the short term, in other 
words, efficient. Speculators may well add stability, but, if so, they cannot be market 
makers.  
Even within the two-asset model, several difficulties arise from the interpretation of 
liquidity preference as a theory of bearishness. First, short selling—selling bonds that are 
not currently owned now, in anticipation of buying them back more cheaply in the future—
is a superior strategy for an individual with a belief that asset prices will fall. A bear trader 
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could be a short-seller and not just one ‘who prefers at the moment to avoid securities’ and 
hold bank deposits (Keynes, 1930a, p. 250). By conducting a short sale, the bear does not 
take a position in money-proper; the funds received from the sale of the bonds in the present 
are used to borrow the very bonds needed to complete the sale. The position is the exact 
counterpart of the bullish investor, who can borrow short term to purchase longer-term 
debts. Both bulls and bears can express their views by leveraged positions in the bond asset, 
without any cash position, just as per the CAPM (see Section 6.6). 
Chick (1983, p. 198) recognises this problem: ‘The speculative demand is made to look 
ridiculous because it seems to imply that speculators occasionally hold a totally barren asset 
when obvious alternatives are available.’ For Chick, however, the problem is more to do 
with the existence of interest-bearing, short-term, liquid assets that are just as good as 
money-proper to mitigate problems with the timing of sales of longer-term assets. As 
already concluded, however, liquidity preference should be defined in terms of near-money 
assets. The issue of short selling is more problematic. 
Ultimately, the interpretation of liquidity preference as a pure theory of bearishness can be 
rejected by noting that the return on short selling can also go either way—the same problem 
identified with building liquidity preference solely on market liquidity. A convinced bearish 
investor can take a short position but would have the same exposure to uncertainty as a 
bullish investor with complete conviction. Although it is not always practically possible to 
engage in short selling, a theory of liquidity based on bearishness is undermined by the 
theoretical existence of instruments that would provide ready substitutes. That liquidity 
preference cannot simply be a theory of bearishness is reinforced when it is realised that 
Keynes’s theory of bearishness was constructed within a Wicksellian loanable funds model, 
which the theory of liquidity preference was explicitly developed to oppose (Smithin, 
2006).  
Instead, the element of uncertainty, and liquidity’s ability to provide safety from 
uncertainty, must be emphasised (Cardim de Carvalho, 2010). Market liquidity underpins 
the speculative motive by permitting, not general equilibrium and fundamental prices, but 
a focus on the near-term. Organised ‘liquid’ markets create the possibility of short-term 
speculative trading strategies and not an evaluation of long-term investment prospects 
(Keynes, 1936, pp. 158-159). The investor’s decision is not based on ‘the absolute level of 
r [the rate of interest] but the degree of its divergence from what is considered a fairly safe 
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level of r, having regard to those calculations of probability which are being relied on’ 
(Keynes, 1936, p. 201, original emphasis). Thus, the likelihood and size of the anticipated 
gain from purchasing an asset must outweigh the likelihood and size of loss expected at the 
time of sale, which itself is uncertain. The ‘actuarial profit or mathematical expectation of 
gain calculated in accordance with the existing probabilities—if it can be so calculated, 
which is doubtful—must be sufficient to compensate for the risk of disappointment’ 
(Keynes, 1936, p. 169). It follows then that, for any given set of expectations, there must 
exist an interest rate at which the investor’s subjective expectation of gain and loss are in 
balance. This balance must also be in terms of risk-neutral probabilities to incorporate not 
just monetary loss, but ‘disappointment’ (see Section 6.6).  
For Kahn (1954), however, the distinction between the precautionary motive and the 
speculative motive is less about organised markets and more about the investor’s degree of 
conviction in his expectations. The speculative motive is more prevalent if there is 
‘complete conviction’ in expectations, and the precautionary motive enters when 
expectations are subject to uncertainty, represented by a perceived unreliability of the 
investor’s subjective probability distribution. The precautionary motive operates in 
conjunction with the speculative motive, when expectations about future interest rates are 
not held with complete conviction and gives the speculative motive ‘something to bite on’ 
(Kahn, 1954, p. 246). With complete conviction, a bull can do no more than invest entirely 
in non-money securities, regardless of interest rate (Tobin, 1958), yet if there is any 
uncertainty, a bull investor will hold some money as a precautionary measure. Although 
the speculative motive appears to be a pure theory of bearishness, it is the addition of 
uncertainty, and the associated precautionary motive, that introduces the motivation for 
investors to hold liquid assets (Keynes, 1937d). 
In the context of a theory of the rate of interest based on uncertainty, the idea that any 
investor can know better than the market, and believe as much, can only be interpreted as 
signifying different degrees of opinion as to the future of the market. For example, Runde 
(1994, p. 134, original emphasis) views the relationship between the speculative motive 
and uncertainty as one where ‘speculators do not choose particular levels of speculative 
balances because they are uncertain about future price movements’, but instead ‘because 
they regard future price movements in one direction as more probable than in the other.’ In 
other words, the compensating price associated with the safe rate of interest will differ for 
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each individual, and none will necessarily agree with the ‘market’ price visible in an 
organised market. Agents will compare their compensating price for an asset with the 
market price to decide whether to purchase the asset or not. Deviations from each investor’s 
safe rate inform the individual’s decision on the amount of price-protected liquidity to hold 
in their portfolios.  
Risk alone cannot explain liquidity preference. The balance of bulls and bears is in terms 
of risk, not liquidity, and liquidity is not conceptually the same as risk: 
I am rather inclined to associate risk premium with probability strictly speaking, 
and liquidity premium with what in my Treatise on Probability I called ‘weight’. 
An essential distinction is that a risk premium is expected to be rewarded on the 
average by an increased return at the end of the period. A liquidity premium, on 
the other hand, is not event expected to be so rewarded. It is a payment, not for the 
expectation of increased tangible income at the end of the period, but for an 
increased sense of comfort and confidence during the period. (Keynes, 1979, pp. 
293-294, original emphasis) 
In the Treatise on Probability, Keynes (1921) introduces a truth relationship between 
proposition 𝑚𝑚 and hypothesis ℎ with probability 𝑝𝑝 as 𝑚𝑚/ℎ =  𝑝𝑝. For Keynes, however, new 
evidence ℎ1, even if it leaves the probability 𝑝𝑝 unchanged, ‘increases the weight of the 
argument’ (Keynes, 1921, p. 71, original emphasis), meaning that the proposition is not 
more or less likely, but that the probability estimate is more reliable. ‘New evidence will 
sometimes decrease the probability of an argument, but it will always increase its “weight”’ 
(Keynes, 1921, p. 71). The new evidence must be ‘relevant’ in the sense that any part of 
the evidence can affect the probability, even if the new evidence as a whole and on balance 
does not (Keynes, 1921, pp. 55, 71-72). With this new evidence the weight of the argument 
𝑀𝑀(𝑚𝑚/ℎ) is increased to 𝑀𝑀(𝑚𝑚/ℎℎ1).50  
Crucially, probability and weight are independent, since ‘the weighing of the amount of 
evidence is quite a separate process from the balancing of the evidence for and against’ 
(Keynes, 1921, p. 74, original emphasis). Runde (1990, pp. 282-283), however, questions 
                                                         
50 Weatherson (2002) shows how Keynes’s intuitive concept of weight can be re-interpreted to be reflected 
in the theory of imprecise probabilities, whereby weight can be represented by an interval of probabilities. 
The wider the interval, the more uncertain the event is, and the less is its weight. 
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the conclusion that new evidence must always increase the weight of a probability with the 
counter argument that new evidence may alert us to more alternatives or possibilities, and 
thereby undermine our previous confidence. Uncertainty can arise ‘when new evidence is 
acquired to the effect that there are more alternatives or a larger field of possibility than 
previously imagined’ (Runde, 1990, p. 283). This counterexample relies on epistemological 
difficulties in determining the range of possible outcomes—a quite separate matter from 
assigning probabilities to them. It may not necessarily apply specifically to variations in 
asset prices. Nevertheless, Keynes’s ‘two-tier theory of belief’ of probability and weight 
(Runde, 1994, p. 133) is needed to understand liquidity preference. 
Finally, the rejection of liquidity preference’s association with both market liquidity and 
risk premia, provides further support for the rejection of the commodity view of money. If 
a commodity were to gain such a liquidity premium, arbitrageurs could sell the commodity 
short and profit from the liquidity premium. This arbitrage is not possible when money is 
credit and issued only by recognised money issuers, such as the government, central bank 
or commercial banking system. In other words, price-protected, information-insensitive 
assets cannot be produced by just anyone, and liquidity cannot be arbitraged by risk 
decomposition to remove the trade-off between liquidity and return (see Section 7.5).  
Keynes’s liquidity premium differs from a risk premium in that it relates to a desire for 
liquidity to mitigate a lack of confidence, with ‘the difference corresponding to the 
difference between the best estimates we can make of probabilities and the confidence with 
which we make them’ (Keynes, 1936, p. 240). The liquidity premium in liquidity 
preference, stems from uncertainty over the rate of interest in the future, and is subject to 
Keynes’s concept of the weight of evidence supporting a proposition. The liquidity 
premium 𝑙𝑙 is a payment or acceptable reduction in yield for otherwise identical assets ‘of 
equal initial value’ (Keynes, 1936, p. 226) and provides a sense of comfort or utility. Time 
and uncertainty are necessary for money to have a fundamental place. Asset prices are, in 
substantial part, determined by uncertainty and economic agents’ desire to maintain a store 
of wealth in a liquid form that can provide a level of insurance against this uncertainty. 
8.5 Consistent Expectations and Equilibrium 
Keynes states that, ‘in equilibrium’, the total expected return for each asset (including the 
liquidity premium) ‘will be equal’ (Keynes, 1936, pp. 227-228, original emphasis). For 
163 
 
example, Kahn (1954, p. 230) explains that agents will remain indifferent between short-
term bills and long-term bonds if the expected fall in the bond price, or rise in the bond rate, 
is equal to the excess of the bond rate over the bill rate. This indifference formula can be 
expressed as: 
 𝔼𝔼𝑡𝑡[∆𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿] = 𝔼𝔼𝑡𝑡[𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡+1𝐿𝐿 − 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿] =  𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿 − 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆, (8.2) 
where ∆𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿 is the change in the long-term bond rate 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿 from time 𝑡𝑡 to time 𝑡𝑡 + 1 and 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆 is 
the short-term bill rate.51 In other words, the expected holding-period returns52 of bills and 
bonds should be equal. Furthermore, the expectation of rising interest rates encourages 
borrowers to borrow long and lenders to lend short, which tends to ‘force short-term rates 
down and long-term rates up’ (Stigum, 1990, p. 86). 
The idea that expected holding-period returns should be equal, however, is consistent with 
the expectations theory whereby the current yield curve expresses unbiased expectations of 
future short rates (Cochrane, 2005b, p. 355), and any combination of short- and long-term 
assets should yield the same expected return. The theory often includes an additional 
liquidity risk premium above the expected future rate (Kaldor, 1939, p. 13, n. 1), but, unless 
this premium is constant, it renders the theory a tautology (Cochrane, 2005b, p. 357). For 
this reason, the expectations theory fails to find empirical support (Hicks, 1974, pp. 45-46), 
and studies have shown that implied forward rates are not predictors of future spot rates 
(Cochrane, 2005b, pp. 426-432). 
Crucially, the expectations theory relies on a ‘sufficient mass of like-minded persons, all 
holding the same views with complete conviction’ (Kahn, 1954, pp. 230-231). The 
expectations theory implies homogeneous agents with identical expectations, leading 
directly to a model populated by a representative agent with Rational Expectations and a 
neo-Walrasian general equilibrium (Mehrling, 2011, p. 65). As we have seen in Section 
6.5, invoking a representative agent with Rational Expectations renders liquidity and 
money redundant, and Rational Expectations, or identical opinions held with ‘complete 
                                                         
51 Equation (8.2) is original and is intended to be more instructive than accurate, since it ignores the non-
linear effect that yield changes have on bond prices, although nothing of importance is lost by omitting it. 
52 The holding-period return of an asset between time 𝑡𝑡 and time 𝑡𝑡 + 1 is the ratio of the sale proceeds to the 
asset’s purchase price. 
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conviction’, undermine the speculative motive and the demand for liquidity (Kahn, 1954).  
Attempts can be made to align the expectations theory with a marginal indifference 
approach, in which asset prices are set so that the marginal investor, in a body of 
heterogeneous investors, is indifferent between all assets. These attempts are not entirely 
successful. Consider an example from Kahn (1954) in which the banking system buys 
short-term bills from the public by selling long-term bonds. In the real world, according to 
Kahn, this exchange will cause the bond rate to rise and the bill rate to fall. The change in 
relative stocks will bring about price changes that maintain the balance between the 
increased supply to the public of bonds and reduced supply of bills, and a change in the 
identity of the marginal investor. A greater stock of bonds means that the new marginal 
investor in bonds must be one that is more bearish than the previous one, with bond rates 
rising to compensate. A similar argument justifies a fall in bill rates. Under the expectations 
theory, however, neither should happen, unless the expected future bill rate, which 
‘predicts’ the higher bond rate, has risen precisely as the actual bill rate has fallen, making 
the expectations theory logically inconsistent with a marginal investor approach. 
Thus, the expectations theory of the term structure of interest rates, despite being ‘the one 
that makes the most sense’ (Smithin, 2006, p. 279), is inconsistent with the theory of 
liquidity preference since it directly contradicts its main premise. The determination of 
interest rates by liquidity preference should be considered in terms of holding-period 
returns, but not as a prediction of future rates. Liquidity preference is a theory of the long 
rate of interest and therefore 
…it is misleading to say that the short rate is determined by demand and supply of 
money while the long rate is determined by the expected future short rate, for one 
of the main determinants of the demand for money is expectations about the course 
of the long rate itself. (Robinson, 1951, p. 101, n. 18) 
The essential element of organised market liquidity is to allow a limited focus on holding-
period returns to only the near future. Organised markets reduce the level of uncertainty 
about the time required for portfolio adjustment and therefore the strength of the 
precautionary motive. Expectations could conceivably coincide for the near future, but then 
deviate as uncertainty causes a divergence of opinion. Prices for both long- and short-term 
bonds must adjust so that changes in the quantity of money are equilibrated. Thus,  
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…the result of increasing the quantity of money is to lower the short rate and to 
pull the long rate below its expected value to the point where the combined effect 
of these two movements increases hoards by the amount of the increase in the 
quantity of money. (Robinson, 1951, p. 101) 
Furthermore, Robinson (1951, p. 110) expects that, if the central bank continually lowers 
its policy rate via open-market operations, then the expected rate of interest will fall, and 
consequently so will the actual one. The current rate of interest is based on past experience, 
and the accepted or conventional rate can fall over time, as the bears gradually give up on 
the idea that rates will rise. This argument conflicts with the idea that interest rates are set 
purely by uncertainty of their future values, although it conforms well to the apparent results 
of current central bank policy settings and the low rates associated with QE. Similarly, 
Bibow (1998, p. 242) hints at the phenomenon that the central bank could buy long-term 
bonds with new money indefinitely, with a continuously lowering rate as more investors 
become bears and prefer to hold the new money. This phenomenon relies on a given state 
of expectations, especially concerning the ‘safe’ rate of interest, which cannot be 
guaranteed to remain constant throughout. Beyond a certain point, the rate of interest may 
not be able to satisfy the liquidity preference and a limitless desire to hold liquidity assets 
could take hold, with the monetary authority losing control and falling into a liquidity trap. 
Depending on expectations, liquidity traps can happen at any level of interest rates (Bibow, 
1998, p. 243). 
The rejection of consistent expectations means that the relationship between liquidity 
preference and equilibrium needs clarification, especially in light of Fischer Black’s 
assertion that, in equilibrium, asset expected returns should be unaffected by liquidity (see 
Section 7.5). This clarification can be provided by considering the concept of equilibrium 
itself. For Hayek (1937), the concept of equilibrium makes most sense in describing the 
planned actions of an individual, and this equilibrium will last for as long as the individual’s 
expectations prove to be correct. It follows, therefore, that time is an essential element to 
the concept of equilibrium and that a timeless equilibrium is ‘meaningless’ (Hayek, 1937, 
p. 37). Extending equilibrium to cover the interaction of many individuals is problematic, 
for if each individual creates a plan based on conflicting expectations then their plans 
cannot be simultaneously executed, and no equilibrium is possible. For a ‘social’ 
equilibrium the ‘corresponding actions’ of other individuals must be compatible (Hayek, 
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1937, p. 38).  
The difficulty in establishing an equilibrium for society as a whole is that each individual 
will have a different set of subjective facts, so an equilibrium for society can then take one 
of two forms. In the first form, each individual’s plan must be ‘mutually compatible’ so 
that there is ‘a conceivable set of external events which will allow all people to carry out 
their plans and not cause any disappointments’ (Hayek, 1937, pp. 39-40). This mutually 
consistent expectations equilibrium ‘will continue, once it exists, so long as the external 
data correspond to the common expectations of all the members of the society’ (Hayek, 
1937, p. 41). Crucially, the equilibrium itself does not depend on objective data, only on 
the condition that all individuals have the same expectations, rightly or wrongly, concerning 
the plans of other individuals and the external facts. In equilibrium, the plans of every 
individual could conceivably be possible, even if external events subsequently make some 
or all of them impossible.  
In the second form, all individuals have the correct knowledge of the objective data. This 
form of equilibrium, which corresponds to Rational Expectations, can only be identified ex 
post (Hayek, 1937, p. 40). If we assume that all agents in a model know everything, then a 
societal equilibrium exists, by definition. Naturally, the subjective expectations of 
individuals will be based on their observations of the objective data, and the first form of 
equilibrium can only last as long as the subjective expectations match the objective facts. 
For Hayek, the only reason to be interested in the concept of equilibrium at all is the 
‘supposed existence of a tendency towards equilibrium’ or that expectations ‘become more 
and more correct’ (Hayek, 1937, p. 44), which, in a world without fundamental uncertainty, 
can be interpreted as Rational Expectations.  
The problem of establishing consistent expectations can be sidestepped by the assumption 
of a representative agent, of course, but this is explicitly rejected by Keynes, for, in the 
absence of perfect foresight, the stability of the system relies on a ‘variety of opinion’ about 
the future rate of interest (Keynes, 1936, p. 172, original emphasis). The expectations 
theory of interest rates, with its consistency of expectations, must be rejected when there is 
more than one individual and a variety of opinions:  
Even if prices are the average of individual expectations, average expectations fail 
even the basic property of the law of iterated expectations. That is to say, the 
average expectation today of the average expectation tomorrow of some variable 
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is not necessarily the average expectation today of that variable. The normal rules 
for intertemporal consistency do not apply to average expectations as they do to an 
individual’s expectations. This is why Keynes’s beauty contest example – about 
how the savvy trader is able to go beyond the “average opinion of the average 
opinion” – is so potent. (Shin, 2017, p. 3) 
Sharp asset-price movements are caused by adjustments by individuals that are ‘more 
similar than they are dissimilar in their reaction to news’ (Keynes, 1936, p. 199). If all 
agents were the same, asset prices would be unstable and relative holdings would be 
indeterminate. Thus, large price movements associated with low volume, rather than being 
indicative of illiquidity (see Section 7.5), signify a convergence of expectations (Rogers, 
1989, p. 196). At the limit, large price movements can occur without any trading as they 
adjust to new information: 
If the change in the news affects the judgement and the requirements of everyone 
in precisely the same way, the rate of interest (as indicated by the prices of bonds 
and debts) will be adjusted forthwith to the new situation without any market 
transactions being necessary. (Keynes, 1936, p. 198) 
The picture drawn is of a market that jumps discontinuously to a ‘new equilibrium rate of 
interest’ (Keynes, 1936, p. 199) as expectations adjust to new information, but without 
necessarily trading at all. As with the Efficient Markets Hypothesis, the flow of information 
and the consequent reformation of expectations are sufficient to change the interest rate: 
Changes in the liquidity function itself, due to a change in the news which causes 
revision of expectations, will often be discontinuous, and will, therefore, give rise 
to a corresponding discontinuity of change in the rate of interest. (Keynes, 1936, 
p. 198) 
Only a variety of opinion will ‘cause some realignment in individual holdings of money’ 
because if ‘everyone is similar and similarly placed, a change in circumstances or 
expectations will not be capable of causing any displacement of money whatever’ (Keynes, 
1936, p. 198). A variety of opinion is required for the demand for money not to be infinitely 
elastic (Kahn, 1954, p. 247). To prevent large movements into cash after small changes in 
opinion, each agent must have a different expectation as to the future volatility of the rate 
of interest. For, if no one felt any uncertainty about the future rate of interest, the speculative 
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motive would not operate (Keynes, 1936, p. 209), the rate of interest would be determined 
by real factors (Kahn, 1954, p. 238), and the quantity theorem would hold (Keynes, 1936, 
p. 209). The greater the similarity there is among investors the greater the move in the 
interest rate will need to be to restore equilibrium. 
The idea that the stability of the system relies on a variety of opinion both conflicts with 
the consistency of expectations necessary for a REE and introduces difficulties of its own. 
For example, Boulding (1944) uses the variety of opinion to develop the concept of a ‘null 
price’, below which an agent would be willing to add to their holdings of bonds and above 
which they would sell or issue new bonds. Assuming the continuity of demand and supply, 
the ‘null price’ is then on the cusp of selling and buying where the agent would make no 
changes to their bond holdings. For Boulding, it is divergences in null prices across agents 
that determine the quantity of an asset exchanged, implying that the divergence is the result 
of disequilibrium. Taken across all agents, excess demand functions can be constructed 
similar to those underlying the Arrow-Debreu derivation of general equilibrium and market 
clearing prices (Arrow & Hahn, 1971). In equilibrium, however, the null prices converge 
(Wray, 1991a, p. 122; Wray, 1992a, p. 73), thereby contradicting the requirement for a 
variety of opinion to ensure stability. 
Boulding then goes a step further and interprets liquidity preference as a desired ratio of 
monetary to total wealth, such that increases in the stock of money prompt increases in non-
monetary asset prices (or production) to restore the desired ratio to equilibrium. In this way, 
it is a theory of asset (and commodity) pricing. The quantity traded depends on the 
divergence between null prices, and the stock of money determines asset prices (Wray, 
1991a, p. 120). As in the Walrasian system, interest rates are not determined directly, but 
are determined by the present price of assets and their future payments (Boulding, 1944, p. 
62).  
Further complexity arises when integrating the banking system. For a bank, an increase in 
the null price, or equivalently a decrease in liquidity preference, implies an increase in its 
propensity to make new loans and issue new bank money, which in turn raises the null 
prices of the non-bank public (Wray, 1991a, p. 120). An increase in the public’s liquidity 
preference, which, when confronted with a fixed stock of money, would raise interest rates, 
could conceivably be offset by the banking system (Wray, 1991b, p. 6). In the case of a 
bearish market, market makers that purchase assets during a sell-off may need to draw on 
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lines of credit, or funding liquidity, and thereby expand the money supply (Brown, 2003, 
p. 334). In aggregate, the banking system has the ability to satisfy a degree of liquidity 
preference, whether stemming from bearishness or not, by purchasing unwanted assets for 
new bank deposits (Kaldor, 1982, p. 14). 
A move by the public into more liquid assets means that liquidity risk has been shifted to 
the banking system, which must be followed by an adjustment of expected returns on bonds 
for this to be profitable for the banks. The terms of this transformation are to be found in 
the interplay between the liquidity preferences of the public and the banking system 
(Keynes, 1937c, p. 666). First, the banking system must purchase bonds at a decreasing 
expected return to counter the public’s increasing liquidity preference. Second, the creation 
of monetary liabilities depends on the central bank lender of last resort protection and the 
banking system’s capital structure. This counterbalancing relies on the unlikely event that 
the banking system’s preferences move in the opposite direction from that of the public 
(Wray, 1991b, p. 6). Instead, increases and decreases are likely to be amplified by the 
banking system (Wray, 1991b, p. 6). 
If liquidity preference falls, the rates on non-money assets fall, the cost of new loans falls 
and creates the conditions for even more money to be created. Liquidity preference—the 
desire to hold near-money assets—affects the expected return on all assets. In a bullish 
market, where every agent prefers securities with a rising price to price-protected assets, 
‘there is no limit to the rise in price of securities and no effective check arises from a 
shortage of money’ (Keynes, 1930a, p. 256). In other words, a shortage of liquidity cannot 
stop a bull market. For, in the absence of uncertainty, only the transactions demand for 
money would operate; there would be no need for precautionary or speculative demand 
(Runde, 1994, p. 133). 
8.6 Stocks, Flows and Asset Fetishism 
Underlying each interpretation of liquidity preference discussed so far is an assumption of 
a fixed stock of assets. ‘Prices are then such that the market is content to hold just that 
quantity of each type of asset which is available at the moment’ (Robinson, 1951, p. 96). 
Liquidity preference shows that the potential supply of liquidity is a fundamental aspect in 
the pricing of all assets:  
When, as happens in a crisis, liquidity-preferences are sharply raised, this shows 
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itself not so much in increased hoards – for there is little, if any, more cash 
[liquidity] which is hoardable than there was before – as in a sharp rise in the rate 
of interest, i.e. securities fall in price until those, who would now like to get liquid 
if they could do so at the previous price, are persuaded to give up the idea as being 
no longer practicable on reasonable terms. (Keynes, 1937a, p. 211) 
On the surface, this passage appears to corroborate the portfolio rebalancing or stock 
interpretation, with security prices adjusting to equilibrate their holdings. On closer 
inspection, we can see that all asset prices adjust to the increased demand for liquidity. 
Liquidity is a systemic factor in asset pricing, hence the appropriateness of the two-asset 
presentation of liquidity preference. Keynes presents liquidity preference using a static, 
partial-equilibrium approach designed to show that a less-than-full-employment 
equilibrium is possible (Brown, 2003). Hence, in this static moment the money ‘supply’ is 
one of the elements that are assumed given, since 
…there are two quite distinct types of influence which play upon the equilibrium 
pattern of rates. One is the state of expectations and the other is the supply of 
money. To discuss them separately we require that one be assumed constant when 
the other varies. (Robinson, 1951, p. 98). 
Thus, the monetary authority can affect interest rates by two channels: first the supply of 
money with constant expectations, and second by changing expectations themselves 
(Bibow, 1998, p. 241). Chick (1983, p. 14), in interpreting Keynes’s analytical method, 
concludes that monetary theory cannot be conducted within either the partial or general 
equilibrium methods. The former cannot account for the ‘macroeconomic repercussions’ 
and the latter has no essential role for money.  
The static, partial-equilibrium approach makes no allowances for the dynamics of the 
money supply and hence the role of banks in supplementing it. Only the finance motive has 
any role in explaining the dynamics of the system (Bibow, 1995). As such, the finance 
motive is a disequilibrium concept, since in equilibrium, ‘when planned activity equals 
actual activity’ (Bibow, 1995, p. 650), demand for finance is met by a ‘revolving fund’. In 
the transitional period before equilibrium is established, an increase in planned activity 
requires some exchange of liquidity, therefore ‘someone else has to agree to become, for 
the time being at least, more unliquid than before’ (Keynes, 1937c, p. 665). If it confronts 
a limited supply, this extra demand for liquidity will raise the rate of interest, but not if the 
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banking system provides the necessary adjustment (Rochon, 1997, p. 288). The finance 
motive does not support a loanable funds argument due to its disequilibrium nature; the 
finance motive folds into the transactions motive, once equilibrium is established. Before 
then the finance motive drives a change in the transactions motive for the planned investor. 
The terms on which finance for any expenditure is available are determined by 
liquidity preference which thereby affects, most importantly, the volume of the 
flow of current investment expenditure and saving, the latter being usually 
obscured by such non-explanatory conceptions as ex ante or ex post saving or 
“loanable funds”. (Bibow, 1995, p. 663, original emphasis) 
An important distinction between Keynes’s theory of liquidity preference and the theory of 
loanable funds is their respective classifications as stock and flow theories (Conard, 1959, 
p. 218). Loanable funds theory establishes a flow equilibrium of real investment and saving, 
whereas liquidity preference is a stock equilibrium of money or liquidity (Wray, 1992a). 
This distinction seemingly allows the pedagogical IS/LM model (Hansen, 1953; Hicks, 
1937) to incorporate both liquidity preference and loanable funds, and apparently to 
reconcile the, otherwise conflicting, issue of equilibrating the stock of money with the flow 
of the goods market. Because of liquidity preference, the equilibration of investment and 
saving are achieved by changes income driven by effective demand, not interest rates 
(Kregel, 1988). 
This supposed reconciliation of flow and stock equilibria is a source of confusion as 
illustrated in interpretations of the finance motive. For instance, Davidson concludes that, 
in the context of the IS/LM model, the finance motive means that ‘demand for money 
function is not independent of changes in the real sector’ (Davidson, 1965, p. 52). A 
conclusion that Bibow (1995, p. 652) translates to be that ‘the finance motive would imply 
that the IS and LM curves are not independent of one another but would generally shift 
simultaneously.’ Bibow finds this conclusion logically inconsistent with the comparative-
static equilibrium analysis of IS/LM since it must imply ‘a lasting additional demand for 
money’, which contradicts the dynamic, disequilibrium nature of the finance motive 
(Bibow, 1995, p. 652, original emphasis). This error creeps in because ‘Davidson defines 
the demand for money as a function of (planned) expenditure and not, as according to him 
is usually the case, as a function of income (output)’ (Bibow, 1995, p. 652). In equilibrium, 




The flow of new loans is small relative to the stock of existing loans, so that expectations 
concerning the value of existing loans are the dominant factor in asset pricing. ‘The price 
of an asset is determined solely by its expected future price, independently of its current 
flows of supply and demand, if these flows are dwarfed by speculative stocks that are very 
large’ (Ertürk, 2006, p. 457, original emphasis). Hicks (1989, p. 11) highlights that, in 
speculative markets where intermediary traders or dealers can hold stocks across trading 
periods, flow demand and supply cannot determine asset prices in a Marshallian or 
Walrasian fashion. Futures markets show that prices are not determined by ‘flow 
propensities’ but expectations, not necessary irrational (Hicks, 1989, p. 17). Instead, a 
distinction must be made between the exchange of existing assets and the production of 
new assets in the theory of value (Townshend, 1937, p. 160). Liquidity preference supports 
this distinction with a ‘two-price’ theory in which ‘asset prices are determined 
independently of investment and saving flows’, and only are indirectly affected by 
consumer prices (Ertürk, 2006, p. 463).  
Although this idea of the flows being small relative to the existing stocks is decisive, it does 
not go far enough. Innovation in modern finance has undermined the importance of assets; 
it has deconstructed assets into risks. Each asset’s risks can be decomposed into its primitive 
risks via financial derivatives and intermediation, with intermediation that depends on the 
weights and individual expectations of the public and the banking system. Asset pricing 
should be seen to be stemming from risk, not stocks, since stocks, if financial assets are 
included, adjust also to ensure that all risks that exist anywhere are owned somewhere. 
Nevertheless, liquidity is not represented in this risk framework. The fact that assets can be 
decomposed, and that derivatives can extend the supply of many of them, moves the focus 
from assets to risks where the supply cannot sensibly be defined. Just like the QTM which 
falls apart when the question ‘what is money?’ cannot be answered, the question ‘what is 
an asset?’ similarly underlines the stock-flow paradox.  
The key difference between the principles underlying portfolio rebalancing and stochastic 
discount factors is whether it is the supply or the riskiness of assets that should determine 
prices. Black’s (1970a; see also Section 7.5) ontological challenge can be used against the 
argument for supply and to reinterpret and clarify Keynes’s theory of liquidity preference.  
Developments in modern finance enable the layering of financial instruments (such as 
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currency, interest rate, and credit default swaps) over physical assets to disassemble the 
various risks embedded in the underlying asset. To maintain a focus on assets per se, and 
not their risks and cash flows, is to suffer from a kind of ‘asset-fetishism’ (Lozano, 2015) 
and to remain oblivious to the distinction between the analysis of ‘classical exchange’ 
concerning ‘exchange and immediate settlement of physical assets’ (Lozano, 2015, p. 32) 
and the ontologically broader concepts of generic and synthetic finance. Generic financial 
instruments are ‘non-physical economic objects, whose quality and character of physicality 
will generally not be informative of its value, e.g., loans, bonds, bills and stock’, with cash 
flows that are decoupled from any reference to physical objects so that the ‘time-horizon 
of the tenure of exchange is loosened beyond immediate settlement’ (Lozano, 2015, p. 33, 
original emphasis). Synthetic finance broadens this ontological set further by considering 
risk-transfer instruments such as interest rate and credit default swaps—instruments that 
have no ‘endogenous limitation’ to their creation (Lozano, 2015, p. 38). This ontological 
insight is crucial to understanding that risk and liquidity are not intrinsic properties of an 
asset and gives us further reason to reject the commodity view of money. 
By arbitrage, asset prices that are not consistent with risk-based models can be undermined 
by the creation of derivatives, thereby imposing a powerful influence that cannot be 
ignored. The stock-based argument cannot provide a particularly strong theoretical basis 
for asset pricing. For example, to claim that an asset's price is ‘high’ because it is in short 
supply is, first, to deny the respective roles of systematic and idiosyncratic risk in asset 
pricing, and, second, to ignore the potential that asset ‘shortages’ can be mitigated by 
deconstructing their respective risks via financial derivatives, even if this is not always 
possible in practice. On the other hand, the risk-based approach relies on the unrealistic 
assumption that investors can buy and sell assets in any amount they like, prompting 
questions about the existence of liquidity constraints. 
The credit risk associated with intermediaries in synthetic finance is the risk introduced by 
the process of transformation; for example, maturity transformation or liquidity risk 
services (Goodhart, 2008). The question is, if financial instruments are created to transfer 
existing risks, are they economically significant in themselves or can they be safely ignored 
to focus on primary risks only (Block & Barnett, 2012, pp. 14-15)? Does intermediation 
create new risks, even as it tries to transfer risks? It can be argued that the creation of 
financial instruments themselves creates new risks, by becoming new weak links in an 
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increasing chain of contractual obligations, and that the gross amount of assets and 
liabilities is important in itself. The chaining of claims across intermediaries must surely 
increase credit risk, such that the ‘scope for introducing risk into the system rather than 
sharing it around is obvious’ (King, 2016, p. 143). That intermediation matters is evident 
by observing that open-market operations and liquidity provision by banks are 
economically significant and the dysfunction of the shadow banking system resulted in real 
economic effects. 
For Jefferis (2017, p. 83), synthetic risk transfers allow the universe of assets with ‘known’ 
prices to be expanded, with the newly added assets becoming more ‘liquid’ by means of 
‘financial calculations [that] do not have veracity because of predictive power but because 
the practice of financial modelling commensurates different forms of capital in order to 
make them into a form of liquidity.’ That supposedly marketable prices could be generated 
by pricing models based on risk transfer supported the illusion of market liquidity needed 
to support repo and the shadow banking system. 
The focus on assets and their stocks is misguided. The idea that all assets must be held by 
someone needs to be adjusted. Financial derivatives make it possible to separate and 
transfer risks, so the focus must be on component risks: all risks must be held by someone. 
Just so, Pozsar (2014, p. 66) laments that the existing U.S. Flow of Funds framework omits 
derivatives thus obscuring the visibility of the flow of risks compared to the flow of funds 
and hence the understanding of asset prices. Similarly, Brunnermeier et al. (2011) suggest 
a ‘Liquidity Mismatch Index’ to improve on basic measures of leverage when applied to 
derivatives and off-balance-sheet exposures.  
The consumption-based asset-pricing model adopts a risk-based approach to asset pricing 
(see Section 6.6). What is missing from this model, however, is the assessment of liquidity 
in the process of establishing prices and its relation to the established Wicksellian, 
intertemporal features in the complete-markets’ paradigm. Without recognising the 
ontological separation of assets from risk, and therefore liquidity, the innovations, 
developments and consequences of synthetic finance, more commonly called 
‘financialisation’, will remain opaque and misunderstood. 
8.7 The Pure Rate of Interest 
Liquidity preference is a theory of the interest rate, or ‘the pure rate of interest’ (Keynes, 
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1936, p. 208) and asset pricing more generally, but should not be conflated with that of 
asset prices itself. Instead, it corresponds to the discount factor expressed the generic asset-
pricing formula, equation (6.9). The pure rate of interest established by liquidity preference 
should be contained in the stochastic discount factor, which must therefore be modified to 
include liquidity preference. 
This discount factor versus payoff split is seen in Keynes’s analysis of long-term 
expectations on the uncertainty of prospective yields, isolated from changes in the rate of 
interest used to discount these yields (Keynes, 1936, pp. 148-149). The distinction between 
yields and the rate of interest is significant. Uncertainty arising from asset yields creates 
the incentive to hold liquid assets, which in turn determines the rate of interest. Liquidity 
preference, or the propensity to hoard, therefore applies directly to asset pricing: 
This, then, is the first repercussion of the rate of interest as fixed by the quantity of 
money and the propensity to hoard, namely, on the prices of capital-assets. This 
does not mean, of course, that the rate of interest is the only fluctuating influence 
on these prices. Opinions as to their prospective yield are themselves subject to 
sharp fluctuations, precisely for the reason already given, namely, the flimsiness 
of the basis of knowledge on which they depend. It is these opinions taken in 
conjunction with the rate of interest which fix their price. (Keynes, 1937a, p. 217) 
Note the distinction between the logically separate (Cottrell, 1994b, p. 417; Keynes, 1936, 
pp. 173-174) processes of fixing the interest rate and forecasting the prospective yield of a 
specific asset is directly analogous to the asset-pricing formula, 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 = 𝔼𝔼𝑡𝑡[𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡+1𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡+1]. The 
stochastic discount factor 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡+1, common across all assets, is the ‘pure rate of interest’ and 
𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡+1, the asset payoff, is the ‘prospective yield’, where the units of measurement are not 
real or percentage returns, but future (and uncertain) monetary flows arising from 
ownership of the asset. Finally, 𝔼𝔼𝑡𝑡[. ] =  𝔼𝔼[. |ℱ𝑡𝑡] is the subjective expectation given ‘the 
flimsiness of the basis of knowledge on which they depend’ and variations in 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡+1 will be 
due to the uncertainty of prospective yields. 
This decomposition of the factors of asset pricing corresponds to the ‘facts’ in the empirical 
finance literature. Specifically, Cochrane (2011b, p. 1051) reports that that the ‘variance in 
dividend yields or price-dividend ratios corresponds entirely to discount-rate variation’ and 
not forecast changes in dividends themselves. Two sources of variation (or asset-price 
shocks) are observed: one due to cash flows or dividends and the other from changes in 
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discount factors, and these shocks are uncorrelated (Cochrane, 2017a, p. 971). Placing these 
‘facts’ into Keynes’s framework, we can recognise that the propensity to hoard is the 
discount factor, and prospective yield aligns with cash flow or dividend yield variations. 
Keynes’s theory allows us ‘to think of and model a world with separate cash-flow and 
discount-rate shocks’ (Cochrane, 2017a, p. 971). 
This independence of cash flow and discount factor shocks reinforces the rejection of 
productivity-based theories of interest rates and the Wicksellian notion of a real interest 
rate determined entirely as a non-monetary phenomenon. It also provides clues as to why 
conflicting theories of interest rates and prices can exist. On the one hand, we find theories 
of the rate of interest as a cost to be covered by profits, and hence prices. A lower rate of 
interest thereby lowers prices (Pivetti, 2009). For entirely different reasons, a similar idea 
is displayed by the neo-Fisherian idea that higher interest rates increase inflation 
expectation. By the QTM, however, lower interest rates increase the money supply and 
hence prices. 
Importantly, the speculative motive does not relate asset prices with the quantity of money; 
it relates the rate of interest with the quantity of money (Keynes, 1936, pp. 173-174). 
Liquidity preference is not a risk-based theory of bearishness; it is an uncertainty-based 
desire for liquid assets: 
Whilst liquidity-preference due to the speculative-motive corresponds to what in 
my Treatise on Money I called “the state of bearishness”, it is by no means the 
same thing. For “bearishness” is there defined as the functional relationship, not 
between the rate of interest (or price of debts) and the quantity of money, but 
between the price of assets and debts, taken together, and the quantity of money. 
(Keynes, 1936, pp. 173-174) 
Without the recognition that liquidity preference relates to only one of the two factors in 
asset pricing, there is ‘a confusion between results due to a change in the rate of interest 
[the discount factor] and those due to a change in the schedule of the marginal efficiency 
of capital [the asset’s payoff]’ (Keynes, 1936, p. 174).  
Ertürk (2006, p. 464) provides an example of this confusion, whereby ‘liquidity preference 
[centred] on the expected variations in the price of loan capital, and delineated the variations 
in share prices as a separate issue to be dealt with under the marginal efficiency of capital’. 
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This delineation must be rejected because asset valuation, whether bonds or shares, requires 
both the marginal efficiency of capital and the discount factor. The marginal efficiency of 
capital cannot be assigned to shares and the discount factor to bonds, each form of asset 
requires both to determine their price. Similarly, Minsky (1975, p. 67) believes that Keynes 
errs by expressing the theory of liquidity preference in terms of interest rates. Minsky 
evaluates asset prices in terms of discounted cash flows, but his theory explicitly considers 
the systematic liquidity risk of failing to meet the future cash-flow commitments from 
current borrowing—the ‘survival constraint’53. Indeed, Minsky’s asset-pricing formula 
includes not just the asset’s payoff, but also the stock of money (Minsky, 1975, p. 102) and 
the financing arrangements of the investor, with more external funding versus internal 
funding lowering the demand price of the asset (Minsky, 1975, p. 106), contradicting the 
Modigliani-Miller theorem. Minsky placed ‘emphasis on (non-diversifiable systematic) 
refinance problems as the source of borrower’s and lender’s risk, since refinance problems 
have no place in an equilibrium theory of asset pricing’ (Mehrling, 1999, p. 150).  
It is important to avoid the misunderstanding that the liquidity premium attached to holding 
money is conceptually the same thing as the rate of interest. It is incorrect, in the context of 
the theory of liquidity preference, to claim that ‘the money rate of interest refers to the fee 
from lending money’ (Hansen, 1953, p. 160, original emphasis). Money and money lending 
are distinct assets and, in equilibrium, their expected returns, including liquidity premia, 
should be equal, but they should not be considered the same phenomenon. By example, 
fees charged by money market funds have been waived since 2008 to avoid negative 
returns, these fees were reinstated in 2016 so that returns are now negative (Ram, 2016). 
The visible carrying costs of money market fund investments are outweighed by the 
abstract liquidity premium associated with their liquidity. Similarly, the negative rates 
charged by the ECB on bank reserves are a carrying cost, and not a negative liquidity 
premium. 
To clarify, the marginal efficiency of bonds has been lost in most interpretations of liquidity 
preference, with the assumption that the yield observed on bonds is conceptually the same 
as the liquidity premium. This is incorrect: the bond price is determined by the liquidity 
preference-based discount factor applied to the cash flows of the bond. The fact that the 
                                                         
53 Mehrling (1999, p. 139) highlights this phrase from Minsky’s unpublished PhD dissertation. 
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bond yield is the most directly observable manifestation of the discount rate should not 
obscure the theoretical point that the discount factor is independent of any particular type 
of asset. Keynes’s ‘money market’ should be differentiated from the credit market, in which 
money is lent (Brown, 2003, p. 331, n. 16). The concept of the ‘money market’ used by 
Keynes is a fictitious institution and demonstrates that the liquidity premium earned by 
money is an abstraction that can only be ‘earned’ in subjective utility terms.  
8.8 Summary 
This chapter has shown that Keynes’s theory of liquidity preference makes a valuable 
contribution to the analysis of liquidity, although some reinterpretation of the theory is 
warranted. The meaning of the term ‘liquidity’ that underpins the theory of liquidity 
preference can now be located in the taxonomy or spectrum of liquidity identified by this 
study. It must be at the aggregate, price-protection end of the spectrum, most commonly 
associated with money and near money. Inasmuch as money (read liquidity) can include 
the command over general purchasing power that can only be recovered over a period of 
months, then liquidity preference can be satisfied by quasi-money categories of self-
liquidating assets and repurchase agreements. Liquidity preference is not built on market 
liquidity, and measures of liquidity based on trading volumes, returns reversals, or zero 
trading days (see Section 7.5) fail to capture the liquidity risk mitigated by assets with a 
price-protection feature specific to liquidity preference. 
The theory of liquidity preference is that agents are willing to forgo interest income to hold 
price-protection assets due to the capital uncertainty associated with relying on market 
liquidity. This uncertainty regarding sales price is not just the transactions cost of illiquidity 
arising from markets without perfect market liquidity; it is due the uncertainty of the 
discount factor itself. Market liquidity is a fictitious form of liquidity that allows measures 
of value to masquerade as measures of cash flow. 
The interpretation taken in this study is that illiquidity is a systemic property of all assets 
that do not display the price-protection property, since expected returns are predominantly 
based on systematic factors. Keynes’s two-asset exposition is justified: any further expected 
return or premium over that determined by liquidity preference is based on the asset’s 
systematic risk, not liquidity. This is not to say that all non-money assets are perfect 
substitutes, only that the component of the interest rate determined by liquidity preference 
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is shared by all assets. Liquidity preference then becomes a theory of asset pricing.  
The characteristic of full value, outside of general equilibrium theory, begs the question. If 
money is non-neutral, no long-period neo-Walrasian equilibrium exists, and the concept of 
a fundamental value is undefined. We must eschew the idea that ‘full value’ represents 
‘without loss’, full or fundamental value relies on a general equilibrium, and perfect market 
liquidity, which has no requirement for money, and is not relevant to the consideration of 
liquidity. It is the mistaken path to considering liquidity as a friction.  
Having discussed and interpreted liquidity preference from the ontological perspective of 
this study, in the next chapter we consider the post-Keynesian contributions to Monetary 




9 Post-Keynesian and Heterodox Monetary Theory 
9.1 Introduction 
Post-Keynesian monetary theories explicitly consider the role of the banking system in the 
operation of an economy where money and credit have a fundamental place. The credit 
nature of money is recognised and essential to each theory. As with the theory of liquidity 
preference, the point of departure for post-Keynesian analysis is a rejection of the axiom of 
money neutrality. Instead, money has real effects. Post-Keynesian theories emphasise the 
process of money creation, and eschew the idea that money is an external phenomenon with 
the sole purpose of establishing price determinacy. 
Post-Keynesian theory as a whole also shuns the deductive and instrumentalist approaches 
prevalent in Real Analysis. The quest for microfoundations is deemed inappropriate for 
macroeconomic analysis (King, 2012), as is general equilibrium theory (Jespersen, 2009). 
These methodological differences allow liquidity and money to appear as social 
phenomena, and for uncertainty to display its natural characteristic of increasing over time, 
rather than dissipating, as in general equilibrium theory. 
Most important, the theories presented in this chapter adopt a different stance on the 
liquidity abundance versus liquidity scarcity issue. In general, the liquidity abundance view 
is embraced, and hence the limits to pure credit expansion are less clear. Although none of 
these theories addresses liquidity directly, a brief summary of each is provided in this 
chapter because each has important elements necessary for the synthesis developed in the 
next chapter. Each theory has important insights to be identified and examined. 
9.2 Circuit Theory 
The credit view of money can be refined by the theory of the monetary circuit with the 
assertion that money ‘is the by-product of a balance sheet operation of a third agent [a 
bank]’ and ‘always emerges as a debt (or liability) issued by this third agent on itself’ 
(Parguez & Seccareccia, 2000, p 101, original emphasis). Circuit theory revives the terms 
of the classical Banking School and combines them with the metaphor of a circuit to 
describe the process of efflux and reflux of bank credit (see Section 4.3). In logical time, 
the circuit begins with banks’ enabling firms to fund the process of production by an 
exchange of credit between the firms and the banking system (Graziani, 1990). Households 
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earn wages paid by the firms in the form of bank credits, which are then used to purchase 
the goods and services produced or, alternately, new financial securities issued by the firms. 
Finally, firms can then repay their bank loans and the circuit reaches closure.54 Circuit 
theory highlights the importance of the distinction between firms, banks and households in 
the creation and circulation of money and the determination of interest rates (Seccareccia, 
2012).  
If households retain savings in the form of bank-money balances, then firms will remain 
indebted to the banks, thereby preventing the closure of the circuit (Fontana, 2000, p. 35). 
In response, the business sector can issue financial assets that pay sufficient interest for the 
household sector to exchange them for their deposits, which can subsequently be used to 
repay business loans from the banks. The interest rate on the financial assets compensates 
the household sector for this reduction in liquidity. Since ‘money balances measure the 
outstanding debt of firms towards banks’, the household sector’s desire to hold money 
results in higher interest rates and restricts the ability of ‘firms to renegotiate a new flow of 
money’ (Fontana, 2000, p. 37). Hoarding ‘obstructs the process of wealth creation upon 
which the value of money depends’, since money ‘has a value only as long as it is spent by 
nonbank agents for the purpose of creating future wealth’ (Parguez & Seccareccia, 2000, 
p. 105).  
Circuit theory represents a significant reinterpretation of the classical velocity of money by 
describing the process of money creation as part of the production process in a credit 
economy in which money is created as a by-product of the ‘income-generating finance 
process’ (Lavoie, 1984, p. 788). Instead of the classical metaphor of the same exogenous 
stock of money circulating throughout the economy, the circuit consists of the continual 
creation and destruction of credit (Rochon, 1997, p 286). Rather than a fixed scarcity of 
liquidity, the circuit implies the continual creation of liquidity by the banking system to 
meet the needs of trade. The amount of lending by the banking system at the beginning of 
the circuit is determined by the factor costs of the producers. Credit requirements arising 
from the production process result in the creation of bank deposits. An implication of the 
circuit theory is that the supply of, but not necessarily the demand for, money depends on 
income.  
                                                         
54 See Passarella (2014, p. 130) for a visual depiction of the process. 
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Money is created during the production process to pay income or factor costs, in other 
words, the value of output:  
The consumers’ purchasing power is therefore largely supplied out of the credits 
which the traders borrow from the banks. Credit originates in production and is 
extinguished in consumption. The supply of purchasing power is thus regulated by 
the transactions which require to be financed. (Hawtrey, 1919, p. 10) 
It follows that any limitation on borrowing for production, is a limitation on income and 
expenditure. Circuit theory speaks directly to trade liquidity (see Section 5.4), where both 
consumers and producers are justified in expecting liquidity due to the very nature of the 
credit and banking system that supports their activities. 
The flow of funds through the circuit is a dynamic, disequilibrium process. Only after 
income earners have satisfied their desired purchase decisions (first reflux) and then their 
desired mix of securities and money (second reflux) is a recognisable state of equilibrium 
achieved. By comparison, a neo-Walrasian general equilibrium is conceptually equivalent 
to the moment of circuit closure, with the added qualification that there is no residual 
demand for money. As noted in Section 7.4, a centralised, Arrow-Debreu market can be re-
interpreted as a decentralised market where transactions are conducted using trade credit, 
which is subsequently cleared. The Walrasian auctioneer conducts a process whereby 
‘multilateral trades are possible through a clearing operation that keeps track of net claims’ 
or settlements (Ljungqvist & Sargent, 2004, p. 214). In effect, the Arrow-Debreu market 
achieves the form of final settlement described in Section 4.8, where all financial debits 
and credits are extinguished. In equilibrium, neither money nor financial securities exist, 
and a credit intermediary such as the banking system is unnecessary. The key element 
missing from neo-Walrasian analysis is an equilibrium in which financial securities remain 
in existence.  
Financial securities are problematic for both circuit theory and neo-Walrasian theory. The 
development of the shadow banking system poses some challenges to circuit theory with 
its specificity to the flows of production and consumption. The rise of ‘financialisation’, 
which ‘refers to a process in which the financial markets have taken on a central role in 
bank-based economic systems’ (Seccareccia, 2012, p. 282) has heralded a dramatic increase 
in the ratio of financial assets and liabilities to GDP (Michell, 2017). Households, 
traditionally net lenders in the monetary circuit, have significantly increased borrowing for 
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house purchases (Sawyer, 2013). Furthermore, securitisation, whereby banks originate 
loans and then package them into a marketable form to distribute to investors, is, for many, 
the prime cause of the GFC, with the conclusion that securitisation should be prohibited 
(Davidson, 2008; Seccareccia, 2012).  
Circuit theory is not naturally expressed in terms that provide insights into non-traditional 
bank lending for the purchase of non-investment assets. For Michell (2017, p. 373), 
applying circuit theory to the creation and final finance of mortgage assets is a ‘perverse 
and mutated form of the monetary circuit’ since it loses its original relevance to the 
financing of production. Circuit theory needs to be updated for the developments associated 
with financialisation (Passarella, 2014). For Lysandrou (2014), circuit theory is 
unsuccessful in describing financialisation because it lacks asset management as a separate 
sector in its own right. Seccareccia (2012) invites us to believe that, because of 
financialisation, households have moved from being net lenders to net borrowers, with the 
corporate sector now taking the position as net lenders. The view that households can be 
net borrowers, however, does not take into account the observation that the corporate sector 
is ultimately owned by households. Instead, some households must be debtors to other 
households via the wealth ownership intermediated by the corporate sector.  
Michell (2017), using the circuit theory as an analytical framework, makes the persuasive 
case that the traditional banking system must still be the source of new money, even for the 
shadow banking system. Financialisation describes the process in which the financial sector 
has evolved to offer new liquid products. Due to a desire by households to hold liquidity, 
the circuit ceases to close, and this closure is prevented by means of new types of financial 
products. Securitisation, then, is a new form of final finance (Botta, Caverzasi, & Tori, 
2015) and one significant provider of these new products is the shadow banking system. 
Similarly, shadow bank liabilities are not money from the perspective of the circuit theory 
because they do not function as a medium of exchange; instead, they represent final finance 
(Gabor & Vestergaard, 2016; Michell, 2017).  
The theory of monetary circuit provides a valuable analytical basis with which to 
understand the process of inside money creation and a means of interpreting the (hidden) 
dynamics behind the Walrasian auction and general equilibrium. 
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9.3 Endogenous Money 
The post-Keynesian theory of endogenous money also aligns with the credit view of money 
and has significant implications for causality in the money creation process (Hewitson, 
1993). Under a commodity view of money, the money creation process cannot be 
influenced by the real economy and is theoretically exogenous, but with a credit view, 
money creation is an essential part of commerce and is theoretically endogenous (Moore, 
1988, p. xi). Unlike the QTM (see Section 3.5), which relies on the extension of the 
exogeneity principle to fiat money, endogenous money theory builds on the basic insight 
that ‘loans create deposits’, but not by means of the money multiplier (see Sections 4.6 and 
4.9). Instead, endogeneity reflects the notion that the money supply—a concept that is itself 
difficult to define—is determined by the process of production and commerce, ‘because 
commercial banks can create credit and money ex nihilo’ (Rochon, 1997, p. 282, n. 6, 
original emphasis). In terms of the equation of exchange, equation (3.1), the theory of 
endogeneity represents ‘reverse causality’, whereby money is created to finance the value 
of output.  
One of the key differences between endogenous money and the QTM is whether the supply 
and demand of money are independent (Le Bourva, 1992), and whether the stock of money 
then resembles a ‘hot potato’ which gets passed from hand to hand, because the economy 
‘as a whole cannot get rid of it’ (Tobin, 1963, pp. 408-409). In the view of the QTM, there 
is no reflux outlet for fiat money and any excess money must affect prices or income as the 
excess moves through individual portfolios until it finds a home (Friedman, 1956).55 The 
theory of endogenous money rejects this attempt to treat money like a commodity with a 
distinct and independent production function, instead it examines ‘the extent that changes 
in the supply of money are caused by changes in the demand for money’ (Bibow, 2000, p. 
533). 
The post-Keynesian monetary literature contains detailed research into the workings of the 
modern financial system, and the technicalities of the banking system (Fullwiler, 2003) 
giving it a solid ontological grounding. This literature emphasises that overdraft 
arrangements commit banks to fulfill pre-arranged lending obligations and, consequently, 
                                                         
55 When coupled with the axiom of money neutrality, the income effect can only be short term. 
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the total amount of lending is determined by borrowers’ demands for bank money at the 
prevailing complex of interest rates (Fontana, 2004). When unused overdrafts are 
considered, the potential amount of lending—and hence the potential money supply itself—
is greater than that measured by the current stock of outstanding bank deposits. 
Furthermore, the potential amount of lending is not constrained by central bank reserves 
for the simple reason that the central bank must supply the reserves required by the banking 
system to ensure that the interbank rate matches its target policy rate. Failure to provide the 
reserves necessary to validate the amount of lending would, at best, drive the interbank rate 
away from its target, and, at worst, violate its responsibility to prevent financial instability 
(Wray, 2006, p. 273). 
Endogenous money theory can also be seen as an extension of the theory of the monetary 
circuit (Rochon, 1999). The existence of bank money created at the beginning of the circuit 
entails an equivalent borrower who must regain bank money to repay the loan, thus setting 
up a strong tendency for the bank money to return to the borrower, either by sale of goods 
or new financial securities. The difference between the amounts of bank money borrowed 
and repaid leaves the stock of bank money determined as a residual and not a causal factor 
(Davidson & Weintraub, 1973). 
In talking of the “stock of money,” we are yielding to convention and habit of 
mind. The money stock is in fact the resulting factor of the expansion of credit. It 
can explain neither employment nor prices. The money stock is a residual and as 
such it cannot be causal. (Lavoie, 1984, p. 775) 
Credit is created and cleared by the banks in a process involving an exchange of producer’s 
credit for bank credit. Bank money is the predominant medium of exchange, which means 
that ‘the volume of nominal lending by the banking system determines the volume of 
nominal lending to the banking system’ (Moore, 1988, p. 62, original emphasis). 
Most significant is the rejection of the money multiplier as a deterministic mechanism for 
controlling the broad money supply (Le Bourva, 1992). Rather than the money multiplier 
hydraulically extending the base money supply, the endogenous theory stipulates that it is 
the demand for credit that creates the broad money supply, with the required reserves of 
base money created afterwards. Central banks ultimately control the amount of their 
liabilities they create, but in practice, and because of convertibility, the desire for an orderly 
market means that they allow for the elastic creation of base money. Importantly, because 
186 
 
the majority of the banking system’s assets have limited market liquidity or marketability, 
the central bank has only a limited ability to reduce the monetary base without dire 
consequences for the stability of the banking system. Conversely, the central bank can 
create new money by means of open-market operations, so that some aspect of the base 
money supply can be seen as exogenous (Moore, 1988, pp. 15-16). Overall, the central 
bank’s control over the monetary base is asymmetric (Moore, 1988, p. 23).  
For reasons of financial system stability, therefore, central banks have no alternative but to 
use interest rates as their policy instrument. By necessity, they operate to achieve a target 
interest rate in the interbank or repo markets. The central banks that operate a channel 
system aim to keep the stock of reserves close to zero, even though reserves must be 
available to banks for intra-day settlements to maintain the stability of the payments system. 
The channel system explicitly uses interest rates to limit the growth in the stock of broad 
money (see Section 4.6). 
The dependency of the bank money supply on credit demand leads to claims that bank 
money lacks traditional supply and demand curves, since the ‘supply and demand for credit 
money are not independent’ (Moore, 1988, p. 68). To claim, however, that the money 
supply is ‘demand-determined’ is to conflate three separate phenomena: the demand for 
credit; the demand for bank liabilities or credit money; and the demand and supply of base 
money. Much confusion in the endogenous money literature stems from the failure to 
maintain clear distinction between credit and credit money (Rochon, 1997, p. 281). First, 
the demand for credit relies on the credit worthiness of the borrower and the cost of 
borrowing specified by the banks. Without a pre-arranged line of credit, any attempt by a 
borrower to obtain credit will not necessarily be satisfied by the banking system (Dow, 
1996; Kahn, 1954, p. 254; Wray, 1992b). Instead, credit restrictions are applied based on 
factors other than the prevailing rate of interest, and such quantitative limits mean that there 
is ‘normally a fringe of unsatisfied borrowers’ (Keynes, 1930b, p. 365).  
Second, the demand and automatic supply of credit via an overdraft leads to equivalent 
creation of bank credit money, which is accepted as a medium of exchange, and becomes 
‘convenience lending’ to the banking system (Moore, 1988). Since money is always 
accepted in exchange, Moore (2001, p. 18) asserts that the ‘general acceptability of money 
in exchange is independent of the subjective value of the real services-in-kind on money 
balances, whether this is expressed as an own rate of return, or as the opportunity cost of 
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holding money balances.’ Ignoring the demand for bank deposits, however, renders 
endogeneity theory a form of ‘reverse monetarism’, in which depositors are willing to hold 
whatever amount of money the banking system creates (Bibow, 2001, p. 606). The willing 
acceptance of money does not necessarily imply a desire to hold money (Arestis & Howells, 
1996). Recall the distinction between the flow value of money and its stock value (see 
Section 7.2). Money can be created, on demand, to meet the needs of trade, but it does not 
necessarily follow that the residual stock of money is optimal (Goodhart, 1989, 1991; 
Howells, 1995, 1997).  
The question of whether bank money is a ‘hot potato’ itself reveals a vision of the demand 
for money as the simple transposition of the supply curve of commodities viewed through 
the lens of classical exchange and perfect barter (Moore, 2001, p. 17). Confusion in the 
endogenous money literature about the possibility of an excess supply of deposits created 
by endogenous money overlooks the important point that banks must pay market interest 
rates on their non-money term deposits (see Section 4.4). The endogeneity of bank money 
stems from the banking system’s commitment to convertibility into state or central bank 
money. Convertibility is managed by the interest rates banks pay on non-convertible 
liabilities with ‘the rate of interest as being determined by the interplay of the terms on 
which the public desires to become more or less liquid and those on which the banking 
system is ready to become more or less unliquid’ (Keynes, 1937c, p. 666).  
Crucially, Moore (1988, p. xiii, n. 9, original emphasis) states that ‘for analytical purposes 
the credit money supply must be broadly defined as all liabilities of financial institutions 
issuing transactions deposits.’ This definition of credit money includes non-convertible, 
and hence non-money, deposits bearing a market rate of interest matching the supply and 
demand of all funding sources (Kaldor & Trevithick, 1981, p. 13). Similarly, Kaldor (1982, 
p. 46, original emphasis) asserts that an excess supply of credit money ‘could never come 
into existence’, since ‘banks provide easy facilities to their customers for switching 
balances on current accounts into interest-bearing deposit accounts, or vice versa’ (Kaldor, 
1982, p. 14). There cannot be a surplus of bank money, since if 
…more money comes into existence than the public, at the given or expected level 
of incomes or expenditures, wishes to hold, the excess will be automatically 
extinguished – either through debt repayment or its conversion into interest bearing 
assets – in a way in which gold could not be made to disappear from existence 
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merely because particular persons find they have too much of it. (Kaldor, 1982, p. 
22, original emphasis) 
Excess money deposits are converted into non-money deposits by means of the adjustment 
of deposit interest rates as part of liability management (Lavoie, 1999). The non-money 
deposit rate must satisfy the public’s preferred mix of demand and term deposits. The 
overall cost of funds is determined by the banking system’s behaviour with regard to their 
preferred mix of monetary and non-monetary deposits—the liquidity preference of the 
banking system. The demand curve for depositors is therefore upward sloping in interest-
money space (Moore, 1988, p. 61). If loan interest rates are set as a mark-up over funding 
costs, then the issuance of credit money depends on ‘the interest rate charged for bank loans 
and the corresponding interest rate paid on bank deposits’ (Moore, 1988, p. 20).  
Third, with regard to the demand and supply of base money, the extension of the 
endogeneity principle to state or central bank money is more problematic. The difficulty is 
that, for some observers, it is self-evident that the ‘community cannot get rid of its currency 
supply’ (Tobin, 1963, p. 415). The evidence for this view stems from a misrepresentation 
of the gold standard applied to fiat money, whereby it is mistakenly believed that the supply 
of money under a gold standard is determined by the supply of gold. As seen in Section 
3.4, the money supply is also endogenous under a gold exchange standard (Glasner, 1985; 
Rochon & Rossi, 2013). As established in Chapter 3, all money—including fiat money—
is credit and therefore has the ability to be extinguished via reflux or final finance. For 
example, the current practices of managing a fiat currency are derived from the practices 
used to manage a gold standard. Under a gold standard, the value of money is determined 
by the value of gold, but the preservation of this link to gold is performed by Bank Rate, 
which provides the reflux mechanism required to maintain sufficient reserves of gold. This 
Bank Rate framework now provides the practical anchor for fiat money. 
Although fiat money appears irredeemable, it can be refluxed by various means. Central 
bank operations require short-term asset purchases and sales, all of which mature and 
provide opportunities for banks to adjust the amount of reserves they hold. Banks can refuse 
to sell or repo assets to the central bank during open-market operations thereby preventing 
the creation of new fiat money. At the end of the repo term, banks can return the central 
bank reserves and receive the asset. The central bank must then re-conduct all maturing 
repo agreements to maintain its monetary policy stance. Any reluctance on the part of banks 
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to enter new repo agreements would be a form of reflux—a preference for assets rather than 
central bank reserves. The central bank must remove reserves from the banking system 
when its policy rate has fallen below target. As long as central banks target interest rates as 
their policy, reflux mechanisms must exist and fiat money must be redeemable. 
When fiat money is understood as an evolution of money once convertible to gold, and 
always managed by way of Bank Rate, it is not difficult to see that the central bank’s 
management framework has not changed. The amount of fiat money in existence is based 
on that which is demanded at the particular level of Bank Rate, in exchange for the 
appropriate collateral. The value of fiat money, which is no longer pegged to a commodity, 
is less obvious. Once the control of the broad money supply by means of the base money 
supply is rejected, the causal link between price inflation and base money is rejected as 
well. Nevertheless, when a central bank adopts an inflation-targeting regime, the public can 
anticipate central bank policy and the expected future path of interest rates is in some sense 
‘known’ or endogenous. 
The more contentious claims of money endogeneity concern the degree of freedom that 
central banks have to set their policy rate. Unlike New Keynesian models, with integrated 
Taylor rules (see Section 6.3), post-Keynesian models allow the central bank to set the rate 
of interest anywhere within a broad range (Moore, 1988, p. 266) with a variety of 
recommended policy rules (Rochon & Setterfield, 2007). This freedom of manoeuvre can 
be justified empirically by the near-zero, or even negative, rate policies enacted by many 
central banks since the GFC (Rochon & Rossi, 2013, p. 212) and supported theoretically 
by a rejection of both the Wicksellian natural rate of interest and the neutrality of money 
(Rogers, 2006a). Endogenous money theory contends that the interest rate is the central 
bank’s policy instrument, even if this lever is applied by controlling access to base money.  
The central bank’s policy rate is exogenous in the control sense (Wray, 1992b, 2006) and 
somewhat exogenous in the theoretical sense because the central bank is free to choose its 
own reaction function. For example, with constant expectations, the traditional LM curve 
in interest-money space can be visualised as being horizontal at the central bank’s policy 
rate. Over a longer time-horizon, and if the central bank reaction function is defined in 
terms of the base money supply, the LM curve could be conceivably be represented as 
upward sloping, without violating the principles of endogenous money (Fontana, 2004; 
Wray, 2007). Without considering the implications of the time-frame of the analysis, the 
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‘horizontalist’ or ‘accommodationist’ view can appear to be at odds with the more long-
term ‘structuralist’ view (Dow, 1996). 
Endogenous money theory, like the theory of liquidity preference, explains that interest 
rates are determined independently of the income generating process and therefore ‘do not 
necessarily increase during economic expansions’ (Rochon, 1997, p. 277). Central banks 
do, however, have the ability to adjust their policy interest rate a level that ‘replicates the 
classical results’ to balance saving and investment (Moore, 2001, p. 28). The fact that Bank 
Rate is the policy lever has complications for the theory of liquidity preference. The 
banking system does not need to be a passive participant in the process of bank money 
determination. In the face of weakening credit demand banks can try to maintain their 
profits by purchasing non-loan securities to maintain their balance-sheet size. Bibow (2000; 
2001) identifies active balance-sheet management as a form of exogenous money in the 
sense that it is neither under the control of the central bank or the public, but is determined 
by bank behaviour. Significantly, if banks were to maintain a constant money stock in the 
face of falling economic activity, then the ‘real balance effect’ (Patinkin, 1965), ‘Keynes 
effect’ (Cottrell, 1994a) or ‘Keynes mechanism’ (Bibow, 2000, 2001) would move interest 
rates in the direction predicted by the loanable funds theory (Bibow, 2001, p. 607, n. 1). 
This effect is contingent on the behaviour of the banking system and is therefore by no 
means an automatic effect (Bibow, 2001, p. 610). In responding to a recession-induced rise 
in liquidity preference by the public, banks would have to raise their term deposit rates to 
maintain their target liquidity ratio (Wray, 1992b, p. 304). Consequent rises in loan rates 
would deter new lending and lower the stock of bank money. Any Keynes or real balance 
effect would be undermined.  
Many post-Keynesians (Moore, 1988; Rochon, 1997) argue that the endogeneity of money 
undermines, or at least necessitates a reinterpretation of, Keynes’s theory of liquidity 
preference, with the short rate exogenously determined by central bank policy and long 
rates derived from expectations of future central bank policy (Moore, 1988, p. 259; Moore, 
1994, p. 122). As seen in Section 8.5, the expectations theory of longer-term interest rates 
lacks empirical support and is indeed inconsistent with liquidity preference.  
The endogenous money approach rightly emphasizes that monetary policy sets the 
short-term rate of interest, thereby influencing effective demand and potential 
growth – the neutrality of money argument is never taken seriously in Post 
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Keynesian models. But little is said about how setting the short-term rate relates to 
financial markets and interest rates in general (other than “mark-ups”). Banks 
appear strangely passive in this approach and liquidity does not seem to play any 
significant role, while little is said about policy communication either. (Bibow, 
2009, p. 28) 
The recognition of liquidity preference as a theory of asset pricing, and not a description of 
the demand for money, provides avenues for its reconciliation with endogenous money 
(Brown, 2003; Chick & Dow, 2002; Smithin, 2017). As such, the theory of endogenous 
money can be viewed as both a complement and an extension of Keynes’s theory of 
liquidity preference. Coupled with the insights of money endogeneity, liquidity preference 
provides a theoretically sound and practical alternative to the theory of loanable funds (see 
Section 6.2) as a guide to monetary policy (Bibow, 2005; Tily, 2006). Whereas the 
Wicksellian notion of the natural rate of interest is deficient: 
…the liquidity preference theory of interest is plainly a piece of pure logic, filling 
the gap, but in itself leaving some important questions unanswered. In particular, 
the liquidity preference theory of interest neither explains why the general public’s 
propensity to hoard is what it is any time, nor why the banking system provides a 
certain amount of liquidity at any time, and neither more nor less. (Bibow, 2001, 
p. 611, original emphasis) 
Central banks ‘set the overnight rate’ but not the ‘interest rates which liquidity preference 
theory is concerned with’ (Bibow, 2001, p. 606). The theory of liquidity preference explains 
the premium between long- and short-term rates, and the short rate itself is determined by 
the relationship between bills and the ‘active transactions balances’ of money required to 
satisfy the medium of exchange function (Wells, 1983, p. 527). The clarity that Keynes 
fails to provide ‘between his basic proposition that the amount of money demanded is 
inversely dependent upon the rate of interest and the completely different proposition that 
the equilibrium rate of interest is inversely dependent upon the amount of money’ (Patinkin, 
1965, p. 372) is resolved by endogenous money theory. The amount of money supplied and 
demanded is dependent on the rate of interest, which is anchored by the central bank. 
That the central bank’s policy rate represents the marginal cost of bank funds (Moore, 1988, 
p. 59) is especially apparent in a channel system. As long as they have the required 
collateral, commercial banks are able to draw down their lines of credit at the central bank, 
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at the rate set by the central bank. The relationship between the commercial banks and the 
central bank is a mirror of that between the public and the commercial banks, just a step 
higher in the hierarchy of money. ‘The liquidity preference of the nonbank public can be 
satisfied by the stock of bank liabilities, while the liquidity preference of banks can be 
satisfied by high-powered money’ (Wray, 1992b, p. 301). For example, in a system based 
on the supply of reserves, if the central bank restricts the amount of reserves available to 
the banking system, banks will need to lengthen their deposit maturities to reduce their need 
for liquid reserves. By raising the rate of interest on term deposits, they encourage 
depositors to move out of demand deposits. This higher cost of funding increases loan rates, 
thus reducing the demand for credit, credit money and hence reserves. The banking system 
adjusts to a change in monetary policy by adjustments on both the demand and supply sides 
of credit. Because of the dependence of the supply of credit money on the demand for credit, 
rising interest rates have a tendency to reduce the money supply. 
The theories of liquidity preference and endogenous money are, to a certain extent, products 
of their time. To reconcile them requires placing them in their respective contexts in the 
evolution of the financial system. 
9.4 Evolution of Finance 
Both the theory of liquidity preference and endogenous money need significant re-
interpretation to maintain their consistency with the evolution of the financial system. To 
see this, consider the provision of price-protection assets under an ‘auto-economy’ 
compared with an ‘overdraft economy’ (Hicks, 1974). In the former access to liquidity 
depends on the ‘actual possession of liquid assets’ (Hicks, 1974, pp. 50-52), whereas in the 
latter, no liquid reserves are kept and liquidity is obtained on demand from banks (Hicks, 
1974, p. 54). Although a mixture of the two occurs in practice, Mehrling (2016) traces an 
evolution from a predominantly auto-economy, immediately post WWII, to a 
predominantly overdraft-economy, and labels the basis of each system as ‘Monetary 
Liquidity’ and ‘Funding Liquidity’, respectively.56 Mehrling (2016) then postulates that the 
                                                         
56 The re-use of terms from the taxonomy of liquidity in Chapter 5 adds the potential for confusion in this 
section. To avoid this confusion, Funding Liquidity and Market Liquidity, introduced here as the basis of 
monetary systems, will begin with capital letters. The elements of the taxonomy, funding liquidity and market 
liquidity, are in lower case. 
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development of the shadow banking system has heralded a new period, one based on 
‘Market Liquidity’, where asset sales or collateralised borrowing are the predominant 
means of accessing liquidity. Post GFC, the introduction of QE and financial regulatory 
reforms have led to a reversion to a system based on Monetary Liquidity, and the impotence 
of monetary policy in the post-war period, has reappeared. In addition, regulatory changes 
are reducing dealer balance-sheet capacity and, hence, market liquidity. 
Each monetary system evolved in response to the contemporary situation. In the system of 
Monetary Liquidity, the ‘private sector as a whole was plentifully supplied with financial 
assets and, in the early post-war years, was under little pressure to borrow in order to obtain 
funds’ (Radcliffe Committee, 1959, p. 15). The difficulties that the monetary authorities 
had in limiting credit expansion in the post-war Monetary Liquidity period were 
ameliorated by the transition to the Funding Liquidity period. After the post-war surplus of 
financial assets was reduced, a reliance on borrowed liquidity became the norm—a system 
based on Funding Liquidity and liability management (Moore, 1988, pp. 26-36). The 
‘Keynesian’ interpretation of monetary policy ineffectiveness was replaced by the power 
of the banking system using Funding Liquidity under an overdraft system (Hicks, 1974, p. 
56; Jefferis, 2017), a power then undermined by the Market Liquidity system. Modern 
central bank channel systems align more closely with a Funding Liquidity system and the 
overdraft economy (see Section 4.6), in which the endogeneity of money is more clearly 
displayed. 
The monetary literature often assumes that the banking system is based on Monetary 
Liquidity, either in theory (Patinkin, 1965) or historically (Hicks, 1974, p. 55). Just so, some 
post-Keynesian authors identify monetary exogeneity in historical periods where 
commodity money, and not credit money, supposedly prevailed (Chick, 1992; Moore, 
1988; Rogers, 1989). Chick (1992) describes hypothetical stages in the evolution of the 
banking system, beginning with Stage 1 where banks are simply repositories of the public’s 
savings in state money. Stages 2 and 3 broadly correspond with Monetary Liquidity, and 
Funding Liquidity is realised in Stage 4. The more recent development of Market Liquidity 
is not represented in Chick’s framework. In this ‘evolutionary view’, then, the endogeneity 
of money is a recent phenomenon made possible by central bank support and financial 
innovation. This study, however, has adopted the ontological view that all money is credit 
(see Chapter 3), and no such concession is necessary. Instead, the credit nature of money 
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supports the ‘revolutionary view’ that money is endogenous both logically and historically 
(Rochon & Rossi, 2013, p. 216). The evolutionary view suffers from the ‘loanable funds 
fallacy that savings deposited with banks may somehow disappear in the banking system’ 
(Bibow, 2001, pp. 605-606). 
The theory of liquidity preference was primarily developed to interpret a system of 
Monetary Liquidity. The precautionary motive, for which liquid assets are held, 
corresponds most closely to Monetary Liquidity. The theory can also be used to interpret 
the subsequent phases. The reliance on funding liquidity and the commonplace access to 
overdrafts, lines of credit, and credit cards have reduced the need for dedicated balances of 
cash to satisfy either the transactions or precautionary motives. For any level of economic 
activity, the amount of money required to satisfy these motives has fallen. Two phenomena, 
more prevalent in the modern environment, affect the interpretation of liquidity preference 
by operating in conflicting ways on the motives for holding cash balances. One relates to 
the increasing availability of liquidity via overdrafts, the other concerns the rate of interest 
paid on liquid assets.  
First, the increasing prevalence of overdrafts and credit cards is a challenge to the motives 
for liquidity preference, which  
…partly depend on the cheapness and the reliability of methods of obtaining cash, 
when it is required, by some form of temporary borrowing, in particular by 
overdraft or its equivalent. For there is no necessity to hold idle cash to bridge over 
intervals if it can be obtained without difficulty at the moment when it is actually 
required. (Keynes, 1936, p. 196) 
The strength of the transactions and precautionary motives depends on institutional 
arrangements: if money creation is ‘demand driven’ then these two motives are 
significantly weakened. To understand the implications requires an analysis of the supply 
of liquidity by the banking system, since the confidence that agents have in this source of 
funds determines the strength of the transaction and precautionary motives. This 
confidence, which will vary with systematic factors, will become difficult to distinguish 
from changes in the discount factor stemming from the speculative motive in a crisis.  
Second, it is now common for deposits at commercial banks and central banks to have non-
zero rates of interest. This phenomenon presents a counter-effect, for ‘[i]f deposit interest 
195 
 
is earned or if bank charges are avoided by holding cash, this decreases the cost and 
strengthens the motive [for holding transactions and precautionary balances]’ (Keynes, 
1936, p. 196). If liquidity is readily available then there is a disincentive to hold liquidity 
balances, but this disincentive is offset by the reduced opportunity cost of the non-zero rate 
of interest paid on liquid hoards. 
Going further, however, the shadow banking system, with its reliance on market liquidity, 
has prompted a subsequent reinterpretation of central bank operations. The innovation of 
the shadow banking system has increased the strength of the speculative motive. As the 
reliance on funding liquidity has shifted to market liquidity, so has the nature of the 
backstop that the central bank must offer. Central banks have morphed from lender of last 
resort to dealer of last resort: the ultimate provider of, not funding liquidity, but market 
liquidity (Mehrling, 2011). Similarly, the ultimate backstop to the international system of 
Monetary Liquidity, the IMF (Hicks, 1974, p. 55, n. 14), has been replaced by a network of 
central bank currency swap lines (Mehrling, 2015), each providing overdraft or Funding 
Liquidity to the international system. 
As discussed in Section 8.1, Keynes’s speculative motive for liquidity relies on an 
organised market. One such organised market is the one maintained by the active monetary 
management of the central bank. The central bank sets the rate of interest as a dealer in 
central bank money and this rate, compared to each individual bank’s safe rate, determines 
the amount that the central bank must provide: ‘the banking system and the monetary 
authority are dealers in money and debts and not in assets or consumables’ (Keynes, 1936, 
p. 205). Without this automatic provision of central bank reserves, as, for example, under 
a gold standard, the precautionary motive and the holding of actual reserves would be the 
more prevalent form of liquidity management. 
If the central bank restricts this organised market to short-term bonds only, then the interest 
rates on long-term bonds are market determined. The central bank could extend their market 
making to bonds of all maturities, as was attempted in the immediate post-war period (Tily, 
2006). If the intention were to push the rate of interest on longer bonds below the ‘safe’ 
level, then the result could be that the public refuses to own the longer bonds at all. The 
long-term rate ‘may be more recalcitrant when once it has fallen to a level which, on the 
basis of past experience and present expectations of future monetary policy, is considered 
“unsafe” by representative opinion’ (Keynes, 1936, p. 203, original emphasis). For 
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example, under a gold standard the ‘safe’ level of interest is given by the rate prevailing in 
the international market, and a domestic rate that deviates too much from this level will be 
‘viewed with a justifiable lack of confidence’ (Keynes, 1936, p. 203). In the end, ‘the 
monetary authority would have lost effective control over the rate of interest’ with the result 
that ‘the public authority itself could borrow through the banking system on an unlimited 
scale at a nominal rate of interest’ (Keynes, 1936, p. 207).  
This picture conjures up images of the present practice of QE, but there are important 
differences. First, in conducting QE, the authorities have not declared a target rate of 
interest; they have generally declared a target amount (in monetary terms) of purchases. 
This has left a degree of uncertainty in the market as to what the interest rate should be, and 
has, to a certain extent, undermined the policy itself. Second, the picture Keynes paints is 
of a market whereby ownership of financial assets has been transferred in its entirety onto 
the balance sheet of the monetary authorities because the public prefers cash or bank 
liabilities. Since all trading in interest-bearing assets has effectively ceased, the interest rate 
is undefined. What is not clear in this analysis is the effect on equities and other types of 
financial asset. Under QE, on the other hand, there still appears to be a public preference 
for non-cash assets, or, more precisely, the public does not have the option of eliminating 
interest-bearing assets from its portfolio, as it would in under an entirely exogenous interest 
rate policy setting. 
If, however, the central bank were to stand ready to buy and sell all government bonds at 
fixed yields, then there would be complete certainty as to the future rate of interest. It would 
be tempting to conclude that the theory of liquidity preference would predict that, without 
uncertainty, the rate of interest would fall to zero. With complete certainty as to future sale 
prices of bond holdings, there would be no need to hold a money asset. Instead, the rate of 
interest would be fixed by the central bank, and the public would request money on demand 
for purchases and then reflux any remaining balances for bonds. In the absence of 
‘uncertainty about the future rates of interest...the propensity to hoard...will always be zero 
in equilibrium’ (Keynes, 1936, pp. 208-209): a Walrasian general equilibrium. Thus, 
liquidity preference can determine the rate of interest ‘even if “idle money” were zero’ 
(Robertson, 1940, p. 12). ‘In the light of Keynes’s theory, society faces a choice of interest 
rates’ (Chick & Tily, 2014, p. 697, original emphasis). 
This portrayal of the central bank as a dealer in an arbitrary variety of bonds should be 
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connected to the ontological view of money as credit. The ability of the central bank to 
establish administered prices in a range of assets and interest rates is an important 
supporting argument in favour of a view that the central bank is in effect purchasing 
financial assets with its own credit, although the determination of the value of this credit 
has not been established. A policy of unlimited two-way open-market operations would 
have an effect on the value of the central bank credit. At the time of writing, the Bank of 
Japan has a target yield on ten-year Japanese Government Bonds of 0%, and many central 
banks (European Central Bank, Bank of Japan, Sveriges Riksbank) have negative interest 
rate policies (NIRP) on commercial bank reserves. The NIRP (see Section 6.3) shows that 
central banks can affect, not only the interest rate in the interbank market, but also the 
holding cost of central bank reserves. In Keynes’s expression for the total return of assets 
(see Section 8.2), negative interest rates are the carrying cost associated with reserves, with 
the implication that, if the carrying cost outweighed the Keynesian abstract liquidity 
premium, then they would cease to be monetary. 
The very existence of the shadow banking system, with its version of liquidity creation, 
raises questions about the idea that central banks have an unlimited ability to create money. 
In positing exogenous interest rates, endogenous money theorists appear to be asserting that 
central banks have no restrictions on money creation. In practice, however, good quality 
collateral must be exchanged for all central bank money created (Bagehot, 1873); ‘it is 
characteristic of modern systems that the central bank is ready to buy for money at a 
stipulated rate of discount any quantity of securities of certain approved types’ (Keynes, 
1930b, p. 211). Unless they are willing to expose themselves to credit risk, central banks 
do not create money ex nihilo—in practice, collateral is required, although the central bank 
can vary the quality of the collateral. Thus, endogenous money theorists may make too 
much of the lender of last resort (LOLR) aspect of a central bank’s role, banks may have 
an insufficient amount of good quality collateral, once necessary haircuts are applied:  
When the Bank of England lent to Northern Rock in 2007, it was possible to predict 
when the LOLR assistance would reach its maximum limit. The limit was duly 
reached on the date predicted and the government had to take over the financing of 
the bank and the associated credit risk. (King, 2016, p. 205) 
Endogenous money theory requires substantial modification when it is appreciated that 
central banks require collateral as part of their money creation. The innovation or important 
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insight is the function of collateral. To understand the importance of collateral, we need to 
consider the implications of synthetic finance. 
The process of bank money creation is an example of a synthetic financial instrument with 
no endogenous supply constraints (see Section 8.6). The bank and the borrower together 
create a new synthetic financial asset satisfying the basic property of exchange, namely the 
‘realization of a symmetry between the economic object and its image of value as money’ 
(Lozano, 2015, p. 2, original emphasis). In this case, the economic objects in question are 
credit and bank money, and the image of value is measured in the unit of account. Synthetic 
financial exchange can be achieved by any conceivable credit and cash flow structure, with 
the only restriction that it must satisfy the symmetry of exchange measured in the unit of 
account. For synthetic financial instruments, it is the ‘process of the exchange itself which 
constitutes the asset, rather than the exchange constituting the process by which some pre-
existing assets are exchanged’ (Lozano, 2015, p. 47, original emphasis). The simultaneous 
creation of a loan and deposit, whereby the deposit itself is money, follows the insight that 
banking is the creation of synthetic financial instruments, in other words, the exchange of 
IOUs or a derivative security over central bank money (see Section 4.6).  
A rejection of the commodity view of money frees the analysis from the restrictions of 
classical exchange, whereby a money object must be involved in the immediate settlement 
or payment of the exchange. The idea that money is a singular commodity-like object 
through which all exchange must be facilitated is ontologically inaccurate. Instead, the 
tenure of generic or synthetic financial instruments is not limited to immediate settlement, 
as it is in classical or barter exchange (see Section 8.6). This loosening of settlement horizon 
opens the way for credit as an independent phenomenon: 
There is virtually no relationship between the legal transaction in which a buyer 
agrees to pay a certain amount to a seller, in return for an asset owned by the seller 
or services to be provided by the seller, and the settlement of the transaction in the 
form of one or more cash flows. (Black, 1970a, p. 3) 
This ‘extension of the time-horizon of tenure’ (Lozano, 2015, p. 24), made possible by 
generic and synthetic finance, provides a clear ontological distinction from the Arrow-
Debreu model of complete futures contracts with payments settled and cleared at the 
beginning of time. Once this Walrasian classical exchange restriction is removed, a 
synthetic universe of future settlement contracts opens, revealing an avenue to the 
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fundamental analysis of credit and liquidity. When exchange can be achieved by credit, the 
tenure of settlement spans an entirely new temporal spectrum of contracts, denominated in 
the unit of account, relating to the expected delivery of payment, not the delivery of the 
commodity. By removing the ‘invariance requirement on tenure’ of immediate settlement, 
entirely new risks appear, since ‘the properties of maturity and interest rate now 
differentiate themselves, and the image of the value of the object is free to grow or shrink 
over the time-horizon of the exchange’ (Lozano, 2015, p. 3). Interest rates, as a truly 
monetary phenomenon, only appear with generic financial instruments (Lozano, 2015, p. 3 
& p. 126). 
The evolution of finance is a historical process that aligns with the expanding ontological 
sets of classical, generic, and synthetic assets. As Jefferis (2017) argues, seemingly 
successful explanations of one crisis, such as Minsky’s ‘Financial Instability Hypothesis’ 
(Minsky, ([1986] 2008, p. 194), are merely descriptions of the particular historical episode, 
but do not explain the historical process that leads to them. Instead, Jefferis argues that the 
process of constructing and calculating the risk of new financial products creates the 
illusion of new liquidity. Liquidity crises appear as a reflexive failure of risk calculations 
because liquidity dynamics are ‘immanent and appear through constructive processes 
associated with the arbitrage and commensuration of financial risks’ (Jefferis, 2017, p. 91). 
The unrecognised and poorly understood expansion of the ontological set to include 
synthetic finance creates a history of epistemological problems. 
The ability of synthetic finance to decompose and redistribute risks in practice stumbles on 
the issue of collateral. The decoupling of exchange and settlement opens the door to new 
forms of risk as the image value of money embedded in generic financial instruments 
acquires the ability change over the maturity period. The introduction of the suite of 
valuation adjustments (known collectively as XVA) into asset pricing is a development, 
while at odds with the Arrow-Debreu complete markets paradigm, that attempts to mitigate 
these new risks and recognise the practical significance of collateral and funding costs (see 
Section 7.4).57  
                                                         
57 Black (1970a) repeatedly stresses that successful risk separation would require collateral but does not 
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The importance of collateral can be seen in the conceptual framework used by Mehrling 
(2012) to understand the fledgling ‘market-based credit system’.58 The framework 
comprises a Capital Funding Bank, a Global Money Dealer, an Asset Manager and a 
Derivatives Dealer, as stylised actors in the risk decomposition of an asset in accordance 
with the principles of synthetic finance. The Asset Manager adopts the risk for the entire 
system by means of credit and interest rate derivatives contracted with the Capital Funding 
Bank, intermediated by the Derivatives Dealer. As a ‘mirror image’ of the Asset Manager, 
the Capital Funding Bank holds the underlying asset stripped of its risk and raises funds in 
the short-term money market via the Global Money Dealer, using the de-risked asset as 
collateral. All participants are secured from counterparty risk, and hence insolvency, by 
these collateral flows.59 Any asset-price losses suffered by the Capital Funding Bank, which 
would otherwise cause funding difficulties as the value of its collateral falls below its 
borrowings, are filled by the collateral posted by the Asset Manager, via the Derivatives 
Dealer, to cover the offsetting gains on its derivatives. Collateral is the key ingredient to 
mitigate any temporary liquidity issues that underlie the transfer and pricing of risk, but 
permanent losses must be met with money payments. A failure in collateral flows leads to 
liquidity, but not solvency, problems. Nevertheless, the reliance on collateral in the market-
based credit system means that any imperfections can lead to a ‘downward liquidity spiral’ 
(Mehrling, 2012, p. 111), where funding problems cause asset fire sales, which lead to more 
funding problems (see also Brunnermeier & Pedersen, 2009). 
The ontological recognition that risk and cash flow are not intrinsic properties of an asset 
implies that the same conclusion can be made for liquidity. The endogenous availability of 
money from the central bank implies a view of liquidity abundance, but the post-GFC 
response to the shadow banking system, with its provision of market-based credit and 
liquidity, shows that collateral must play a theoretically more significant role in resolving 
                                                         
develop the idea. 
58 See also Mehrling et al. (2013) and Pozsar (2014) for similar frameworks. 
59 Taken to the limit, where all credit risk is mitigated by collateral, we could conceive of a state of moneyless 
pure exchange with immediate settlement and therefore a role for the Walrasian auctioneer. The vision is 
undermined by the practical difficulties of collateral valuation and haircut determination and the hidden 
assumption of perfect market liquidity. 
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the uncertainty introduced by synthetic finance.  
9.5 Summary 
Post-Keynesian monetary theory explicitly considers the role of the banking system in the 
operation of an economy in which liquidity and money have a fundamental place. The credit 
nature of money is recognised and essential to both the theory of the monetary circuit and 
the theory of endogenous money. The theory of the monetary circuit describes the process 
of bank money creation and destruction and its essential function in the production and sale 
of goods and services. The relationship between the financial system and saving by the non-
bank public is consistent with the ontological view that money is credit. The circuit theory 
applies specifically to traditional banking and needs to be updated to explain 
financialisation and the shadow banking system. 
Endogenous money theory extends the circuit theory to include a role for the central bank 
and an explanation for the determination of the rate of interest. Given a pre-arranged line 
of credit, credit money can be created at the discretion of the borrower, who has a financial 
option to draw on a source of bank credit at the interest-rate terms agreed when the line of 
credit was extended. It follows that bank credit is demand-determined and credit money is 
created automatically.  
The limits to pure-credit monetary expansion are less clear in post-Keynesian monetary 
theory. An appeal to the central bank’s interest-rate policy or the state of trade is an 
insufficient basis for understanding the potential supply of liquidity. Both the active (rather 
than passive) nature of the banking system in moving liquidity provision outside traditional 
bank channels and the importance of collateral in the world of synthetic finance are areas 
that challenge central ideas of money endogeneity. Rather than rejecting the theory of 
liquidity preference, it should be seen as extending endogenous money theory into the realm 
of asset pricing. Overall, the post-Keynesian literature provides important insights into the 
operation of a credit-money system and its relationship with liquidity that are developed 
further in the next chapter when we synthesise theoretical elements from both Real and 




Part V Synthesis 
The assessment of Wicksellian and Walrasian general equilibrium models, within the 
context of the taxonomy of liquidity put forward in this study, has revealed the limited 
applicability of Real Analysis to the analysis of liquidity. The axiom of monetary neutrality 
means that neither liquidity nor money has a fundamental place in Real Analysis. Similarly, 
interest rates in Real Analysis are represented by proxies that only partially aligned with 
phenomena observed in reality. Instead, liquidity and money are introduced as frictions that 
delay the realisation of the inevitable general equilibrium. The preordained fixed point of 
convergence provided by the general equilibrium introduces a further weakness that 
uncertainty reduces over time, as the effects of financial frictions dissipate and the long-
run general equilibrium asserts itself. In actuality, the further the time horizon, the more 
uncertain is our knowledge of the potential outcomes. 
Nevertheless, modern financial theory and practice have recognised and engaged with the 
ontological realisation that risk is not a fundamental property of an asset; risk can be 
transformed, separated, and transferred. This separation of risk, cash flow and asset 
ownership has equally significant implications for the ontology and analysis of liquidity: 
liquidity also cannot be an intrinsic property of an asset. Nevertheless, without a complete 
treatment of liquidity, the otherwise-insightful consumption asset-pricing model cannot 
directly inform the analysis of liquidity. 
The investigation of theories associated with Monetary Analysis has revealed two further 
insights. First, Keynes’s theory of liquidity preference warrants a significant 
reinterpretation in light of the taxonomy of liquidity outlined in this study. This taxonomy 
has allowed the principles of liquidity preference to be clarified and its place as a theory of 
the rate of interest restored. Liquidity preference expresses the trade-off between assets 
with price-protection and those relying on market liquidity, with the rate of interest 
determined by the uncertainty associated with the proceeds of asset sales in organised 
markets. 
Second, the theories of the monetary circuit and endogenous money engage directly with 
the operation of credit money and describe essential features of the financial system at 
particular points during its evolution. Once each is placed in its particular context, 
generalisations can be made and apparent conflicts between the theories of liquidity 
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preference, endogenous money and the monetary circuit can be resolved. 
In Part V, elements of both Real and Monetary Analysis are combined to construct a 





10 A Conceptual Framework for a Theory of Liquidity 
10.1 Introduction 
The economics and finance literature displays conceptual dissonance in its treatment of 
liquidity and money. This dissonance warrants an investigation into the relationship 
between liquidity and money in the literature so that their ontological features can be 
identified and organised into a conceptual framework. The aim of this research is to develop 
a deeper understanding of liquidity and money and to provide a framework for evaluating 
their fundamental causal relationships and tendencies. For this framework to have 
explanatory power and correspondence with reality, it is necessary for it to be built on a 
firm ontological platform and to satisfy realist criteria for both assumptions and predictions. 
Consequently, this study has established a firm ontological grounding for the analysis of 
liquidity and money. The rejection of the commodity view of money allows liquidity to 
occupy a financial dimension unavailable in the restricted realm of Real Analysis. This 
dimension is increased still further by considering credit money, in accordance with Innes 
(1913, 1914), as a more general concept than that allowed by the state theory of money. 
The realisation and acceptance that liquidity and money exist in a dynamic hierarchy of 
credit (Mehrling, 2013a) based on social relations (Beggs, 2012) are keystones for 
understanding their relationship and constructing a conceptual framework for a theory of 
liquidity. 
Also important are the ontological insights of generic and synthetic financial exchange 
(Lozano, 2015), which increase the understanding of risk and its transferability, and also 
the nature of liquidity itself. The troubled relationship between liquidity and money is 
evident in the difficulty in resolving the liquidity abundance view of finance and liquidity 
scarcity view of economics (Mehrling, 2000b). The key characteristic of money is that it 
can achieve balance-sheet clearing, and the interpretation of the theory of liquidity 
preference (Keynes, 1936) as an explanation of the trade-off between asset pricing and 
credit clearing reconciles this apparent tension.  
This chapter answers the two research questions posed in Section 1.2. The first section 
explores and clarifies the relationship between liquidity and money. Then, in the following 
sections, a conceptual framework for a theory of liquidity is constructed. 
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10.2 The Relationship Between Liquidity and Money 
Answering the first research question requires the clarification of the relationship between 
liquidity and money in the economics and finance literature and the identification of the 
flaws in this relationship. At the outset, it can be observed that the relationship is largely 
determined by the ontological view of money adopted. In many cases, the relationship is 
dominated by the mistreatment of money, which consequently restricts the number of forms 
of liquidity that can be represented. In the tradition of Real Analysis, the literature attempts 
to treat money, even in its fiat form, as a commodity. Money, by this reasoning, is the most 
liquidity commodity in that it is readily acceptable in exchange for any other commodity. 
The ontological justification for this treatment is weak, and a recognition of money’s credit 
nature changes its complexion and renders many aspects of monetary theory in Real 
Analysis defective. As a consequence, liquidity, which is fundamentally defined by its 
relation to money, tends to be assumed away or is limited by the ad hoc nature of the 
associated money object.  
The relationship between liquidity and money can be clarified by the insights of Black 
(1970a) that risk, being transferable, is not an intrinsic property of an asset and that the 
timing of cash flow is entirely separate from the moment of exchange. If all the risks 
associated with an asset can be transferred, the question arises as to where the property of 
liquidity resides; it cannot simply be an intrinsic property of an asset. Black’s insights also 
point to the existence of generic financial instruments which extend the tenure of exchange 
beyond the immediate settlement of pure or classical exchange (Lozano, 2015). Generic 
financial instruments introduce the property of maturity, and the risk of volatility in their 
value over this new temporal dimension brings with it a monetary rate of interest unrelated 
to intertemporal consumption preferences. Instead, the rate of interest represents a 
preference for the timing of cash flows decoupled from the risks and assets used to support 
the value of these future payments (see Section 9.4).  
Unlike pure exchange in neo-Walrasian theory, which is restricted to immediate settlement, 
generic financial exchange allows payments to take the form of credit promises at any point 
in the future (or past). The image of value as money that satisfies the symmetry of exchange 
can take the form of a cash flow promised for any time—past or future. The transfer price 
of risk established by standard valuation techniques is expressed in reality by a credit flow 
located in an entirely separate temporal dimension. Even under the assumption that these 
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credit promises are riskless (that is, expected to be paid with certainty), their extended 
exchange tenure means that the value of these generic financial instruments can change 
over their lifespan. This variation in value introduces risks not captured by the concept of 
a Walrasian auction conducted at the beginning of time. The dimension associated with 
payment or settlement cannot be represented in a system restricted to pure exchange or 
perfect barter, which maintains the invariance restriction on tenure associated with classical 
exchange.60 Real Analysis, therefore, disregards the real-world process of exchange 
whereby an asset or commodity is realised, or becomes perfectly liquid, in the form of its 
image of value as money. 
The lack of this temporal dimension, where liquidity is naturally represented, contributes 
to the deficient treatment of money and the rate of interest in neo-Walrasian general 
equilibrium models. Neo-Walrasian theory provides a means of determining relative value 
and, coupled with complete markets, introduces the concept of a risk-free asset with its 
return based on the ratio of prices of contingent claims. The combination of perfect market 
liquidity and an asset paying a risk-free rate of interest dominates and obviates any need 
for a monetary asset. As a result, the neo-Walrasian paradigm encompasses the 
determination of relative values, but leaves liquidity, money, and interest rates unexplained. 
Removing the assumption of complete markets only partially undermines the theory since 
it can be reconstructed with dynamic trading and Rational Expectations. The assumption of 
perfect market (and funding) liquidity persists. 
Instead, the rate of interest is introduced into neo-Walrasian models by coupling the 
complete markets paradigm with the Wicksellian natural rate of interest, thus tying the risk-
free rate to the marginal productivity of capital. The model is extended still further to 
include the Fisherian theory of intertemporal consumption preferences. In Real Analysis, 
then, the real risk-free rate of interest is determined by time preference and the marginal 
productivity of capital. The framework is summarised by the Euler equation (6.6), which 
determines the representative agent’s optimum intertemporal consumption plan, given the 
assumption of the full employment of resources.  
It is evident, however, that the resulting frameworks suffer from deficiencies in their 
                                                         
60 The Real Bills doctrine can be interpreted as a practical attempt to enforce the restriction of classical 
exchange necessary for Real Analysis. 
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interpretation of liquidity and money. Neo-Walrasian theory crowds out any form of 
liquidity other than perfect market liquidity (Mehrling, 2011) and excludes money 
altogether (Rogers, 1989, 2014). Paradoxically, the attempt to treat money like a 
commodity leads to the non-monetary theory of neo-Walrasian general equilibrium 
founded on pure exchange. Pure exchange, in which all commodities are directly 
exchangeable for all other commodities, restricts money payment and settlement to an 
abstraction conducted at the beginning of time. The paradox is that the assumption of 
perfect market liquidity leaves no role for, not only credit or credit money, but also 
commodity money. 
The Walrasian auctioneer ensures that exchanges of credits denominated in the abstract unit 
of account represented by the numéraire are cleared at the beginning of time. In this way, 
the theory abstracts from the process of creating and clearing credits conducted by the 
banking system. Attempts to include money into such liquidity-free models then take ad 
hoc forms, such as: unspecified utility arising from liquidity; search or coordination 
frictions that cause illiquidity; transactions costs minimised by a spontaneously tradable 
commodity; or entirely cashless models. Instead of the banking system facilitating and 
enabling trade in the neo-Walrasian models, ‘financial frictions’ are introduced that reduce 
and restrict opportunities for trade. Liquidity morphs into illiquidity frictions (Rogers, 
2008a, 2014). Conceptual frameworks in the tradition of Real Analysis (Diamond & 
Dybvig, 1983; Holmström & Tirole, 1998; Tirole, 2008) represent ‘liquidity’ as losses due 
to production inefficiencies and interruptions, unrelated to money. Liquidity and money are 
represented by concepts that bear little resemblance to, or behavioural similarities with, 
their real-world counterparts. 
Furthermore, the Wicksellian natural rate of interest can only find theoretical justification 
in a world with a single commodity (Rogers, 1989). Imbalances between saving, investing 
and consuming a single commodity, say corn, can be rectified simply by consuming or 
planting. Perfect technological liquidity crowds out any other form of liquidity. Credit 
money does enter Wicksellian theory, but only to ensure price determinacy—an 
unnecessary safeguard when the solitary consumption good already acts as numéraire. The 
analysis of Wicksellian theory has shown that the productivity of the system can be aligned 
with any exogenous interest rate and should be abandoned as part of the theory of interest 
(see Section 6.2). Finally, in Fisherian interest rate theory and neo-Walrasian general 
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equilibrium, the supposed intertemporal characteristics introduced by time-dated 
commodities are no different from analysing commodities in different locations, so that the 
‘interest rates’ derived from the model are no more than the relative propensities to 
consume in different locations. The Wicksellian and Fisherian concepts only have validity 
in a single-commodity world. Furthermore, in a model with more than one consumption 
good or incomplete markets the anchor of the risk-free rate is lost. Without the risk-free 
rate, modern asset-pricing theory has no anchor, and the number of valid discount factors 
becomes infinite (see Section 6.6). 
The recognition that risk and cash flow are ontologically separate from assets is reflected 
in the widespread adoption of the complete markets paradigm for asset pricing. Asset 
pricing, based on the valuation of risks and the price of risk transfer, is consistent with this 
ontological principle, but is also constructed on the basis that all such risks have perfect 
market liquidity at their fundamental value. It is a paradigm without a place for liquidity. 
To understand liquidity, we must move beyond Real Analysis and introduce generic 
financial assets, which loosen the restriction of classical exchange and the immediate 
settlement inherent in pure-exchange models. Once the invariance requirement of tenure is 
removed, then cash flows and payments are decoupled from exchange and interest rates 
and credit risks appear naturally. Similarly, the role of a purely liquidity-derived discount 
factor, which expresses the liquidity premium derived from the theory of liquidity 
preference, becomes apparent. The fact that cash flows can be separated from assets and 
vary according to an entirely new temporal dimension introduces the need for the rate of 
interest to equalise the demand and supply for generic financial assets at each point on the 
maturity spectrum, to balance tenure preference.  
The behavioural factors behind these demand and supply curves, however, are those 
expressed in the theory of liquidity preference (Keynes, 1936), not loanable funds 
(Robertson, 1940). Money is credit, and the rate of interest is the cost of delaying 
settlement. With a credit view of money, it follows that the choice between holding money 
or bonds is not whether to invest or not, as it is in the loanable funds theory. Instead, it is 
the decision on how, or equivalently in what form, to invest. The social relationship 
underpinning money negates the idea that hoarding has the direct effect of rendering money 
unavailable for investment. The loanable funds theory, whereby a fixed stock of funds is 
either hoarded or available for investment, is a fallacy based on the erroneous commodity 
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view of money.  
The theory of liquidity preference fills this lacuna and permits the pure rate of interest to 
be determined in a dimension entirely missing from general equilibrium theory, which 
contends with value, but not cash flow or liquidity. Value and cash flow can be entirely 
separated, and this ontological observation points to a path to a reconciliation with general 
equilibrium theory, which limits itself to the utility of commodity exchange. By removing 
the QTM as an explanation of prices, and marginal productivity as an explanation of the 
rate of interest, general equilibrium models can be extended to include exchange tenure and 
hence liquidity. The stochastic discount factor must be derived from liquidity preferences, 
and then equilibrated with the intertemporal rate of substitution. 
Similarly, the theory of endogenous money (Lavoie, 1984, Moore, 1988) explains why the 
banking system is not physically constrained in its provision of money in the way necessary 
to restrict lending to the supply of loanable funds. In addition, the theory of the monetary 
circuit further illuminates the relationship between liquidity and money within the circular 
flow of income. Nevertheless, the banking system must manage its exposure to tenure 
preference; the liquidity mismatch generated in the banking system by the tenure preference 
of borrowers and lenders must be resolved by the complex of interest rates prevailing in the 
money market. It is not that interest rates equilibrate the supply of and demand for loanable 
funds, it is that they equilibrate borrowers’ and lenders’ preferences for length of exchange 
tenure. 
An explanation of and a distinction between liquid and illiquid forms of assets are missing 
from Real Analysis. A more promising avenue follows an investigation of the effect of 
liquidity on time preference. Also essential is an evaluation and selection of the aspects 
from the tradition of Real Analysis that make a valid contribution. We turn next to the 
construction of a conceptual framework to increase our understanding of liquidity. 
10.3 A Conceptual Framework 
The second research question asks whether it is possible to construct a conceptual 
framework for a theory of liquidity that can guide future research. The recognition that the 
tenure of exchange can expand to allow for more than immediate settlement transforms the 
understanding of both liquidity and money. Delayed settlement, which manifests itself in 
the form of generic financial assets, introduces credit at a fundamental level. Money appears 
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in many forms as part of a dynamic credit hierarchy and its social-relational aspect comes 
to the fore. The result is a structure and dimension of payments vastly beyond that embraced 
by models based on pure exchange and commodity utility that take the focus in Real 
Analysis.  
Once it is recognised that money is a social relation that always has a debt counterpart and 
is exposed to the potential operation of the reflux mechanism (Lavoie, 1999), it follows 
logically that holding money is an asset allocation decision, and that Keynes’s two-asset 
model is a valuable pedagogical device for representing the resulting liquidity dichotomy. 
This dichotomy, which bears superficial resemblance to the distinctions between inside and 
outside liquidity, and between public and private liquidity, can be visualised as two forms 
of financial put option, categorised according to the nature of the liquidity supplied by 
dealers or financial put option writers. Inside/outside liquidity and public/private liquidity, 
as discussed in Section 5.6, inherit too much from their association with inside and outside 
money, with their undue emphasis on state money. The reduction of emphasis and 
placement of state money in a hierarchy of credit allows for a more far-reaching study of 
liquidity. Instead, this liquidity dichotomy takes central place in the conceptual framework 
presented here as a distinction between exchange liquidity and redemption liquidity. 
The dichotomy between exchange and redemption liquidity builds on the ontological 
insights of generic financial exchange (Lozano, 2015). The property of maturity and 
extended tenure in exchange, allows monetary settlement to be entirely independent from 
contractual and physical exchange. This dimension, missing from much of the literature on 
liquidity and money, is governed by the behavioural characteristics underlying tenure 
preference, and allows for a realistic introduction of the rate of interest. The basic property 
of tenure in generic exchange undermines theories of the rate of interest in the tradition of 
Real Analysis. Cash flows are independent from the time of exchange and, therefore, 
consumption itself, and so the monetary rate of interest cannot represent a Fisherian trade-
off between consumption in the present and the future. 
More important, liquidity is the product of this structure and dimension of payments and 
the dynamic interaction with the tenure of exchange. The loosening of the tenure of 
exchange, so that payment for a commodity exchanged today is decoupled from the 
moment of exchange and is pushed into an uncertain future, allows for the independence of 
cash flows from the utility of consumption and the productivity of production. 
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Consumption today can be supported by commitments to payments in the future, at the 
maturity of a generic financial asset that satisfies the required image of the commodity’s 
value in the unit of account. This generical financial asset, which only provides guaranteed 
liquid value at maturity, imposes a liquidity restriction on its owner. The owner, in a desire 
to break this contractual tenure, must appeal to the asset’s exchange value, and this value 
is vulnerable to the conditions prevailing at the moment of sale. The acceptable tenure of 
exchange—longer for buyers and shorter for sellers—depends on the balance of 
preferences for guaranteed redemption liquidity versus uncertain exchange liquidity. These 
are behavioural drivers independent of intertemporal consumption plans or production 
possibility frontiers; they are based on the supply and demand for liquidity. 
Therefore, the liquidity dichotomy, coupled with the ontological insights arising from 
generic finance, leads to an understanding of the relationship between, and a possible 
reconciliation of, the neo-Walrasian theory of value with the liquidity preference theory of 
the rate of interest. The neo-Walrasian theory of value, for which a theory of the rate of 
interest is absent, is specified within a framework where the tenure of exchange is 
immediate. Loosening this restriction on the tenure of exchange brings forth a temporal 
dimension that forms the basis of a theory of the rate of interest. Coupled with the theory 
of physical exchange provided by the neo-Walrasian framework, the theory of the rate of 
interest based on the tenure of exchange provides a valuable avenue to the reconciliation of 
aspects of Real Analysis and Monetary Analysis. The long-period equilibrium specified by 
a neo-Walrasian commodity exchange model should be anchored to the rate of interest 
specified by the tenure preferences of borrowers, lenders and the banking system. 
Keynes’s theory of liquidity preference provides the point of departure for a conceptual 
framework organising these characteristics of liquidity. With the distinction between 
redemption liquidity and exchange liquidity made explicit, the theory of liquidity 
preference and Keynes’s two-asset model are sufficient to present a theory of the rate of 
interest in the tradition of Monetary Analysis whereby the uncertainty regarding the future 
rate of interest determines the current rate of interest.   
10.4 Exchange Liquidity and Redemption Liquidity 
Exchange liquidity and redemption liquidity can both be conceptualised as a financial put 
option provided by a liquidity provider. Just as risk is not the specific property of an asset, 
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it follows that exchange liquidity and redemption liquidity are not intrinsic properties, and 
are simply applied by a potentially unrelated third party. The difference between exchange 
and redemption liquidity stems from the nature of the liquidity put option provided to its 
holder. The crucial distinction is whether the put option is over the option-writer’s own 
liabilities or the liabilities of others.61 Redemption liquidity is provided by agents over their 
own liabilities. Money issuers offer redemption liquidity by allowing for immediate debt 
clearing and reflux.  
Exchange liquidity in an organised market is a financial put option provided by a market 
maker (see Section 5.2). The put option manifests itself through an entitlement to sell or 
buy at the ‘exercise price’ stipulated by the market maker’s respective bid or ask prices. 
The option premium embedded in the bid-ask spread compensates the dealer for the 
provision of the liquidity option. The provider of exchange liquidity has no direct 
relationship with the asset, but merely facilitates its shiftability, confirming that exchange 
liquidity is not an intrinsic property of an asset. Exchange liquidity encompasses both 
market and funding liquidity and is microeconomic in nature. Exchange liquidity is an 
unreliable mirage that disappears in a crisis. 
Dealers provide exchange liquidity, which is the mechanism by which a pre-agreed tenure 
of exchange can be reduced for the generic-asset holder. By providing exchange services 
for generic assets, dealers mitigate the need to wait until the asset’s maturity for it to become 
liquid in the final settlement of the generic exchange. The dealer can buy the asset outright 
or provide funding liquidity in the form of a collateralised loan, such as repo. In this way, 
dealers offer the ability for an agent to adjust the tenure of generic financial assets. 
Consequently, dealers operate outside the realm, and hence are independent, of any 
hypothetical long-period equilibrium based on pure exchange. Their role is to equilibrate 
the supply of and demand for the length of tenure in generic exchange. 
Exchange liquidity encompasses the idea of liquidity when defined as the conversion into 
money within the three dimensions of certainty, short notice and without loss 
(Bronfenbrenner, 1945; Hicks, 1962; see Section 8.2). By invoking an idea of loss, it builds 
                                                         
61 In terms of generic financial instruments, one person’s liability is another person’s asset. In the case of 
physical assets without technological liquidity (unlike corn, which is technologically liquid, see Section 5.1), 
only exchange liquidity can apply. 
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on a theoretical platform of fundamental or long-period prices provided by a general 
equilibrium model (see Section 6.5). In practice, however, exchange liquidity relies on the 
existence of market makers and money dealers, who are prepared to provide shiftability 
based on relative value. Dealers do not attempt to measure fundamental value, nor do their 
profits rely on assessing the difference between the market price and fundamental value. 
Instead, they attempt to operate a ‘matched book’ so that systematic risk is reduced as far 
as possible. 
It is precisely because exchange liquidity cannot be an intrinsic property of an asset, that 
analysing liquidity using the three dimensions of certainty, short notice and without loss, 
which rely on the existence of fundamental value, is paradoxical and inappropriate. The 
notion of fundamental value, derived in a general equilibrium assuming perfect exchange 
liquidity, falls into the trap of asset fetishism (Lozano, 2015), by ignoring the ontological 
principle that risk and cash flows—and not assets per se—are the economic phenomena 
that can be valued (see Section 8.6). The concept of exchange liquidity cannot be used to 
understand the liquidity of cash flows, which, by their very nature, are self-liquidating. 
Neo-Walrasian general equilibrium models lack financial instruments that can represent the 
image of value in exchange by denying the distinction between value and cash flow. The 
liquidity of value and the liquidity of cash flow must be considered separately. 
A distinction must be made, therefore, between the variability of expected returns across 
short- and long-dated assets, and any liquidity premium required for an asset supplied with 
a dealer put option. Short-dated assets are more liquid in the sense that their closer maturity 
date entails an earlier repayment or liquidation date, which a long-dated asset does not (see 
Section 5.5). Longer-maturity assets rely on exchange liquidity provided by a dealer in an 
organised market to be immediately realised in money terms. Exchange liquidity is 
fundamentally uncertain and corresponds with the empirical observations of time-varying 
discount factors (Cochrane, 1992; Shiller, 1981; see Section 6.6), and agents attempt to 
counter this uncertainty with judicious allocations of assets with price-protection and 
redemption liquidity. 
To repeat, exchange liquidity, being a form of liquidity supplied primarily by dealers, is 
not an intrinsic property of an asset, since its purpose is to alter the original terms of the 
exchange tenure. This being the case, exchange liquidity is ordinal only via a complex 
functional relationship (see Section 8.2). Any ranking of assets in terms of exchange 
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liquidity would be conditional on the dealer structure prevailing at the time of measurement 
and would therefore only be transitory. Without a fundamental value for comparison with 
a realised value, transactions cost methods also fail as ordinal measures. 
The liquidity of money arises from its ability to achieve immediate balance-sheet clearing 
between the issuer of the money and the holder of the money (see Section 4.8). Money, 
being a synthetic financial instrument arising through the exchange of debts, enables credit 
clearing and provides the ready means to dissolve its associated social relationship. Money 
provides reflux to its issuer, an action by which the money holder avoids the need to settle 
their debt to the issuer with goods or services. The redemption liquidity associated with 
money contrasts with the exchange liquidity facilitated by a market maker. Money’s 
liquidity, or immediate reflux to the issuer, is an essential feature. Like exchange liquidity, 
however, redemption liquidity is not an intrinsic property since it must be provided by the 
money issuer.  
Importantly, the difference between money and non-monetary debt can be delineated by 
this reasoning: only a credit that can be used to repay an issuer immediately can be money. 
If the issuer is a large economic agent, to which many other agents are constantly indebted, 
like the state or the banking system, then these credits will be in continuous demand as a 
means of debt repayment. Although state fiat money appears to be irredeemable, it is 
sufficient that it can be used to settle debts arising from taxation for it to have value (see 
Section 3.8). Similarly, a bank loan cannot be repaid without first securing possession of 
an offsetting deposit with that same bank (see Section 4.2). Both forms of money offer 
redemption liquidity. Thus, the crucial difference between credit money and shadow-bank 
‘money’ or repo is that the liquidity of repo is founded on the market liquidity of its 
underlying collateral and is therefore reliant on exchange liquidity. Given the 
microeconomic nature of exchange liquidity, the failure of shadow-bank ‘money’ during 
the systemic GFC should be unsurprising. 
Money is a credit that can be used to repay a debt to the issuer of the credit. It is a synthetic 
financial instrument without maturity, or, equivalently, a perpetual asset with a redemption 
put option written by its issuer (see Section 4.8). If the credit is dated then it cannot be 
money since its ability for use as repayment has been postponed—it offers no redemption 
liquidity. Demand deposits, on the other hand, are money because they can be used to 
extinguish a loan obligation to a bank. Government bonds are not money because they must 
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be converted, by means of exchange liquidity, into central bank reserves or state money to 
be used to pay taxation. Central bank reserves, even when they pay interest, differ from 
bonds, which do not have redemption liquidity. The distinction between exchange and 
redemption liquidity allows for a deeper understanding of the supply of liquidity and 
money. 
10.5 The Supply of Liquidity 
Immediately redeemable credits are money and the value of these redeemable credits relies 
on the balance between amount issued and the availability of offsetting credits. If more 
credits are issued than can be supported by available offsets, then their value will be reduced 
to zero. In the case of state money, this reduction would be due to an imbalance between 
money and taxation. Unless offsetting credits can be sourced, a debtor (or credit issuer) 
must redress any credit-debit imbalance by reducing the amount of their debts immediately 
redeemable. In other words, they will need to exchange their redeemable credits for new 
generic financial assets with the property of maturity. This action is a form of own-funding 
liquidity, whereby own-issued money is sourced. Own-funding liquidity, achieved by 
selling a new generic financial instrument, is then subject to the cost of postponing 
immediate reflux. 
The maturity of a financial instrument able to serve as credit money is crucial: debts can 
only be repaid with immediately redeemable or undated credit (Innes, 1913, 1914; 
Tymoigne, 2017; see Section 4.8). A debtor can repay a creditor with an offsetting credit 
against that same creditor, but only if the offsetting credit is currently due for repayment. 
The creditor can reject as payment their own debts if those debts themselves are not due for 
payment. In this way, creditors can control the reflux mechanism by managing the maturity 
profile of their debts. Pushing the repayment dates for debts into the future is an effective 
method of maintaining the balance of debits and credits currently due. Thus, the property 
of tenure embedded in generic and synthetic financial assets underpins the concept of 
redemption liquidity. 
The condition to be satisfied for the postponement of payment, or lengthening of maturity, 
is the rate of interest. For example, government bonds cannot be ‘spent’ (see Section 6.4) 
because the government has purposely converted its immediate, monetary debts into those 
not due until a future time and is under no obligation to accept these future debts as payment 
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for current taxes. The value of the government’s immediately redeemable credits, in the 
form of state money, is based on its current period spending and tax flows. Current spending 
not matched by tax flows must be postponed if the value of state money is to be maintained.  
Money can only be refluxed back to its issuer, and the issuer determines how much of its 
money is available for reflux by liability management through interest rates, thereby 
maintaining its value to other agents for use as a medium of exchange. For an issuer of debt, 
postponement is the alternative to a reduction in the value of immediately payable debts. 
The amount of immediately payable debt must be altered by extending it into the future, 
but at a cost. This cost, expressed as the rate of interest, provides the inducement for some 
agents to postpone their attempts at reflux. Thus, the issuing of debt, or accessing own-
funding liquidity, is itself a form of reflux, necessary to prevent the value of money falling 
to zero, in other words, the issuer defaulting. 
Again, this process is seen in the management of government debt, where swapping state 
money for non-monetary interest-bearing liabilities removes the need to alter the level of 
taxation. Similarly, banks, via their liability management, carefully maintain an asset-
liability term profile so that longer-term assets are funded by longer-term liabilities. Banks 
cannot create unlimited amounts of monetary liabilities; they require longer-term funding 
which cannot be used for repaying bank debts or conversion into state money. Banks pay 
interest on deposits that cannot be redeemed to prevent the reflux of their liabilities and 
thereby maintain their value at par with state money. 
Money issuers must be cognisant of their place in the hierarchy of money, which is 
constructed explicitly in terms of a gold standard or commercial bank convertibility to state 
money, or implicitly, in terms of an inflation or exchange-rate target. When the nature of 
the liquidity put option offered by money issuers depends on convertibility to higher forms 
of money, then the resulting hierarchy of money signifies that, unlike exchange liquidity, 
redemption liquidity is ordinal. The lever for managing the value of money is the interest 
rate on the non-money debt that the issuer offers to discourage reflux or, equivalently, to 
prevent the liquidity put option from being exercised. Money issuers who aim at a target 
real value of their money must offer a reflux exit point so that money holders can adjust 
their desired stock of money. The relevant insight expressed in the endogenous money 
literature is that, if a money issuer sets the terms under which money-debt can be exchanged 
for non-money debt, then the balance between money and debt will be determined, not by 
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the issuer, but by the holders. 
Similarly, the government, as one of the issuers in the hierarchy of money, must postpone 
the process of reflux for its monetary liabilities to maintain price stability. This mechanism 
should not be confused with a quantity theoretic explanation of prices. A monetary balance 
must be maintained primarily against the level of taxation, and not between the stock of 
money and the productive capacity of the economy, as per the quantity theory of money. 
At issue is not the size of government debt, or the monetary base, but the liquidity mismatch 
between taxation and monetary liabilities. These are either resolved by conversion of 
money into debts or a discount on government liabilities. 
Historically, monetary assets have taken different values even when measured in a single 
unit of account (see Section 4.3). Against competing monetary assets, state money has not 
always played the role of the strongest money. In general, the banking system maintains a 
peg to the government’s currency thereby fixing the value of bank money in the unit of 
account. Otherwise, as has happened in historical periods, the banking system may be able 
to command a premium over the value of the government’s currency, depending on its 
integration and its liquidity management. The value of money is based, not on the total 
amount issued in the overall debt sense, but in the balance between purchasing power and 
credits owed in the current period, or the ability to support the reflux put option.  
Hence, the stock of money comprises immediately payable, or undated, debt, which must 
be repaid on demand, and so can itself be used for repayment. Conceptually, this stock is 
not in continuous existence throughout time; it is either repaid, and thereby destroyed, or 
rolled forward. Rolling a debt forward is fundamentally equivalent to repaying and 
simultaneously re-borrowing. Conceptually, there is no externally set amount of money that 
forever circulates with a velocity, but, instead, a continuous flow of creations and 
cancellations—efflux and reflux—whereby each obligor’s creations and cancellations must 
balance if their credits are to maintain their value in terms of the unit of account. The theory 
of the monetary circuit applies to all money issuers. 
Nevertheless, credit money emitted by an agent will circulate before it refluxes, either as 
repayment or extended by postponement. A decrease in tenure preference will result in an 
increase in the demand for credit money and its circulation time will increase as credits are 
hoarded. As a result, some agents, who are indebted to the credit-money issuer, will struggle 
to obtain the credits necessary for repayment, and will need to borrow them from others. 
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This scramble for credits will increase the interest rate on the inter-agent borrowing and 
lending of these credits. Similarly, the cost to the issuer of postponing reflux, or own-
funding liquidity, will increase. In response, the issuer can alleviate the shortage by 
purchasing the generic financial assets of others with newly created credit money, in other 
words, by conducting open-market operations or QE. 
The central bank’s convention of using open-market operations as its monetary mechanism 
applies a liquidity option to those assets that the central bank receives as collateral, mostly 
government debt. Again, this viewpoint shows us that, government debt is not redeemably 
liquid. Instead, government debt gains exchange liquidity from the central bank’s dealing 
in the government debt market. The public-private form of liquidity, where government 
bonds underlie private repo, is an extension of this central-bank provided exchange 
liquidity (Pozsar, 2014, 2015; see Section 5.7). 
Price-protected instruments, which provide price stability in the unit of account (Ricks, 
2011), are not simply limited to the forms of outside money. Bank deposits, as a medium 
of exchange, provide price-protection and redemption liquidity by means of reflux and loan 
repayment. Less successfully, the shadow banking system attempted to create redeemably 
liquid instruments. The shadow banking system combined market liquidity and funding 
liquidity to create price-protected assets, in an attempt to increase the supply of redemption 
liquidity. The innovation of increasing the liquidity supply by means of security repurchase 
agreements relied on the ability of exchange liquidity to simulate the redemption liquidity 
of a price-protected asset. The ability to synthesise redemption liquidity as shadow-bank 
‘money’ (Gabor & Vestergaard, 2016) was tested and subsequently failed during the GFC. 
Overall, the supply of liquidity is offered by dealers that issue liquidity put options, and 
these issuers form a hierarchy. In order of strength, they are generally the government, the 
central bank, commercial banks and securities dealers, although this order is not immutable. 
The hierarchy aligns with the public-private, outside-inside spectrum of liquidity identified 
in Chapter 5, and straddles the exchange/redemption dichotomy. The value of each of these 
put options depends on the perception of the default risk of the issuer, determined by the 
balance of credits payable and receivable.  For instance, the exchange liquidity offered by 
a security dealer is unreliable, since it is implicit and can be withdrawn during periods of 
market turbulence. Nonetheless, all liquidity is provided by a dealer that stands ready to 
convert assets, and this set of dealers should include traditional money issuers, such as 
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central banks and commercial banks. 
The clarification of the supply of liquidity allows us to conduct a similar exercise for 
liquidity demand. 
10.6 The Demand for Liquidity 
Generic finance complements the view that money is credit with an immediate redemption 
option, situated on a credit spectrum of delayed settlement that expands the tenure of 
exchange. This spectrum is independent of any particular asset, since risks and cash flows 
can be separated from the assets that they reference. Money itself is a synthetic financial 
instrument that preserves the invariance requirement of immediate settlement associated 
with classical exchange, thereby eliminating the risk associated with a decoupled time 
horizon. In models with a single fixed moment of exchange, such as that associated with a 
Walrasian auctioneer or the portfolio rebalancing model of Tobin (1969), the concept of a 
risk-free asset is sufficient to function as the determinant of the rate of interest, since the 
invariance requirement of immediate settlement is strictly enforced. Without these 
restrictions on exchange settlement, the rate of interest is instead required to equilibrate the 
supply and demand for generic financial instruments. 
This dimension of credit and liquidity—and the rate of interest that arises with it—is 
unrelated to assets per se. The cash flows associated with any particular asset can be de-
coupled from it, and the creation of generic and synthetic instruments, which separate risk 
from assets, confirms that liquidity is also not a property of any specific asset; it is a 
property of the nature and the maturity of cash flows. It is informed by the knowledge that 
the value of generic financial instruments, although perhaps conceptually in equilibrium at 
any point in time, can change over their life. The extra time dimension related to generic 
and synthetic finance creates entirely new risks missing from Real Analysis. 
It follows that, with the credit nature of money in its private and public forms, it is not 
possible to simply refer to ‘money’ as a single concept. More generality can be introduced 
by considering the taxonomy of liquidity represented in Table 2. It then remains to consider 
the nature of the demand for liquidity. By clarifying the different forms of liquidity, this 
study has shown that that the theory of liquidity preference is founded on the interplay 
between assets with price-protection or redemption liquidity, and those with only market, 
funding or exchange liquidity. It was established in Chapter 8 that market liquidity and 
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funding liquidity, provided by organised markets, are important pre-conditions for the 
speculative motive, but do not represent the essential form of liquidity underlying Keynes’s 
theory of liquidity preference itself. 
For example, liquidity preference is not satisfied by assets, such as long-term Treasury 
bonds, that trade in, what are often referred to as, deep and liquid markets and can be 
realised for cash as short notice. Although such an asset can be realised for an amount of 
cash that is (presumably) close to its ‘fair value’, the actual amount of cash is unpredictable 
and is therefore not suitable for meeting an unexpected cash payment of possibly knowable 
size. It is for more than pedagogical reasons that Keynes’s presentation of liquidity 
preference places a sharp distinction between liquid assets and non-liquid assets, in a model 
comprising only cash and bonds. Liquidity preference is not founded on the market liquidity 
or funding liquidity displayed by bonds; it expresses the desire for assets with price-
protection, information insensitivity, or redemption liquidity. Liquidity preference 
motivates investors to hold assets that maintain their value against the unit of account, 
instead of exchange liquidity.  
As identified by Bibow (1998), in Keynes’s framework of expected returns, any premium 
associated with exchange liquidity should be interpreted as a holding cost (see Section 8.2), 
with the consequence that the large empirical literature on bid-ask spreads is not directly 
relevant to the theory of liquidity preference. Analysis of the dealer microstructure provides 
insights into the profit-making activities and asset inventory management of dealers but 
does not contribute to a macroeconomic theory of liquidity. Ultimately, the microstructure 
analysis can only reveal the various ways that the carrying cost is expressed: either as a 
profit to market makers to provide an exchange-liquidity put option; or as the cost of search 
and delay in transactions. Liquidity frameworks in which illiquid assets have discounted 
prices do not align with the interpretation of Keynes’s liquidity preference framework 
presented in this study. 
Instead, liquidity is realised as an abstract premium earned by the issuer of assets with 
redemption liquidity, as seigniorage. Money, being the liquid asset par excellence, is 
awarded a liquidity premium in Keynes’s framework, not illiquid assets. In reality, 
however, money earns no premium. The fee from lending money arises from not actually 
holding money, it arises from holding another type of asset entirely: a loan for which the 
rate of interest is its return. The failure to distinguish the rate of interest from the liquidity 
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premium of money is a subtle, but significant, error, which has led the interpretation of 
liquidity preference astray. The liquidity premium that Keynes assigns to money is due to 
the utility gained by holding it; the premium is not directly apparent in its price. The fact 
that this utility is observed through the expected return of other assets is an implication of 
the theory but not the core of the theory itself. The utility attached to the liquidity of money 
makes it costly to borrow from other agents, and interest rates are evidence of this utility 
but not its cause. In equilibrium, the rate of interest earned from lending money must equal 
the liquidity premium on money, but they are not the same thing. 
Thus, the essential element at the core of liquidity preference is not the explicit cost of 
illiquidity, but the hidden premium associated with liquidity. Consequently, liquidity 
preference cannot be stated in terms of market liquidity or risk preferences as in the models 
of Hicks (1989) and Tobin (1958). The liquidity premium differs fundamentally from a risk 
premium by adding an overlay of uncertainty to the assessment of risk, in the form of the 
Keynesian weight of probability (see Section 8.4). Price-protected assets reduce this 
uncertainty, since the unit of account is a mapping from all events, of any nature, to a 
measurable outcome. All events, known or otherwise, are covered. When all outcomes are 
measured in the unit of account, the range of alternatives is known. The uncertainty 
associated with unexpected alternatives or possibilities is eliminated; no new outcomes are 
possible. On this restricted range of outcomes, the estimation of probabilities and their 
weights is possible, as new information always increases the weight of probability. An 
asset's return is comparable, the domain of outcomes is manageable, and fundamental 
uncertainty is partially mitigated. 
The price-protection feature, in a probabilistic framework, is the property that an asset 
maintains a constant price across all future states and sample paths of nature. The desire for 
liquidity is to avoid uncertainty in future returns and the time-variation in discount factors. 
The phenomenon behind liquidity preference is precisely the unpredictability of the 
discount factor and asset-price risk. Redemption liquidity provides a stable value in all 
outcomes, especially in bad states of nature, where the value of other assets has fallen.  
A price-protected asset’s correlation with systematic risk or stochastic discount factor is 
therefore close to zero. Price-protected assets have a payoff that displays zero correlation 
with systematic risk and a low risk of default, and this information insensitivity increases 
their predictability and, hence, liquidity. According to the empirical finance literature, 
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excess expected returns—those above the risk-free rate—are based on correlation with 
systematic risk. The zero-correlation feature is commonly associated with the concept of 
the risk-free rate, which, unlike the rate generally earned on money-proper, is non-zero. 
The risk-free rate, however, is only appropriate for a well-defined investment horizon, 
without path-dependency. For example, selling a risk-free bond before its maturity relies 
on exchange liquidity, which exposes the owner to price risk. In the complete-markets 
model that forms the theoretical foundation for the risk-free rate, exchange liquidity poses 
no problem; all assets are tradable at their fundamental values. Instead, as we shall see next, 
it is the interplay between exchange liquidity and redemption liquidity that determines the 
rate of interest. 
10.7 Liquidity and the Rate of Interest 
The following simple demonstration model, an adaptation of the certainty-equivalent model 
presented by Pratt (1964) (see Section 7.5), illustrates the key concepts of the conceptual 
framework and clarifies this study’s interpretation of Keynes’s theory of liquidity 
preference. Under consideration is the determination of an individual’s ‘safe’ rate of 
interest (see Section 8.1). The model presented here is highly simplified and is offered as a 
pedagogical illustration of the mechanism that relates the liquidity dichotomy to the rate of 
interest. More elaborate constructions are possible, but would merely obscure the main 
purpose, which is to compare a price-protected asset with one exposed to market liquidity 
and show how the concept of a safe rate of interest arises. The purpose of the model is to 
show that it is possible for current interest rates to be determined by uncertainty concerning 
future interest rates, as opposed to the usual idea that forward rates are predictors of future 
spot rates. 
The entry point of the model is the closing stage of the monetary circuit. Production and 
consumption decisions have been made, and the agent has wealth 𝑊𝑊 available to invest in 
an interest- and non-interest-bearing asset. Following Keynes’s two-asset model, the 
agent’s investment choice consists of combinations of the money asset, with redemption 
liquidity, that yields a value of unity at any point over the investment horizon, and a zero-
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coupon bond paying an amount 1 + 𝜆𝜆 > 1 at time 𝑃𝑃.62 The bond is tradable at any time 0 <
𝑡𝑡 < 𝑃𝑃 by means of exchange liquidity, but only at an uncertain price 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡.63 
The agent faces the risk that, in relying on exchange liquidity, a loss is incurred at the time 
of sale, in comparison with an investment in the price-protected instrument. Because 
expected returns vary, more than can be explained by intertemporal preferences and 
dividend volatility, the agent faces a path-dependent market-price risk (see Section 6.6). 
The uncertain dynamics of the bond price impact the agent because, at some uniformly 
random time 𝜏𝜏 ~ 𝑈𝑈(0,𝑃𝑃) between 0 and 𝑃𝑃, the agent will need to realise their entire bond 
and money holdings. The agent’s liquidity preference therefore reflects the relative utility 
of exchange versus redemption liquidity. 
Even though the proceeds of the bond are uncertain between time 0 and time 𝑃𝑃, the agent 
is nevertheless certain of the proceeds from either investment at the investment horizon 𝑃𝑃. 
This certainty at the investment horizon, but uncertainty in between, differentiates this 
model from those of Hicks (1989) and Tobin (1958). This uncertainty determines the rate 
of interest, unlike in the models of Hicks and Tobin, where risky and risk-free asset returns 
are given, and the agent’s task is to construct an optimal portfolio for a fixed time horizon. 
In the current model, both assets are risk-free at the investment horizon, but only one is 
money in that it offers a price-protection feature. Rather than being a risk-free rate, 𝜆𝜆 is the 
liquidity premium necessary to compensation the agent for the uncertainty regarding the 
future rate of interest, in the form of the bond price at the time of sale, as per the precepts 
of liquidity preference (see Section 8.1). Furthermore, both assets can be classified as near-
money in the sense that each is self-liquidating (see Section 5.5), so that the agent’s choice 
is isolated to be between exchange liquidity and redemption liquidity.  
The price uncertainty facing the agent is modelled by means of a Brownian bridge process, 
whereby the bond price 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 begins at 𝑝𝑝0 = 1 and then fluctuates randomly before finishing 
                                                         
62 The bond pays more than its notional amount at maturity. This deviation from standard bond practice is for 
simplicity and can easily be corrected by adjusting the initial bond price by the final payment. 
63 Note that 𝜆𝜆 should be a function of 𝑃𝑃, since there will be a premium associated with every time horizon 
which contributes to the complex of interest rates. For simplicity the dependence of 𝜆𝜆 on 𝑃𝑃 is omitted. 
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with certainty at 𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇 = 1 + 𝜆𝜆 (see Figure 1).64 A Brownian bridge process is used to simulate 
the capital-uncertainty faced when bonds are not held to maturity (see Section 5.2).  
By the properties of a Brownian bridge, 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 is then defined as  
 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 ≡ 1 + 𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃 𝜆𝜆 + 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡 − 𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃 𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇 , (10.1) 
where 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡 is a Brownian motion process such that 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡~𝑁𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜎2𝑡𝑡), and 𝜎𝜎2𝑡𝑡 is the agent’s 
subjective measure of risk regarding 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡. The agent does not know the ‘true’ dynamics of 
𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡, but uses the Brownian bridge model to frame the economic effects of uncertainty. By 
comparison, the money asset maintains a constant value of unity. 
Figure 1 – Example of Brownian Bridge Bond Price Dynamics 
 
The agent is risk averse with a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility of wealth 𝑊𝑊 
given by  
 
𝑢𝑢(𝑊𝑊) ≡ 𝑊𝑊1−𝛾𝛾 − 11 − 𝛾𝛾 , (10.2) 
where 𝛾𝛾 ≠ 1 is the coefficient of relative risk aversion.  
                                                         
64 A Brownian bridge is a standard mathematical process that represents a ‘pinned’ Brownian motion or 
‘random walk’, in which both the origin and destination are fixed but the dynamics in between exhibit a 








Following Pratt (1964), the uncertainty regarding the proceeds of the bond implies that the 
agent will demand a return premium 𝜋𝜋 to hold the bond. This premium 𝜋𝜋 depends on wealth 
𝑊𝑊 and the probability distribution of the bond price, and so can be written as 𝜋𝜋(𝑊𝑊, 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡). 
The premium 𝜋𝜋 therefore reflects the safe rate of interest that leaves the agent indifferent 
between the price-protection of money and the capital-uncertainty of the bond. It is 
compensation for having to rely on exchange liquidity to meet uncertain payments.  
To find the premium 𝜋𝜋, we substitute 𝑝𝑝𝜏𝜏 for 𝑅𝑅 and 1 for 𝔼𝔼[𝑅𝑅] in equation (7.1). We also 
adjust the size of the necessary premium by the expected time until sale. It follows then 
that, for the agent to be indifferent between the bond and money, the premium 𝜋𝜋 must 
satisfy the equality: 
 𝔼𝔼[𝑢𝑢(𝑊𝑊𝑝𝑝𝜏𝜏)] = 𝔼𝔼 �𝑢𝑢 �𝑊𝑊(1 − 𝜏𝜏𝑃𝑃 𝜋𝜋)��. (10.3) 
That is, the expected utility from either asset is the same, where the expectation 𝔼𝔼[. ] is 
taken at time 𝑡𝑡 = 0 over both the random sale time 𝜏𝜏 and the bond price 𝑝𝑝𝜏𝜏 at the time of 
sale, also random.65 The premium 𝜋𝜋 is scaled by the ratio of the random time of sale 𝜏𝜏 and 
the maturity of the bond 𝑃𝑃. 
The fact that 𝔼𝔼[𝑊𝑊𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡] = 𝑊𝑊�1 + 𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇 𝜆𝜆�, and not 𝑊𝑊, is inconvenient, but can be remedied by 
setting 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡∗ ≡ 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 −
𝑡𝑡
𝑇𝑇
𝜆𝜆 and using the adjustment to the premium 𝜋𝜋 outlined by Pratt (1964, 
p. 124, Equation 2), repeated here in a more convenient form as  
 𝜋𝜋(𝑊𝑊,𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡) = 𝜋𝜋 �𝑊𝑊 − 𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃 𝜆𝜆,𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 + 𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃 𝜆𝜆�. (10.4) 
The process 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡∗ is a Brownian bridge anchored to unity at both 𝑡𝑡 = 0 and 𝑡𝑡 = 𝑃𝑃. Using 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡∗ 
in place of 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡, equation (10.3) then becomes  
 𝔼𝔼[𝑢𝑢(𝑊𝑊𝑝𝑝𝜏𝜏∗)] = 𝔼𝔼 �𝑢𝑢 �𝑊𝑊(1 − 𝜏𝜏𝑃𝑃 𝜆𝜆 − 𝜏𝜏𝑃𝑃 𝜋𝜋)��. (10.5) 
The task now remains to find 𝜆𝜆, and hence the final proceeds of bond, for which the agent 
                                                         
65 For simplicity, no attempt is made to include expected inflation or the Fisher Effect (see Section 6.3) since 
both assets would be affected equally. 
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is indifferent between investing in the bond or in cash. This task is equivalent to solving 
equation (10.5) for 𝜋𝜋 = 0. 
Substituting equation (10.1) into the LHS of equation (10.5) gives66 
 
𝔼𝔼[𝑢𝑢(𝑊𝑊𝑝𝑝𝜏𝜏∗)] = 𝔼𝔼 �𝑢𝑢 �𝑊𝑊 �1 + 𝐵𝐵𝜏𝜏 − 𝜏𝜏𝑃𝑃 𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇���, (10.6) 
and, by taking a Taylor series expansion about 𝑊𝑊, equation (10.6) approximates to 
 ≅ 𝔼𝔼 �𝑢𝑢(𝑊𝑊) +  𝑊𝑊 �𝐵𝐵𝜏𝜏 − 𝜏𝜏𝑃𝑃 𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇� 𝑢𝑢′(𝑊𝑊)+ 12𝑊𝑊2 �𝐵𝐵𝜏𝜏 − 𝜏𝜏𝑃𝑃 𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇�2 𝑢𝑢′′(𝑊𝑊)�. (10.7) 
Noting that, by the properties of a Brownian bridge, 
 𝔼𝔼 �𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡 −
𝑡𝑡







�𝑡𝑡 = 𝜏𝜏� = 𝔼𝔼 �𝜎𝜎2𝑡𝑡 �1 − 𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃� �𝑡𝑡 = 𝜏𝜏�, (10.9) 
and substituting equations (10.8) and (10.9) into (10.7), we arrive at 
 
𝔼𝔼[𝑢𝑢(𝑊𝑊𝑝𝑝𝜏𝜏∗)] ≅ 𝔼𝔼 �𝑢𝑢(𝑊𝑊) + 12𝑊𝑊2𝜎𝜎2𝜏𝜏 �1 − 𝜏𝜏𝑃𝑃�𝑢𝑢′′(𝑊𝑊)�. (10.10) 
Next, setting 𝜋𝜋∗ ≡ 𝜆𝜆 + 𝜋𝜋, and assuming that 𝜋𝜋∗ is small, the RHS of equation (10.5) can 
also be expanded using a Taylor series expansion about 𝑊𝑊 to become 
 𝔼𝔼 �𝑢𝑢 �𝑊𝑊(1 − 𝜏𝜏
𝑃𝑃
𝜋𝜋∗)�� ≅ 𝔼𝔼 �𝑢𝑢(𝑊𝑊) − 𝜏𝜏
𝑃𝑃
𝜋𝜋∗𝑊𝑊𝑢𝑢′(𝑊𝑊)�. (10.11) 
Equating the RHS of equation (10.10) with the RHS of equation (10.11) and cancelling the 
common term 𝑢𝑢(𝑊𝑊) gives 
 
𝔼𝔼 � 12𝑊𝑊2𝜎𝜎2𝜏𝜏 �1 − 𝜏𝜏𝑃𝑃� 𝑢𝑢′′(𝑊𝑊) + 𝜏𝜏𝑃𝑃 𝜋𝜋∗𝑊𝑊𝑢𝑢′(𝑊𝑊)� = 0. (10.12) 
Taking expectations over the random sale time 𝜏𝜏 ~ 𝑈𝑈(0,𝑃𝑃), we have 
                                                         






12𝑊𝑊2𝜎𝜎2 �𝑡𝑡 − 𝑡𝑡2𝑃𝑃 � 𝑢𝑢′′(𝑊𝑊) + 𝑡𝑡𝑃𝑃 𝜋𝜋∗𝑊𝑊𝑢𝑢′(𝑊𝑊)� 𝑇𝑇0 𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡)𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡= 0. (10.13) 





12𝑊𝑊2𝜎𝜎2 �𝑡𝑡22 − 𝑡𝑡33𝑃𝑃�𝑢𝑢′′(𝑊𝑊) + 𝑡𝑡22𝑃𝑃 𝜋𝜋∗𝑊𝑊𝑢𝑢′(𝑊𝑊)� 1𝑃𝑃�
0
𝑇𝑇 = 0, (10.14) 
which, over the interval [0,𝑃𝑃], becomes 
 
�
12𝑊𝑊2𝜎𝜎2 �𝑃𝑃22 − 𝑃𝑃33𝑃𝑃�𝑢𝑢′′(𝑊𝑊) + 𝑃𝑃22𝑃𝑃 𝜋𝜋∗𝑊𝑊𝑢𝑢′(𝑊𝑊)� 1𝑃𝑃 = 0. (10.15) 
Simplifying, rearranging, recalling that 𝜋𝜋∗ ≡ 𝜆𝜆 + 𝜋𝜋, and setting 𝜋𝜋 = 0 gives the general 
expression for the liquidity premium, or safe rate of interest, as 
 
𝜆𝜆 = −𝜎𝜎26 𝑊𝑊𝑢𝑢′′(𝑊𝑊)𝑢𝑢′(𝑊𝑊) . (10.16) 
For utility function specified by equation (10.2), the first and second derivatives are 
 𝑢𝑢′(𝑊𝑊) = 𝑊𝑊−𝛾𝛾, (10.17) 
and 
 𝑢𝑢′′(𝑊𝑊) = −𝛾𝛾𝑊𝑊−𝛾𝛾−1, (10.18) 
which, when substituted into equation (10.16), give 
 
𝜆𝜆 = 𝛾𝛾𝜎𝜎26 . (10.19) 
Thus, the liquidity premium required by the agent to be indifferent between money and 
bonds is proportional to the agent’s uncertainty about the rate of return from exchange 
liquidity 𝜎𝜎2 and the agent’s degree of risk aversion 𝛾𝛾. In other words, the agent’s safe rate 
of interest is determined by the agent’s subjective uncertainty concerning the future rate of 
interest as postulated by Keynes. This finding is consistent with the interpretation of the 
theory of liquidity preference expressed in this study and measures the value of the 
difference between exchange and redemption liquidity. Across a host of agents with a 
variety of opinions, a spectrum of safe rates of interest will emerge. Any one agent’s actual 
investment allocation will be based on the difference or degree of divergence between the 
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market price and the price associated with their safe rate of interest (see Section 8.4). At a 
macroeconomic level, liquidity preference will determine demand-side drivers of the rate 
of interest. 
Similar arguments can be applied to the supply side of the rate of interest. In accordance 
with the precepts of circuit theory, the relative demand for money and bonds affects the 
banking system and final finance. The allocation from money to bonds results in a reflux 
of the opening stock of money in the monetary circuit. The initial flow of money itself 
depends on the interest rate, both due the elasticity of demand for loans and the asset and 
liability management policies of the banking system. The balance sheet of the banking 
system intermediates between borrowers with a tendency to borrow long and investors 
preferring to lend short. The bank profits from this mismatch, but only by managing the 
liquidity risk, and, because of the effect that this risk management has in interest rates, the 
supply and demand for money are not independent. 
In borrowing from banks to pay for the factors of production, producers become more 
illiquid than they would like. They move from their preferred level of liquidity by either 
spending existing money balances or newly borrowed funds. This deviation from their 
preferred liquidity position is expected to be temporary because they anticipate the recovery 
of the proceeds of sale before too long. In a buoyant economy, producers are confident of 
sales and the liquidity risk is low (see Section 5.4). Similarly, buoyant customers have a 
reduced demand for deposits, so that the interest rate to satisfy liquidity preference is also 
low. Banks, if they match their maturity profile, pass their liquidity risk on to borrowers 
and lenders. In this way, the liquidity provided to the banking system is related to the 
confidence in near-term sales of producers as part of the theory of the monetary circuit. A 
fall in confidence in sales, by curtailing the short-term borrowing required to produce 
saleable goods also removes the natural source of liquidity for the banking system. 
Liquidity preference, together with the quasi-rents of assets, determines asset prices. 
Interest rates are determined by asset allocation decisions between assets with exchange 
liquidity and assets with redemption liquidity. The propensity to consume out of income 
reflects time preferences. Therefore, the prices of long-term bonds are not based on 
expectations as to what will happen over their 30-year term, their prices are based on 
liquidity discount factors, which are largely derived from uncertainty about discount factors 
in the near future—the preference of near-term cash flows over the abstract value of a 
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capital asset. Thirty-year interest rates cannot balance the supply and demand of 30-year 
investments and saving. Nor can Fisherian time preference explain interest rates. Only 
liquidity preference of cash flow maturity can explain the pricing of short and long-term 
assets in the present moment. The expected return on a 30-year asset relates to the value 
risk inherent in the asset if it needs to be realised for cash in the near future. 
As a measure of the degree of preference for redemption liquidity over exchange liquidity, 
𝜆𝜆 is cardinal (and hence ordinal as well). A liquidity premium 𝜆𝜆 can be derived for each 
maturity 𝑃𝑃, and the complex of stochastic discount factors generated enforce the 
consumption trade-offs set out in the Euler equation (6.6). Instead of the real economy 
dictating the real rate of interest, as in the neoclassical prescription, the nominal rate of 
interest is set by liquidity preference and the real economy adjusts to this nominal rate. The 
Euler equation (6.6) should be matched, not to the marginal productivity of capital, but to 
the complex of interest rates derived from liquidity preference. An amount saved today can 
be saved in any form of generic financial asset across a spectrum of maturities, and the rate 
of interest ensures that the image of value in the unit of account is the same for all. The 
choice is made on the basis of liquidity preference, where the complex of interest rates is 
extrapolated from short to long rates. The long rate of interest is a cardinal metric derived 
from the asset price that ensures indifference between holding an asset for which only 
market liquidity is available, versus a price-protected asset. This choice of implied interest 
rate on an asset has no effect on the amount saved.  
The image of value in the unit of account arising in exchange is determined by the liquidity 
discount factor across the spectrum of tenure. The valuation applies regardless of whether 
the flows are directed into money or long-term illiquid property. The symmetry of exchange 
is affected by liquidity preference—the ultimate determinant of the term structure of 
interest rates. Interest rates maintain the symmetry of exchange for generic financial assets 
and the loosening of the invariance requirement of immediate settlement. This ontological 
insight reinforces Keynes’s observation that interest rates cannot be a reward for saving 
(see Section 8.1). With the recognition that generic and synthetic financial instruments 
bring with them entirely new risks, investors have to balance the relative benefits of 




The conceptual framework presented here identifies the fundamental distinction between 
exchange and redemption liquidity, where each is associated with a financial put option 
that offers liquidity services to its owner. Neither exchange liquidity nor redemption 
liquidity is an essential property of any specific asset, but are differentiated by the 
mechanism by which the liquidity option is offered to the asset owner. 
Exchange liquidity covers the tradability offered by dealers in an organised market who 
extract profits by mitigating the costs of search and delay in exchange. These profits are the 
reward to dealers for providing exchange liquidity on the assets and liabilities of others and 
translate to a user cost for their customers. Redemption liquidity arises in the specific 
conditions related to reflux and liability management of money issuers. The theories of the 
monetary circuit and endogenous money are positioned in the framework as descriptions 
of the process of liability management and the operation of redemption liquidity. 
Once this liquidity dichotomy is identified, the principles underlying the theory of liquidity 
preference are clarified, and the validity of Keynes’s two-asset model can be recognised. 
Liquidity preference exists on the cusp between exchange and redemption liquidity and 
operates to balance the relative supply and demand for each. The balancing factor is the 
rate of interest and it is here that the difference between theory of liquidity preference, 
based in the tradition of Monetary Analysis, and the interest rate theories of Real Analysis, 
becomes most apparent. Real Analysis, where perfect exchange liquidity is awarded to all 
assets, cannot encompass or comprehend this dichotomy. The hypothetical Walrasian 
auctioneer, by clearing all credit at the beginning of time, entirely abstracts from the risks 
associated with the change in value of delayed cash flows provided as means of payment 
or investment. This abstraction from the risks associated with the property of exchange 
tenure removes any reason to favour redemption liquidity over exchange liquidity. 
The risk arising from exchange involving generic financial instruments, and the liquidity 
dichotomy, can be illustrated using a simple Brownian bridge model. The uncertainty 
associated with a reliance on exchange liquidity can be compared with the safety of a price-
protected asset offering redemption liquidity. In agreement with the theory of liquidity 
preference, the rate of interest is explained by the compensation required to adopt the risks 
associated with exchange liquidity. 
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In the next chapter, this conceptual framework is used to indicate the direction and 






A clarification of the forms of liquidity and the nature of money in Part II formed the basis 
of an immanent critique of the literature on liquidity and money in Part III and Part IV of 
this study. In Part III, it was shown that the treatment of liquidity and money within the 
tradition of Real Analysis fails to achieve the level of correspondence with reality required 
to be consistent with the realist methodology adopted by this study. Consequently, the 
insights gained from this literature are of limited relevance for policy. 
In Part IV of the study, the critique led to an extension and new interpretation of Keynes’s 
theory of liquidity preference. The interpretation builds on, but is significantly different 
from, the previous interpretations of liquidity preference in the literature, such as those of 
Bronfenbrenner, Hicks and Tobin, by focusing on liquidity and not market risk. 
Two related contributions are made to knowledge by the conceptual framework constructed 
in Part V. First, the distinction between redemption and exchange liquidity reduces the 
many forms of liquidity into two distinct categories and thereby clarifies the relationship 
between liquidity and money. Second, the distinction between redemption and exchange 
liquidity forms a basis for a new interpretation of Keynes’s theory of liquidity preference 
as a determinant of the rate of interest. 
11.2 Summary: Addressing the Research Questions 
Money is the result of a synthetic financial exchange, and as such exists as a social relation 
represented by balance-sheet transactions. Being created as act of synthetic exchange, 
money has no endogenous limit and its value is based on an underlying reference object, 
which varies by institutional and historical context. Such examples are: central bank money 
based on a gold standard; private sector banks that maintain convertibility into a central 
bank or state money; or fiat money with reference to a consumer price index. None of these 
reference objects applies any limit to the creation of synthetic money, although the 
anchoring to the reference object does create the need to manage the resulting stock of 
money by the adjustment of interest rates. 
With regard to the first research question posed in Section 1.2, the relationship between 
liquidity and money is dominated by the ontological view that one takes of money. When 
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money is viewed as the most tradable commodity as discussed in Section 3.3, then liquidity 
is reduced to saleability, and, in the neo-Walrasian benchmark model, money is eliminated 
altogether. As shown in Part III, Real Analysis, whereby money is treated as a commodity, 
fails to incorporate liquidity and instead focuses on market liquidity and transactions costs. 
Neither the neo-Walrasian nor the Wicksellian forms of general equilibrium theory are 
therefore suitable to generate insights into the nature of liquidity. Wicksellian models, due 
to their reliance on the marginal productivity of capital, are theoretically inconsistent. Neo-
Walrasian pure-exchange models, lacking money, fail to achieve sufficient correspondence 
with reality to build a coherent framework to consider liquidity. 
By contrast, if money is viewed as a social relationship based on balance-sheet debits and 
credits (see Section 3.6) and it is recognised that the tenure of exchange can extend beyond 
the immediate settlement of commodity-for-commodity contracts (see Section 8.6), then 
the concept of liquidity can be placed into a temporal dimension associated with 
preferences for credit clearing. Specifically, this temporal dimension allows for the 
distinction between exchange liquidity and redemption liquidity. Exchange liquidity 
represents the transfer of financial assets between counterparties unrelated to the issuer of 
the financial asset, whereas redemption liquidity refers to the repayment option embedded 
in money whereby it can be used to cancel debts with the money’s issuer by the mechanism 
of reflux. 
To answer the second research question, the distinction between redemption and exchange 
liquidity forms the basis of the conceptual framework of liquidity presented in Section 10.3. 
Importantly, liquidity is recognised as not being an intrinsic property of an asset but, 
instead, is a form of financial contract provided by liquidity suppliers. Issuers of money 
must manage the reflux mechanism by adjusting the rate of interest paid on their non-
redeemable liabilities. By contrast, the demand for liquidity arises as the result of the trade-
off between the certainty of redemption liquidity and the uncertainty of relying on the price 
risk associated with exchange liquidity. This trade-off between redemption and exchange 
liquidity forms the basis of a new interpretation of Keynes’s theory of liquidity preference 
where the current rate of interest is determined by uncertainty regarding the future rate of 
interest. The rate of interest, then, is not the balancing factor between real investment and 
real saving as it is in the theory of loanable funds. Instead, it equilibrates the competing 
preferences for credit assets arising through the extended tenure of exchange. This insight 
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suggests that the construction of theory with regard to the rate of interest must be conducted 
from within the tradition of Monetary Analysis, not Real Analysis. 
11.3 Limitations 
Due to the scope of this study—the literature related to liquidity and money is vast—the 
analysis is broad rather than deep. The focus has pragmatically been on the area of the 
literature that reveals the ontological assumptions underlying each theory of liquidity and 
money. The framework organises these ontological concepts but stops short of any 
theoretical or empirical analysis. 
A further limitation is that, although the existence of uncertainty is essential to the 
explanation of liquidity and money, the concept of uncertainty itself has conflicting 
definitions in the literature. Clarifications of uncertainty are beyond the scope of this study, 
and therefore questions concerning its ontology and epistemology are left open. Further 
research is required to clarify its relationship with, for example, non-ergodicity and chaos 
theory. 
11.4 Implications for Policy 
The explanation of the rate of interest by factors related to exchange and redemption 
liquidity suggests reasons for the failure of the global economy to revert to growth paths 
experienced before the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). The preoccupation of policy makers 
and academics with the Wicksellian natural rate of interest has informed such explanations 
as secular stagnation or a savings glut and is behind the concerns regarding the ‘artificial’ 
stimulus provided by unorthodox central-bank monetary policy. That massive monetary 
creation has not generated inflation is also a mystery for those whose conceptual framework 
maintains a place for the quantity theory of money. The behaviour of the global economy 
over the past decade has provided counter-examples for both the quantity theory of money 
and the inevitable alignment of central bank rates with a rate of interest determined purely 
in the real economy. Interest rate theories anchored in Real Analysis fail to explain the low 
level of interest rates prevalent beyond a period of time that can sensibly be aligned with 
anything other than the long run.  
As shown in Part IV, the Keynesian and post-Keynesian theories of liquidity preference, 
endogenous money and the monetary circuit provide explanations consistent with observed 
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financial market behaviour, both before and after the GFC. Low interest rates are now 
conventional in the sense that the economy has adapted to them, and consequently the 
determination expressed by the monetary authorities to ‘normalise’ policy and balance-
sheet size would now be highly disruptive if enacted. That low rates have not provided the 
launch pad for an investment boom indicates that Keynes’s two-price mechanism driving 
investment is not a latent factor suppressed by uncertainty. Instead, uncertainty regarding 
the future rate of interest determines the current rate of interest, and policies such as QE 
satisfy a liquidity preference, but do not create spending. The circular flow of income and 
a desire to hold liquid stores of value are separate phenomena. Central-bank policy makers 
are trapped in the confusion generated by their inappropriate analytical framework. 
The trade-off between redemption and exchange liquidity is most apparent in repo, which 
formed the basis of the shadow banking system. The security of collateral and the 
application of a haircut to its value to protect the money lender mean that repo is almost 
entirely free from credit and market risk, leaving the exchange as a pure expression of 
liquidity preference. The framework offered by this study is suitable for a deeper 
consideration of the shadow banking system, its potential benefits and the reasons for its 
failure. 
The distinction between exchange and redemption liquidity, coupled with an emphasis on 
collateral, provides a better understanding of yield-curve dynamics. For example, shortages 
in redemption liquidity, which raise short-term funding rates, can also increase the demand 
(that is, lower the yield) for long-term assets that serve as collateral for repo-based short-
term funding (Pozsar, 2017). Thus, it is possible to understand the slope of the yield curve 
entirely in terms of current redemption liquidity provision, and not expectations of future 
short-term rates. Monetary authorities will be able use this framework to interpret market 
movements. 
Several policy implications of this framework directly concern the banking system. One 
area of consideration, discussed in Section 7.3, is the push to eliminate ‘run-prone 
securities’ from the banking system. The successful application of this initiative would be 
to limit the financial system to issuing assets subject to exchange liquidity and eliminate 
the provision of redemption liquidity. Such a policy approach is based on ontological 
confusion as to the nature of bank liabilities coupled with a misreading of the purpose and 
innovation underling the shadow banking system. In its attempt to provide redemption 
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liquidity, the phenomenon of shadow banking shows two things. First, the significance of 
the trade-off between redemption and exchange liquidity means that financial innovation 
partly consists of an unceasing effort to convert exchange liquidity into redemption 
liquidity. Any attempt to restrict redemption liquidity in one part of the system will result 
in an attempt to revive it elsewhere. Second, and more important, the shadow banking 
system demonstrated that the provision of redemption liquidity is unstable and requires the 
support of a lender or dealer of last resort. It would be unwise to push its provision into 
parts of the financial system without access to this assistance. 
11.5 Implications for Future Research 
Many empirical and theoretical avenues for future research are open. First, the importance 
of collateral has been amplified in the post-GFC environment, with the consequence that 
the supply and valuation of collateral have the potential to affect significantly the provision 
and cost of liquidity. Second, more research is needed to investigate the macroeconomic 
significance of the safe rate of interest (see Sections 8.1 and 10.7), as well as empirical 
research into the link between uncertainty and the entire complex of interest rates. Third, 
the distinction between exchange and redemption liquidity has implications for the 
interpretations of the risk-free rate and the market-risk premium in the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (CAPM). A deeper understanding of exchange liquidity could also be used to assess 
the benefits of exchange-traded funds (ETFs). Finally, the framework could be used to 
answer the question of whether the current environment of low interest rates globally is in 
accord with Keynes’s policy of cheap money and perhaps heralds the ‘euthanasia of the 
rentier’. 
The explicit linkage between redemption and exchange liquidity, uncertainty and the rate 
of interest offers macroeconomic modellers a better alternative to the incoherent theories 
founded on time preference and the marginal productivity of capital (Rogers, 1989). Post-
Keynesian stock-flow consistent (SFC) models (Godley & Lavoie, 2012) often rely on 
portfolio-rebalancing models and asset stocks (see Section 8.3), and hence suffer from asset 
fetishism (see Section 8.6). SFC models could be improved by the pricing of risk and 
liquidity outlined by the conceptual framework offered here. Linking the rate of interest (or 
the demand for redemption liquidity) to uncertainty would allow the models to reflect a 
greater level of realism in their treatment of money creation, the operation of the banking 
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system and asset returns. 
11.6 Concluding Note 
This work goes a long way towards clarifying the confusion surrounding the concept of 
liquidity. A taxonomy of liquidity is offered, and a crucial distinction between redemption 
and exchange liquidity is identified. This distinction allows for a new interpretation of 
Keynes’s theory of liquidity preference that provides insights into the current economic 
environment, an understanding of recent innovations in finance, and explanations for the 
failure of the shadow banking system. The importance of the tradition of Monetary 
Analysis, as the appropriate method of explaining and understanding liquidity, is 
established. This research also provides a basis for many different strands of future research 
in areas as diverse as: asset pricing; monetary policy and financial stability; the effect of 
collateral on the post-GFC financial system; the future of shadow banking; and the 
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